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THE

WORKS OF PLATO

A NEW AND LITERAL VERSION, CHIEFLY
FROM THE TEXT OF STALLBAUM

BY

GEORGE BURGES, M.A.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

VOL. IV

CONTAINING

PHILEBUS	HIPPIAS MINOR	THE RIVALS
CHARMIDES	ION	HIPPARCHUS
LACHES	FIRST ALCIBIADES	MINOS
MENEXENUS	SECOND ALCIBIADES	CLITOPHO
HIPPIAS MAJOR	THEAGES	THE EPISTLES

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS,

ON

THE GREATEST GOOD.

Of this rather long, frequently corrupt, and therefore difficult dialogue, the leading object may be expressed in a very few words. It is to show, that the greatest happiness is to be found, not, as Aristippus, in a lost work, seems to have asserted, in an unlimited indulgence in the pleasures of the body, nor even in those of the mind, as laid down by the school of Pythagoras, but in the temperate enjoyment of both, as being the best suited to the mixed nature of man, made up of matter and of mind.

In allusion to a similar union in a moral point of view of the Epicurean and Religious systems of living, Dr. Dodd, when in prison, wrote the following Epigram:

> "Live whilst you live," the Epicure would say,
> "And taste the pleasures of the passing day."
> "Live whilst you live," the sacred preacher cries,
> "And give to God each moment as it flies."
> Lord, in my life let both united be;
> I live to pleasure, if I live to thee.

The unfortunate English divine had, like the more fortunate lyric poet and satirist of Rome, probably learnt, that however pleasant for a time is the Epicurean doctrine, "Carpe diem," yet it was not the one which could be followed through life, even were the remark of Rochefoucault not founded on truth, that "we do not leave our vices, but they leave us."

With regard to the difficulties of the text, no better proof can be given, than the fact, that Sydenham's translation is merely a paraphrase, in many places so loose, as to preserve little trace of the original; while Stalbaum, who has published two editions of the dialogue, each with an elaborate commentary, has, in the one, expressed opinions the very reverse of what are given in the other.

The reader will therefore have no reason to wonder that I have frequently been tossed in a sea of doubt, and unable to find the haven of certainty.

PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES.

SEE[1] then, Protarchus,[2] what is the doctrine which you are about to receive from Philebus,[3] and against what reasoning of mine to contend, unless it has been stated according to your mind. Do you wish me to present each question in a summary way?

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Philebus then asserts, that the (chief) good[4] to all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight, and whatever else harmonizes with such kind of things. But what I contend for is, that it is not those things, but to be wise, and to understand, and to remember, and whatever is of a kindred nature, both correct opinion, and true reasonings, are better and more acceptable than pleasure to all who are able to partake in them;

[1] From the abrupt commencement of the dialogue one might be led to imagine that something has been lost. But it may be said of Plato, as of Homer, that he is wont to rush, according to the expression of Horace, "in medias res." Compare the similar exordium of the Banquet.

[2] Of this Protarchus nothing more is known, than that he was a son of Callias, and a pupil of Gorgias, as stated in § 25 and 136.

[3] Not only is nothing known of this Philebus, but even the name is so uncommon, that, says Stalbaum, it can scarcely be found except in Alciphron Epist. iii. 50.

[4] According to the distinction made by Aristotle in Analyt. Prior. i. 49, between ἀγαθὸν and τὸ ἀγαθὸν, one would expect here τὸ ἀγαθὸν in lieu of ἀγαθόν. But Stalb. has shown that the article is sometimes omitted by Plato; of which however I confess I have my doubts.

and that to those who are able to partake, it is of all things the most advantageous (so to partake), and not only to those (already existing), but to those who are to come. Say[5] we not, Philebus, each of us thus?

Phil. Most assuredly, Socrates.

[2.] *Soc.* Do you then, Protarchus, receive the view thus given of the questions?

Prot. I must receive it. For Philebus, the handsome,[6] shrinks from speaking.

Soc. By every means then the truth respecting those questions must be arrived at.

Prot. It must indeed.

Soc. Come then, let us in addition to these points agree in this.

Prot. In what?

Soc. That each of us[7] should endeavour to set forth some habit and disposition[8] of the soul, which is able to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. You then assert it is that of rejoicing; we, of thinking rightly.

Prot. Such is the fact.

[3.] *Soc.* But what if there should appear some other (habit) superior to both of these? Should we not, if it appeared more related to pleasure, be both of us vanquished by a life, which possesses those very things firmly; and a life of pleasure would be superior to one of intellect?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. But if (that superior state be more nearly allied[9]) to

[5] Instead of λέγομεν Ast would read ἐλέγομεν, from "diximus" in Ficin. Stalb. is content with λέγομεν.

[6] Although the word καλὸς is frequently applied as a compliment, either real or pretended, to persons who either were, or fancied themselves to be, handsome, yet here one can hardly perceive its beauty. Ficinus has "Philebus noster," which is far more intelligible.

[7] Instead of αὐτῶν Sydenham suggested ἡμῶν, answering to "nostrum" in Ficinus. And so the three oldest MSS. But in αὐτῶν something lies hid. Two MSS. omit both ἡμῶν and αὐτῶν.

[8] According to Aristotle in Categor. ◊ vi., and Metaphys. iv. 19, by ἕξις is meant a permanent habit, and by διάθεσις a transient disposition of the soul. S.

[9] Ficinus has, "Sin autem sapientiæ sit propinquior," as if from his MS. Ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει μᾶλλον ξυγγενὴς, or from his own head

intellect, a life of intellect would be superior to one of pleasure, and the last would be forced to yield. Say ye that it is so agreed, or how?

Prot. To me, at least,[10] it seems.

[4.] *Soc.* But how seems it to Philebus? What say you?

Phil. To me it seems, and will (always)[11] seem, that pleasure is altogether the superior. And you, Protarchus, will be convinced of it yourself.[12]

Prot. Having resigned, Philebus, to myself the debate, you can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to Socrates, and the contrary.

Phil You say what is true. But, however, I have discharged my duty;[13] and I here call the goddess herself to witness it.

Prot. We too would be witnesses on these very points, that you have said what you are saying.[14] But now let us endeavour, Socrates, to go through in order what is to follow after this, whether with Philebus [15] being willing, or however he may be willing.[15]

[5.] *Soc.* Let us endeavour, (beginning)[16] from the very

[10] In the Greek of this answer, Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, Stalbaum is uncertain, whether we ought to read γοῦν or γ' οὖν. But the preceding οὕτως—ἢ πῶς would naturally lead to Ἔμοιγ' οὕτως δοκεῖ.

[11] Ficin. has "semperque videbitur," adopted by Sydenham. But in the mass of paralel passages quoted by Stalb. the adverb is uniformly omitted.

[12] On the formula αὐτὸς γνώσει Stalb. refers to his note in Gorg. p. 505, C.

[13] On the meaning of ἀφοσιοῦσθαι Stalb. refers to Wyttenbach on Plutarch, p. 489, ed. Ox. = i. 386, Lips., and to Leopold on Plutarch, Numa, § 10, p. 299.

[14] In such expressions as ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις, the pronoun ταῦτα is never introduced, except in modern writers, such as Nicolaus of Damascus in Excerpt. Vales. p. 415, Εἰ—δέδρακα ταῦτα, ἃ δέδρακα: while the same verb is repeated in both clauses, as shown by Abresch and Blomfield on Æsch. Agam. 67, and myself in Cl. Jl. No. xv. p. 144; and to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more.

[15]—[15] Stalb. renders μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ by "cum Philebo sive voluerit sive noluerit." But ἑκόντος could not be thus opposed to ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ. Hence, probably to avoid the tautology, Ficinus translated "cum volente Philebo, vel quomodocunque vis." But ἑκόντος could not be thus applied to Philebus, and ἢ ἐθέλῃς to Protarchus. Plato probably wrote, ἄκοντος, ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ, i. e. "unwilling, or however willing in part."

[16] Ficinus has "ab ipsa dea exordientes." Hence Steph. proposed to insert ἀρξάμενοι, which is similarly used elsewhere, as shown by Heusde on

goddess herself, whom this person says is called Aphrodité, but whose truest name is Pleasure.

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. The dread, which I always feel as regards the names of the gods, is not after the manner of men; but is beyond even the greatest fear. And now I speak of Aphrodité by whatever name may be agreeable to her. But how various a thing is pleasure I know well; and, as I just now said, we ought to begin from it, by considering upon and seeing into its nature. For one may hear it called simply by one single name. It has assumed however all sorts of forms, and even such as are in a certain manner unlike to one another. For, observe, we say that the intemperate man has pleasure; and the temperate man has pleasure likewise [17] [in being temperate].[17] Again, we say that the thoughtless man is pleased in being full of silly opinions and hopes; and that on the other hand, the thoughtful man is pleased with his thinking wisely. Now, how could any one, who asserts that each of these pleasures are like to each other, not justly appear to be silly?

[6.] *Prot.* These pleasures, Socrates, are indeed from contrary acts; but not in themselves contrary to each other. For how could pleasure not be of all things the most similar to pleasure,[18] this thing itself to itself?[19]

Soc. Colour, too, thou happy fellow, differs not from colour, at least in this respect, that it is universally colour. And yet we all know that black, besides being different from white, happens to be also the most opposite to it. So, too, figure is taken singly the same with figure, in the general; but as to its parts, some are the most opposite to others, and some happen to possess an infinite diversity. And many other things we shall find to be thus circumstanced; so that do not you trust

Theætet. p. 171, A. Stalbaum however says that *περαίνειν τὸν λόγον* is to be supplied after *πειρατέον*, and *διαλέγεσθαι* before *ἀπὸ*—

[17]—[17] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[18] This was the doctrine of Aristippus, who said *μὴ διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς*, "that pleasure does not differ from pleasure." S. On the other hand, Aristotle says in Ethic. Nicom. x. 3, quoted by Stalb., *τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν.*

[19] I cannot understand the Greek *τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ*, nor could Salvini, who would read in Observat. Miscell. Belgic, v. 2, p. 244, *κατὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ*, similar to *κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, just afterwards; while Stalbaum prefers *τό γε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ*, answering to "quum sit eadem ipsa sibi" in Ficinus.

to the reasoning, that makes things the most opposite to be one? And I fear that we shall find some pleasures to be quite opposite to others.

[7.] *Prot.* Perhaps so. But how will that injure my argument?

Soc. [20]Because, we will say, you call things, dissimilar in themselves, by another name.[20] For you call all pleasant things good. Now that pleasant things are not pleasant, no one disputes. But though the most of them are evil, and (some)[21] good, as we assert, yet all of them you call good, although confessing them to be dissimilar, when one compels you by reasoning (to do so). By what name then do you call that, which, existing in evil pleasures equally with good, (causes)[22] all to be a good?

[8.] *Prot.* How say you, Socrates? Think you that any person, after having laid down that pleasure is the good, will agree with you? or will bear with you, while asserting that [23]some pleasures are good, but others evil?[23]

Soc. But you will at least acknowledge that pleasures are unlike to one another, and some even opposite to others?[23]

Prot. By no means, as far as they are pleasures.

Soc. We are now brought back again to the same position, Protarchus. We will say then that a pleasure does not differ

[20]—[20] The Greek is *Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ φήσομεν ὀνόματι*: where, since nobody has been able to elicit a satisfactory sense, various alterations have been suggested by De Grou, Heindorf, and Baumgarten Crusius; which, says Stalb., are unnecessary, if we take, with Heindorf on Lysid. p. 45, *ἑτέρῳ ὀνόματι* in the sense of "another, i. e. not its own, name." But as *ἕτερος* is never found in that sense, we must still have recourse to conjecture. For the train of ideas appears to lead to *Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις ταὐτὰ τὰ ὄντ' ἀνόμοι', ἃ ἑτέρῳ φήσομεν ὀνόματι*, "Because you call things really unlike by the same name, which we should call by another." Opportunely then has one MS. *ὄντ' ἀνόμοια*. Stalbaum, in ed. 2, adopts the interpretation of Heindorf, but without being able to support it by a single similar passage.

[21] Ficinus has "bona quædam," as if his MS. read *καὶ ἀγαθά τινα*, what the sense requires, in lieu of *καὶ ἀγαθὰ δὲ*—Compare § 10, *καὶ ἀνόμοιαί τινες αὐτῶν*.

[22] Stalbaum, in ed. 2, has laboured hard to support the construction. For he did not perceive that *θέμενον* had probably dropt out between *ἀγαθὸν* and *εἶναι*, as is evident from *θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθὸν* in the very next speech of Protarchus.

[23]—[23] This assertion is however made in Gorg. p. 499, C. = § 118, quoted by Stalb. after Heind.

from a pleasure, but that all are alike; and the instances, just now produced, inflict no wound upon us. But we will make an endeavour, and say, what the meanest of speakers and mere novices in argument do.

[9.] *Prot.* What do you mean?

Soc. (I mean,) that if by imitating you, and defending myself, I should dare to assert that the thing the most unlike is of all things the most like to the most unlike, I should say the same as you do; and both of us would appear to be more of novices than is fitting; and the subject of dispute would thus slip away and fall to the ground. Let us therefore back water;[24] and perhaps by returning to similitudes,[25] we may come to an agreement with each other.

Prot. Say how.

[10.] *Soc.* Suppose me to be questioned by yourself, Protarchus.

Prot. Concerning what?

Pol. Will not intelligence, and science, and mind, and all that I laid down at the commencement, and spoke of as being good, when I was asked what sort of thing was a good, be under the very same circumstances as is your argument?

Prot. How so?

Soc. The sciences, taken together, will seem to be both many, and some of them dissimilar to each other. Now if some are opposite also, should I be worthy of holding a conversation with you, if, fearful of admitting this very point, I should assert that no science was unlike (another) science? For then the very question [26] would be, as if it were a mere

[24] This is the English phrase in rowing, answering exactly to *ἀνακρούεσθαι* in Greek; although not applied metaphorically, as the Greek verb *κρούω* and its compounds are to an argument or discourse; as I have shown in Poppo's Prolegomen. p. 180, and to the passages there quoted I could now add as many more. On the word *ἀνακρούεσθαι*, in Latin "remis inhibere," Stalbaum refers to J. F. Gronovius, Observat. iv. 26, Valckenaer on Herodot. viii. 84, and Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. t. i. p. 418.

[25] In lieu of *τὰς ὁμοίας*, Sydenham suggests *ὁμοιότητας*, or *τὰ ὅμοια*. For he says that *ὁμοίας* could agree only with *ἡδονὰς*, about which not a word is said in what follows. Stalbaum understands *λαβὰς*, supplied in Phædr. p. 236, C., *εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας*, similar to "easdem in ansas," in Ficinus.

[26]—[26] A similar expression is found in Theætet. p. 164, D.=§ 56. It was applied to such discourses as were brought to no end at all, or to an unsatisfactory one.

tale,[26] destroyed, and vanish, and we be saved[27] upon some absurdity.[28]

[29] *Prot.* But this ought not to happen, except so far as the being saved And now with the equality in your assertion and mine I am well pleased. Let then pleasures be many and dissimilar; and let the sciences likewise be many and different.[29]

[11.] *Soc.* The difference then between your good, Protarchus, and mine, let us not conceal; but, placing them between us, let us venture (to discuss),[30] [31] if (reasons) on being examined will indicate (any thing),[31] whether we ought to pronounce pleasure or intellect the chief good, or whether there is any other third thing. For we surely do not now desire to enter into a contest, in order that what I lay down, or what you do, may gain the victory; but we ought both of us to unite in fighting for what is the most true.

Prot. We ought to do so.

[12.] *Soc.* Let us then fix still more firmly this point by means of a mutual agreement.

Prot. What point?

Soc. That, which gives trouble to all persons who are willing, and sometimes to some who are unwilling.

Prot. Speak more clearly.

Soc. I am speaking of that, which has just now fallen by

[27] In Legg. i. p. 645, B., the tale is said to be saved, and not the speakers: but in Rep. x. p. 621, B., it is said not only to be saved itself, but to save the speakers likewise.

[28] Instead of *ἐπὶ—ἀλογίας*, one would prefer *ἐπὶ—οὐ λόγου σχεδίας*, "upon some raft of not-reason," similar to *ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας*, Phædo, p. 85, D., where there is an allusion to the raft on which Ulysses was carried in safety to land, after his vessel had been broken up by a storm. Perhaps however *ἀλογίας* means "a quibble."

[29]—[29] All within the numerals Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 127, assigns to Protarchus. And so six MSS., whom Stalb. follows in ed. 2.

[30] As there is wanting a verb after *τολμῶμεν*, Ficinus seems to have introduced "discutere" out of his own head to fill up the sense.

[31]—[31] The Greek is *ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι, πότερον*—where to supply the substantive required by *ἐλεγχόμενοι*, Winckelmann, in Præf. to this Dialogue, proposes to read *ἐλεγχόμενοι οἱ λόγοι*.—For *ὁ λόγος* is perpetually thus united to *μηνύει*, as may be seen in Ast's Lexicon. He ought however to have elicited *τι* from *πότερον*. Stalbaum suggested *ἐλεγχόμεναι*, referring it to *διαφορήτητες* understood; of which Schleiermacher and Matthiæ approved. But the substantive could hardly be omitted.

our side, of a nature somehow full of wonders. For that many are one, and one many, is a thing wonderful to be asserted; and it is easy to controvert a person laying down either of these points.

[13.] *Prot.* Do you mean, [32] that when any one says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am again many, laying down that the one, and persons opposite to each other, great and little, and heavy and light, are the same, and a thousand other things? [32]

Soc. The wonders, Protarchus, which you have now spoken of, relating to the one and many, have become vulgarized; but by the common agreement, so to say, of all men, it is laid down that it is needless to touch upon such things; since they consider them to be childish and easy (to be seen through),[33] and great impediments to rational discourses; since not even such things [34] (any one ought to say),[34] when, after having in a

[32]—[32] Such is the literal and unintelligible version of the Greek text; out of which Heusde could not make sense, nor can I. Stalbaum however asserts that the words Ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον, ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τους ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος, (so the three oldest MSS. in lieu of τιθεμένους,) καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, mean—"When any one says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am many, laying down likewise that those many, *into whom I am as it were cut up piece-meal*, are the opposite to themselves, great and little, heavy and light, and what other things are of this kind." But even if there existed in the original, which is not the case, words answering to the English in Italics, still it would be impossible to believe that τοὺς could thus precede ἐμὲ, or the singular μέγαν, σμικρὸν, βαρὺν, and κοῦφον thus follow ἐναντίους. Moreover, in this interpretation, no notice whatever is taken of πάλιν, in which not a little of the difficulty lies. Ficinus has "cum quispiam me, verbi causa, Protarchum, unum naturâ genitum, asserit, deinde me rursus multos atque contrarios prædicat, magnum, parvum, gravem, levem eundem hominem, aliaque permulta;" by the aid of which Heusde proposed to read Ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ—πολλοὺς εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν τούτους ἐμὲ, καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν—I should, however, prefer ἐμὲ—εἶναι πολλοὺς καὶ πολλοὺς πάλιν ἐμὲ, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις—τὸν αὐτὸν.—For thus καὶ πολλοὺς might easily have dropt out between πολλοὺς and πάλιν, and τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις be properly opposed to τὸν αὐτόν.

[33] Ficinus has "facilia cognitu," which would lead to ῥᾴδια εἰδέναι. At all events ῥᾴδια could hardly stand here by itself.

[34]—[34] The Greek is simply ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, where, says Stalbaum, we must suppiy δεῖ λέγειν: to which he was perhaps led by finding in Sydenham, "It is now also agreed never to introduce into conversation." But Plato is not wont to omit words requisite for the sense and syntax. I suspect he wrote ἐπεὶ εἰπεῖν τινὰ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε δεῖ. For thus εἰπεῖν τινὰ might have been lost through ἐπεὶ, and δεῖ through δὲ.

discourse divided the members and parts of each thing, he shall confute the party, who has confessed[35] that all these are that[36] one, and ridicule him, because he has been compelled to make such monstrous assertions, as that a single one is many and infinite, and many only one.

[14.] *Prot.* Of what other things are you speaking, Socrates, which have not, as being universally agreed upon, become vulgarized, relating to the very same same subject?

Soc. When, young man, a person lays down that the one does not belong to things generated and destroyed,[37] as we have lately said.[38] For in that case, as we just now stated, it has been agreed that we need not confute a oneness of such a kind. But when a person attempts to lay down a oneness, as in the case of one man, and one ox, one beauty, one goodness, respecting these and such-like onenesses, [39]much of attention, together with a division, becomes a controversy.[39]

Prot. How?

[15.] *Soc.* In the first place, whether a person ought to consider such onenesses as truly existing. In the next place, how it is that these, every one of them being always the same, and never receiving generation or destruction, are, notwithstanding, with the greatest stability[40] this one. And after this,

[35] In lieu of *διομολογησάμενος*, read in all the MSS., and acknowledged by "quis—fatetur" in Ficinus, Schleiermacher adopted what the sense evidently requires, *διομολογησάμενον*, furnished by the two Basil edd. Baumgarten Crusius says, however, that *διομολογεῖσθαι* means, not "to agree," but to "cause to agree:" whom Stalbaum follows in ed. 2, and thus deserts the other scholar, whom he had followed in the 1st.

[36] I cannot understand *ἐκεῖνο* after *τὸ ἕν*. One MS. has *ἐκείνῳ*. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὸ Ἐλεατικὸν ἕν*, in allusion to Zeno; as in Phædr. § 97, *Τὸν Ἐλεατικὸν—λέγοντα—τὰ αὐτὰ, ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά.*

[37] By things generated and destroyed, says Stalbaum, are meant those that are cognizable by the senses; for those, that are cognizable by intellect alone, exist the same for ever, as stated in the Timæus, p. 28, A.

[38] This is supposed to refer to a previous conversation.

[39]—[39] Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται*, out of which the reader is left to make what sense he can. Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 134, wished to insert *καὶ* between *σπουδὴ* and *μετὰ*—But neither he nor Stalbaum, who is content with the common text, saw that correct Greek would require *πολλὴ ἡ σπουδή*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἐν πολλῇ σπουδῇ μεγάλη διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται*, i. e. 'in the midst of much attention a great controversy arises respecting a division." For ΜΕΓΑΛΗ ΔΙ could easily have been corrupted into ΜΕΓΑ ΔΙ.

[40] Grou, in the notes to his French version, p. 239, was the first to sug-

we must lay down whether (oneness) is dispersed amongst things generated again[41] and infinite, as having become many, or is a whole itself, from itself apart;[42] which would appear the most impossible of all, for the same and one to exist in one and in many at the same time. These are the questions relating to such things as [43]the one and many,[43] and not those, Protarchus, (mentioned by you,)[44] are, through their being not well agreed upon, the cause of all difficulty in our path; but, by being properly (agreed upon), they would on the other hand be (the cause) of our easy progress.

Prot. It is necessary, then, for us to labour at this point the first.

Soc. So at least I should say.

Prot. Understand then that all of us[45] agree with you on these points; and it is best, perhaps, not to stir up just now by interrogations Philebus, who is well put to rest.[46]

[16.] *Soc.* Be it so; but from whence shall one begin, the battle-field for controversy being so wide and various? Shall it be from hence?

Prot. From whence?

Soc. We surely assert, that one and many, being made by reasonings the same, run round[47] every where according to

gest *βεβαιότατα* in lieu of *βεβαιότητα*; which he probably got from "suâque in unitate firmissimam" in Ficinus. But though *βεβαιότατα* is read in nearly all the MSS., yet the language of Ficinus would lead to something else; for it is hard to understand the meaning of *ταύτας—εἶναι μίαν ταύτην*. One would have expected *μίαν αὐτην*.

[41] Ficinus omits *αὖ*. Perhaps it is meant to follow *μετὰ ταῦτα*.

[42] Baumgarten Crusius quotes opportunely from Parmenid. p. 131, B. Εν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἔνεσται· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

[43]—[43] The words within the numerals Schleiermacher once considered to be interpolation, but afterwards to be genuine. Stalbaum, who on his authority had once expunged them, has subsequently restored them.

[44] Sydenham has introduced, for the sake of perspicuity, the words—"mentioned by you." Perhaps he wished to read *τὰ σά, πάσης*, in lieu of *ἀπάσης*.

[45] From the ords "all of us," it is evident that there were present during the dialogue more than Philebus and Protarchus.

[46] The earliest allusion to the proverb *Μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον* is in Soph. Œd. C. 510.

[47] This is a strange expression applied to a mere metaphysical abstraction; although it is repeated in Theætet. p. 207, A., quoted by Baumgarten Crusius.

each of the things made the subject of reasoning always[48] and formerly and now; and this shall never have an end, nor has it ever had a beginning at the present time. But there is, as it appears to me, some such feeling in us, relating to reasonings themselves,[49] of an immortal and ageless kind. For when a youth has first tasted it, he is delighted, as having found a treasure of wisdom, and being transported with delight, he tosses about every reasoning; and at one time he rolls it (from this side)[50] to that, and mixes (all of it)[51] into one; at another unrolling it back again, and separating it into parts, he throws himself first and foremost into a difficulty, and next the person ever nearest[52] at hand, whether he happens to be younger, or older, or equal in age, sparing neither father nor mother, nor any one else, who will listen, and scarcely the rest of animals, not men alone; since he would spare not even one of the barbarians, could he but find some where an interpreter.

[17.] *Prot.* Do you not, Socrates, see the great number of us, and that we are all young? And are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we shall, with Philebus, fall upon you all together?[53] However, for we understand what you mean, if there is any

[48] Stalbaum says that λεγομένων ἀεὶ is the same as λεγομένων ἑκάστοτε, an assertion more easily made than proved. He once proposed to read λεγομένων εἶναι. But he subsequently rejected what seems to me the preferable reading. Ficinus has "semper per singula, quæ dicuntur, et nunc et olim undique circumcurrere," as if ἀεὶ had been written, in his MS., between πάντη and καθ' ἕκαστον.

[49] I cannot understand αὐτῶν, which is omitted by Ficinus.

[50] Stalbaum explains ἐπὶ θάτερα by "in alteram partem." But the idea of "another side" would be unintelligible, without a reference to its opposite one. Of this Baumgarten Crusius was aware; and hence he supposed that τότε δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα should be inserted, as in Sophist. p. 236, B., χαίρει, τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, τότε δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἑλκύων.

[51] The sense evidently requires the insertion of πάντα, as opposed to ἕν. Instead then of τότε δὲ πάλιν, which could not balance τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, Plato wrote, I suspect, πάντα, καὶ πάλιν—

[52] Instead of ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, the sense nifestly demands τὸν ἀεὶ ἐχόμενον—and so we must read in Rep. vii. p. 539, B., τοὺς ἀεὶ πλησίον instead of τοὺς πλησίον ἀεὶ—where there is a similar description of young persons playing with reasonings.

[53] There is a similar playful threat in Phædr. p. 236, C. § 27; and in Horace, "Cui si concedere nolis Multa—veniat manus, auxilio quæ Sit mihi; nam multo plures sumus," as remarked by Baumg. Crus. Stalb. too refers to Rep. i. p. 327, C.

method or contrivance for this confusion to depart[54] from us, somehow with a good will, out of the way of our reasoning, and for discovering a road to reasoning better than this, do direct your thoughts to it, and we will to the best of our power follow. For the present debate, Socrates, is not a little matter.

Soc. Indeed it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you. There is and can be no better way (than that) of which I am ever a lover; but often before now has it fled away, and left me deserted and at a loss.

Prot. What is it? Let it only be mentioned.

[18.] *Soc.* That, which to point out is not very difficult, but to make use of is very difficult. For all the things that, connected with art, have been ever discovered, have become manifest through it. Consider then the way which I am speaking of.

Prot. Only tell it.

Soc. A gift, as it appears to me, from gods to men, was, through a certain Prometheus, cast down from some quarter by the gods[55] along with a certain[56] fire the most luminous; and the men of old, being better than us, and dwelling nearer to the gods,[57]

[54] Ficinus has "ad hanc perturbationem—rejiciendam," as if he had found in his MS. *ἀπωθεῖν* instead of *ἀπελθεῖν*.

[55] The Greek is *ποθεν ἐκ θεῶν*. But by no process could the indefinite *ποθεν* commence a clause after a parenthetical sentence; nor, if it could, would Plato have written *θεῶν—δόσις—ἐκ θεῶν*. There is some error here, which I will leave for others to correct by the aid of the Scholia of Olympiodorus, and my note on Hipp. Maj. § 46, p. 117.

[56] Although *τινι* is supported by Numenius in Euseb. Præp. Evang. xi. p. 539, A., *ὁ Πλάτων τὴν σοφίαν ὑπὸ Προμηθέως ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἀνθρώπους μετὰ φανοτάτου τινὸς πυρὸς ἔφη*, yet it is properly omitted by Julian Or. vi. p. 183, C., and Damascius, quoted by Suidas in *Δῶρος*: and since Clemens Alex. in Protrept. p. 2, C., has *κατάγωμεν δὲ ἄνωθεν ἐξ οὐρανῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν ἅμα φανοτάτῃ φρονήσει*, it is easy to see that in *ἐμοὶ* lies hid *ἡ ἔννοια*; for otherwise the nature of the gift would be unknown; while *ἡ ἔννοια* is plainly confirmed by Prom. 441, *Ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους*.

[57] Baumgarten Crusius considers the words, *ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες* to be taken from some poet; for they are similar to *οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι* (*καὶ*) *Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς* in Rep. iii. p. 391, E. He quotes too opportunely Seneca Epist. xc. 44, (Aureæ ætatis homines) alti spiritus fuerunt, et, ut ita dicam, a diis recentes:" to which Stalbaum adds Cicero de Legg. ii. 27, "Quoniam antiquitas proxime accedit ad deos, a diis quasi traditam religionem tueri."

have handed down this story,[58] that, since the beings,[59] said to be for ever, are produced from one and many, and have in themselves bound and the boundless born with them, we must therefore,[60] since things have been so arranged, ever lay down the existence of some one idea respecting every thing, and on every occasion seek for it; for being there, we shall find it; and if we lay hold of [61] it, we must after one look for two, if two there are; but if not, three, or some other number; and again, in like manner [62] each of those that are one;[62] until at length a person perceives that the one at the beginning is not only one, and many, and infinite, but also how many it is: but that a man should never bring the idea of infinity to multitude, before he shall have fully seen all its [63] number, which lies between the infinite and the one; and then having dismissed each one of the all into infinity, we must [64] bid them

[58] Stalbaum here, and on Politic. p. 293, C., defends *ταύτην φήμην* without the article *τὴν*, with which Dawes in Miscell. Crit. p. 468, was the first to show that *οὗτος* could not dispense. In the present case, since many MSS. offer *φήμῃ*, Plato probably wrote *ταῦτ' ἐν φήμῃ*—

[59] The Greek is *ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι*. But *ὄντων* could not dispense with the article; moreover *τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων* would mean, "of things that happen to be ever said." Plato wrote, what the sense and syntax equally demand, *τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι*.

[60] Stalbaum defends *δεῖν οὖν* after *ὡς*—*ἐχόντων*—Ficinus has "quum—habeant, oportet nos," which leads to *δεῖ*, found in one MS.; but instead of omitting *οὖν* with Stephens, we must read *ἐννοίᾳ*—to answer to *ἡ ἔννοια*, restored just before.

[61] All the MSS. read *μεταλάβωμεν*. But from "comprehendamus" in Ficinus Stephens elicited *καταλάβωμεν*, adopted by Bekker, and by Stalbaum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

[62]—[62] The Greek of this evidently corrupt passage is—*τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*—where Schütz would read *τὸ ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Schleiermacher, *τῶν ἑνόντων ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Ast, *τῶν ἓν ἐκείνῳ ἕκαστον*: of which Stalbaum approves in ed. 2, although in ed. 1 he had suggested *τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον*. Lastly, Klitzsche in Observ. Crit. in Phileb. 1841, Zwiccau, has, it seems, suggested *ἑνῶν*, "ones," in lieu of *ἓν ἐκείνων*, with the approbation, he says, of Godfred Hermann. Ficinus has "et quodlibet eorum, quæ sunt unum," which leads, as Stalbaum saw, to *καὶ τῶν ἓν ὄντων ἕκαστον*. Correctly indeed as regards *ἐκείνων*, which has no meaning here. But Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐνὶ κειμένων ἕκαστον*, i. e. and each of the parts that lie in one (whole).

[63] I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

[64] Instead of *τότε δ' ἤδη*, the three oldest MSS. read *τότε δὲ δεῖ*, adopted by the Zurich editors. But the continuity of the construction requires *δεῖν*, as Stalbaum has correctly remarked; but he incorrectly prefers *τότε δ' ἤδη*, not aware that *τότε ἤδη* could not be joined together, as I have shown on Parmen. § 51, where in Agam. 940, the words *τότ' ἂν οἶδ' ψῦχος* are printed instead of *τότ', οἶδ', ἂν ψῦχος*—

farewell. [19.] The gods then, as I said, have granted us to consider things in this way, and to learn them, and teach them to each other. But the wise men of the present time introduce, as it may happen, one, and many, more quickly and slowly than is fitting, and immediately after the one, infinity, but (all) the intermediate escape them; by which are kept apart the methods of our carrying on with each other disputations in a logical[65] and contentious manner.

Prot. A part, Socrates, I seem somehow to understand; but of the other part I beg I may hear more clearly what you mean.

Soc. What I mean, Protarchus, will be[66] evident in the case of letters; and in these, through which you have been taught, accept my meaning.

Prot. How?

Soc. The voice, that issues through the mouth, is surely one, and on the other hand infinite, not only in that of all, but of each.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now we are skilled (in voice) by neither of these considerations, whether we know that it is infinite or one; but (to know) how many and of what kind are (its parts), this it is which produces in each of us the grammar-art.

Prot. Most true.

[21.] *Soc.* And further, that which produces the music-art, is the very same thing.

Prot. How so?

Soc. (Musical) sound,[67] [68] and the thing according to that art is one in it.[68]

[65] The Greek is *διακεχώρισται—πάλιν*. But as *πάλιν* has no well-defined meaning here, Heusde proposed to read *ἔμπαλιν*, which appears equally unintelligible. Ficinus omits the word entirely, and so does one MS. Plato probably wrote *πολὺ*—Respecting the two methods of disputation, Stalb. refers to Sophist, p. 216, B. 231, E. and 253, C.

[66] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἔσται*, instead of *ἐστιν*.

[67] In Greek *φωνὴ* means a sound proceeding either from the voice or a musical instrument. Hence Plato supposes it to be a common genus, divisible into two species; and so it is laid down by Nicomachus, in Harmonic. Enchirid. p. 3, ed. Amst.—*Τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ διδασκαλείου δύο ἔφασκον, ὡς ἑνὸς γένους, εἴδη ὑπάρχειν· καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεχὲς ἰδίως ὠνόμαζον· τὸ δὲ διαστηματικόν.* i. e. "The writers of the Pythagorean school say, that of the human voice there are two species, as of one genus. One they call peculiarly continuous, the other separated by intervals." The continuous is used in speaking; and therefore called by Aristoxenus and by Euclid *φωνὴ λογική*: but the other is used in singing, and hence termed *φωνὴ μελῳδική*. S.

[68]—[68] Such is the literal version of the received Greek text—*καὶ τὸ*

Prot. How not?

Soc. And let us suppose two kinds, the grave and the acute, and a third, the homotonous;[69] or how?

Prot. In this way.

Soc. But by knowing these facts alone you would not be skilled in music; although by not knowing you would be, on these points, worth, so to say, nothing.

Prot. Yes, nothing.

Soc. But, my friend, when you shall have (correctly)[70] comprehended the intervals of sounds, with respect to their being acute and grave, how many they are in number, and of what kinds, and the limits[71] of the intervals, and how many combinations are produced from them, which our predecessors have remarked and handed down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies,[72] and such other circumstances[73] as are in, (and) produced by, the motions of the body, (and in words,[74]) which being measured by numbers, they say

κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ; where, although *καὶ τὸ* are omitted by the three oldest MSS., it is difficult to say how those words could come here, and no less so to explain *ἐν αὐτῇ*. Ficinus alone has what is perfectly intelligible—"Una quodammodo et in hac arte vox est," thus omitting *καὶ τὸ* and *ἐν αὐτῇ*, in which all the difficulty lies.

[69] Instead of *ὁμότονον* Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *μεσότονον*, answering to his version—"tonus medius." One would prefer, however, *ἡμίτονον*. For the idea of a homotonic sound can have no part here, if it be, as Sydenham asserts, that, which is produced from the string of one instrument having the same degree of tension with the similar string of another, or when two different voices give at the same time musical sounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other.

[70] The word *καλῶς* has been luckily preserved in two MSS. Compare Pseudo-Plato in Hipparch. p. 227, C., *εἴ τις ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ*.

[71] Plato in Rep. iv. p. 443, D., speaking of *ὑπάτη*, "the lowest note," *νήτη*, "the highest," and *μέση*, "the middle," describes them as *τρεῖς ὅρους ἁρμονίας*, "the three limits of harmony." S.

[72] When Plato and Aristotle speak of harmony, in the singular number, they mean what is now called music. But when they speak of harmonies, in the plural, they mean those different modes of harmony, the principal of which were called Doric, Phrygian, and Lydian. S.

[73] There is no word in English corresponding to the comprehensive idea expressed by the Greek *πάθος*, by which, as Sydenham observes, was meant any condition, situation, accident, or circumstance, in or under which any thing was said to be placed, or, as Taylor says, any participated property of any being. I have generally rendered it "circumstances," unless where the idea of a positive suffering was to be conveyed.

[74] As there is nothing to answer to *ἐν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν*, Sydenham would insert *ἔν τε ῥήμασιν*. But one would expect rather *ἔν τε ταῖς τοῦ στόματος*— For thus *σῶμα* and *στόμα* would be properly opposed to each

again[75] we ought to call them rhythms and metres, and at the same time to consider that we ought to thus look into every thing that is one and many—when (I say[76]) you shall have comprehended all these things, in this manner, then will you have become skilled; and when by considering in this way any other kind whatsoever of being, you shall have comprehended it, you will have thus become intelligent respecting it. But the infinite multitude of, and in, individuals causes you to be infinitely far off[77] from thinking correctly, and to be [78] of no account or number,[78] as you never look to any number in any thing whatever.

[22.] *Prot.* Most beautifully, Philebus, does Socrates appear to me to have spoken in what he has now said.

Phil. And to me likewise the very same thing[79] (appears). But how has this speech been spoken as regards us, and what does it mean?

Soc. Correctly indeed,[80] Protarchus, has Philebus proposed this question.

Prot. Very much so; and do you give an answer.

Soc. This I will do, after I have gone through yet a little (more) respecting these very points. For, as we said, that should

other; while a portion of the missing words is still to be seen in *ἐόντα*, which is quite superfluous, not to say unintelligible, thus coming before *γιγνόμενα*. Stalbaum, too, seems to have felt some difficulty; for he says, one would have expected here *τῆς φωνῆς* in lieu of *τοῦ σώματος*.

[75] I cannot understand *αὖ*, which Bekker and Stalbaum have edited in lieu of *αὐτὰ*, from the three oldest MSS. Ficinus acknowledges neither *αὐτὰ* nor *αὖ*.

[76] Since some MSS. read *ὅταν τε*, and others *ὅταν γὰρ*, Plato probably wrote *ὅταν*, *λέγω*—for he would thus resume by the verb *λέγω* the thread of the speech, which had been interrupted by a prolix parenthesis.

[77] From this version it would seem that Sydenham wished to read *ἄπειρον ἑκαστάτω* in lieu of *ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε*. With regard to the play on *ἄπειρος*, Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Timæus, p. 55, C., *τὸ ἀπείρους κόσμους εἶναι λέγειν ὄντως ἀπείρου τινος δόγμα*.

[78]—[78] In this passage, says Baumg. Crus., there is an allusion to the oracle pronounced in ridicule of the people of Megara, who were said to be *οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ*. See Schol. on Theocrit. Id. xiv. 48.

[79] I have adopted the reading *ταὐτά γε ταῦτα* suggested by Stalbaum in ed. 1, although rejected in ed. 2.

[80] The Greek is *ὀρθῶς μέντοι*: where, says Stalbaum, *μέντοι* indicates the assent to an assertion. But *μέντοι* could not thus follow *ὀρθῶς*, unless *ὀρθῶς* were found in the speech preceding, as is evident from the passages quoted by Stalbaum here, and myself on Hipp. Maj. § 12, n. 2, to which I could now add a dozen more. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὀρθῶς, μὰ τὸν*— with the usual omission of *θεόν*

a person lay hold of any one thing whatever, he ought not to look at once upon the nature of the infinite, but upon some number; so, on the other hand, when a man is compelled to lay hold of the infinite,[81] he ought not (to look) at once upon the one, but to a certain number, possessing some multitude of individual things, (and) to think upon it; and to end from all in one. Let us then again lay hold of what I have now said, in the case of letters.

[23.] *Prot.* How?

Soc. From the time when some god, or godlike man, as the story in Egypt goes, by saying it was some Theuth,[82] first thought upon sound as being without limit,[83] the person has been mentioned in history, who[83] perceived that in the limitless[84] there were vocal (letters), not one but more; and again, other (letters) not having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound;[85] and that of these also there was a certain number. A third kind of letters he set apart; those which are now called mutes by us.[86] After this he separated both the

[81] The Greek is *μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὔ τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν*—on which Stalbaum has written, in his two editions, two rather long notes; both of which, I think, he would have omitted, had he seen, what was partially done by Baumgarten Crusius, that *βλέπειν* is to be inserted from the preceding sentence after *μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθὺς*, and that Plato probably wrote *ἀριθμὸν πλῆθος ἑκάστων ἔχοντά τι καὶ κατανοεῖν*: and Julian, in Epistol. p. 384, A. = 82, A., *κατανοήσας δέ πως τὸ διάφορον τοῦ τρόπου καὶ βλέπων*— not *πρός*; for *πως* and *πρὸς* are constantly confounded in MSS.

[82] On this Theuth, the supposed inventor of language, see Phædr p. 274, § 134.

[83]—[83] To avoid the anakolouthon, I have translated as if Plato had written *ἱστόρηται*, *ὃς*—not *ὃς πρῶτος*—which Stobæus, however, acknowledges.

[84] I confess I do not understand *ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ*, unless it be said that there is no limit to the varieties of sound.

[85] A similar distinction is found in Cratyl. p. 424, C., *τὰ φωνήεντα μὲν οὖ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα*: which Sydenham might have quoted to defend his proposed reading, *φωνήεντα μὲν οὖ*—obtained from *φωνῆς μὲν ὄντα οὐ* in the margin of Gesner's ed. of Stobæus, Ecl. Eth. lxxix. p. 469. Sydenham, however, subsequently saw that as *φωνὴ* means the clear sound of a vowel, and *φθόγγος* the not-clear sound of a semi-vowel, or, as he should have said, of a consonant, no matter whether a mute or liquid, there was no need of any alteration.

[86] Respecting the division of the Greek letters into vowels, semi-vowels, and mutes, Stalbaum refers to Dionys. H. *Περὶ Συνθεσ. Ὀνομ.* § 14, p. 166—176, ed. Schæf., and to Sext. Empir. Adv. Mathem. § 5.

letters which are without any vocal sound, [87] clear or not clear,[87] [88] as far as each one,[88] and the vowels also and those in the middle[89] in the same manner, until having comprehended their number, he gave to each one, and to all together, the name of an element. But perceiving that none of us could understand any of them by itself alone, without (learning) them all, he considered this bond between them as being one, and as making all these in a manner but one thing; and to them he applied the name of the grammar-art, calling it so as being one.

Phil. [90] These, taken by themselves and in relation to each other,[90] Protarchus, I understand more clearly than what was said before. But there is still at present wanting, as before, the very same trifling part of the discourse.

Soc. Is it not this, Philebus? what have these matters to do with the subject?

Phil. Yes. This is the very thing which I and Protarchus are for a long while in search of.

Soc. You are then for a long while, as you say, in search, when you have just now arrived at it.

Phil. How so?

[24.] *Soc.* Was not the question originally between us relating to intellect or pleasure, which was the more eligible?

Phil. How not?

Soc. We admit, however, that each of them is one thing?

Phil. By all means.

Soc. This then does the previous subject demand of us; how is each of them one and many? and how is it that they are not at once infinite; but that each possesses somehow a certain number before it becomes infinite?

[87]—[87] This is perhaps the best way of rendering *ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα* Sydenham has "perfect or imperfect." Ficinus, "liquidas mutasque."

[88]—[88] I confess I cannot understand *μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου*: nor could Sydenham, who has omitted them. Ficinus has literally, "usque ad quodlibet unum."

[89] By *μέσα*, says Stalb., are meant those mentioned above, as "not having a part of the voice, but of some kind of sound."

[90]—[90] I have adopted the correction of Schleiermacher, *αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα*, in lieu of *αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα*, found in the majority of MSS. Ficinus has "videlicet ipsa invicem comparata."

Prot. Into no trivial a question, Philebus, has Socrates thrown us, after having led us, I know not how, a round-about road. And now consider, which of us two shall reply to the question proposed. Perhaps, however, it would be ridiculous in me, who have [91]stood as a reinforcement to your argument, to order[91] you again to this business, through my being unable to reply to the present question; but I think it would be much more ridiculous for neither of us to be able. Consider, then, what we are to do. For Socrates seems to interrogate us respecting the (different) kinds of pleasure, whether they do or do not exist; and how many and of what kind they are; and in like manner and touching the same points as regards intellect.

[25.] *Soc.* You speak, son of Callias, most truly. For since we are unable to do this, as regards every thing, as being one, similar, and same, and the contrary, as the past reasoning has pointed out, not one of us would in any matter ever be worth any thing at all.

Prot. Such, Socrates, very nearly seems to be the case. But though it is a fine thing for a prudent person to know all things, yet it seems to be a second step[92] for a person not to be ignorant of himself. Why then have I now said this? I will tell you. This conversation, Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of deciding what is the greatest good to man. For, after Philebus had said, that it is pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you said in opposition to this, that it was not these things, but those which we often willingly call to our recollection; and we are right in so doing, in order that each question, being laid up in our memory, may be put to the test. [26.] You assert then, it seems, that, what is to be spoken[93] of correctly, there is a good, superior to pleasure,

[91]—[91] In the words *ὑποστάντα διάδοχον* and *προστάττειν*, there are military metaphors, which I have adopted in the translation.

[92] The Greek is *πλοῦς*, "a sailing." Respecting the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, found in Phædon. p. 99, B.; and Politic. p. 300, B.; Baumgarten Crusius refers to Gataker on M. Anton. ix. 2, and Bergler on Alciphron i. p. 352, ed. Wagn., who have said all that is necessary.

[93] I cannot understand the words *τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς*; nor could Schütz, who wished to expunge them. I could have understood *τὸ προσευρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς*, i. e. "what is to be discovered truly." Stalbaum, in ed 1, attributed to Ficinus "quod adjiciendum puto recte," and

in mind, science, intelligence, art, and all things allied to them, which one ought to possess, and not the others. Now these positions being laid down severally on each side, as the subjects of dispute, [94] we in a jocose way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home, before, of the questions so defined, a sufficient limit had been reached.[94] To this you assented, and to these points you gave yourself up to us. We assert then, as children say, that of what has been given fairly, there is no taking away. Forbear then to meet us on what has been now said in this manner.

Soc. In what manner?

[27.] *Prot.* By throwing us into a difficulty, and propounding questions, to which we should not be able on the instant to give a sufficient answer. For let us not fancy that the present difficulty of us all is a finish (to the inquiry); but if we are unable to do this,[95] you must do it, for so you promised. Wherefore advise yourself, whether you must distinguish the kinds of pleasure, as of knowledge; or leave them alone, if perchance you are able and willing by some other method to render plain somehow else[96] the question now in dispute between us.

Soc. Nothing dreadful then need I fear any longer for myself, since you have said this. For the expression, "if you are willing," relieves me from all fear respecting each thing. But, in addition to this, there seems some god, I think, to have given me a recollection of some things.[97]

Prot. How, and of what things?

[28.] *Soc.* Having formerly heard, either in a dream or broad awake, certain sayings respecting pleasure and intel-

finds fault with the version, as not corresponding to the Greek. Had he looked into Bekker's reprint, he would have found "quod recte appellandum erit," similar to "quod recte dicendum sit," in the note of Baumgarten Crusius, which he praises, and has adopted.

[94]—[94] As nothing of this kind had been mentioned in the preceding part of the dialogue, Stalbaum says it alludes to something which is feigned to have occurred previously.

[95] Viz. "to extricate ourselves from the difficulty," as remarked by Stalbaum, who found those words in Sydenham's translation.

[96] The words πως ἄλλως, clearly superfluous after καθ' ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον, are properly omitted by Ficinus. Moreover correct Greek requires ἄλλως πως— Plato wrote, I suspect, παισὶν ἄλλως, i. e. "to children merely."

[97] Instead of μνήμην τινα, the question of Protarchus evidently leads to μνήμην τινων.

lect, I have them now again present to my mind, that neither of them is of itself the good, but some other third thing, different from them, and better than both. Now if this should appear to us clearly, pleasure is then removed from victory. For the good would no longer be the same with it; or how (say you)?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. We shall have no need then, in my opinion, to distinguish the kinds of pleasure. And the thing itself,[98] as it progresses, will show itself more clearly.

Prot. Having begun so happily, proceed (with the same success).[99]

Soc. Let us previously agree still upon a few little points.

Prot. What are those?

[29.] *Soc.* Is it necessary for the condition[100] of the good to be perfect or not perfect?

Prot. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Soc. What then? Is the good self-sufficient?

Prot. How not? and in this respect it excels all other things existing.

Soc. And this too, I think, it is of all things the most necessary to state about it, that every being that knows of it hunts after it, and desires to catch it, and to have it about itself, and cares for nothing else except such as are brought to perfection in conjunction with good things.

Prot. There is no gainsaying this.

Soc. Let us then consider and judge of the life of pleasure, and that of intellect, viewing them separately.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. In the life of pleasure, let there be no intellect; nor

[98] All the MSS. read *προῖον δ' ἔτι—δείξει*: where it is strange that Stalbaum should not have suggested *προῖον δ' αὐτὸ ἔτι—δείξει*, after he had in both edd. referred to the proverb *αὐτὸ δείξει*, and its cognate *δηλοῖ*. He once approved of the correction of Cornarius, *προϊὼν δ' ἔτι ὁ λόγος—δείξει*, which he confirmed by *δείξει δὲ αὐτὰ προϊὼν ὁ λόγος*, in Legg. vii. p. 812, E.; but in ed. 2, he asserts that *δείξει* can be used for *αὐτὸ δείξει*. But of this I have a very great doubt.

[99] From this translation I infer that Sydenham wished to read *διαπέραιν' εὖ*, in lieu of *διαπέραινε*. For thus *εὖ* would balance *κάλλιστα*. Opportunely then has one MS. *διαπεραίνω*.

[100] To this passage Aristotle in Ethic. x. 2, alludes, as remarked by Baumgarten Crusius.

in that of intellect, pleasure. For, if either[1] of them be the good, it need not want any thing additional from any other quarter. But, if either of them appears to be indigent of aught, this can no longer be the good.

Prot. For how could it?

[30.] *Soc.* Let us then endeavour with you to try them by a touchstone.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. Answer, then.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer to live through the whole of life enjoying pleasures the most exquisite?

Prot. Why not?

Soc. If you possessed this completely, would you not think that you still wanted something else?

Prot. Not at all.

Soc. [2]See now, is it not for the things that are wanting in thought, and mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to see not even something?[2]

Prot. And why? for I should in a manner possess all things, in possessing joy.

Soc. Living thus continually through life, would you not feel a joy in the most exquisite pleasures?

Prot. Why not?

Soc. Possessing neither mind, nor memory, nor science,

[1] Instead of *πρότερον*, Stephens proposed *πότερον*, suggested by "alterum" in Ficinus: and so the three oldest MSS. But *ὁπότερον*, found in three others, is the more correct reading.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal version of the common text—"*Ὅρα δὴ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ μῶν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τί*; out of which none of the learned have been able to elicit a satisfactory sense. Ficinus has "Adverte itaque, num ipsa sapientia indigeres et intelligentia et convenienti ratiocinatione et aliis, quæcunque horum cognata, annon rei alicujus visu." Now though it is evident he found in his MS. *μῶν μηδὲ ὁρᾶν τί*, yet from his "indigeres," it is equally evident that he applied *δέοντα* to a person, and not to a thing. Hence I suspect that Plato wrote "*Ὅρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ, μῶν σ' ἡδέα ὁρᾶν ἔστι*; i. e. "See now, is it possible for things that are wanting in thought, mind, and reasoning powers, and whatever are the sisters of these, to do to you what is pleasant?" To which the answer would be, *Καὶ τί*; "Why (is this)?" Stalbaum, however, Lehrs, and Winckelmann, would read *μῶν μηδὲ ὄναρ τι*, referring to *οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς* in Theætet. p. 173, D. But the mention of pleasure could hardly be omitted.

nor a true opinion, it is surely necessary for you, in the first place, to be ignorant, whether you had any joy, or not, being void of all intellect.

Prot. It is necessary.

[31.] *Soc.* Being moreover in a similar manner not in possession of memory, there is surely a necessity for you not even to remember that you ever had any joy, or for not even the least memorial to remain of a joy coming upon you on the instant; and not possessing a true opinion, (a necessity) for you to think that, when you are feeling a joy, you do not feel it; and deprived of the reasoning power, to be not even able to calculate that you shall feel a joy in a time to come; and thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of an animal called lungs,[3] or of such marine substances as are endued with life, together with an oyster-like body. Are these things so? or can we think otherwise concerning them?[4]

Prot. And how?

Soc. Would, then, such a life be eligible?

Prot. This reasoning, Socrates, has imposed upon me silence altogether for the present.

Soc. Let us not become cowards, but changing[5] (the view), look upon the life of intellect.

[32.] *Prot.* What kind of life do you mean?

[3] The fish called in Greek πνεύμων or πλεύμων, and in Latin "pulmo," seems to have been little more than a mass of gelatinous matter, with little or no feeling, and belonging to the genus "Mollusca." To this passage of Plato there is an allusion in Plutarch, ii. p. 137, B., οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλ' ὀστρέου τινὸς ζωῇ προσεοικός: and in Synesius de Regn. p. 14, D., βίον ζῶντας θαλαττίου πνεύμονος, quoted by Stalbaum after Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. p. 216. Ficinus explains "pleumonis" by "sponge;" which is not an animal, but, like amber, the secretion from some animal.

[4] Sydenham has thus adopted περὶ ταῦτα from ed. Ald. Ficinus found, what all the MSS. offer, παρὰ ταῦτα, as shown by his version—"aliter præter ista." But ἄλλως πως is a manifest tautology after παρὰ ταῦτα. Hence Stalb., in ed. 2, says, "one might suspect that in ἄλλως πως lies hid ἄλλο τι, especially since the three oldest MSS. omit πως: but nevertheless ἄλλως πως does not seem to require any proof to support it;" an assertion, with which I at least am not satisfied; for to myself it is evident that Plato wrote καλῶς πως—

[5] Instead of μεταλαβόντες one MS. has μεταβάλλοντες: from which Bast correctly elicited μεταβαλόντες, found in a similar manner below, in § 114, and in Parmenid. p. 128, A., and Sympos. p. 204, F. Stalbaum, however, who, in ed. 1, had adopted μεταβαλόντες, has, in ed. 2, returned to μεταλαβόντες. Ficinus has "in medium adducentes," as if he found in his MS. ἐς μέσον βαλόντες.

Soc. Whether any of us would choose to live, possessing intellect, and mind, and science, and a perfect memory of all things, but partaking of pleasure, neither much nor little; nor, on the other hand, of pain; but being[6] wholly exempt from all things of such kind.

Prot. To me, Socrates, neither life is eligible; nor would it, I think, ever appear so to any other person.

Soc. What (seems) to you, Protarchus, a life[7] mixed up with, and common to, both together?[7]

Prot. Do you mean of pleasure, and of mind and intellect?

Soc. In this way; and of such a life am I speaking.

Prot. Every person would certainly prefer such a kind of life to either of those, [8]and, moreover, not one this, and another that.[8]

[33.] *Soc.* Perceive we now what is the result of our previous reasoning?

Prot. Perfectly well; that three lives have been placed before us, and that of the two, neither one is self-sufficient or eligible for any one man, or animal.

Soc. Is it not evident then with regard to these, that neither of them possess the good? for (otherwise) it would have been all-sufficient, and perfect, and eligible for all [9]plants and

[6] Stalbaum defends the omission of *ὢν* against the doctrine laid down by Porson on Hecub. 788.

[7]—[7] I cannot believe that Plato wrote *ὁ ξυναμφότερος — ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμιχθεὶς*, especially since Ficinus has "vita ex ambobus in unum congredientibus mixta." But what he did write, could not be guessed at except by a bold conjecture.

[8]—[8] All the words within the numerals Sydenham has omitted. For perhaps he did not understand the formula, *οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ*, with which Blomf. on Pers. 807, *οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὔ*, compares in Herodot. i. 138, *οὐ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα.* ii. 37, *οὐκ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντες.* Phocylid. Fr., *Λέριοι κακοὶ, οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὃς δ' οὔ, Πάντες.* But as Ficinus has "Unusquisque—eliget, neque unus optabit quidem, alius minime, sed omnes pariter expetent," Stephens suspected that something had dropt out. Besides he probably knew that *πᾶς* ought to follow rather than precede *οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ*. Hence one would prefer *Πῶς δὴ τις οὐ τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται—οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντες?* Stalbaum once wished to read *Καὶ παῖς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται*, comparing *τοῦτο δὲ κἂν παῖς γνοίη* in Euthyd. p. 279, D.

[9]—[9] The Greek is *πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις*, "to all plants and animals." But are plants capable of living a life of sensual pleasure? or brute animals, a life of science and understanding? We are therefore inclined to think that Plato wrote *πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις*: for immediately he subjoins an explanation of his meaning, and limits the word *πᾶσι*, "all," to such only

animals,[9] that are capable of living ever thus through life. But if any one should prefer other things, than what we do, he would take it contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, not willingly, but through ignorance, or from some unhappy necessity.

Prot. Such seems to be the case.

Soc. That we ought not therefore to consider that goddess of Philebus and the good to be the same, seems to have been stated sufficiently.

[34.] *Phil.* Neither, Socrates, is that intellect of yours the good; but it will somehow have the same charge made against it.

Soc. Mine perhaps, Philebus, may; but not, I think, that intellect which is at the same time both divine and true; but it will be somehow in a different state. However, I do not contend for the prize of victory, in behalf (of the life) of intellect, against the common[10] one. But what we are to do with the second prize, it is meet to see and to consider. For the cause (of the happiness of) the common life, we each assign to be, one of us, intellect, the other, pleasure. And thus neither of these two would be the good. And yet a person might suppose one or other of them to be the cause. Now on this point I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever is the thing, by possessing which that life becomes eligible and good, it is not pleasure, but intellect, which is more allied and similar to it. And according to this reasoning it could not be truly said that pleasure has any share in the first, nor even the second prize; and it is still further from the third prize, if any credit may be given for the present to that intellect of mine.

[35.] *Prot.* It seems to me in good truth, Socrates, that pleasure has fallen (to the ground), struck down, as it were, by your present reasoning; for after fighting for the prize, it lies there (vanquished). But of mind, it seems, it must be

as are endued with reason. S. This idea Stalbaum once felt disposed to adopt; but he afterwards rejected it; for he says that Plato attributes life even to plants in Tim. p. 77, C. But this does not answer Sydenham's objection. Perhaps Plato alluded to the sensitive plants of the Mimosa kind, the leaves of which when touched immediately curl up. And if so, we must read *καί τισι φυτοῖς καὶ πᾶσι ζώοις*, i. e. "and to some plants and to all animals."

[10] By common life, says Stalbaum, is meant, as indeed Sydenham had translated, the mixed or middle.

said, that it has prudently laid no claim for the prize; for it would otherwise have suffered the same fate. But pleasure, should it lose also the second prize, would meet altogether with some dishonour from her lovers: for not even to them would she appear any longer to be beautiful.

Soc. Why then is it not better to dismiss her directly, and not to pain her, by bringing to her the most accurate touchstone, and convicting her?

Prot. You are saying nothing, Socrates, to the purpose.

Soc. Is it because I spoke, what is impossible, of giving pain to pleasure?

Prot. Not on that account only, but because you are ignorant[11] that none of us will dismiss you, before you have come to the end of these disputes by reasoning.

Soc. Ho! ho! Protarchus; for though the remaining discourse is plentiful, yet scarcely is any part of it very easy now. For it seems that he, who marches out in defence of mind, has need of another stratagem, and must have, as it were, arrows different from those of former reasoning; perhaps, however, some are the same. Is not this requisite?

Prot. How not?

[36.] *Soc.* Let us then endeavour, when laying down the principle, to act with caution.

Prot. Of what principle are you speaking?

Soc. All things existing in the universe let us divide into two, or rather, if you please, into three parts.

Prot. You should state, why so.

Soc. Let us take[12] some of the subjects already mentioned

Prot. What?

Soc. We said somehow[13] that of things existing, the deity has exhibited the limitless, and also the limit.

Prot. Very true.

[11] Sydenham has "sensible," what the train of thought requires. He therefore would have proposed perhaps to read *εὖ γε νοεῖς* in lieu of *ἀγνοεῖς*.

[12] Instead of *λάβωμεν*, Schleiermacher and Heindorf wished to read, *ἀναλάβωμεν*, similar to Sydenham's "reassume:" but Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, considered the correction as not admitting of a doubt, has, in ed. 2, defended *λάβωμεν* by referring to *λάβοι* above in p. 18, A.=§ 18, and to *ληπτέον* below in p. 34, D.=§ 68.

[13] The expression *ἐλέγομέν που* is designedly introduced, because in § 18, the assertion had not been actually made in the same words as here

Soc. Let us then take these two of the species (of things),[14] and for a third, some one composed of those two mixed together. But I am, it seems, to be laughed at as a person sufficiently[15] distinguishing and enumerating things according to their species.

Prot. What say you, my good man?

Soc. It seems again that there is need of a fourth kind.

Prot. Say, what?

Soc. Of the combination of these with each other consider then the cause; and to these three species set me down this for a fourth.

Prot. Will there not be wanting a fifth too, able to produce the separation of something?

Soc. Perhaps there may; but not, I think, at present. However, should there be a want of it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of a fifth [life].[16]

[37.] *Prot.* How so?

Soc. Having, in the first place, of these four species, divided[17] the three, [18]let us, after having seen each of two cut into many parts and dispersed, endeavour by collecting again each into one, to understand those two,[18] in what manner each of them is, at the same time, one and many.

[14] The Greek is *τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν.* But Ficinus has "Has utique species duo illa esse ponamus," from which Stalbaum was led to propose *τούτω* for *τούτων.* But he ought to have read likewise *τὰ εἴδη,* unless he meant *τῶν εἰδῶν* to depend upon the following *τὰ δύο.*

[15] Why Socrates should be laughed at for "sufficiently" distinguishing things according to species, Stalbaum could not understand, nor can I. He therefore proposed, in ed. 1, to read *οὐχ ἱκανῶς.* But in ed. 2, he introduces the idea of "being desirous to distinguish," similar to Sydenham's "pretending to distinguish." Perhaps Plato wrote *οὐκ ἐννόως,* or *οὐ καλῶς,* instead of *ἱκανῶς.*

[16] In lieu of *βίον,* which Schütz wished to reject entirely, and Stalbaum, in ed. 2, has enclosed in brackets, Schleiermacher happily suggested *τι ὄν.*

[17] Instead of *διελόμενοι,* Ficinus seems, from his version "eligentes," to have found in his MS. *ἑλόμενοι.* Stalbaum too renders *διελόμενοι* by "secernamus."

[18]—[18] Ficinus has "duoque ex tribus *sic se habere consideremus ut unumquodque duorum sit* multa dividuum insuper atque dispersum, rursusque in unum ducentes, cogitare nitamur," where he either found in his MS., or introduced from his own head, the words marked in Italics. With regard to *διεσπασμένον,* which seems to be superfluous after *πολλὰ διεσχισμένον,* the "dispersum" in Ficinus would lead to *διεσπαρμένον,*

Prot. If you would speak more plainly respecting them, I might perhaps follow you.

Soc. I say then that the two, which I lay before you, are those which I just now (spoke of); one the limitless, and the other limit. Now, that the limitless is in some manner many, I will attempt to show; but let that, which has a limit, wait for us a while.

[38.] *Prot.* It shall wait.[19]

Soc. Consider now; for what I order you to consider is a thing difficult and doubtful. Consider it, however. With regard to things hotter and colder, first see if you can conceive any limit to them. Or would not the more and the less, residing in the genera themselves of things, enjoin, so long as they resided there, an end to be not in them? For if there were an end, they are at an end themselves.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. And we say that in the hotter and colder there is the more and the less.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Reason then ever points out to us that the colder and the hotter have no end; and being thus without any end, they are altogether limitless.

[39.] *Prot.* Vehemently so, Socrates.

Soc. Well have you answered, friend Protarchus, and reminded me, that the "vehemently," which you now pronounced, and the "gently," have the same power as the "more" and the "less." For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any thing to be just "so much;"[20] but infusing something more vehement than the more gentle into every action, and the contrary, they effect either "the more" or "the less;" but cause the "just so much" to disappear. For, as it was just now stated, if they did not cause the "just so much" to disappear, but permitted both it and "the moderate" to be in the seat of "the more" and "the less," or of "the vehement"

were it not that διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται are found just afterwards, as remarked by Stalbaum.

[19] The imperative μενέτω evidently requires here Μενεῖ found in one MS., instead of Μένει.

[20] From the allusion to the comparatives, perhaps the best translation of τὸ πόσον, here and elsewhere, would be "the positive." Baumgarten Crusius explains τὸ πόσον by "a definite measure of quantity," which is equally applicable to the idea of the positive and superlative.

and "the gentle," these very things (would) flow[21] out of their own place in which they were; for if they admitted the "just so much," "the hotter" and "the colder" would not exist. For "the hotter," and in like manner "the colder," is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same spot; but the "just so much" stops, and ceases to progress.[21] According then to this reasoning, "the hotter" must be limitless; and so must also be "the colder."

[40.] *Prot.* So indeed, Socrates, it appears. But, as you said, these things are not easy to follow. But subjects spoken of again and again would perhaps show the questioner and the questioned agreeing sufficiently together.

Soc. You say well; and let us try so to do. But for the present, see whether we will receive this as a sign of the nature of the limitless, in order that, by going through all, we may not be prolix.

Prot. What mark do you mean?

Soc. Whatever things appear to us to be growing more or less, or to admit of the vehement, and the gentle, and the too much, and all such attributes, we ought to refer all these to the genus of the limitless, as to one thing, according to the previous remark which we made, that whatever things were torn and cut into parts, we ought to collect, to the best of our power, and put a mark on them as being of some one nature, if you remember.[22]

Prot. I remember it.

Soc. Those things then, which do not admit these attributes, but admit their contraries, in the first place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and whatever other relation one number bears to another, and one measure to another, by reckoning up all these as relating to limit, should we seem to do right? or how say you?

Prot. Perfectly right, Socrates.

[41.] *Soc.* Be it so. But the third thing, made up of the other two, what idea shall we say it possesses?

Prot. Yourself, as I conceive, will tell me.

[21] Baumgarten Crusius aptly refers to Aristotle, Categ. 4, *οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ πόσον ἐνδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, κ. τ. λ.*

[22] By *ἔρρει* Stalbaum understands "pereunt." But it rather means 'fluebant," as shown by the preposition *ἐκ*. Besides, there would be an allusion to the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things flow; while correc Greek requires *ἔρρει ταῦτ' ἂν* instead of *ἔρρει ταῦτα*.

Soc. A deity (might); if any of the gods will hearken to my prayers.

Prot. Pray, then, and take a survey.[23]

Soc. I do survey: and some deity, Protarchus, seems now to have become favourable to us.

Prot. How say you this? and of what proof do you make use?

Soc. I will tell you plainly:[24] but do you follow my reasoning.

Prot. Only speak.

Soc. We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. To these then add the drier and the moister, the more numerous and the fewer, the swifter and the slower, the larger and the smaller, and whatever things beside that we previously ranked under the one head of a nature, that admits of the more and the less.

Prot. You mean of the limitless.

[42.] *Soc.* Yes: and do you combine into this that which we spoke of next afterward, the genus of limit.

Prot. What genus?

Soc. That, which, when we should just now have brought together (as the genus) of the limit, formed in the same manner, as we brought together the genus of the limitless, we did not bring together. But now perhaps [25] you will do the same.[25]

[23] Here seems to be an allusion to the act of an augur; who, after uttering a prayer, looked towards heaven to see if the god, to whom he had prayed, answered, or not, with a favourable omen.

[24] I cannot understand here *δῆλον ὅτι*, and I have therefore omitted with Ficinus *ὅτι*. I could have understood *δηλῶν εὖ τι*, i. e. "well making something plain."

[25]—[25] This is the English for the Latin of Ficinus—"idem ages:" who therefore found in his MS. *ταὐτὸν δράσεις* in lieu of *ταὐτὸν δράσει*: which, confess, I cannot understand; nor could Stalbaum originally; for in ed. 1, he considered as an interpolation all the words, *ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται.* But in ed. 2, he says that *ταὐτὸν δράσει* has for its subject something not found indeed in the Greek, but which in Latin is "ipsum genus finiti, cujus nondum subtilior definitio est proposita;" while to show that an idea can be applied to the verb *δρᾶν*, he refers to the expression, *ταὐτὸν δὴ οἶμαι δρᾶσαι ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ξυμβουλήν.* Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀλλ ἴσως, εἴ γ' ἐνῆν μοι τοῦτο νῦν δρᾶν, σοί, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων, καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται*, i. e. "but pe haps, if it is permitted

When both these are brought together, that too will become manifest.

Prot. Of what (genus) are you speaking? and how?

Soc. I speak of that relating to the equal and the double, and whatever else causes things to cease at variance with each other, and by introducing number,[26] moulds them into what are symmetrical and harmonize with each other.

Prot. I understand. You seem to me to say that [27]if these are combined[27] certain productions would somehow arise[28] in the case of each.[29]

Soc. (Yes.) For I seem (to have spoken) correctly.

Prot. Say on then.

Soc. In the case of diseases, does not the right combination of those two produce the state of health?

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. And in the acute and the grave, the swift also and the slow, all being limitless, do not the very same thing, being introduced, effect at the same time a limit[30] and render most perfect all the Muse's art?

me to do this, (to bring together) that (genus) will, when both of these are brought together, become manifest to you." This at least would be intelligible; what can hardly be said of the present Greek text or of any interpretation of it.

[26] For, as stated in Epinom. p. 978, A., quoted by Baumgarten Crusius, where number is not, there is *ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄτακτος, ἀσχήμων, ἄρρυθμος, ἀνάρμοστός τε φορά.*

[27]—[27] Ficinus has "si ista miscentur." He therefore found in his MS. *εἰ μίγνυται ταῦτα*, not *μιγνὺς ταῦτα*, with which Stalbaum was justly offended in ed. 1, but defends in ed. 2. Heindorf, on Phædon. § 59, suggested *ἂν μιγνύῃς ταῦτα.*

[28] Instead of *αὐτῶν*, omitted by one of the oldest MSS., and in another placed in the margin or inserted by a second hand, the syntax and sense require *ἄν πως*—as I have translated. Ficinus too has "eventuras," i. e. *ἂν—συμβαίνειν.*

[29] Ficin. "ex eorum singulis," which answers to *ἀφ' ἑκάστων*, found in one of the oldest MSS. and adopted by the Zurich editors, and which Stalbaum preferred in ed. 1, but has rejected in ed. 2.

[30] How the limitless and limit being introduced can effect a limit, I cannot understand, nor could Stalbaum; who, in ed. 1, wished to read *ἐγγενομένη*, and to refer that word to *κοινωνία*, as Ficinus did in his version, "et ista terminum peperit," omitting however *ταυτὰ—ταῦτα*, which he saw would be then unintelligible. There is some error here. Perhaps Plato wrote, *Ἆρ οὐ ταῦτα ἐγγενομένη πάντα ἅμ' ἐπεραστὰ ἀπειργάσατο*, i. e. "Has not it, being introduced, caused at the same time all these to be delightful." where *ἅμ' ἐπεραστὰ* differ scarcely by a single letter from *ἅμα πέρας τε.*

Prot. Yes, most beautifully.

Soc. Moreover it being introduced into cold weather and hot, it takes off [31] the very much, the too much, and the infinite,[31] but it effects the moderate and the symmetrical.

Prot. How not?

Soc. And are not produced from them mild seasons, and all whatever is lovely for us, the limitless and those which have a limit being combined together?

Prot. How not?

Soc. A thousand other things I omit to state; as, for instance, together with health, beauty and strength; and in the soul other properties very many and very beautiful.[32] [43.] For the goddess herself,[33] O thou handsome Philebus, looking down upon lust, and all manner of vice in all persons, (and) [34] (seeing) no limit existing in them of pleasures and their full enjoyment, has laid down a law and order, having a limit. And [35] you said that she would wear down; [35] but I maintain, on the contrary, that she would preserve. But how, Protarchus, does it (now) appear to you?

[31]—[31] The Greek is *τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον.* But the three oldest MSS. read *λεῖον* for *λίαν.* And so perhaps the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is, "id quod multum et minus et infinitum dicitur." Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὸ μὲν πλέον καὶ μεῖον ἀφείλετο,* without *ἄπειρον,* which "the more" and "the less" have been shown to be. Stalbaum defends *πολὺ λίαν*: but those words, I think, are never thus united.

[32] Schütz, in Opuscul. Philolog. p. 138, conceived that something was wanting here. For the mention of the goddess of Pleasure could scarcely thus follow the discussion relating to the combination of the limitless and limit. Stalbaum however, in ed. 2, says, as Sydenham had translated, that the deity alluded to is Aphrodītē, which in § 5 Socrates states Philebus had identified with Pleasure, and that the goddess of Beauty is here introduced, with reference to the beauty both of body and soul, which had been just now mentioned.

[33] Instead of *ἡ θεὸς,* I should prefer *ἡ σὴ θεὸς,* as in § 5.

[34] To avoid the want of connexion I have introduced "and;" and I suspect that *καὶ* has dropt out after *Φίληβε,* for *κ* and *β* are very similar in MSS., as shown by myself at Tro. 935.

[35]—[35] The Greek is in some MSS. *ἀποκνᾶν ἔφης*; in others, *ἀποκναῖς*; but in one, by a correction, *ἀποκναῖσαι,* thus confirming the conjecture of Porson, in Miscellan. Critic. p. 265, adopted by Stalbaum, who, in ed. 2, renders the passage, "And you indeed think that the goddess wears down, but I that she preserves." But what is the thing worn down or preserved, he does not distinctly state. More correctly has Sydenham translated, "And this (the law) you said was to impair pleasure, but I, that it was to preserve pleasure." But in that case Plato would have written, as he probably did, *ἀποκναῖσαι ἔφης ταῦτα* (i. e. *νόμον καὶ τάξιν*) *αὐτὴν*—not *ἀποκναῖσαι ἔφης αὐτὴν*—

Prot. This, Socrates, is quite to my mind.

[44.] *Soc.* I have mentioned then those three things, if you comprehend.

Prot. I think I do. For one you seem to call the limitless, and one, the second, the limit in all things; but what you mean by the third, I do not very well comprehend.

Soc. Because the multitude, O thou wondrous man, of the generation of the third, has amazed you. And yet the limitless has afforded you many genera; but as they were all of them marked with the seal of the genus of the more and its opposite they appeared one.

Prot. True.

Soc. And yet neither did limit contain many, nor did we bear it ill that it was not by nature one.

Prot. How could we?

Soc. By no means. But do thou say that by the third I mean this one, [36] laying down all their progeny, from the measures which have effected together with limit a generation into being.[36]

Prot. I understand you.

[45.] *Poc.* Now besides these three, we then said we must look for some fourth kind, and that the looking for it was common to us both. See then whether it seems to you necessary for all things, which are produced, to be produced through some cause.

Prot. So it seems to me; for without that (thing),[37] how should they be produced?

Soc. The nature then of the thing making differs from the cause in nothing but the name: so that the thing making and the cause may be rightly deemed one.

Prot. Rightly.

[36]—[36] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, of which I cannot elicit the meaning. I could have understood, *τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, τὴν γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων ἀμέτρων.* i. e. "laying down, as their whole progeny, the generation into being from the measureless working together with the limit:" where *ἀμέτρων* would be the synonyme of *ἀπείρων*.

[37] Instead of *τούτων*, which Stalbaum in ed. 2 defends, three MSS. read *τούτου*, which he had adopted in ed. 1. But neither *τούτου* nor *τούτων* could agree with *αἰτίας*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *χωρίς γ' αἰτίου του*—similar to the expression in Tim. p. 28, A., *πᾶν δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν.*

Soc. So, likewise, the thing made, and the thing produced, we shall find, as just now said, to differ in nothing but the name; or how?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. According to nature, does not the thing making ever lead the way? and the thing made follow it into being?

Prot. Certainly.

[46.] *Soc.* Cause then, and that which is the slave of cause for production, is another thing, and not the same.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Have not the things which are produced, and the things out of which they are all produced, exhibited to us the three genera?

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. [38] The fourth then, which is the artificer of all these, let us call the cause; [38] as it has been sufficiently shown to be different from those.

Prot. Let us call it.

Soc. The four sorts having been now defined, it is well, for the sake of remembering each one, to enumerate them in order.

[47.] *Prot.* How not?

Soc. The first then I call limitless; the second, limit; the third, what is mixed and generated from these; and in saying that the cause of this mixture and this production is the fourth, should I do aught amiss?

Prot. How so?

Soc. Well now, what is the reasoning after this? and with what design have we come to this? Was it not this? We were inquiring whether the second prize was due to Pleasure or Intellect. Was it not so?

Prot. It was so.

Soc. Since then we have thus divided these things, may we not now better form a finished judgment about the first nd the second, respecting which we disputed at first.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Come now, we laid down, as the conqueror, the combined life of Pleasure and Intellect. Was it not so?

[38]—[38] Ficinus has "Omnium autem istorum opificem quartum ponimus causamque vocamus," as if he had found in his MS. *τίθεμεν τέταρτον καὶ λέγομεν τὴν αἰτίαν*: where *λέγομεν* is found likewise in five MSS.

Prot. It was.

Soc. Do we not perceive then somehow what this life is, and of what genus?

Prot. How not?

Soc. And I think we shall say, that it is a part of the third. [39] For it is not combined with some two,[39] but with all the limitless linked by a chain with limit; so that this life, the winner of the victory, may be rightly said to be a part of the third.

Prot. Most rightly.

[48.] *Soc.* Be it so. But that life of yours, Philebus, being pleasant and uncombined, to which of the three can it be rightly said to belong? But before you pronounce, answer me first this question.

Phil. Propose it then.

Soc. Have Pleasure and Pain a limit? or are they amongst the things which admit "the more" and "the less?"

Phil. Assuredly, Socrates, amongst those (that admit) "the more." For Pleasure would not be wholly a good, if it were not by nature limitless with respect to multitude and "the more."

Soc. Nor would Pain, Philebus, be wholly an evil; so that we must think of some thing else than the nature of the limitless, which[40] is to impart any good to pleasures. Let then this be the issue of the limitless. But to which of the beforementioned may we, Protarchus and Philebus, refer Intellect, and Science, and Mind, and not be impious? For there seem to me to be no little danger to us, whether we are right or not respecting the present question.

Phil. You magnify, Socrates, that god of yours.

Soc. So do you, my friend, that goddess of yours. The question, however, ought to be answered by us.

[49.] *Prot.* Socrates speaks correctly, Philebus, and we must obey him.

[39]—[39] Such is the translation of Stalbaum's text. But in the notes he prefers the correction of Schütz, who suggested *μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο*. similar to the version of Ficinus, "neque enim quod, ex duobus quibusdam mixtum sit, sed quod ex infinitis omnibus a termino nexis." Klitzsche defends *μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος* by arguments, to which Stalbaum replies in the "Additamenta." I confess however I do not understand how *δεδεμένων* by itself could mean "linked by a chain with—"

[40] The reading ὃ, which Stephens elicited from "quod" in Ficinus has been found only in one MS. instead of *ὡς*.

Phil. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself to speak on my part?

Prot. Certainly. But in the present case I am nearly[41] at a loss; and I request of you, Socrates, to become yourself a speaker for us, in order that we may not, by a mistake respecting the combatant,[42] say something contrary to the measure.[43]

Soc. We must obey, Protarchus. For you enjoin nothing difficult. But when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, (a deity)[44] by way of a joke, I did in reality confuse you, by asking of what genus were Mind and Science.

Prot. Altogether so, Socrates.

[50.] *Soc.* And yet it was an easy (question). For all the wise, in reality extolling themselves, agree that Mind is to us a king of heaven and earth.[45] And perhaps they say well. But let us, if you are willing, make our examination of this genus rather more at length.

Prot. Speak as you wish, taking no account of the length, as you will not be disagreeable (to us).

[51.] *Soc.* You have spoken fairly. Let us begin, then, by asking a question in such way as this.

Prot. How?

Soc. Whether shall we say that the power of an irrational (principle) governs all things, and that, which is called the universe, at random, and as may happen? or, on the contrary, as our predecessors asserted,[46] that Mind and a certain wonderful Intellect, arranges things together, and governs throughout?

Prot. Alike in nothing, Socrates, (are the two tenets). For what you have just now mentioned seems to me to be impious. But, to say that Intellect disposes all things in order, is worthy of our view of the world, and of sun, and the

[41] Sydenham has, "I am much at a loss;" what the sense requires. Hence for *μέντοι σχεδὸν* Plato probably wrote *μέγα τι σχεδὸν*—

[42] By *ἀγωνιστὴν*, says Stalbaum, is meant Intellect, as opposed to Pleasure.

[43] Stalbaum quotes opportunely from Horace, "nil extra numerum fecisse modumque Curas."

[44] This word, absolutely requisite for the sense, is found only in the version of Ficinus—"deum extollens jocando."

[45] Stalbaum has given, from the notes of Wyttenbach on Phædo, § 11, and of Creuzer on Plotinus *Περὶ Κάλλους*, p. 90, a list of the Neo-Platonists, who have referred to this dictum.

[46] Plato alludes to Anaxagoras. See Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 40, B.

moon, and the stars, and the whole revolution (of heaven);[47] nor would I ever say, or even think, otherwise respecting them.

[52.] *Soc.* Do you wish then for us to say something in accordance with our predecessors, that such is the case, and for us not merely to think that we ought to speak the sentiments of others without danger to ourselves, but that we should run the risk together, and share in the censure, should a man of mighty power[48] assert that these things are not in this state, but in that of disorder?

Prot. How should I not wish it?

Soc. Come now, look to the reasoning, which is advancing towards us respecting these matters.

Prot. Only say it.

Soc. The things that surround the nature of all the bodies of animals, (namely,) fire, and water, and air, and earth, we somehow descry, as persons tossed in a storm say (of land), existing in the constitution (of the universe).

Prot. And truly so; for we are really tossed about in our present reasonings.

Soc. Come then, respecting each of those things in[49] us, conceive some such thing as this.

Prot. What?

[53.] *Soc.* That each of those in us is little and inconsiderable, and is no where and in no manner pure, and possessing a power worthy of its nature. Take them in the case of one (element), and understand the same respecting all. Fire in some manner exists in us, and it exists also in the universe.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now the fire, which is in us, is weak and inconsiderable; but that which is in the universe is wonderful for its multitude and beauty, and for every power which belongs to fire.

Prot. What you say is very true.

Soc. What then? Is the fire of the universe generated,

[47] Ficinus has "cœlestis circuitus," as if he had found in his MS. *περιφορᾶς οὐρανοῦ*, or *οὐρανίας*.

[48] By this expression, says Stalbaum, is meant one of the Sophists, who are called perpetually *δεινοὶ* by Plato.

[49] Ficinus has "circa nos," as if he found in his MS. *περὶ ἡμᾶς*, similar to *περὶ τὴν—φύσιν* just above; but *παρ' ἡμῖν* is repeated in the next sentence, where Ficinus has "apud nos."

and fed, and ruled[50] by that which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does mine and yours, and that in the rest of animals, receive all these things[51] from it?

Prot. You ask this question, which does not deserve an answer.

Soc. True. For you will say the same, I think, of the earth, which exists here in animals, and of that in the universe; and so will you answer touching all the other things, about which I inquired a little before.

Prot. For who in his senses would ever be seen answering in another way?

[54.] *Soc.* Scarcely not any one whatever. But follow us to what comes next in order. Have we not, looking to all those things just now mentioned, and brought to one point, called them body?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Conceive the same thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. For in the same manner, being composed of the same elements, it would be body.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

Soc. Whether from that body wholly is nourished the body with us, or that body from the one with us? and has it received and does it keep whatever properties we have just now mentioned respecting them?

Prot. And this too is another point, Socrates, not deserving a question.

Soc. What then? Is this deserving? Or how will you say?

Prot. Say what it is.

Soc. Shall we not affirm that the body with us possesses a soul?

Prot. It is evident, we shall affirm it.

Soc. From whence, friend Protarchus, did it obtain it, unless the body of the universe happens to be with a soul, and possessing the same things as this, but in every way more beautiful?

Prot. It is evident, Socrates, from no other source.[52]

[50] The Greek is *τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται.* To avoid the *ὕστερον πρότερον* I have translated as if it were *γίγνεται καὶ τρέφεται.*

[51] By "these things" is meant, says Stalbaum, the produced, nourished, and ruled.

[52] On the doctrine that the human soul is a part of the soul of the uni-

[55.] *Soc.* [53] For we cannot surely, Protarchus, expect that, while there are these four things, limit, the limitless, the combination (of both), and the genus of the cause, amongst all the four, it is permissible for that, which furnishes the soul in us, and makes the body a tabernacle (for it), and, when the body has met with a stumbling-block, cures it by the medical art,[53] and on other occasions frames other constitutions, these should be addressed by the name of wisdom, whole and of every kind; but that, while these very same things exist in the whole of heaven, and according to its great parts, and, moreover, while they are lovely and without blemish, in these there should not have been planned the nature of things the most beautiful and held in the highest honour.

Prot. This would indeed have no reason on its side.

[56.] *Soc.* If this then be irrational, we may the better assert, by following that reasoning of ours, that there is, what we have often said, in the universe many a limitless, and a limit sufficient,[54] and besides these, a cause, not inconsiderable

verse, Stalbaum refers to Xenophon M. S. iv. 3, 14; Cicero De N. D. ii. 6; iii. 11; Tusc. v. 13; De Divinat. i. 49; and Fabricius on Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 61. Cicero, de Senect. § 21, says it was a tenet of the Pythagoreans, that "ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus," the origin of the "divinæ particula auræ" in Horace.

[53]—[53] On this difficult passage Stalbaum wrote, in ed. 1, a rather long note, in which he suggested alterations, repudiated in ed. 2; where he has however failed to unravel the intricacies of the syntax, which must continue to baffle all the exertions of scholars; for neither syntax nor sense can be made out of words evidently defective. To arrive therefore at what Plato probably wrote, I have translated the passage as if the Greek were Οὐ γάρ τί που προσδοκῶμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὅτι, ὄντα τὰ τέτταρα ——ἐνῆν τοῦτο——σῶμα σκηνὴν ποιοῦν——ἰατρικῇ ἀκούμενον καὶ——συντιθὲν, πᾶσαν—in lieu of Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα——ἐνὸν——σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν——ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν—where I have adopted Stalbaum's ὄντα, and altered Sydenham's σκῆνος into σκηνὴν, for thus σῶμα σκηνὴν ποιοῦν differs by scarcely a letter from σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν; while not only do we get rid of ἐν, which has no meaning here, but recover the usual construction of ποιεῖν with two accusatives. With regard to the body being considered a tabernacle for the soul, Sydenham refers to Tim. Locr. p. 100, A., and 103, C., Ocell. Lucan. in Stob. Ecl. Phys. c. 16, and Æschin. Socrat. iii. 5, to which I will add Etymol. Σκῆνος καὶ το σῶμα, παρὰ τὸ σκήνωμα καὶ σκηνὴν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον οἰκητήριον. Lastly, with regard to προσδοκῶμεν, I was led to it by finding in one MS. πω δοκοῦμεν. For πω and προ and προσ are frequently confounded by the scribes.

[54] Instead of the unintelligible ἱκανὸν, Winckelmann would read καὶ

which puts into order and arranges the years, and seasons, and months,—a cause, which may most justly be called Wisdom and Mind.

Prot. Most justly, indeed.

Soc. Wisdom however and Mind could not exist without Soul.

Prot. By no means.

Soc. You will say then that in the nature of Zeus there is a kingly soul in a kingly mind, through the power of the cause; and that in the other (gods)[55] there are other beautiful attributes, according as it is agreeable for each to be called.

Prot. Certainly I shall.

[57.] *Soc.* Do not think, Protarchus, that we have spoken this discourse at all in vain. For it fights on the side of those persons of the olden time, who showed that Mind is ever the ruler of the universe.

Prot. It does so very much.

Soc. Besides it has furnished an answer to my inquiry,—that Mind is a relation[56] of that, which was said to be the cause of all things; for of the four this was one.[57] For now at length you surely have the answer.

Prot. I have, and very sufficiently. But it lay hid from me that you were giving the answer.

Soc. [58]For play is sometimes, Protarchus, a remission from serious study.[58]

Prot. Well have you said this.

κοινὸν, as in § 55, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος: which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt.

[55] Sydenham has thus anticipated Stalbaum in applying ἄλλοις to θεοῖς understood, while Reisig on Soph. Œd. C. 44, Τὰς πάνθ' ὁρώσας Εὐμενίδας ὅ γ' ἐνθάδ' ἂν Εἴποι λεώς νιν· ἄλλα δ' ἀλλαχοῦ καλά, has aptly referred to this passage of Plato.

[56] The strange word γενούστης, which is acknowledged by Olympiodorus, the Scholiast, Hesych., and Suid., and quoted distinctly from this dialogue by the Etymol. M., Stalbaum conceives Plato to have coined with the view of punning upon νοῦς: for that otherwise he would have written γεννήτης: and he refers to a similar play on the same word in § 152, ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν.

[57] I have adopted Stalbaum's happy restoration of this passage, in lieu of the common reading, τῶν τεττάρων, ὧν ἦν, where since ὧν is omitted by the three oldest MSS., he suggested τῶν τεττάρων δ' ἦν.

[58]—[58] This apophthegm has been adopted by Aristænetus, Epist. i. 26, where see Boissonade.

[58.] *Soc.* And thus, my friend, of what genus Mind is, and of what power it is possessed, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

Prot. It has, completely.

Soc. Moreover in like manner the genus of Pleasure has appeared before.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Concerning these two then let us remember this also; —that Mind is a relation to cause, and is nearly of that genus; but that Pleasure is both limitless itself, and is of that genus which, of itself, neither has nor ever will have in itself, either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

Prot. We will remember. How not?

[59.] *Soc.* Now we ought to consider next, in which genus either of these two exists, and through what circumstance they are produced, when they come into being, first in the case of Pleasure; (for,) as we previously tried by a touchstone its genus, so, with regard to these points, (we must try) them previously. For, apart from Pain, we should never be able fully to try Pleasure.

Prot. Nay, if we must proceed in this way, let us proceed.

Soc. Does it seem to you, as to me, as regards production?

Prot. What?

Soc. Pain and Pleasure appear to me to be produced naturally at the same time as a common genus.

Prot. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before, you wish to indicate by the word common.

Soc. This shall be done, O thou wondrous man, to the best of my power.

Prot. You have spoken fairly.

Soc. By common, then, let us understand that, which we reckoned as the third of the four.

Prot. That which you mentioned after both the limitless and limit; in which you ranked health, and also, as I think, harmony.

[60.] *Soc.* You have said perfectly right. Now give me all possible attention.

Prot. Only speak.

Soc. I say, then, that whenever the harmony (in the frame) of any animal is loosened, a loosening is made in

its nature, and at that very time the production of pains takes place.[59]

Prot. You say what is very probable.

Soc. But when the harmony is properly fitted, and it returns to its own nature, we must say that pleasure is produced, if it is requisite for arguments on matters of the greatest moment to be despatched as quickly as possible in a few words.

Prot. I think, Socrates, you speak correctly; but let us endeavour to speak of these same things still more clearly.

[61.] *Soc.* Is it not most easy to understand things of common occurrence and seen all around?

Prot. What kind of things?

Soc. Hunger, surely, is a loosening and a pain.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And by eating, a filling-up is, on the other hand, a pleasure.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Thirst also, again, is a corruption and pain, [60]and a loosening;[60] but the power of a liquid, by replenishing the part dried up, is a pleasure. Again, the suffering a preternatural heat, being a separation and dissolving, is a pain: but, on the other hand, [61]according to nature, a giving way and cooling is a pleasure.[61]

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. And the coagulation of animal moisture through cold, contrary to its nature, is a pain: but, on the other hand, a return[62] to the same (state), according to nature, [63]of what had departed and been separated (from it),[63] is a pleasure.

[59] The whole of this argument has been abridged by Nemesius, De Natur. Homin. p. 229. Compare likewise Tim. p. 64, B. STALB.

[60]—[60] The words *καὶ λύσις* Schleiermacher rejected as being interpolated, with whom Stalbaum agrees. Cousin however defends them, by saying that the negligent style of Plato would perhaps justify their retention, p. 32, A.

[61]—[61] The very balance of the sentences proves that Plato did not write what is found in the text at present; to say nothing of the uncertain meaning of *ἀπόδοσις*.

[62] In lieu of *ὁδὸς*, the "reditus" in Ficinus leads to *ἄνοδος*.

[63]—[63] Ficinus has "contra humido liquescente et in suam redeunte naturam;" which plainly show that he found in his MS. *εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν ἀνιόντων*—what Schleiermacher elicited from the reading in Sto-

And, in one word, consider whether the reasoning is in moderation, which says, that when the species, naturally produced with a soul from the limitless and limit, as I previously stated, is corrupted, to it corruption is a pain; but that [64] the road into their being, and the return back again, is of all a pleasure.[64]

Prot. Be it so; [65] for it seems to have some stamp (of likelihood).[65]

Soc. Let us then lay down this as one kind of pain and pleasure (as existing) under each of those conditions.

Prot. Let it so lie.

[62.] *Soc.* Lay down now the expectation of the soul itself, regards the nature of these circumstances; one antecedent to pleasures (enjoyed), a matter hoped for, [66] agreeable and full of confidence; the other, antecedent to pains (endured), a thing of fear and anxiety.[66]

Prot. This is, therefore, a different species of pleasure and pain, independent of the body, and produced through an expectation of the soul herself.

Soc. You have understood the matter rightly. Now in these (feelings), [67] I think, according to my opinion at least, being each of them, as it seems,[67] sincere and unmixed, of pain and pleasure, there will be manifest that respecting

bæus, Ecl. Phys. p. 99, *εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν.* But what he found in lieu of *διακρινομένων* is not equally plain. For though Bernhardy and Stalbaum assert that *τῶν ὑγρῶν* is to be supplied from *τῆς ὑγρότητος*, yet I wish they had produced one passage where *τὰ ὑγρὰ* are said *διακρίνεσθαι.*

[64]—[64] Stalbaum thinks that *αὐτῶν*, and I presume *πάντων* likewise, are to be referred to the preceding *ἔμψυχον εἶδος.*

[65]—[65] Ficinus has "Videtur enim mihi hoc admodum verisimile," which is far more intelligible than the Greek—*δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν*: where, however, since one MS. offers *ἔχειν οὕτω*, perhaps Plato wrote *τύπον —ἔχειν τοῦ εἰκότος.*

[66]—[66] In these balanced sentences there is either one word too much in the first, or one too little in the second. Stalbaum, in his Latin translation of the passage, has, in ed. 2, omitted *ἐλπιζόμενον*: although, in ed. 1, he had stated that one need not wonder at the expression *προσδόκημα ἐλπιζόμενον.*

[67]—[67] According to Faehse, there is in the tautology, *οἶμαι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν—ὡς δοκεῖ*, "the negligence of an every-day discourse expressed to the life." Stalbaum in ed. 2, defends it by quoting Sophist, p. 225, D., *δοκῶ—κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμήν.* Lach. p. 192, C., *ἔμοιγε φαίνεται—ὡς ἐγῷμαι.* But he neither does, nor could he, I think, pro-

pleasure, whether the whole genus is to be embraced, or this is to be assigned to some genus different from those beforementioned; but that to pleasure and pain (it is allowable),[68] like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, for us to sometimes embrace them, and at other times not to embrace, as being not good in themselves, but admitting only sometimes, and some of them, the nature of the good.

Prot. You say most correctly that it is requisite for the thing now pursued to be caused to go[69] some where in this road.

[63.] *Soc.* Let us then look together at this part first. Since, if what has been said is really the fact, when those things are being destroyed, there would be[70] pain, but being preserved, pleasure, let us now consider respecting those which are neither being destroyed, nor being preserved, what condition must there then be to each animal, when such is the case.[71] Give your earnest attention to this point, and tell me, is there not every necessity for every animal at that time to be neither pained nor pleased, either greatly or little?

Prot. There is a necessity.

Soc. There is then some third[72] disposition of this kind, beside that of being delighted and that of being grieved.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then, be ready to remember this (decision). For

duce a single passage to support the tripled repetition of a similar idea. What Plato really wrote, a person, conversant with Greek, might perhaps elicit from the version of Ficinus, "ut mea fert opinio—liquido discernemus."

[68] Stalbaum says that *ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ* depend upon *συγχωρητέον*. Ficinus has "competat, ut interdum amandum sit."

[69] In lieu of *διαπορευθῆναι*, Ald. alone has preserved the elegant reading *διαθηρευθῆναι*: which Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt. For Plato thus perpetually employs metaphors derived from hunting, as shown by Wyttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 41, and Creuzer on Proclus and Olympiodor. T. i. p. 177. Of the passages quoted by Stalbaum, the most apposite is in Tim. p. 64, B., *ταύτῃ γὰρ μεταδιωκτέον πάντα ὅσα ἐλεῖν ἐπινοοῦμεν*.

[70] Instead of *ἀνασωζομένων*, where the preposition is useless, the three oldest MSS. read *ἂν διασωζομένων*: where evidently lies hid—*ἂν εἴη σωζομένων*.

[71] That is, to be neither in a state of destruction nor preservation. Stalb.

[72] On the three states of pleasure, pain, and something intermediate, Stalbaum refers to Rep. ix. p. 583, C—E.

towards the verdict respecting pleasure, it will be not a little thing for us to remember it or not. But let us, if you please, go through this point in few words.

Prot. Say, what?

[64.] *Soc.* To a person preferring a life of intellect, you know there is no hinderance to his living in that manner.

Prot. Do you mean in the state of being neither pleased nor pained?

Soc. Yes; for it was stated in our comparison of the lives, that there was no necessity for the person, preferring the life of mind and intellect, to be delighted either much or little.

Prot. It was altogether said so.

Soc. In this way therefore it would be to him. And perhaps it would be by no means out of the way, if that life were of all the most godlike.

Prot. To me at least it seems unlikely that the gods feel neither pleasure nor its opposite.

Soc. It is highly, indeed, unlikely. For each of these things is unseemly. But let us consider further this point afterwards, if it should be to the purpose; and we will apply it towards (winning) the second prize for mind, should we be unable to apply it for (winning) the first.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

[65.] *Soc.* Now that other species of pleasures, which we said is peculiar to the soul herself, is all produced through memory.

Prot. How so?

Soc. What memory is, we ought, it seems, to previously remember:[73] and prior to memory, what perception is, methinks; if, what relates to these points, is about to become, as is fitting, clear to us.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. Of those circumstances, which are on every occasion surrounding our body, lay down that some are extinguished, before they enter thoroughly the soul, and leave it unscathed; others going through both, bring on them, as it were, a kind of earthquake, peculiar (to each) and common to both.

[73] The verb ἀναληπτέον, which means, 1. "To take up again bodily," 2. "To take up again mentally," i. e. to remember, Stalbaum conceives to have been introduced here for the sake of a play on the word μνήμη.

Prot. Be it laid down.

Soc. If we should say that those, which do not go through both, lie hid from our soul, but that those which (do go) through both, do not lie hid, should we speak most correctly?

Prot. How not?

Soc. By no means understand that I am speaking of lying hid, as being in that case somehow the production of forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is the departure of memory.[74] But that has not as yet, in what has been said, been produced. Now of that, which neither is nor has been, it is absurd to say there is any loss. Is it not?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Only then alter the terms.

[66.] *Prot.* How?

Soc. Instead then of (saying that) a thing lies hid from the soul, when it is unscathed by any violent shakings of the body, call that insensibility, which you just now called forgetfulness.[75]

Prot. I understand.

Soc. In the soul and the body, when affected,[76] in common by one circumstance, being moved also in common, you would not speak wide of the mark by naming that motion a sensation.

Prot. You speak most truly.

[67.] *Soc.* Now then do we not understand, what we mean to call sensation?

Prot. How not?

Soc. And a person saying that memory is a preservation of sensation, would correctly say so in my opinion.

Prot. He would correctly.

Soc. Do we not say that memory differs from recollection?

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. Is it not in this?

Prot. In what?

Soc. When, what the soul has once together with the body

[74] A similar sentiment is found in the Banquet, p. 208, A. § 32, and Phædo, p. 75, D. § 54.

[75] Since Protarchus had not as yet mentioned the word λήθη, Schleiermacher and Heindorf suggested ἵνα μὴ λήθην καλῇς, "that you may not call it forgetfulness."

[76] Sydenham acutely saw that γιγνόμενον should be corrected into γιγνόμενα. For a neuter plural adjective thus agrees with substantives of different genders in the singular number, like ψυχὴν and σῶμα.

suffered, this it does itself by itself without the body, as much as possible, recover, we say that it then recollects. Do we not?

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. Moreover, when the soul, after losing the memory of a thing perceived or learnt, brings it back again, itself by itself, in all these[78] instances too we speak of recollections, and memories.[79]

Prot. You speak correctly.

Soc. The reason, for which all this has been said, is this.

Prot. What?

Soc. That we may at the same time[80] understand as clearly as possible[81] the pleasure of the soul apart from that of the body, and, at the same time, desire. For both of these seem likely to be made clear through those.

[68.] *Prot.* Let us then, Socrates, now speak of what is to follow.

Soc. In treating of the generation of pleasure, and of its every form, it is necessary it seems for us to look to many points. For even now we must, it appears, consider,[82] what desire is, and where it is produced.

Prot. Let us then consider; for we shall lose nothing by it.

Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall lose our doubt about them, and this too, after having found what we are in search of.

Prot. You have well defended yourself. Let us then try to discuss what is next in order to these.

Soc. Did we not assert just now, that hunger, and thirst, and many other things of the like kind, were certain desires?

Prot. Yes, strongly.

[69.] *Soc.* Looking, then, to what thing, the same (in all), do we call those differing so much (from one another) by one name?

[78] Ficinus omits *ξύμπαντα*.

[79] As Plato had just before made a distinction between *ἀνάμνησις* and *ανήμη*, he could not have united them here. This Sydenham saw, and wished to read *ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμης ἀνακτήσεις*. I should prefer simply *οὐ* in lieu of *καὶ*—

[80] The Greek is *Ἵνα μὴ*, in lieu of which Grou suggested *Ἵνα δὴ*, adopted by Sydenham; but Heusde, Heindorf, and Schütz, *Ἵνα πῃ*, adopted by Stalbaum. Plato evidently wrote *Ἵν' ἅμα*, to balance the subsequent *καὶ ἅμα*—

[81] Instead of *ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα*, we must either omit *καὶ*, with three MSS., or read *κάλλιστα* from conjecture.

[82] Ficinus has "et nunc primo videndum," as if he had read *σκεπτέον* instead of *λεπτέον*, as remarked by Stalbaum.

Prot. By Zeus, Socrates, it is, perhaps, not easy to say; it must, however, be told.

Soc. Let us from thence[83] take up the inquiry again from the same points.

Prot. From whence?

Soc. Do we not constantly say that thirst is something?[84]

Prot. How not?

Soc. Is not this, to have an emptiness?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Is not thirst a desire?

[85] *Prot.* Yes, for drink.

Soc. For drink? or for a repletion from drink?

Prot. For repletion, I suppose.[85]

Soc. Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, what is contrary to what he is suffering. For being emptied, he desires to be filled.

Prot. Most clearly so.

[70.] *Soc.* What then, is it possible that the person, who is empty for the first time, should apprehend, from any quarter, either from sense or memory, a filling of that, by which he neither is at the present time affected, nor ever was affected heretofore.

Prot. How can it be?

Soc. But, however, the person who desires, desires something.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now he does not desire that which he is suffering. For he is suffering thirst, and that is emptiness; but he desires repletion.[86]

[83] Ficinus omits *ἐκεῖθεν*. Perhaps Plato wrote *Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*—Stalbaum would defend *Ἐκεῖθεν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*, by quoting Euthyd. p. 271, C., *ἐντεῦθέν ποθέν εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου*; and Phædr. p. 229, B., *ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ*. But after the indefinite *ποθεν*, assuredly the name of a definite place could not be thus inserted. Both *ἐκ Χίου* and *ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ* are evidently from a gloss.

[84] Ficinus has "Dicimusne sitire aliquem," which leads to *Διψῆν που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τινα*, and hence *κενοῦται* might be read with all the MSS. but one, which offers *κενοῦσθαι*, similar to "exhaustum esse," in Ficinus. Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had adopted *διψῆν* and *κενοῦσθαι*, in ed. 2 has preferred *διψῇ—κενοῦται*.

[85]—[85] In the arrangement of the speeches Stalbaum follows Bekker, who had followed some of the MSS.

[86] This was a Pythagorean doctrine, as stated by Jamblichus in Vit. Pythag. § 205. See Mahne on Aristoxenus, p. 76, quoted by Stalbaum.

Prot. True.

Soc. Something, therefore, of those belonging to the thirsty person, would have a perception in some manner of repletion.

Prot. Necessarily.

Soc. Now the body is unable; for it is suffering emptiness.

Prot. True.

Soc. It is plain then that it is left for the soul to have a perception, by means of memory, of repletion; for by what means could the soul have such perception?

[71.] *Prot.* Nearly by none.

Soc. Learn we then, what follows from this reasoning?

Prot. What?

Soc. This reasoning shows us that desire is not produced from the body.

Prot. How so?

Soc. Because it shows that the endeavour of every animal is opposed to its sufferings.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Now the inclination, leading to a point opposite to the sufferings, indicates somehow the remembrance of things opposite to those sufferings.

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. The reasoning then, having shown that memory leads to the things desired, discovers the general inclination and desire, and the ruling power of the soul in every animal.

Prot. Most correctly.

Soc. The reasoning then proves that by no means does our body thirst, or hunger, or suffer any of such affections.

Prot. Most true.

[72.] *Soc.* Let us further observe likewise this, respecting these very same things. For the reasoning appears desirous of indicating a certain kind of life in those very things.

Prot. In what things? and of what kind of life are you speaking?

Soc. I mean in the being filled, and emptied, and in all the other things, which relate to the preservation and the destruction of animals; and whether one of us, being in either of these states, (at one time)[87] feels pain and another pleasure, according to the changes (of circumstances).

[87] On the omission of τότε μὲν in the first clause, see Stalbaum.

Prot. It is so.[88]

Soc. But what when a person is in the middle of them?

Prot. How in the middle?

Soc. When on account of a suffering he is pained, and yet has a remembrance of pleasures past,[89] [90] a part indeed of his pain ceases; but pleasant things have not been filled up at that time.[90] [91] Shall we affirm, or deny,[91] that he is in the midst of two contrary states?

Prot. Let us affirm it.

Soc. That he is pained or pleased wholly?

Prot. By Zeus, he is afflicted by some double pain; according to the body, by his suffering; according to the soul, by a certain longing from an expectation.

[73.] *Soc.* How, Protarchus, have you spoken of a doubled pain? Is it not, that at one time one of us, being empty, is in the clear hope of being filled? and at another time, on the contrary, is in a hopeless state?

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Does not the person, who hopes to be filled, seem to you to feel a joy through the recollection (of fulness)? and yet, being empty, at the same time to be in pain?

Prot. He must be so.

Soc. At that time, then, man and other animals are at the same time pained and pleased.

Prot. It seems so.

Soc. But what, when a person, being empty, is hopeless of obtaining repletion? will there not be then that doubled state respecting his pains, on which you just now looked, and thought it was simply doubled.

Prot. Most true, Socrates.

[74.] *Soc.* Now of this inquiry into these feelings let us make this use.

[88] Schleiermacher justly remarks that, as this answer would require a preceding interrogation, there is some error here.

[89] Ficinus has "voluptatum—præteritarum," which leads to γεγενημένων, in lieu of γιγνομένων in three MSS., and γενομένων in others.

[90]—[90] I have translated as if the Greek were παύεται μέν τι τῆς ἀλγήδονος, πεπλήρωται δ' ἡδέα μήπω τῷ τότε, not παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγήδονος πεπλήρωται δὲ μήπω τι τότε. For Ficinus has "cessat quidem tristitia," from whence Stephens elicited παύεται μέν, adopted by Sydenham, and by Stalbaum too in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

[91]—[91] The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus

Prot. What use?

Soc. Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true, or false? or that some of them are true, and others false?

Prot. But how can pleasures or pains, Socrates, be false?

Soc. How then, Protarchus, could fears be true or false? or expectations, true or not? or opinions, true or false?

Prot. Opinions, I would somehow concede, may be; but I would not the others.

Soc. How say you? We are however[92] in danger of raising up a disquisition of not a little kind.

Prot. You say true.

Soc. But whether it relates to what has passed by, O son of that[93] illustrious father, this must be considered.

[75.] *Prot.* Perhaps it ought.

[94] *Soc.* It is meet then to bid farewell to the rest of the disquisition,[95] and to whatever is said beside the purpose.

Prot. True.[94]

Soc. Tell me then, for a wonderment ever continuously seizes

[92] Instead of *μέντοι* Plato probably wrote *μὰ τὸν*, with *θεὸν* understood, as usual.

[93] In lieu of *παῖ κείνου τάνδρὸς* Sydenham wished to read *κλειτοῦ ἀνδρὸς*—But *κλειτὸς* is not found in prose. It would be better to read *κλεινοῦ*—For *κεῖνος* and *κλεινὸς* are frequently confounded, as I have shown at Philoct. 261. But as nothing has been said of the father of Protarchus, Plato wrote, I suspect, *παῖ δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρὸς*—For *δεινὸς*, as shown by Stalbaum on p. 29, A. § 52, *δεινὸς ἀνὴρ*, was applied perpetually to a Sophist, whose son Protarchus was feigned to be; while to show that *δεινὸς* was spoken ironically, the particle *γε* was properly added. Others perhaps would prefer *οὐκ ἄνου του ἀνδρὸς*, i. e. "of some not senseless man;" but *δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρὸς* is far superior. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, conceived that *ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς* was said pointedly and with a ridicule at the person. But *ἐκεῖνος* is never used except in the sense of praise. Besides, as the father of Protarchus does not appear to have been present, Socrates could not point to him. Stalbaum accordingly cancelled this remark in ed. 2, from which I learn that C. F. Hermann, in a Dissertation on Plato's Republic, p. 31, conceives that *ὦ παῖ κείνου τάνδρὸς* was a proverbial expression similar to *φίλη κεφαλή*. But this novel notion Stalbaum is unwilling to admit; and he therefore prints *ὦ παῖ 'κείνου*—with the view of avoiding the objection that *κεῖνος* is never found in Attic prose; nor is *ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ* in correct Greek, as I have shown in Bailey's Hermesianax, p. 78.

[94]—[94] All between the numerals Sydenham has omitted, although duly found both in the Greek and in the Latin of Ficinus.

[95] On *μῆκος* applied by itself to a lengthy discourse, see Stalb.

me respecting those very doubts, which we have now brought forward.

Prot. How say you ?

Soc. Are not (some) pleasures false, but others true ?

Prot. How could they be ?

Soc. Neither then is there[96] a dream by night or by day as you hold, nor in fits of madness or silliness is there a person, who thinks he is pleased, when he is pleased not at all ; nor on the other hand, thinks he is pained, when he is not pained.

Prot. All of us, Socrates, have conceived that all this is the case.

Soc. But have they done so correctly ? Or must we consider whether this has been said correctly or not ?

Prot. We must consider, as I would say.

[76.] *Soc.* Let us then define still more clearly what was just now said respecting pleasure and opinion. For it is surely possible for us to hold an opinion ?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. And to feel a delight.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Moreover that which is held as an opinion, is something.

Prot. How not ?

Soc. And something too that, in which the thing delighted feels a delight.

Prot. Most certainly.

Soc. The thing then that holds an opinion, whether it holds the opinion rightly or not rightly, never loses the reality of holding an opinion.

Prot. For how could it ?

Soc. The thing therefore that feels a delight, whether it feels a delight rightly or not rightly, it is evident it will never lose the reality of feeling a delight.

Prot. Certainly ; and such is the case.

Soc. In what manner then is opinion wont to be to us

[96] As the phrase *οὔτ' ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ* is generally used absolutely, Stalbaum wished to expunge *ἔστιν*. On the other hand, Ficinus found something in his MS. wanting at present in the Greek : for his version is—" Neque igitur revera falsove lætari aut tristari dicitur, ut tu ais—" unless he supplied " lætari aut tristari " out o his own head

false and true; but pleasure only true? [97]for to hold an opinion and to feel a delight, have both equally received the property of a reality.[97]

Prot. (This) we must consider.

Soc. Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion? and that through them it not only becomes opinion, but also of what kind each opinion is? Say you that we must consider this?

Prot. Yes.

[77.] *Soc.* And in addition to this, whether some things are altogether of certain qualities; but that only pleasure and pain are, what they are, and do not become certain qualities, must we agree upon this point likewise?

Prot. Plainly so.

Soc. But it is not difficult to perceive this, that they too are of certain qualities. For we said of old, that pains and pleasures become great and little, and each of them vehemently so.[98]

Prot. By all means.

Soc. And if to any one of these there be added the quality of evil, shall we not say that opinion has thus become evil, and pleasure likewise evil?

Prot. Why not, Socrates?

[78.] *Soc.* What then, if rectitude, or the opposite to rectitude, is added to any of them, shall we not say, that opinion is right, if it possess rectitude, and say the same of pleasure?

Prot. Necessarily so.

Soc. But if what is held as an opinion be mistaken by us, must we not acknowledge that the opinion is erroneous, and not right, [99]and not rightly holding an opinion?[99]

[97]—[97] I have translated as if the Greek were *δοξάζειν γὰρ τὸ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληφε*, instead of *δοξάζειν δὲ ὄντως*—for *δὲ* and *γὰρ* are constantly confounded; and *τὸ*, which is found in one MS. before *δοξάζειν*, has now its proper place before *ὄντως*, and *εἴληφε* now recovers, what it has hitherto wanted, its object.

[98] Ficinus has "magnas et parvas vehementes remissasque fieri." From whence Cornarius elicited *μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφοδραὶ καὶ ἡσυχαίτεραι*, with the decided approbation of Stalbaum in ed. 1, but which he rejects as an interpolation in ed. 2.

[99]—[99] This is the literal version of the Greek, *οὐδ' ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν*: which is not very clear. Sydenham translates it "and that we are

Prot. For how could we?[100]

Soc. But what, if we discover (any) pain or pleasure mistaken about that, in which it is pained, or effected contrariwise, shall we give to it the epithet of right, or good, or any other of honourable appellations?

Prot. It is impossible, if pleasure shall have been mistaken.

[79.] *Soc.* And yet pleasure seems often to be produced in us, accompanied, not with a right opinion, but with a false one.

Prot. How not? And the opinion, Socrates, in that case, and at that time, we say[1] is a false opinion; but the pleasure itself, no man would ever call it false.

Soc. You very readily, Protarchus, support your argument about pleasure on the present occasion.

Prot. (I do) nothing else but say what I hear.

Soc. With us, my friend, makes there no difference the pleasure, accompanied with right opinion and science, and that which is often produced in each of us, accompanied with a false opinion and ignorance.[2]

[80.] *Prot.* It is probable there is no little difference.

Soc. Let us then come to the view of the difference between them.

Prot. Lead by whatever road it seems good.

Soc. I lead then by this.

Prot. By what?

Soc. We say there is a false opinion, and there is likewise a true one.

Prot. There is.

Soc. Upon them, as we just now said, pleasure and pain oftentimes attend; I mean, upon opinion true and false.

Prot. Certainly so.

not right ourselves in entertaining such an opinion." Ficinus has "Et, si quod opinione comprehenditur, sit fallax, nonne opinionem falsam potius quam rectam vocabimus," from which it is evident that he did not find in his MS. the concluding clause.

[100] I cannot perceive to what ἂν in Πῶς γὰρ ἂν is to be referred.

[1] Stalbaum would read λέγομεν for ἐλέγομεν. For the question is not about a past act, but a present one.

[2] Ficinus, by his version "ignorantiam," has alone led to the true reading, ἀγνοίας, first elicited by Cornarius, in lieu of the incorrect ἀνοίας found in all the MSS.

Soc. From memory and sensation is not opinion [3]and the attempt to hold an opinion thoroughly[3] produced on every occasion?

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Do we, then, deem it necessary for us to have ourselves thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. Would you say that it often happens to a person looking from a distance, on things not very clearly discerned, to be willing to form a judgment of them?

Prot. I would say so.

[81.] *Soc.* Upon this, would not the person question himself thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. What is that, which appears to be standing under a tree by the cliff there? Does it not seem to you that a person would speak these words to himself, looking at some such things as perchance appeared to him?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Hereupon would not such a person, as if giving an answer, say to himself, speaking conjecturingly, It is a man?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. But carried beside (the truth),[4] he would perhaps say of[5] the figure clearly discerned, that it is the work of some shepherds.

[3]—[3] As the verb *διαδοξάζειν* is found only in this passage, its meaning has been guessed at by Stalbaum, who translates it by "conjectando discernere," i. e. "to discern by conjecturing:" while Ficinus renders *καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν*, (or *ἐγχωρεῖν*, for both words are found in MSS.,) "fitque ut opinione pro arbitrio disseramus." I confess myself at a loss.

[4] So Stalbaum, with Ast, in ed. 2, understands *παρενεχθείς*. But as at the moment, when the party was thus conversing with himself, he is supposed to be ignorant of the truth, there would be no allusion to it. In ed. 1, his rendering is "he passed by," i. e. "he approached passing by." But he who, after passing by an object, continues to walk on, instead of coming nearer to it, only recedes farther from it. The sense evidently requires *προσενεχθεὶς*, as proposed, I suspect, by some scholar, against whom he has directed his remark—"Temere tentaveris *προσενεχθείς*." Ficinus has "mutata sententia."

[5] Since the figure is supposed to be clearly discerned, and to be spoken of distinctly as the work of some shepherds, one would expect that, as shepherds are not generally carvers in wood, something definite would be stated touching the figure carved by such hands. In lieu then of

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. And if any one were present, he would express by his voice to the person present, what he had said to himself, and repeat the very same words; and thus, what we lately termed an opinion, becomes a speech.

[82.] *Prot.* How not?

Soc. But if he were alone, thinking continuously within himself upon this very same thing, he walks on keeping it in his mind sometimes for even a rather long period.

Prot. Assuredly.

Soc. Well then, does that, which takes place respecting these things, appear to you as it does to me?

Prot. What is it?

Soc. The soul in that case seems to me to resemble some book.[6]

Prot. How?

Soc. The memory coinciding with our sensations, and those affections which are about them, seem to me almost at that time to write in our souls[7] speeches. And when this suffering[8] writes what is true, there result from it true opinions, and true speeches are produced within us; but when such a scribe within us writes what is false, there results what is contrary to the truth.

Prot. So it seems entirely to me; and I receive what has been stated.

Soc. Admit likewise, that there is another workman existing at that time within us.

Prot. Who is he?

Soc. A painter, who, after the writer of what has been mentioned, paints of such things the representations in the soul.

Prot. How and when say we this person does[9] so?

προσείπω Plato wrote, I suspect, Πανὸς εἴπω, for the human-like figure, made by shepherds, would be that of their tutelary deity, Pan.

[6] In like manner Locke compares the mind to a sheet of paper.

[7] On the phrase γράφειν ἐν ψυχαῖς, see Menage on Diog. L. vi. p. 319 Valckenaer on Callimach. Fr. p. 246; Blomfield on Prometh. 814; myself on Æsch. Suppl. 168. Shakspeare has "And thy commandment all alone shall live Within the book and volume of my brain."

[8] I cannot understand τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα. Ficinus has "passionem hujusmodi veram opinionem dicimus," as if his MS. offered τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα δόξαν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν.

[9] In lieu of αὖ, which is quite unintelligible, one MS. has οὖν which leads to δρᾶν, answering to "agere," in Ficinus.

Soc. (It is) when a person, having taken away from sight, or from any other sense, what have been imagined by and mentioned (to himself), sees somehow within himself the representations of what have been imagined by and spoken (to himself). Or does this not take place within us?

Prot. (It takes place) very much so.

Soc. The representations then of true thoughts and speeches are true; but those of the false are false.

Prot. By all means.

[83.] *Soc.* Now if we have spoken thus far correctly, let us still consider in addition likewise this.

Prot. What?

Soc. Whether it is necessary for us to be affected thus, with respect to things present and past, but not the future.

Prot. With respect to all time in a similar manner.

Soc. Were not the pleasures and pains, felt by the soul alone, asserted before to be such, that they would arise prior to those felt by the body; so that it happens to us to feel antecedently pain and pleasure, [10]about the time about to be produced?[10]

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Do then the writings and the pictures, which we laid down a little before, as being produced within us, have regard to the past and present time, but not to the future?

Prot. Very much about the future.[11]

Soc. Do you strongly assert that all these things are expectations of the future; and that we are, through all life, full of expectations?

Prot. Entirely so.

[84.] *Soc.* Now then, in addition to what has been said, answer this likewise.

Prot. What?

Soc. A man just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not god-loved?

[10]—[10] I can scarcely understand *μέλλοντα εἶναι γιγνόμενον*. For though *εἶναι γιγνόμενον* is correct Greek, as shown by Stalbaum, *μέλλων* is not elsewhere united to those words. Plato wrote, I suspect, *περὶ τὸ ἀνὰ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον*, i. e. "about the thing produced in the course of time to come," where *τὸ ἀνὰ* might easily have been lost through *τὸν*.

[11] In lieu of *σφόδρα γε*, Ficinus has, more correctly, "ad omnia," although *σφόδρα* seems to be supported by *σφόδρα λέγεις* in the next question of Socrates.

Prot. How not?

Soc. What then, is not a man unjust and entirely wicked, the reverse of the other?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Now every man, as we said just now, is full of many expectations.

Prot. Why not?

Soc. There are speeches within each of us, which we call expectations.

Prot. Yes.

Soc. And phantasies also are painted (in us). [12]For one often sees a deal of money belonging to himself, and many pleasures in addition to it, and he views himself painted within himself, as highly delighted.[12]

Prot. Why not?

Soc. Of these phantasies, shall we say that the true are painted and placed before the good, for the most part, on account of these persons being god-loved, but the contrary before the bad, for the most part? or shall we deny it?

Prot. We must assert it strongly.

Soc. To wicked men, then, likewise pleasures are present painted within them; but these are of the false kind.

Prot. How not?

[85.] *Soc.* Wicked men, therefore, for the most part delight in false pleasures; but the good, in the true.

Prot. You assert what is most necessary.

Soc. According then to this reasoning, there are in the souls of men false pleasures; imitating however, in a ridiculous way, the true; and similar is the case with pains.

Prot. There are.

Soc. It is possible then for a person, who holds upon every thing an opinion, to hold always an opinion really[13] upon things which are not, nor have been, and, sometimes, on such as will never be?

Prot. Certainly.

[12]—[12] Ficinus evidently found in his MS. something superior to the common text. For his version is "Nam cuique licet fingere se cumulum auri maximum possidere, oblectamentisque variis abundantem, omni suavitate perfundi." Here in the Greek, in lieu of ἐπ' αὐτῷ, one would prefer ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (χρυσοῦ), "from it—"

[13] In lieu of οὕτως, Sydenham suggested ὄντως, and so three MSS.

Soc. And these are they that effect at that time a false opinion, and the thinking falsely. Is it not?

Prot. Yes, it is.

[86.] *Soc.* Well then, must we not attribute in return to pains and pleasures a state in them the counterpart[14] of that in the others?

Prot. How?

Soc. That it is possible for a person, who feels a delight upon every thing, in any manner whatever, and at random, to feel always really a delight, not only from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were, but frequently too, and, perhaps, the most frequently, from things which are never about to be?

Prot. This, too, must of necessity be the case.

[87.] *Soc.* Would there not be the same reasoning as regards fears and desires, and all things of that kind, that all such are sometimes false?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, can we say of opinions, that they are evil, [15][and advantageous,] any otherwise than as being false?[15]

Prot. Not otherwise.

Soc. And pleasures, I think, we conceive are bad on no other account, except by their being false.

Prot. It is quite the contrary, Socrates, (to what)[16] you have said. For hardly would any man attribute to falsehood that pains and pleasures are very evil, but that they fall in with wickedness much and of many-kind by some other way.[17]

Soc. Of pleasures that are evil, and are such through wicked-

[14] The word in Greek is *ἀντίστροφον*, in allusion to the antistrophé in the chorus of a Greek play, which is the counterpart of the strophé in the number of lines, and of the number and kind of syllables in each line.

[15]—[15] Stalbaum rejects the words *καὶ χρηστὰς* as an interpolation. Ficinus has, "Num opiniones ob aliud bonas vel pravas quam quod veræ et falsæ sint, appellamus?" From whence Cornarius supplied the next sentence, *ἢ ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀληθεῖς*. But more correctly the margin of one MS. has *ἢ ὅτι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς*.

[16] Stalbaum explains *τούναντίον εἴρηκας* by "you have said the contrary to what should be said." He did not therefore see that Plato wrote, as I have translated—*Σώκρατες, ἔστ' ἢ εἴρηκας*: for thus *ἢ* follows *τούναντίον*, in p. 35, A. § 69, and in the other passages quoted there by Stalbaum.

[17] Ficinus has, "in maximam ac multiplicem pravitatem aliter incidentes." He found therefore in his MS. *μεγάλῃ δὲ καὶ πολλῇ ἄλλως πως συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ*.

ness, we will speak shortly afterwards, if so it seem good to us. But of those that are false and many and oftentimes existing and produced in us in yet another way, we must say a word. For perhaps we shall make use of it for our decisions.

Prot. How not? if indeed they exist.

Soc. And there are such, Protarchus, at least in my opinion. But as long as this doctrine lies by us (unexamined),[18] it is impossible for it to be disproved.

Prot. Fairly (said).

[88.] *Soc.* Let us then stand up, like combatants, against this reasoning.

Prot. Let us come on.

Soc. We said, if we remember, a little while before, that, when what are the so-called desires remain in us, the body is at that time laid hold of by its affections in two ways, and apart from the soul.

Prot. We remember; (for) so it was said.

Soc. The soul therefore was that which desired a condition contrary to that of the body; but that, which imparted any pain or pleasure through any circumstance, was the body.

Prot. It was so.

Soc. Now reckon together what takes place in these.

Prot. Say what.

Soc. It takes place then, when such is the case, that at the same time pains and pleasures lie by each others' side; and that at the same time the sensations respecting these, being contrary, are by the side of each other as has just now appeared.

Prot. It appears so.

[89.] *Soc.* Has not this also been said, and is laid down, as having been agreed upon as before?

Prot. What?

Soc. That pain and pleasure, both of them receive "the more" and "the less;" and that they belong to the limitless.

Prot. It has been said; what then?

[18] Sydenham tacitly introduced "unexamined—" for he saw that without that word the reasoning would be incomplete. One MS. has however preserved a most remarkable reading, although from correction, ἕως ἂν κέηται ἀνέλεγκτον, ἀδύνατον δή που τὰς κρίσεις ἡμῖν εὖ γίγνεσθαι—i. e. "as long as it remains disproved, it is surely impossible for our decisions to turn out well." This is the very sense required; while the Greek is in every way worthy of Plato.

Soc. (There is) then[19] some plan for judging of these correctly.

Prot. Where, and how?[20]

Soc. Does not * the design of our decision respecting them aim at distinguishing them on each occasion by such marks as these, which of them as compared with each other is the greater, and which the less; and which is more and which (less)[21] intense pain, as compared with pleasure, and pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure?

Prot. Such these things are, and such is the design of our decision.

Soc. Well now, in the case of vision, to see magnitudes far off and near causes the truth to disappear, and makes us to have false opinions. And does not the very same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?

Prot. Rather much more, Socrates.

Soc. What has happened now is surely contrary to what occurred a little before.

Prot. Of what are you speaking?

Soc. In that case the opinions themselves, being false and true, infected at the same time pains and pleasures with their own state of suffering.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. But now, through being on each occasion changed in position, and viewed far off and near, and at the same time placed by each other, the pleasures appear greater and more intense as compared with the pains; and the pains, on the other hand, compared with the pleasures (appear) the contrary to those.

[19] In lieu of *τις οὖν* we must read *ἔστ' οὖν*. For the indefinite *τις* cannot commence a sentence in correct Greek, although Hermann, on Viger, p. 730, whom Stalbaum has followed, says it can.

[20] Instead of *πῇ*, Heindorf and Schleiermacher suggested *ποία*—and so Sydenham—"What way."

* Instead of *εἰ* the MS. of Ficinus had *οὐ*, as shown by his "Nonne—"

[21] Stalbaum, who in ed. 1 wished to read *καὶ τίς ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα*, and in Var. Lect. *μᾶλλον χαλαρὰ*, now defends *καὶ μᾶλλον*, thus introduced between *ἐλάττων* and *σφοδροτέρα*. I should prefer *τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς ἧττον*. For these two adverbs are opposed to each other in the passages quoted by himself in ed. 2. Phædo, p. 93, B., *μᾶλλόν τε—καὶ πλειων—ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων*. Protagor. p. 356, A., *πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*. Hipp. Mag. p. 299, D., *μείζων—ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον*.

Prot. For such things to arise through such means, is a matter of necessity.

[90.] *Soc.* As far therefore as each appear greater and less than they really are, if you cut off what each appears to be, but is not, you will neither say that it appears correctly, nor, on the other hand, will you dare to say that the additional part of pain and pleasure is correct and true.

Prot. By no means.

Soc. Next then in order after these we will look, if we can meet with[22] them here, upon pleasures and pains still more false than those, which both appear to be and are in animals.

Prot. Of what are you speaking, and how?

[91.] *Soc.* It has been often said, that when the nature of each thing is being destroyed by mixtures and separations, by repletions and evacuations, by increase and decrease, pains, and aches, and throes, and every thing else that bear suchlike names, do happen to be produced.

Prot. Yes, this has been said frequently.

Soc. But that when things return to their natural state, we have received this recovery as a pleasure from ourselves.

Prot. Right.

Soc. But how is it, when none of these things shall have taken place?

Prot. When could this be, Socrates?

Soc. The question, Protarchus, which you have now asked is nothing to the purpose.

Prot. How so?

Soc. Because it does not hinder me from putting again my question to you.

[92.] *Prot.* What question?

Soc. If nothing of this kind, I will say, Protarchus, took place, what must of necessity result to us from it?

Prot. Do you mean when the body is not moved either way?

Soc. Exactly so.

Prot. It is plain, Socrates, that in such case there would be neither pleasure nor any pain at all.

Soc. You have spoken extremely well. But I suppose you mean this, that it is necessary for some of these things to

[22] Ficinus has—"in medium afferamus," as if he had found in his MS. ἐπάγωμεν instead of ἀπαντῶμεν.

happen to us continually, as say the wise. For all things, going upwards and downwards, are in a perpetual[23] flow.

Prot. So they say indeed, and seem to speak not badly.

Soc. For how should they (speak badly), not being bad themselves.[24] But from this reasoning, which is rushing against us, I wish to secretly withdraw. I design then to run away by this road ; and do you fly with me.

Prot. Say by what road ?

[93.] *Soc.* Let us say, then, to these wise men, "Be it so." But do you give an answer to this—Whatever any animal suffers, does it, while suffering, perceive that continually ? and neither while growing, or suffering any such (change), are we unconscious of it? or is it quite the reverse? for almost every thing of this kind has lain hid from us.

Prot. Quite the reverse.

Soc. That therefore which was just now said, was said by us not correctly, that all changes, which take place up and down, produce pains or pleasures.

Prot. Why not ?[25]

Soc. In this way the assertion will be better, and less liable to censure.

Prot. How ?

Soc. That great changes produce in us pains and pleasures ; but the moderate and trifling neither of them at all.

Prot. In this manner it is more correctly said than in the other, Socrates.

Soc. If then these things are so, the life mentioned just now would come back again.

Prot. What life ?

Soc. That which we said was without pain and pleasures.

Prot. You speak most truly.

[94.] *Soc.* From hence let us lay down for ourselves three kinds of life, one pleasant, another painful, and one neutral. Or how would you say respecting them ?

Prot. Not otherwise myself than in this way, that there are three kinds of life.

[23] On this saying of Heracleitus see Cratyl. p. 402, A. § 42.

[24] So in Euthyd. p. 284, E. § 33, *τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς—φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι.* Aristoph. Thesm. 168, *Ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποεῖ.*

[25] The phrase, *τί μήν*, which generally means "why so," is here to be translated "why not," as I have rendered it frequently elsewhere.

Soc. To feel no pain therefore cannot be the same thing as to feel a pleasure.

Prot. How can it?

Soc. When therefore you hear that to live through all life without pain, is the most pleasant of all things, what do you understand that a person[26] so saying means?

Prot. Such a person[27] seems to me at least to mean that it is a pleasure not to feel a pain.

Soc. Of any three things, whatever you like, existing, lay down, in order that we may adopt the names of things rather pretty, one gold, another silver, and another neither gold nor silver.

Prot. It is so laid down.

Soc. Is it possible for that which is neither, to become either gold or silver?

Prot. (No); for how could it?

Soc. The middle life then being said to be[28] pleasant or painful, would not be correctly thought to be so, should any so think it; nor, should any one so speak of it, would it be so spoken of according at least to a correct reasoning.

Prot. (No); for how could it?

[95.] *Soc.* And yet, my friend, we perceive there are those, who thus speak and think.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Do then those persons feel pleasure[29] at the time, when they are not pained?

[26] The person alluded to was probably Aristippus, who wrote a treatise in defence of Pleasure. But as he and Plato were no friends, the latter seems to have been unwilling to mention his name; and hence we can understand who was meant by *δεινοῦ γ' ἀνδρὸς*, in § 74, as I have corrected.

[27] I have followed the MS. which alone reads *ὁ τοιοῦτος* instead of *οὗτος*.

[28] Stalbaum justly objects to *λεγόμενος*, for it is at variance with the subsequent supposition. Ficinus has avoided the difficulty by his abridged version, "Vita igitur media, si quando suavis vel mæsta dicitur aut existimatur, nequaquam recte vel existimatur vel dicitur."

[29] I think we ought to read *χαίρουσιν οὗτοι*, instead of *χαίρειν οἴονται*. For otherwise, in the next sentence, where *χαίρειν οἴονται* is properly repeated, there would be a tautology. S. So too Schütz, in Opuscul. p. 133, suggested *λέγουσι* for *οἴονται*, to answer to *φασὶ* in the reply of Protarchus. But Stalbaum says that *φασὶ γοῦν* is to be referred to *οἴονται χαίρειν*

Prot. So they say.

Soc. They think therefore they are pleased then; for otherwise they would not say so.

Prot. It nearly seems so.

Soc. They have then a false opinion of pleasure, if the natures of the two things, to be not pained and to be pleased, are separate from each other.[30]

Prot. And different indeed they were.

Soc. Shall we choose then that there are, as (we said) just now, three things, or that only two are to be mentioned, pain, an evil to man, and deliverance from pain, a pleasure, as being the good itself.[31]

[96.] *Prot.* How is it, Socrates, that we are asked this by ourselves at the present time? for I do not understand.

Soc. In fact, Protarchus, you do not understand who are the enemies of Philebus here.

Prot. Whom do you call such?

Soc. They, who are said to be very skilled in natural philosophy, assert that pleasures do not exist at all.

Prot. How so?

Soc. (They say) that all those things, which the partisans of Philebus call pleasures, are but escapes from pain.

Prot. Do you then advise us, Socrates, to hearken to them? or how?

Soc. Not so; but to use them as a kind of diviners; who divine not by any art, but, from the austerity of the not ignoble nature of those, who had a great hate of the power of pleasure, and have held nothing in her to be sound; so that her attraction is merely a witchcraft and not [true] pleasure. In this way then we should use them, especially if we consider their other austerities. But afterwards you shall hear what seem to me to be true pleasures, in order that, after viewing from both accounts her power, we may place ourselves (so as to come) to a decision.

Prot. You speak correctly.

Soc. Let us then go after them, as our allies, along the track of their austerity. For I suppose they assert some

[30] Stalbaum quotes very aptly Aristoph. Thesm. 11, Χωρὶς γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἑκατέρου 'στὶν ἡ φύσις, Τοῦ μήτ' ἀκούειν μήθ' ὁρᾶν.

[31] I have translated, as if the Greek were αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν, and not αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν—

such thing as this, beginning from some point above,[32] that, if we wish to know the nature of any species whatever of things, for instance, of the hard, whether by looking to the hardest things, should we thus better understand than to those endued with hardness in the least. Now, Protarchus, you must give an answer, as if to myself, to these austere persons likewise.

[97.] *Prot.* By all means; and I say to them, that (we must look) to the first in magnitude.

Soc. If then we wish to know the genus of pleasure, and what kind of nature it has, we must look not to the least, but to those called the extreme and violent.

Prot. On this point every one would agree with you for the present.

Soc. Do not the pleasures then, which are within reach, and still more[33] the greatest, as we often say, belong to the body?

Prot. (Yes); for how not?

Soc. Are then the pleasures, which exist in, and are generated about, persons in bad health, greater than those about persons in good health? Now let us take care, lest we stumble by answering precipitately.

Prot. How so?

Soc. For perhaps we might say those about persons in good health.

Prot. Probably.

Soc. But what, are not those pleasures the superior, which the strongest desires precede.[34]

Prot. This indeed is true.

[98.] *Soc.* But do not both[35] they, who are in a fever, and those afflicted with diseases of that kind, thirst more, and shiver more, and suffer more all that persons are wont to

[32] The Greek is *ποθὲν ἄνωθεν*. But in this formula the indefinite *ποθὲν* always follows the definite word, as shown by the passages quoted by Heindorf on Phædrus, p. 229, B. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ἀμόθεν ποθὲν*, found in Gorg. p. 492, D. Legg. vii. p. 798, B.

[33] By reading *καὶ πέρα γε* for *αἴπερ καὶ*, we meet the difficulty felt by Stalb. in ed. 1. So *καὶ πέρα γε* in Philoct. 1271.

[34] H. Stephens, in Schediasm. Var. ii. p. 26, was the first to read *προγίγνωνται* instead of *προσγίγνωνται*; which Stalbaum, in ed. 2, defends, after he had rejected it in ed. 1.

[35] Since the majority of the best MSS. read *ὅτι* for *οἱ*, it is evident that Plato wrote *οἵ τε*—

do in the body, and are more conversant with the want [36] of those things, in which,[36] being supplied, they feel a greater pleasure? Or shall we deny all this to be true?

Prot. It appears to be altogether as now stated.[37]

Soc. What then, should we appear to speak[38] correctly by saying, that, if any one would know what are the greatest pleasures, he must not go and look upon the healthy, but upon the sick? But be careful not to conceive that I am designing to ask you this, whether those in very ill health feel more pleasures than those in good health; but conceive that I am inquiring about the greatness of pleasure, and where (and)[39] when the intensity belonging to such a feeling is on every occasion produced. For we are to consider, we say, what is the nature of pleasure, and what they call it, who assert that it does not exist at all.

Prot. But[40] I nearly follow your argument.

[99.] *Soc.* Perchance, Protarchus, you will show[41] it not

[36]—[36] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἐνδείᾳ—ῶν*, not *ἐνδείᾳ—καὶ*. Ficinus has "quo fit, ut magis indigeant, indigentiamque replentes vehementius delectentur;" from which Stephens was led to *ἀποπληρούμενοι*, adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2.

[37] Ficinus has "Omnino, ut dictum est, apparet," which evidently leads to *Πάνυ μὲν εἶναι, οἷον ἦν ῥηθὲν, φαίνεται*, in lieu of *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται*, where Protarchus does not, as he should do, give a decisive opinion. Hence Stephens was led to suggest *ὀρθῶς* before *ῥηθὲν*, as in p. 61, E., *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς*: of which Stalb. approved in ed. 1, but silently rejects in ed. 2.

[38] In the formula *ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινόμεθα λέγοντες*, the verb *λέγειν* cannot be omitted, as I have shown on Criton, § 8, n. 10, and to the passages there quoted I could add full twenty more. Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *φρονεῖν φαινοίμεθα*, for his version is "sentire videbimur, asserentes."

[39] Instead of *ποῦ ποτε*, i. e. "where in the world," I have translated as if the Greek were *ποῦ καὶ πότε*— Stalbaum, in ed. 1, wished to read *οἷόν ποτε*, but he tacitly rejects it in ed. 2.

[40] In lieu of the unintelligible *ἀλλὰ*, omitted by Ficinus, Plato wrote, I suspect, *καλῶς*.

[41] Here too in *δείξεις* scholars are at a loss. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, adopted *δείξει*, the conjecture of Heindorf and Schleiermacher, understanding *αὐτὸ*—But such an ellipse could not be admitted in correct Greek Of this he was no doubt aware; for in ed. 2 he rejects it, and is half inclined to receive *δράσεις*, proposed by some critic not mentioned. Winckelmann would read *οὐχ ἧττον ἑξῆς*, referring to p. 29, D., *σχεδὸν—μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς ἑποῦ*: but there *ἑξῆς* belongs to *μετὰ τοῦτο*, not to *ἕπου*. I suspect that Plato wrote *οὐχ ἧττον εὖ ἕξεις*, i. e. "you will be not the less well off." And thus *εὖ* confirms, and is in turn confirmed by, *καλῶς* just before.

the less. For answer me—In a life of riot do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean more in number, but exceeding in intensity and vehemence—than those in a life of temperance? Give your mind to the question, and tell me.

Prot. Nay, but I understand what you mean; and I see the one that is greatly superior. For the saying that has become a proverb, and which exhorts to "nothing too much," on every occasion restrains somehow the temperate who obey it. But intense pleasure possesses even to madness the race of the silly and riotous, and makes them in bad repute.

Soc. Excellent. For if this be the case, it is evident that the greatest pleasures, and likewise the greatest pains, are produced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, and not in their virtuous state.

Prot. Certainly.

[100.] *Soc.* Ought then one not to select some of the pleasures, and to consider what condition they had, when we called them the greatest?

Prot. It is necessary.

Soc. Consider now what condition have the pleasures arising from maladies of such a kind.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. The unseemly; which they, whom we called the austere, thoroughly hate.

Prot. What pleasures?

Soc. For instance, the curing the itch by scratching, and such others of a kind as need no other remedy; for as to this affection, forsooth, what, by the gods, shall we call it, pleasure or pain?

Prot. This, Socrates, seems to be a kind of mixed evil.[42]

Soc. It was not however for the sake of Philebus that I brought forward this argument; but without these pleasures and those that follow them, unless they were seen, we should have scarcely been able to decide upon the object of the present inquiry.

[42] This introduction of the idea of evil Stalbaum explains in ed. 2, by saying that Protarchus with some subtlety calls that an evil, which Socrates wished to know whether it was a pleasure or a pain. But in ed. 1 he stated that Protarchus plays on the ambiguity in the word πάθος, to which κακὸν is to be referred; unless indeed it alludes to the idea of the wickedness in the soul and body.

Prot. We must then proceed to such as have an affinity with them.

[101.] *Soc.* Do you mean those, that have some communion by their mixture?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Of these mixtures then, some belonging to the body, are in the bodies alone; others belonging to the soul alone, are in the soul; but those of the soul and body we shall find to be pains mixed with pleasures, called unitedly at one time pleasures, at another time pains.

Prot. How?

Soc. When a person in a restored or decaying state suffers at the same time two contrary affections, (and)[43] when shivering warms himself, and sometimes cools himself when heated, seeking, I presume, to enjoy the one and to be relieved from the other, [44]the so-called sweet mixed with bitter being present with a difficulty of deliverance causes an impatience, and a fierce standing together.[44]

Prot. And very true is what has been now said.

[102.] *Soc.* Are not the mixtures of this kind composed some of pain and pleasure in equal proportion, and others of either[45] in a greater one?

Prot. How not?

Soc. [46]Say then that, when the pains are more than the

[43] It appears to me that correct Greek demands the insertion of *καὶ* here; or else we must read *θέρεται* and *ψύχεται* in lieu of *θέρηται* and *ψύχηται*, similar to "calescit" and "refrigescit" in Ficinus.

[44]—[44] Such is the literal English version of the unintelligible Greek—*τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρὸν ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον ξύστασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ*: It appears to me that *ὕστερον* leads to *πρότερον*: and that the words *τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον γλυκὺ πικρῷ μεμιγμένον* is an entire Iambic verse, and *δυσαπαλλακτίας* and *ἀγρίαν ποεῖ* the ends of two others; and lastly, that some words have dropt out, that should be opposed to *δυσαπαλλακτίας*, *ἀγανάκτησιν* and *ξύστασιν*, as read in some MSS., or *ξύντασιν*, in others. For otherwise there will be no proof of the *πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον*. To show however that Ficinus was as much in the dark as others, I will give his version—"quod utique dicitur amaro dulce permixtum cum difficultate rejectiones assistens, molestiam ac deinde ferum congressum conficit."

[45] Instead of *ἑτέρων*, "others," Ficinus found in his MS. *ἑκατέρων*, what the sense requires, as shown by his version, "ex alterutro excedente."

[46]—[46] Such is the literal English translation of the Latin version, made

pleasures, those, which have been just now mentioned, belong to the itch and to tinglings. When there is within that, which boils and is inflamed, and a person by rubbing and scratching does not reach it, but only diffuses what is on the surface, then those inflaming the labouring parts, and by that very thing, through the want of remedies, changing to the contrary, at one time they procure immense pleasures, at another, on the contrary, from the internal parts they bring to the pains of the external parts, pleasures mixed with pains, according as a thing inclines this way or that; because things mixed together violently disjoin, or separated violently unite, and at the same time place pains by the side of pleasures.[46]

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Hence, when on the other hand more pleasure is mingled, according to all such things, the slightly-mingled portion of pain [47]tickles and causes there to be a slight uneasiness:[47] but, on the other hand,[48] [49]the much greater pleasure being infused, puts on the stretch, and sometimes causes to leap, and working out all kinds of colour, all kinds of posture, and all kinds of breathings, it works out every stupor and exclamations accompanied with madness.[49]

Prot. Entirely so.

[103.] *Soc.* And it causes, my friend, a person to say of himself, and another likewise (to say), that, delighted with such pleasures, he is, as it were, dying. And these pleasures

by Stalbaum in his second edition; where he conceives that φέροντες εἰς πῦρ does not mean "bringing to a fire," but "producing an inflammation." The passage is very perplexing, and until better MSS. are discovered, we shall perhaps never know what Plato wrote.

[47]—[47] Sydenham's freer translation seems to convey, what Plato intended to say—"the smaller quantity of pain creates but a slight uneasiness, and no more than what serves to tickle."

[48] Instead of αὐτῆς Sydenham was the first to read αὖ τῆς—found subsequently in all the MSS., and similar to "iterum" in Ficinus. The emendation is attributed to Schleiermacher by Stalbaum.

[49]—[49] Here again Sydenham's vivid paraphrase will give perhaps a better idea of the meaning of this passage, than can be obtained from any literal translation: "The greater excess of pleasure spread throughout convulses the whole frame, and sometimes causes involuntary motion, producing also every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of posture in the limbs, and every different degree of respiration, and within the soul it energizes in transports uttered madly in exclamations."

by all means and for ever is he pursuing, so much the more, as he happens to be more unrestrained, and less prudent; and he calls them the greatest, and reckons him the happiest of men, who lives the most in them.

Prot. You have gone through, Socrates, all that happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own estimate.

[104.] *Soc.* At least, Protarchus, as regards the pleasures [50]which are in the common affections of the body alone, those on the superficies and the body having been mingled.[50] But with regard to those in the soul, [51]the contrary confer with the body,[51] both pain towards pleasure, and pleasure towards pain, so that both come to one mixture; these we have detailed before, as when [52](a person), on the other hand, is emptied, he desires repletion,[52] but being emptied he is pained. To these points we did not then appeal as evidence; but we now say, that in all those cases, infinite in number, where the soul is different from the body, one mixture of pain and pleasure is produced and comes together.

Prot. You appear nearly to speak most correctly.

[105.] *Soc.* There is then among the mixtures of pain and pleasure, still one remaining.

Prot. Of what kind are you speaking?

Soc. The mixture which we said the soul alone oftentimes receives from itself.

Prot. How then do we say the same thing again?[53]

Soc. Anger, and fear, and desire, and lamentation, and love,

[50]—[50] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "De voluptatibus, quæ in communibus corporis passionibus extrinsecus intrinsecusve miscentur." But in that case the syntax would require *ἡδονῶν—κερασθεισῶν* in lieu of *κερασθέντων*.

[51]—[51] A literal version of an intricate text, that Buttmann, Ast, Winckelmann, and Stalbaum have been unable to unravel. They have all suggested different alterations, none of which are perfectly satisfactory. Ficinus has given this version of the passage, "De iis vero, quæ miscentur in anima, contraria quædam ad corpus conjiciuntur, voluptatem scilicet cum dolore, et dolorem cum voluptate in unam mixtionem concurrere," which is quite as unintelligible as the Greek.

[52]—[52] This is another difficult passage, for which Stalbaum proposes to read, *ὡς ὅταν μὲν πληρῶταί τις, χαίρει, ὅταν δ' αὖ κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ*, i. e. "that when a person is filled, he feels delight, but when emptied, he desires repletion."

[53] Instead of *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, Ast would read, what Stalbaum considers a specious conjecture, *τοῦτ' αὖ*—Plato doubtless wrote *αὖ ταὐτὸ*, as I have translated.

and emulation, and envy, and all other such passions, do you not lay down these as certain pains of the soul alone?

Prot. I do.

Soc. And shall we not find these very passions fraught with boundless pleasures? Or need we be reminded of that,[54] which leads a very prudent person to be harsh [55][through his passion and rage];[55]

And which than honey dropping is more sweet; (Il. xviii. 107.)

and that in our lamentations and regrets, pleasures have been mixed up with pains?

Prot. No (we need not). But in this way and in no other would these happen to be produced.

[106.] *Soc.* And do you not remember at the representations of tragedies, when persons weep in the midst of joy?[56]

Prot. How not?

Soc. And have you perceived the disposition of your soul during a comedy, how that there a mixture of pain and pleasure is found?

Prot. I do not well comprehend.

Soc. For it is not altogether easy, Protarchus, at such a time, to understand a feeling of this kind in every case.

Prot. To me at least it is not at all easy.

Soc. Let us, however, lay hold of it so much the more, as it is the more obscure, in order that one may be able in other cases to discover more easily the mixture of pain and pleasure.

Prot. Say on.

Soc. The name just now mentioned of envy, will you set it down as a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. And yet the man who envies will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils of his neighbours.[57]

Prot. Clearly so.

[54] By reading *ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ* instead of *ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι τὸ*, we shall restore at once the syntax and sense.

[55]—[55] The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus in ed. pr. But his translation is in this passage much too free to enable the reader to see what he really found in his MS. They were subsequently rejected by Fischer, whom Stalbaum and the Zurich editors have followed.

[56] There is a similar idea in Æsch. Agam. 261, Χαρά μ' ὑφέρπει δάκρυον ἐκαλουμένη, imitated from the Homeric Δακρυόεν γελάσασα.

[57] On the meaning of *οἱ πέλας*, see Elmsley at Med. 85.

Soc. Now ignorance[58] is an evil; and so is the condition which we term stupidity.

Prot. How not?

[107.] *Soc.* From hence perceive what is the nature of the ridiculous.

Prot. Do you only tell it.

Soc. A certain depravity is so called, in a few words, after some habit. But of the total depravity, the contrary is that affection, which is mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.

Prot. You mean, Socrates, the "Know thyself."

Soc. I do. And the contrary to that saying would be, it is plain, [59] if mentioned in any writing,[59] "Not to know oneself in any respect at all."

Prot. How not?

Soc. Try now, Protarchus, to divide this very thing (self-ignorance) into three kinds.

Prot. How, say you? for I shall not be able (to do it).

Soc. Do you say that I must make this division for the present?

Prot. I say it, and in addition to saying, I request you.

[108.] *Soc.* Is it not necessary then for each of those, who do not know themselves, to be subject to this condition in three ways?

Prot. How?

Soc. First, with respect to property, to fancy themselves wealthier than according to their substance.

Prot. Many persons, truly, there are, who are suffering this.

Soc. Yet more numerous are they, who fancy themselves to be taller and more handsome, and, in all the things excelling, that relate to the body, beyond the real truth itself.[60]

Prot. Very true.

Soc. But the most numerous, I think, have, as regards the third kind of those things in the soul, made a mistake, by fancying themselves rather virtuous, although not being so.

Prot. Greatly so.

[58] The correct reading *ἄγνοια*, in lieu of *ἄνοια*, has been again found in the MS. of Ficinus alone, as shown by his version—"ignorantia."

[59]—[59] The clause *λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος* Beck wished to expunge, as being spurious, whom Stalbaum followed in ed. 1, but in ed. 2 he retains it. Ficinus has "Oppositum huic esset, si forte præciperetur," which leads to *εἰ λεγόμενον ἦν ὑπό τον γράμματος*, i. e. "if it had been told by any writing."

[60] I have adopted Stephens's *αὐτῆς*. For I cannot understand *αὐτοῖς*

Soc. [61] Among the virtues, is it not wisdom,[61] that the multitude clutch at, through being full of contention, and of a false opinion about wisdom?

Prot. How not?

[109.] *Soc.* Should any one then say that all such feeling is an evil, he would say what is true?

Prot. Perfectly so.

Soc. This then, Protarchus, must still be divided into two parts, if we are about, on beholding that child-like[62] envy, to see the strange mixture of pleasure and of pain.

Prot. How then shall we cut them, say you?

Soc. All such as foolishly hold this false opinion of themselves, [63] it necessarily happens that upon some of these, as it does in the case of all men in general, strength and power follow; but upon others the reverse.

Prot. It does so necessarily.

[110.] *Soc.* In this way then divide them. For whoever of them are accompanied by weakness, and being such are unable, when laughed at, to revenge themselves, in saying that these are open to ridicule, you will speak the truth. But in calling those, who are able to take their revenge, persons to be dreaded, and powerful, [and hostile,][64] you would give to yourself the most correct account of them. For ignorance, accompanied with power, is hostile and base; for it is hurtful to every one, both itself and whatever are its likenesses.[65] But ignorance, without power, has obtained the rank and nature of what is an object of ridicule.

Prot. You speak most correctly. But in these remarks the mixture of pain and pleasure is not to me very apparent.

[61]—[61] In lieu of Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας πέρι, I have adopted Τῶν ἀρετῶν πέρι, ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας—which Stephens elicited from Ficinus, "Quantum vero ad virtutes animi pertinet, nonne vulgus sapientiam prorsus sibi vendicans—" Stalbaum, indeed, who in ed. I had rejected πέρι, now retains it; he thinks that ἀρετῆς πέρι is used absolutely, and that αὐτῆς is to be understood after ἀντεχόμενον.

[62] I have translated παιδικὸν, "child-like," remembering the line of Gray, speaking of children, who "climb the knee, the envied kiss to share"—of their parent on his return home. Sydenham renders it "mirthful," with reference to the fun in a comedy.

[63] After "themselves," there seems to be something wanting to complete the sense and syntax.

[64] Stalbaum would reject καὶ ἐχθροὺς, omitted in three MSS., and shortly afterwards Heusde would read ἰσχυρὰ for αἰσχρά.

[65] I cannot, I confess, understand the meaning of εἰκόνες.

Soc. Understand then first the force of envy.

Prot. Only tell it.

Soc. There is an unjust pain surely, and an (unjust) pleasure?

Prot. There is so of necessity.

Soc. There is then neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the ills of our enemies.

Prot. Certainly. How not?

Soc. But sometimes, on beholding the ills of our friends, to feel no pain, but on the contrary,[66] a pleasure, is not an act of injustice?

Prot. How not?

[111.] *Soc.* Did we not say that ignorance[67] was an evil to all?

Prot. Correctly so.

Soc. (Shall we say) that the false notion in our friends of their wisdom, and beauty, and of whatever else we mentioned, while stating that they belonged to three kinds, is an object of ridicule when weak, but of hatred when powerful? or shall we deny, what I just now said, that this habit of our friends, when a person possesses it harmless to others, is an object of ridicule?

Prot. Yes, very much.[68]

Soc. And do we not acknowledge this (false notion) to be an evil, as being ignorance?

Prot. Heartily.

Soc. Do we feel pleasure or pain, when we laugh at it?

Prot. It is plain that we feel pleasure.

Soc. Did we not say, that it is envy, which produces in us pleasure at the ills of our friends?

[112.] *Prot.* It must be (envy).

Soc. Our reasoning then shows, that, when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, by mixing delight with envy we mix together pleasure and pain. For envy was acknowledged long ago to be a pain to the soul, but laughing a plea-

[66] Instead of ἄρ' Sydenham seems to have wished to read αὖ, what the sense requires.

[67] Here too the correct reading ἄγνοιαν, in lieu of ἄνοιαν, is due to Ficinus; while shortly afterwards I have adopted φῶμεν before ἢ μὴ φῶμεν from one MS. after a correction.

[68] Instead of πάνυ γε, which I cannot understand, Ficinus has what is perfectly intelligible, "Fatemur sane," answering to "fatemur" in the question; for so he translates φῶμεν.

sure; but in these cases they arise, both of them,[69] at the same time.

Prot. True.

Soc. Our argument then points out, that in laments and songs of joy,[70] and not only in dramas, but in the whole tragedy and comedy of life, and in a ten-thousand other cases, pains and pleasures are mingled together.

Prot. It would be impossible, Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever so fond of dispute against an opposite opinion.

[113.] *Soc.* We have proposed (to consider) anger, and regret, and lamentation, and fear and love, and jealousy and envy, and such other passions, in which we said we should find those mixed (feelings), that have been so often mentioned. Did we not?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. Do we understand that all, which relates to grief, and envy, and anger, has been now despatched?

Prot. How do we not understand?

[114.] *Soc.* Is there not much yet remaining?

Prot. Yes, very much.

Soc. On what account, principally, do you suppose it was that I explained to you the mixture (of feelings) in a comedy? Was it not from a belief, that it was easy to show the mixture in fear, in love, and in the other (passions)? and that, after you had admitted this to yourself, it would be meet to dismiss me, and by no longer proceeding to the rest, that I might not prolong the argument; but that you might receive, without exception, this doctrine,—that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in the things affecting them, full of pleasure mingled with pain. Now therefore say whether you will dismiss me, or make it midnight (before I finish). But I imagine that, after speaking a little more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal. For

[69] Instead of τοῦτο Sydenham evidently wished to read τούτω, for Ficinus has "hæc."

[70] In lieu of τραγῳδίαις, which could not be opposed to θρήνοις, Orelli proposed τρυγῳδίαις. But that word, I suspect, is never found in prose, and certainly not in Plato; who probably wrote, as I have translated, ἱλαρῳδίαις, found in a passage of Aristoxenus, preserved by Athenæus xiv. p. 621. Hermann suggested ἐν θρήνος τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, which Stalbaum calls an egregious restoration.

of all these things I shall be willing to give you an account to-morrow; but at present I wish to proceed on my course to what remains towards the decision, which Philebus enjoins.

Prot. Well have you spoken, Socrates; and as to what remains, go through it in whatever way is agreeable to yourself.

Soc. According to nature, then, after the mixed pleasures, we will proceed in turn by a kind of necessity to the unmixed.

Prot. You have spoken most beautifully.

Soc. These I will endeavour in turn[71] to point out to you. For to those, who assert that all pleasures are but a cessation from pain, I do not altogether give credit. But, as I said before, I make use of these persons as[72] to the fact,—that some pleasures seem to be, but are by no means so in reality; and that some others appear to be many and great, but are mixed up with pains, and a cessation from the greatest pains, touching the difficulties of the body and the soul.

[115.] *Prot.* But what pleasures are those, Socrates, which a person, deeming to be true, would rightly think so?

Soc. Those which relate to what are called beautiful colours, and to figures, and to the generality of odours, and to sounds, and to whatever that possesses wants unperceived, and that without pain yields a repletion perceived, and pleasant, [73](and) unmixed with pain.[73]

Prot. How, Socrates, speak we thus again of these things?

Soc. What I am saying is not, indeed, directly obvious. I must therefore try to make it clear. For I will endeavour to speak of the beauty of figures, not as the majority of persons understand them, such as of animals, and some paintings to the life, but as [74] reason says, I allude to something straight and

[71] So Stalbaum renders *μεταβαλὼν*, for which some MSS. read *μεταλαβὼν*. Sydenham, "with a little alteration."

[72] In p. 44, C. § 96, the expression is *μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαι*. And so Schütz wished to read here in lieu of *μάρτυσι*. The emendation adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, is rejected in ed. 2 as specious rather than true. For Socrates, he observes, is speaking figuratively But the reference to the former passage in the words "as I said before," shows he was speaking not figuratively, but positively.

[73]—[73] The Greek is *καὶ ἡδείας καθαρὰς λυπῶν*: where Schleiermacher proposed to read *καὶ καθαρὰς*, similar to "et tristitia vacuas" in Ficinus. But to preserve the balance of the sentences Stalbaum would expunge *καθαρὰς λυπῶν* as a gloss for *ἡδείας*.

[74] Instead of *φησὶν ὁ λόγος*, which Ficinus, not understanding, has

round, and the figures formed from them by the turner's lathe, both superficial and solid, and those by the plumb-line and angle-rule, if you understand me. For these, I say, are not beautiful for a particular purpose, as other things are; but are by nature ever beautiful by themselves, and possess certain peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to those from scratchings; [75] and colours possessing this form beautiful and pleasures.[75] But do we understand? or how?

[117.] *Prot.* I endeavour (to do so), Socrates; but do you endeavour likewise to speak still more clearly.

Soc. I say then that sounds gentle and clear, and sending out one pure strain, are beautiful, not with relation to another strain, but singly by themselves, and that inherent pleasures attend them.

Prot. Such is indeed the fact.

Soc. The kind of pleasures arising from odours is less divine than those; but through pains being not of necessity mixed with them, and their happening[76] to be produced for us by any means and in any thing, I lay down all this as opposed to those. But, if you observe, these are two kinds of pleasures spoken of.[77]

Prot. I do observe.

Soc. To these then let us still add the pleasures connected with learning; if indeed they seem to us not to have a hunger

omitted, I have translated as if the Greek were ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος: where ὥς was lost through the preceding λέγω.

[75]—[75] The Greek is *καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς*. Ficinus has "colores item eadem ratione, pulchros atque gratos esse," as if he had found in his MS. *τρόπον—καὶ ἡδέα* without *ἔχοντα*. From the two united, one might elicit *καὶ χρώματα διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδονας*. Schleiermacher suggested *καὶ χρώματα δήπου τοῦτον τὸν τύπον καλὰ καὶ ἔχοντα ἡδονάς*. He should have read rather *καὶ χρώματα ἄττα δὴ διὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὄντα καλὰ καὶ ἔχοντα ἡδονάς*. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, conceived that many words had dropt out; but in ed. 2, would supply after *ἔχοντα*, λέγω καθ' *αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι καὶ ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν*.

[76] I have translated as if the Greek were *καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ—τυχάνειν*, not *καὶ ὅπῃ—τυγχάνει*. For the infinitive is required by *συμμεμίχθαι*, and *τὸ* before *ὅπῃ τυγχάνειν*, as in p. 28, D., *τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν*.

[77] Instead of *λεγομένων*, Heindorf suggested *λέγομεν τῶν*, Schütz, *ἐλέγομεν*, from "collegimus" in Ficinus, which, adopted by Stalb. in ed. 1 is rejected in ed. 2, for he says that *ἐστὶ* is to be understood after *εἴδη*, and *ὑφ' ἡμῶν* after *λεγομένων*.

after learning, nor pains arising at the commencement, through the hunger after learning.

Prot. But[78] so it seems to me.

[118.] *Soc* What then if there should be to those, who have been filled[79] with learning, losses subsequently through forgetfulness, do you perceive any pains in those (losses)?

Prot. Not naturally, but through some reasonings respecting the suffering, when, after being deprived, a person feels a pain through a want.

Soc. At present however, blessed man, we are going through the feelings arising only from nature, independent of any reasonings.

Prot. You are right then, in saying, that, in learning, a forgetfulness frequently takes place, without any pain to us.

Soc. These pleasures, then, of learning, we must say are unmixed with pains. But by no means do they belong to the majority of mankind, but to the very few.

Prot. How must we not say so?

[119.] *Soc.* Since, then, we have tolerably well distinguished between the pure pleasures and those which are almost rightly called impure, let us [80][in our account][80] attribute to vehement pleasures immoderation; to those that are not so, the contrary moderation; and those that admit[81] the great and the intensely, and contrariwise [82](the little and the mildly),[82] [83]such, let us say, do all of them ever[83] belong to the limitless

[78] I cannot understand ἀλλὰ thus used by itself in a confirmation.

[79] In lieu of πληρωθεισῶν Schütz suggested πληρωθεῖσιν, adopted by Bekk. and Stalb., Faehse more neatly τί δ' οὐ,—πληρωθείς, ὧν ἐὰν—— γίγνωνται, καθορᾷ—i. e. "What, does not a person, having been filled with learning, of which should there be subsequently losses—, perceive some pains in those (losses)?"

[80]—[80] The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus; who through the whole of this speech found in his MS. readings far superior to any furnished by other MSS.

[81] Instead of γιγνομένας Heindorf was the first to suggest δεχομένας, obtained from the version of Ficinus, "quæ—suscipiunt."

[82]—[82] The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus alone, from whose version, "intentius, remissius, magnum, parvum, raro, crebro," Heindorf elicited τὰς τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα, καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ καὶ τὸ ἠρέμα, but Schütz, τὰς τὸ σφόδρα αὖ καὶ ἠρέμα, καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν—But the balance of the sentence requires rather τὰς καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ ἠρέμα αὖ—

[83]—[83] The Greek is τοιαύτας τῆς—— προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς, where Sto-

genus, namely, the more and the less, borne along through the body and soul; but that those, which do not admit of these properties, belong to the moderate.

Prot. You speak most correctly, Socrates.

Soc. Still further, in addition to these, we must look thoroughly[84] subsequently into this belonging to them.

Prot. What?

[120.] *Soc.* What it is meet to say contributes to truth. Is it the pure, and sincere, and sufficient,[85] or the violent, and the many, and the much?

Prot. What do you mean, Socrates, in asking this?

Soc. That I may omit proving nothing relating to pleasure and knowledge, whether in either of them a part is pure, and a part not pure, in order that each being pure may come to a trial, and enable myself and you and all these here to form a decision more easily.

Prot. Most correctly (said).

Soc. Come then, let us consider in this way respecting all the kinds which we say are pure; (and)[86] having first selected some one from among them, look at it thoroughly.

Prot. What then shall we select?

Soc. Let us look, if you will, at the white kind amongst the first.

Prot. By all means.

[121.] *Soc.* How then, and what would be the purity of white? whether, where there is the greatest and most, or where it is the least mixed in that substance, in which there is no portion of any other colour?

Prot. Evidently, where it is the most sincere.

Soc. Rightly (said). Shall we then, Protarchus, not lay

phens was the first to reject τῆς, and Stalbaum προσ, and the latter to adopt αὐτὰς, found in a single MS. But it is easier, I think, to alter τῆς into δὴ, and προσ into πως, and θῶμεν into φῶμεν, and αὐτὰς into ἀεὶ πάσας.

[84] In lieu of διαθετέον, Heusde suggested διαθεατέον, found subsequently in a single MS. after correction, and adopted by Stalbaum.

[85] By introducing καὶ τὸ ἱκανὸν in this place, instead of the end of the sentence, we not only preserve the balance of the sentence, but get rid of the difficulty, which Stalbaum was the first to see, but unable to overcome.

[86] We must either insert καὶ with Stephens, or omit διασκοπῶμεν with Ficinus; who has, however, "in medium inducentes."

down this as the truest, and at the same the most beautiful of all whites; but not that, where it is the largest, and most.

Prot. Most correctly.

Soc. If then we should say, that a little of pure white is more white, and more beautiful, and more truly white, than a great quantity of mixed white, we should say what is entirely correct.

Prot. Most correctly.

[122.] *Soc.* Well then, we shall assuredly be not wanting in any such examples in favour of our reasoning respecting pleasure; but it is sufficient[87] for us to perceive from thence, that in the case of pleasure in general, a portion small in size and little in quantity, yet unmixed with pain, would be more sweet, more true, and more beautiful, than a portion large in size, and great in quantity, [88](mixed with pain).[88]

Prot. Greatly so, and quite sufficient is the example.

Soc. But what is one of this kind? Have we not heard respecting pleasure, that it is a thing always generating, and that of pleasure there is no existence at all? For some clever[89] persons, forsooth, to whom we owe thanks, attempt to point out to us this kind of reasoning.

Prot. What is it?

Soc. Shall I go through it before you, friend Protarchus, and interrogate you?[90]

Prot. Only tell it, and interrogate.

[123.] *Soc.* There are some two things; one itself by itself; the other always desirous of (something)[91] else.

Prot. How say you this?[92] and of what (are you speaking)?

Soc. The one is by nature most worthy of respect; the other falls short of it.

[87] Ficinus has "sufficiet." He therefore found in his MS., ἀρκέσει—

[88]—[89] The words within numerals Sydenham first supplied in his English version, and Heindorf in a note the Greek word μεμιγμένης after μεγάλης. And so too Stalbaum in ed. 1, but he rejects the idea in ed. 2.

[89] In the Greek — κομψοὶ, i. e. "elegant," in their reasonings and discourses; subtle arguers, or fine logicians; a character which distinguished the school of Zeno the Eleatic. It will presently be seen, that the persons here spoken of philosophized on the principles of the Eleatic sect, and were probably some of Zeno's Athenian disciples. S.

[90] So Ficinus correctly. Others take the speech positively.

[91] Ficinus has "alterum—quid," which leads to ἄλλοι τοι instead of ἄλλου—

[92] The oldest MS. correctly reads τοῦτο for τούτω—

Prot. Speak a little more clearly.

Soc. We have beheld young persons beautiful and good, and seen their admirers.

Prot. Often.

Soc. Similar then to these two seek two others, [93]according to all those things, which we say is the third to another.[93]

Prot. State more plainly, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. It is nothing subtle, Protarchus. But our present argument is playing with us; and says, that of things existing one thing is ever for the sake of something; and the other, for the sake of which there is on every occasion produced that, which is produced always for the sake of something.

[124.] *Prot.* I scarcely understand you, [94]through the being said oftentimes.[94]

Soc. Perhaps, however, we shall better understand, boy, as the reasoning proceeds.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Let us now take these two different things.

Prot. Of what kinds?

Soc. The generating of all things is one kind; the existence, another.

Prot. I acknowledge these two, existence and generating.

Soc. Most correctly. Now, which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Shall we say, generating is for the sake of existence, or existence for the sake of generating?

[125.] *Prot.* Are you now inquiring whether that, which is called existence, is what it is for the sake of generating?

Soc. I appear so.

[93]—[93] The Greek is *κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῳ.* Stallbaum and Cousin say, that Schleiermacher has well expressed the passage in German; which means, according to Cousin, that "the relation, which one thing bears to another, is a third thing opposite to the two things." But the relation neither is nor could be opposite to any thing but a counter-relation. Had there been indeed an allusion to a geometrical ratio, I could have understood the expression "a third to another," or rather "to either," in Greek *ἑκατέρῳ*, as a mean between the two quantities mentioned. But at present I am quite in the dark; and so too Protarchus is feigned to be; for he bids Socrates state more clearly what he means.

[94]—[94] The Greek is *διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι*: which I cannot understand. I could have understood *διὰ τό τι ποικίλως πλεχθῆναι*, i. e. "through something having been subtlely woven;" where there would be a proper reference to the preceding *ποικίλ*

Prot. By the gods, [95] would you be asking me in addition? [95]

Soc. I mean, Protarchus, something of this kind. Would you say that ship-building exists for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building? and whatever things there are of the like kind, Protarchus, I mean by this very (question).

Prot. Why then, Socrates, do you not give an answer to it yourself?

Soc. There is no reason why not. Do you however take a share with me in the discourse.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. I say then, that, for the sake of generating, medicines,[96] and all instruments, and all matter is placed by the side of all; but that each act of generating is for the sake of some individual existence, one for one kind and another for another; but that generating taken universally is for the sake of existence taken universally.

Prot. Most clearly.

[126.] *Soc.* Pleasure then, if it be a generating, will of necessity be for the sake of some existence.

Prot. How not?

Soc. [97] Now that, for the sake of which the thing generated for the sake of something would be always generated, is in the portion of the good; but that which is generated for the

[95]—[95] This is the literal version of the Greek, *ἆρ' ἂν ἐπανερωτᾷς με.* But, as Stalbaum says in ed. 1, Protarchus would be a simpleton to inquire merely of Socrates, whether he was asking a question. Accordingly he proposed to read, *Ποῖον ἆρ' ἐπανερωτᾷς με*: for which, in ed. 2, he substitutes *Τί, πρὸς θεῶν, ἆρ' αὖ ἐπανερωτᾷς με.* But *ἄρα* could not thus commence a clause after the parenthetic *πρὸς θεῶν.* Other critics too, and among them Schleiermacher, Ast, Baiter, and Sauppe, have tried their hands at corrections, which are equally unsatisfactory to Stalbaum and myself. Plato wrote, I suspect, *Πρὸς θεῶν, ἄρα παῖδ' ὄντ' ἐρωτᾷς με*; i. e. "By the gods, are you asking me, as if I were a child?" For thus there would be not only an allusion to Socrates, addressing Protarchus just before as a boy, but to the expression in Sophist. § 58, *μῦθον—διηγεῖσθαι, παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν, ἡμῖν.* Gorg. p. 499, B., *καὶ ἐμοί, ὥσπερ παιδί, χρῇ.* Prometh. 1022, *Ἐκερτόμησας δῆθεν, ὡς παῖδ' ὄντ', ἐμέ:* Agam. 278, *Παιδὸς νέας ὥς κάρτ' ἐμωμήσω φρένας.* Theognis, *Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ' ἀπατᾷς.*

[96] I scarcely understand *φάρμακα* by itself. I could have understood *φθορᾶς φάρμακα*, i. e. "remedies against decay."

sake of any thing, must, my friend, be placed in another portion.[97]

Prot. It is most necessary.

Soc. If then pleasure be a generating, shall we not in placing it in an allotment different from that of the good, correctly place it?

Prot. Most correctly.

Soc. Hence, as I said at the beginning of this argument, we owe many thanks to the person, who pointed out, respecting pleasure, that it is a generating, but that its existence is not any thing whatever. For it is plain that this person would laugh at those who assert that pleasure is a good.

Prot. Very heartily.

Soc. And this very same person would certainly on every occasion laugh at those, who place their ultimate end in generatings.

[127.] *Prot.* How, and what kind of men, do you mean?

Soc. Such as those curing hunger or thirst, or any of such things as by generating cures are delighted on account of generating being a pleasure; and who declare they would not choose to live without being thirsty and hungry, and suffering those other things, which one might mention as following such kinds of feelings.

Prot. They are likely (to do so).

Soc. Would not all of us say that destruction is the contrary of generation?

Prot. It is of necessity so.

Soc. Whoever then chooses this, would choose destruction and generation, but not that third life, in which it is possible[98]

[97]—[97] I confess I am here quite at a loss. Ficinus has "Quod vero tale est, ut ejus gratia fiat, quod semper alterius gratia fit, in boni sorte locatur; quod vero alterius gratia, in aliam sortem, O vir optime, reducendum videtur;" i. e. That which is such, that for its sake is produced, what is ever produced for the sake of another thing, is placed in the portion of a good; but that, which is produced for the sake of another thing, is to be carried, my good man, to another portion.

[98] In the Greek *φρονεῖν δὲ ἣν δυνατὸν ὡς οἰόντε*, Bekker would expunge *δυνατὸν*, and he is followed by Stalbaum; for they did not see that it should be placed before *φρονεῖν δ' ἣν* instead of after these words They ought rather to have omitted *τὸν* before *ἐν ᾧ*, for it has nothing to which it can be referred, unless it be said that it is the remnant of *κάλλιστον*.

for a person to be neither pleased nor pained, but to have thoughts the purest possible.

[128.] *Prot.* Much absurdity, as it seems, Socrates, would result, should any one lay down that pleasure is a good.[99]

Soc. Much; since[100] let us discourse still in this way.

Prot. In what?

Soc. How is it not absurd for nothing good or beautiful to exist, neither in the body nor in many other things, except in the soul, and there only pleasure; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor mind, nor any of the good things, which the soul has obtained by lot, should exist of that kind?[1] And still in addition to this, that the person not delighted, but in pain, should be compelled to say that he is then wicked, when he is in pain, although he be the best of all men; and on the other hand, that the person delighted excels in virtue so much the more, as he is the more delighted then, [2]when he is delighted.[2]

Prot. All these suppositions, Socrates, are absurdities, the greatest possible.

[129.] *Soc.* Let us then not endeavour to make an examination of pleasure at all; nor appear to be, as it were, very chary of mind and science; but let us spiritedly strike every thing all round, if perchance it gives a cracked sound,[3] until coming to the view of that, which is naturally the most free from a flaw, we may use it for our decision, suited alike both to the truest parts of these and of pleasure likewise.

[99] One would expect rather *τἀγαθόν*, i. e. "the good."

[100] This "since" is absurd; although *ἐπεὶ* is acknowledged by Ficinus' version "quandoquidem;" but as he adds "et hoc præterea ratione ostendere licet," it is evident he did not find in his MS. *λέγωμεν*, but *λέγειν ἐνῆν*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὦ παῖ*, as in § 124.

[1] I cannot understand *τοιοῦτον* here.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus—"At eum contra, qui voluptatibus delinitur, quo magis gestit, eo virtute præstantiorem dicere." They seem however to be required, although not easy to understand, to preserve the balance of the sentence; where *τὸν μὴ χαίροντα* is opposed to *χαίροντα*, and *ἀλγοῦντα* to *χαίρει*, and *κακὸν* to *διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετὴν*, and *ὅταν ἀλγῇ* to *ὅταν χαίρῃ*. But as there is nothing to balance *κἂν ᾖ ἄριστος πάντως*, Plato perhaps wrote *διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τότε, ὅταν χαίρῃ κάκιστος ὡς*, i. e. "excels in virtue then, when he is delighted, although he is the most wicked."

[3] I have adopted, in lieu of the scarcely intelligible *ἕχει*, the more correct *ἠχεῖ*, suggested by Steinbrüchel in Mus. Turicens. t. ii. p. 334, and Wyttenbach on Plutarch, t. ii. p 64 D Despite, however, the array of

Prot. Rightly (said).

Soc. Is there not, I think,[4] one part of the sciences relating[5] to learning in general, connected with handicraft trades, and another with instruction and nurture?

Prot. It is so.

[130.] *Soc.* Now in the manual arts,[6] let us consider, first, whether there is[7] one part more closely connected with science, and another part less so; and whether it is meet to reckon the former as the most pure,[8] but the latter as the most impure.[9]

Prot. It is meet.

Soc. We must therefore take the leading arts apart from each individual one.[10]

Prot. What arts? and how?

Soc. As if a person should, for example, separate from all arts arithmetic, and mensuration, and weighing, the remainder of each would become, so to say, inconsiderable.

Prot. Inconsiderable indeed.

Soc. For after these there would be left for those only to conjecture, and to exercise the senses by experience and practice, who by making use of the power of guessing, which the many call art, have worked out[11] their strength by assiduity and labour.

parallel passages produced in the note of Stalbaum, he says that the correction is very elegant, but not necessary.

[4] There is some error in *οἶμαι*. For no person in asking a question could say, "I think;" although he might say, "think you." Ficinus omits *οἶμαι* entirely.

[5] This is the correct meaning of *μαθήματα* here, as remarked by Stalbaum.

[6] Instead of *χειροτεχνικαῖς* Sydenham suggested *χειροτεχνίαις*: of which Stalbaum disapproves at the very moment when he quotes Rep. ix. p. 590, B., *βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία*, which seems to give some support to Sydenham.

[7] In lieu of *ἔνι* Sydenham suggested *ἐστὶ*, which Stalbaum attributes to Schleiermacher.

[8, 9] Stalbaum reads *καθαρώτατα* and *ἀκθαρτότερα*, with the majority of MSS. and Ficinus. But the balance of the sentence requires the same degree of comparison in both clauses. I have therefore adopted *καθαρώτατα* and *ἀκθαρτότατα*. Sydenham has "more pure—more impure."

[10] So Stalbaum in ed. 2. rejecting the correction of Stephens, *ἑκάστην* for *ἑκάστων*, which he had adopted in ed. 1.

[11] I cannot understand *ἀπειργασμένας* found in nearly all the MSS. For *ἀπεονάζεσθαι* never means "adipisci" or "nancisci," as translated by

Prot. You say what is most necessarily (true).

[131.] *Soc.* [12]In the first place, (is not) the musical art full (of conjecture), while adapting the harmony not by (a fixed) measure, but by practice? and of it taken universally (do not) hautboy-playing (and harp-playing) hunt out the measure suited to each by the aid of (a mouth-piece and) string through guessing merely, so that it has a great deal mixed, which is not very certain, and only a little, that is sure.[12]

Prot. Very true.

Soc. Moreover we shall find that the medical, and agricultural, and naval, and military arts are in a similar condition.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. But the art of building (we shall find), I think, making use of very many measures and instruments; which,[13] giving to it great accuracy, make it more scientific than the majority of arts.

Prot. How so?

Soc. So too in ship-building, and house-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, (the art) uses the straight rule, and the turning-lathe, and the compass, and the plumb-line, and the marking-line, and the level properly formed.

Prot. You say very correctly, Socrates.

Ficinus and Stalbaum respectively. I have therefore adopted *ἀπειργασμένους*—

[12]—[12] On this most difficult, because corrupt, passage, Stalbaum has written a long note in ed. 1, and another still longer in ed. 2. From the two I have selected what seemed to me to be the nearest to the truth. Instead therefore of *μεστὴ—πρῶτον οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ*, the text was perhaps *μεστὴ—στοχασμοῦ—οὐ μέτρῳ*—where *μεστὴ—στοχασμοῦ*, suggested by Stalbaum and adopted by Winckelmann, is confirmed by p. 62, B. § 148, *μουσικὴν—ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεως—μεστήν*. Next, in lieu of *ξύμπασα αὐτῆς*, the sense requires *ξυμπάσης αὐτῆς*—For the whole of music was confined to the hautboy and harp; and hence after *αὐλητικὴ*, Stalbaum approves of *καὶ κιθαριστικὴ*, found in one MS. after correction: and as two instruments are alluded to, it is evident that besides *χορδῃ*, which is a part of the harp, there is required a word to express a part of the hautboy; and hence *φορβείας* has probably dropt out before *χορδῆς*: while to complete the syntax, *ἐστον* may be inserted between *θηρεύουσαι* and *ὥστε*.

[13] I have adopted Heindorf's *ἃ* for *τὰ*, obtained perhaps from "quibus" in Ficinus, or "which" in Sydenham. The reading was received by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but is rejected in ed. 2.

[132.] *Soc.* Let us then place the arts so called into two kinds; some following music, (and) possessing in their works a less share of accuracy; others, building, possessing a larger share.

Prot. Let them be so placed.

Soc. And of these arts, that those are the most accurate which we lately said were the prime (or leading).

Prot. You seem to me to be speaking of arithmetic, and those other arts, which together with it you mentioned just now.

Soc. Just so. But, Protarchus, must we not say that each of these, again, is twofold? or how?

Prot. What arts do you mean?

Soc. Must we not say, in the first place, that the arithmetic of the many is of one kind, but that of philosophers another?

Prot. By dividing in what way, can a person lay down the one and the other?

Soc. The boundary, Protarchus, is not trifling. For of the things relating to number, the many calculate by unequal units; as two armies, two oxen, two things the smallest, or two the greatest of all things. But philosophers could not follow them, unless a person should lay down an unit, differing in no respect from each of the units in ten thousand.[14]

Prot. Indeed you say very correctly that there is no little difference amongst those, who occupy themselves in arithmetic; so as to make it reasonable that there are two kinds.

[133.] *Soc.* And what of calculation in trade, and of mensuration in building? [15](Do these differ)[15] from the geometry and the calculations made by students in philosophy? Shall we say that each of them is one art? or shall we set down each as two?

Prot. Following out the preceding remarks, I should, according to my vote, lay down that each of these is two.

Soc. Correctly so. But do you understand for what reason we have brought forward these matters between us?

[14] Such is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from the four oldest MSS. The others offer *μορίων*, similar to "partium" in Ficinus.

[15]—[15] Stephens was the first to remark, that *διαφέρει* was wanting to support the syntax and sense; for which Stalbaum in ed 1 suggested *διαφέρουσα*. But in ed. 2 he thinks that Plato had in mind *διαφέρει*, but omitted to put it down.

Prot. Perhaps I do. But I would wish yourself to lay open the question just asked.

Soc. To me at least then this reasoning seems no less, than when we commenced detailing it [16]by seeking something[16] the counterpart to pleasures, to have reached[17] to that point, where it is possible to consider what science is more pure than another science, as (one) pleasure (was more so than another) pleasure.

Prot. This at least is very clear, that it attempted those things for the sake of these.

[134.] *Soc.* What then, has it discovered,[18] in what has gone before, that over others[19] one art is clearer than another, and one less clear than another?

Prot. Entirely.

Soc. And has not in these instances the reasoning, after speaking of some art, of the same name (as another), led to the opinion of both being one; and does it not then inquire, as if being two, their clearness and purity, whether the opinion of those who philosophize, or those who do not, is the more accurate respecting them?

[16]—[16] In lieu of *ζητῶν* Stephens suggested *ζήτησιν*. He should have proposed *ζητοῦντε*, applied to the two speakers. For *ζητεῖν* is thus perpetually said of persons engaged in a mental inquiry, as shown by Stalbaum; who in ed. 1 correctly saw that *τι* had dropt out after *ἀντίστροφον*.

[17] Although Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum in ed. 1 followed, acutely perceived that Plato wrote *προβεβηκέναι*, and not *προβεβληκέναι*, yet he did not perceive that *ἐνταῦθα* would require *ἵνα*, lying hid in the tail of *προβεβηκέναι*: and as one MS. offers *σκοπεῖν* from correction for *σκοπῶν*, it is evident we must read *ἵνα σκοπεῖν πάρεστι τίς*—instead of *σκοπῶν· ἆρ' ἐστί τις*—, as I have translated. The version of Ficinus would lead us to believe that his MS. was different from any other since discovered. For it runs thus, "Disputatio nostra, quæ jamdiu proportionem quandam æqua divisionis conversione voluptatis respondentem quærit, dum indagat, num sit scientia quædam alia scientia purior, quemadmodum voluptate voluptas."

[18] The Greek is in some MSS. *ἀνευρίσκει*, in others *ἀνευρίσκειν*, but in one from correction *ἀνευρήκει*: while Ficinus has "repertum est." From hence it is easy to restore *ἀνεύρηκε*, namely, *ὁ λόγος*.

[19] I cannot understand *ἐπ' ἄλλοις*, which Stalbaum translates "over other things;" Ficinus, "in alia re." But the balance of the sentence in the next clause, *ἄλλην ἄλλης*, proves that *ἄλλης ἄλλην*, found here in some M^S^S., is the correct reading, while in *ἐπ'* lies hid *εἰπὲ*—

Prot. And it appears to me to make this inquiry very correctly.[20]

Soc. What answer then, Protarchus, shall we give it?

[135.] *Prot.* To a wonderful extent of difference have we, Socrates, arrived, touching a clear view of the sciences.

Soc. We shall therefore answer more easily.

Prot. How not? And let it be said, that these (leading)[21] arts differ greatly from the others; and that from these themselves differ those, which engage the exertions of persons philosophizing really with accuracy and truth on the subject of measures and numbers.

Soc. Let this be according to your views; and trusting to you, let us boldly give an answer to those, who are terrible in tearing[22] arguments to pieces.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. That there are two kinds of arithmetic, and two of mensuration, and many others of the same kind, following these and possessing this duality, but having one name in common.

Prot. Let us, Socrates, with good luck give to those, whom you say are terrible, that very answer.

[136.] *Soc.* Do we then affirm, that these sciences are the most accurate.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. But the dialectic power, Protarchus, would repudiate us, if we preferred any other science to hers.

Prot. Whom must we call by that name?

Soc. Plainly, Protarchus, her, who perceives all the (knowledge)[23] just now mentioned. For I am entirely of opinion, that all persons, to whom even a small particle of mind has been apportioned, must deem the knowledge, which relates to

[20] Instead of *μάλα* the sense requires *μάλ' εὖ*. Compare § 132, *καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις*.

[21] Stalbaum with Sydenham understands by *αὗται*, "the leading arts," remarking at the same time, that this use of the pronoun is rather harsh. Perhaps Plato wrote *αἱ πρῶται*, as in § 132, *ἃς—πρώτας εἴπομεν*.

[22] With *λόγων ὁλκὴν* Stalbaum compares *τοὺς λόγους ἕλκειν* in Theætet. § 126.

[23] Ficinus has "quæ omnem modo inductam peritiam noscit:" who thus found in his MS. the word *ἐπιστήμην*, wanting to complete the sense and syntax.

the really existing,[24] and that which is ever by nature according to the same, to be by far the most true notion. But what and how would you, Protarchus, decide?

Prot. I have often, Socrates, heard from Gorgias on each occasion, that the art of persuasion excels by much all other arts. For it would make all things its slaves willingly, and not by violence; and therefore it would be of all arts by far the best. Now I should not be willing to lay down what is opposed to you or him.

[137.] *Soc.* You seem to me to say that, having wished for arms, you are ashamed of having deserted them.

Prot. Let these matters be in the place, where it seems good to you.

Soc. Am I the cause of your not correctly understanding?

Prot. What?

Soc. I did not, friend Protarchus, inquire this—what art or what science is superior to all, by its being[25] the greatest, and best, and benefiting us the most; but what is that, which looks upon the clear, the accurate, and the most true, although it may be little and benefit but little. This it is which we are now seeking. Look to it. For you will not become hateful to Gorgias, if you allow his art to be of use [26] to the ruling of mankind,[26] [27] but, what I just now said, to the busy occupation,[27] as I then said respecting white, that if there be a little but pure, it excels a large quantity that is not such, by the very circumstance of its being the most true. And now, having thought greatly upon this, and reasoned about it sufficiently, and look-

[24] As Plato never elsewhere has *τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως*, but always *τὸ ὄντως ὂν*, we must read so here, as I have translated.

[25] The infinitive *εἶναι*, which Stephens first perceived to be wanting here, has been found in a single MS. after correction. It was adopted by Stalbaum in ed. 1, but rejected in ed. 2, because he did not see that *ὠφελοῦσα* could be easily changed into *ὠφελῆσαι*, what *εἶναι* would require. In defence of *τῷ—ὠφελοῦσα* Stalbaum produces some passages collected by Poppo in Prolegom. p. 150, and himself, all of which I have shown, or could show, to be corrupt.

[26]—[26] I have translated, as if the Greek were *πρὸς χρείαν τοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κρατεῖν*, and not *πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν*. For Gorgias prided himself upon the power he possessed, and professed to teach, of ruling mankind by the art of persuasion.

[27]—[27] The words within numerals I cannot understand, nor could Stalbaum; nor Ficinus, whose version is, "Nihil enim Gorgiam lacesses, si ejus arti utilitatis laudem præstantiamque concedas, ei vero, quam ipse modo narravi, facultati veritatis præcellentiam tribuas."

ing to neither the utility of sciences nor to their high repute, but, if there be any power inherent in our soul to love the truth, and for its sake to do every thing,[28] of this let us speak; and having thoroughly searched out the purity of mind and intellect, let us seek whether we can say that in all probability we possess this, or any other power more powerful than this.[28]

[138.] *Prot.* Nay, I do consider, and I think it is difficult to admit that any other science or art lays hold of truth more than this.

Soc. Have you said what you have said now, after perceiving something of this kind, that the majority of arts, and such as busy themselves about matters here, make use in the first place of opinions, and with the mind on the stretch[29] are in search of what relates to opinions; and if a person[30] thinks fit to pry into the phenomena of Nature, you know that through life he merely searches into the matters relating to this world, how it has been produced, and in what way it suffers, and in what way it acts. Shall we say this, or how?

Prot. Thus.

Soc. Such a person then has undertaken this study, not about the things which exist always, but about those that are in the course of being, and will be, and have been.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. What clearness then can we say exists in truths the most exact respecting those things, not one of which has possessed ever, or will possess, or possesses at present, the state of sameness?

Prot. How can we?

[28]—[28] Such is the literal version of the Greek; of which Stalbaum has, in ed. 1, given a paraphrase, omitted in ed. 2. Ficinus has "hanc diximus perscrutantes puritate mentis et sapientiæ, considerandum an probabile sit a disserendine scientia maxime possideri, vel aliam potius hac præstantiorem ista perquirere;" by the aid of which it would perhaps be not difficult to recover what Plato wrote.

[29] So Grou and Heusde; whose conjecture of ξυντεταμένως for ξυντεταγμένως has been found in one MS. after correction. Stalbaum however defends ξυντεταγμένως, and explains it, "in a compact body," like a troop of soldiers. Ficinus has "ex instituto." But though, as Cicero says, there is a kind of union amongst all arts, yet philosophical studies are pursued separately, but with an intensity of thought.

[30] The persons here alluded to, called by Aristotle οἱ φυσικοὶ, "naturalists," were probably Anaxagoras and Archelaus. See Xenophon in M. S. i. 1, 11. S.

Soc. How then respecting things, which do not possess any stability whatever, can there be any thing stable in us?

Prot. By no means, I imagine.

Soc. Nor is there mind, nor any knowledge possessing the greatest truth respecting them.

Prot. It is probable there is not?

[139.] *Soc.* We ought then, both you and I, to leave and bid farewell frequently to Gorgias and Philebus, and in our reasoning to appeal to this as a testimony.

Prot. What?

Soc. That there either is respecting those matters the stable, and the pure, and the true, and what we lately called the immaculate, as regards the things, which have the property of existing ever in the same manner, and similarly perfectly unmixed; or secondly,[31] whatever has the most affinity with them; but that of all the rest we must speak as secondary and subsequent.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. With respect then to things of this kind, is it not most just to give the most beautiful names to things the most beautiful?

Prot. It is at least reasonable.

Soc. Are not mind and intellect and wisdom the names which a person would hold in the highest honour?

Prot. Yes.

Soc. These then, after having been formed accurately, may be correctly given to the notions conversant about the things really existing.

Prot. Perfectly.

Soc. And the things, which I formerly brought for our decision, are not other than these names.

[140.] *Prot.* How not, Socrates?

[31] The Greek is *δεύτερος*, which Schleiermacher says agrees with *πλοῦς* understood. But such an ellipse would be here inadmissible. For whenever Plato uses that proverbial expression, he always introduces, what could not be omitted, the substantive. We might indeed read here *ἢ ὁ δεύτερος πόρος*—for *πόρος* might easily have dropt out after—*τερος*. But as Ficinus has "quod secundo loco," Stephens suggested *δεύτερον*, taken separately or united to *ἐκείνων*. Two MSS. offer *δευτέρως*. But in that case we must read *δευτέρως μάλιστα ἐκείνων ὅ τι ἐστὶ ξυγγενές*, as in Tim. p. 58, B., *μάλιστα—δευτέρως*.

Soc. Be it so If then a person were to say that, what relates to intellect and pleasure, touching their mutual mixture, is placed before us, as before workmen, from which or in which they must fabricate something, he would make a comparison suitable to our discourse.

Prot. Very much so.

Soc. Must we not in the next place attempt to mix them?

Prot. How not?

Soc. Would it not be best to mention beforehand, and call to remembrance things of this kind?

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Those we have mentioned before. For the proverb seems to be well, [32] "Twice and thrice what is well to turn over" [32] in our discourse is meet.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then, by Zeus; for I think that what has been stated previously, was said in this wise.

Prot. How?

[141.] *Soc.* Philebus affirms that pleasure has been established as the proper aim for all animals, and that all persons ought to aim at it; that this very thing is to all universally the good; and that the two terms "good" and "pleasant" have been correctly assigned to one thing and to one nature. But Socrates denies this; and (says) that in the first place the things are, like the terms, two; and secondly, that the good and the pleasant possess a nature different from each other; and that intellect partakes in a share of the good more than pleasure does. Is not this now, and was it not then, stated so, Protarchus?

Prot. Strongly so.

Soc. And was not this (agreed upon) then, and should we not agree upon it now?

Prot. What?

Soc. That the nature of the good differs from the rest of things in this?

[142.] *Prot.* In what?

Soc. That whatever animal possesses it for ever, perfectly,

[32]—[32] There is an allusion to the same proverb, but in different words, in Gorg. p. 498, E., Legg. xii. p. 957, A., and the other passages quoted by Stalbaum.

and under all circumstances of time and place, such a being has no want of any thing beside, but has what is sufficient and most complete. Is it not so?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Have we then not endeavoured in this discourse, by placing each apart from each as regards the life of each, (to leave)[33] pleasure unmixed with intellect, and in like manner intellect possessing not the smallest particle of pleasure?

Prot. It is so.

Soc. Did either of those (lives) seem to us at that time to be sufficient for any person?

Prot. How could it?

[143.] *Soc.* But if at that time we were carried in any respect beside the mark, let any person whatever, taking up again the subject, say what is more correct, laying down that memory, and intellect, and science, and correct opinion belong to the very same species, and considering whether any one would without those choose that any thing whatever should happen to him, much less pleasure, be it the greatest in quantity and most intense in kind, provided he had neither a true conception of being delighted, nor knew at all by what things he was affected, nor had a recollection of the circumstance for any period whatever. And let him say[34] the same respecting intellect likewise, whether any one would choose without all pleasures, or[35] even the least, to possess intellect, rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without intellect, rather than with some intellect.

Prot. There is no one,[36] Socrates. And there is no need to ask these questions frequently.

[144.] *Soc.* Neither one of these then would be the perfect, and all-eligible, and consummate good.

Prot. For how could it?

[33] To preserve the sense and syntax we must insert ἐᾶν, which might have easily dropt out before ἄμικτον. On the loss or confusion of ἐᾶν see my notes on Crito, § 15, n. 27.

[34] Instead of λέγε the three oldest MSS. offer λέγω. From the two Stalbaum, in ed. 1, elicited λεγέτω, similar to εἰπάτω, towards the commencement of this speech. But in ed. 2, he prefers λέγε.

[35] Instead of καὶ the sense requires ἢ καὶ—

[36] I have translated as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, Οὔκ ἐστιν εἷς; Σώκρατες, instead of—ὦ Σώκρατες.

Soc. This good then we must comprehend clearly, or at least some form of it, in order that we may have something to give the second prize.

Prot. You speak most correctly.

Soc. Have we not taken then some kind of road to the good?

Prot. What road?

Soc. As if a person in search of another should first hear of his dwelling [37] [where he resides],[37] he would surely have something great towards the discovery of the person sought.

Prot. How not?

Soc. And now a reasoning has pointed out to us, as at the commencement, not to seek the good in the unmixed life, but in the mixed one.

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. There is moreover a hope that the thing sought for will be more conspicuous in the mixed than in the not mixed.

Prot. Much more.

[145.] *Soc.* Let us then, Protarchus, make a mixing after praying to the gods;[38] whether Dionysus, or Hephæstus,[39] or whatever else of the gods, [40] has obtained by lot the honour[40] (of presiding over) the mixing.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. And now, to us, as it were to butlers, stand (two)[41] fonts; the one of pleasure[42] a person might guess to be of

[37]—[37] The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. Instead of *ἵνα*, ed. Bas. 2, has in the text *ὅπου*, and one MS. *ὅπου* over *ἵνα*: which leads to *ἀπ' οἰκέτου*, "from a domestic," in lieu of *ὅπου οἰκεῖ*.

[38] Here is an allusion to the custom of making a libation and uttering a prayer to the gods at a banquet before the first cup was tasted.

[39] According to Stalbaum, Hephæstus is here alluded to, because he is represented by Homer in Il. i. 595, as acting the part of a butler to the gods.

[40]—[40] This has reference to the myth, that the gods had obtained their respective powers by casting lots.

[41] I have inserted "two." For the Greek was, doubtless, *κρῆναι ὦ μέλιτος*: where *ω* is one form in MSS. of *β*, and would mean "two."

[42] Pleasure is compared to honey, says Olympiodorus, because it possesses sweetness and the ecstatic. And hence the Pythagorean saying, that souls fall into generation through honey (*διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος λόγος, διὰ μέλιτος πίπτειν εἰς γένεσιν τὰς ψυχάς*). But intellect is compared to water, because it is sober. T.

honey; but that of intellect, hard and healthful, sober and wineless, to be of water; which let us be ready to mix together in the best manner we can.

Prot. How not?

Soc. Come then (and say) whether by mingling all pleasure with all intellect we may in the [43]best way obtain the doing it well.[43]

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. But it is not safe. But how we may make a mixing with less danger, I seem to myself to be able to put out a notion.

Prot. Say what.

[146.] *Soc.* [44]There was formerly, as we truly thought, one pleasure more pure than another; and one art more accurate than another.[44]

Prot. Undoubtedly so.

Soc. One science too differs from another; one in looking to things that are produced and perish; another to things which are neither produced nor perish, but exist with the properties of the same, the similar, and the eternal. And looking to the truth, we deemed this science to be more true than the other.

Prot. Very correctly so.

Soc. If then, in the first place, after having mixed together the truest particles of each, when we look upon them, (shall

[43]—[43] The Greek is *τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστ' ἐπιτύχοιμεν*, where Wyttenbach on Phædo, § 65, says that *τοῦ καλῶς* is put for *τοῦ καλοῦ*: while Stalbaum says that *μιγνύναι* is to be supplied after *καλῶς*. In accordance with his own notes on p. 18, A., 20, A., 62, A., he might have suggested *δρᾶν ἂν*, and *κάλλιστα* instead of *μάλιστα*. For there would thus be a play on *καλῶς* and *κάλλιστα*.

[44]—[44] The Greek is *Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς ὡς οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον ἐτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα*. Here Schleiermacher was the first to object to *ἀληθῶς* and to suggest *ἀληθής*. But, as Stalbaum observes, pleasures were not said to be truer so much as purer than one another; and hence the Zurich editors wrongly rejected *μᾶλλον* with the three oldest MSS. Nor can *ἀκριβεστέρα* be translated "sincerior," as Ficinus has done. Moreover, although Stalbaum has shown that *καὶ δὴ καὶ* are perpetually united, yet they never are, nor could be, where two sentences are, as here, balanced. I have therefore translated as if the Greek were *Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ τότε, ὡς ἀληθῶς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον εἰλικρινὴς δή, καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα*: where *τότε* is still seen in Ficinus, "in superioribus;" and we can now perceive from whence he got his "sincerior." For *εἰλικρινὴς* is the word constantly used before in that sense.

we say,)[45] that these, being mixed together, are sufficient to enable us to work out[46] the most desirable life? or do we still want something, and not of such a kind?

Prot. To me it seems we must act thus.

[147.] *Soc.* Let there be then a man having a notion of justice itself, and knowing what it is, and having a language following upon his notions, and thinking thoroughly in like manner upon every thing else in existence.

Prot. Let there be such a person.

Soc. Will now this man have a sufficiency of science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere itself, while, ignorant of the sphere, and of the circles made by man,[47] he is making a bad use[47] in building, and in other things similarly, of straight-rules and circles.[48]

Prot. Ridiculous we should call[49] our position here, Socrates, if it existed only in the sciences relating to things divine.

Soc. How say you? Must we throw and mix together in common the art neither stable nor pure of the false straight-rule and mason's chisel,[50] and mix them with the other ingredients?

Prot. Yes; for it is necessary, [51]if any of us is about on each occasion to find the way home.[51]

[148.] *Soc.* And music too, which we said a little before was wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

[45, 46] To complete the sense I have translated as if the Greek were ἆρ' ἐροῦμεν, not simply ἄρα, and ἀπεργάσασθαι, not ἀπεργασάμεθα, found in one MS. derived from the various reading ἀπεργασάμενα.

[47—47] The Greek is ἀγνοῶν καὶ χρώμενος. But the train of thought leads evidently to ἀγνοῶν ἣν καταχρώμενος, as I have translated.

[48] Every scholar, who has written on this passage, confesses that κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις is a corruption. I suspect that Plato wrote κανόσι καὶ τύκοις—as shown by Φοίνικι κανόνι καὶ τύκοις ἡρμοσμένα in Eurip. Herc. 945, κανόνων τυκίσματα in Tro. 814, and in Sophocl. Πριάμου Fr., Τύκοι, κανὼν, πῆχυς, διαβήτης καὶ στάθμη, evidently said of the building of Troy. Of these builders' instruments, the κανὼν, διαβήτης, and στάθμη have been mentioned in §1 31. The τύκος was the mason's chisel. See Pollux, vii. 118, and 125.

[49] So Sydenham; as if he wished to read λέγοιμεν ἄν for λέγομεν.

[50] Here again we must read τύκῳ for κύκλῳ.

[51—51] I confess I do not understand Plato's meaning here.

Prot. To me it seems necessary, if our life is to be in any manner whatever a life.

Soc. Are you then willing, like a door-keeper, jostled and forced by a throng of people, to yield and throw open the doors, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, and to be mixed together [52]the wanting (in purity)[52] with the pure.

Prot. I cannot perceive, Socrates, how any one would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if possessing already the leading.

Soc. Let me then admit them all to come pouring into the receptacle of Homer's[53] poetical mingling of the waters in a valley.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. They are admitted. And let us now return to the font of pleasure.[54] For when we thought of mixing them together, the portions of the true had not been produced; but, from our love of all science, we sent them in a crowd to the same spot, and even before the pleasures.

Prot. You speak most truly.

Soc. It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those, that are true, the first.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in first the true.

Soc. Let these then be admitted. But what after this? Must we not, if some are necessary, mix together these as we did those?[55]

Prot. Why not? at least the necessary, surely.

[150.] *Soc.* But if, as we held it harmless and useful to know through life all the arts, we now assert[56] the same of pleasures likewise, we must mix them all together, if indeed

[52]—[52] That Plato wrote ἐνδεεστέραν as opposed to καθαρᾷ, I much doubt. Ficinus has "cum pura passim deteriorem."

[53] Il. iv. 452.

[54] After observing in ed. 1, that there was something wanting here, as Heindorf likewise suspected, Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that all will be sound, if we correct ἐξεγενήθη into ἐξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, and render ἐξεγένετο "it was lawful:" but that verb never has such a meaning.

[55] Instead of ἐκεῖ one MS. has ἐκείναις: which leads to ἐκείνας, answering to ταύτας.

[56] One MS. reads λέγομεν for λέγωμεν, as Stalbaum suggested in ed. 1.

it is conducive to us and harmless for all to enjoy all kinds of pleasures through life.

Prot. How shall we say then on these very points? and how act?

Soc. It is not proper, Protarchus, to ask us this question; but the pleasures themselves, and intellect, by inquiring respecting each other,[57] some such thing as this.

Prot. Of what kind?

Soc. Ye friends, whether we must call you Pleasures, or by any other name whatever, would ye choose to dwell with all Intellect, or without Intellect? To this I think it is most necessary to say thus.

Prot. How?

[151.] *Soc.* That, as was said before, for any pure[58] kind to be alone and deserted, it is neither very possible nor useful. We deem it however that the best of all kinds should, one above others,[59] dwell with us;—that one, which is able[60] to know both all the rest [61]and itself likewise, and at the same time each of us as perfectly as possible.[61]

Prot. And well have ye now answered, we will say to them.

Soc. Correctly so. After this then we must inquire of Intellect and Mind. Have ye any need of Pleasure in your mixture? [62][we will say on the other hand, interrogating Mind and Intellect].[62] What pleasures? they would perhaps reply.

Prot. Probably.

[152.] *Soc.* To such a question our language would be this. Beside those true pleasures, we will say, do ye further want

[57] I cannot understand *ἀλλήλων περὶ*: nor could Ficinus, who has omitted these words. For the pleasures and intellect did not inquire of each other, but both were interrogated by Socrates.

[58] Stalbaum, who, in ed. 1, had with Ficinus rejected *εἰλικρινὲς*, retains it in ed. 2.

[59] On the phrase *ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς*, see Stalb.

[60] I have translated, as if the Greek were not *τὸ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν*, which I cannot understand, but *τό γ' οἷον γιγνώσκειν*, where *οἷον* means "able," as we often find in Xenophon.

[61]—[61] The Greek is *καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῶν*——*ἑκάστην*—where Heusde was the first to see that the mention of knowing itself was required. I have translated, therefore, as if the text were *καὶ αὐτὸ, ἅμα τε ἡμῶν*—*ἑκάστην*.

[62]—[62] The words within brackets are evidently superfluous. They are properly omitted by Ficinus; although his version here is too unlike the Greek to be safely trusted

pleasures the greatest and most intense to dwell with you? How, Socrates, they would say, should we want those, which give a thousand hinderances to us by disturbing the souls, where we dwell with maddening pleasures,[63] and do not permit us to exist, and entirely spoil our children, there born, by introducing for the most part carelessness through forgetfulness? But the other pleasures, of which you have spoken, the true and the pure, do thou consider as nearly related to us; and beside these, such as are accompanied with health and sobriety, and such also as are in the train of all Virtue in general, as if of a goddess, and every where follow her, all these do thou mix[64] (with us). But those that always accompany folly, and the rest of depravity, it is a great absurdity for a man to mix with Intellect, who desires to see a mixture[65] the most beautiful, and the least disturbed, and to try to learn from it what good is naturally, not only in man, but in the universe; and to divine what is the idea (of good) itself. Shall we not say that Mind has, in answering thus, spoken prudently, and with self-possession, in behalf of itself and memory, and right opinion?

Prot. By all means.

[153.] *Soc.* And this moreover is necessary, for not a single thing could ever otherwise exist.

Prot. What is that?

Soc. That, with which we cannot mix truth, could never be in existence truly, nor ever have been.

Prot. For how could it?

Soc. By no means. But if any thing further be yet wanting for the mixture, do you and Philebus mention it. For to me our present reasoning appears, like some incorporeal world[66] about to rule correctly over an animated body, to have been worked out.

[63] Stalbaum, objecting justly to *αἱ ἡδοναὶ—ταράττουσαι διὰ ἡδονὰς*, wishes, in ed. 2, to read *ἐπιθυμίας*. Ficinus has "furiosæ" simply, as if he had found in his MS. *μανικῶς* without *ἡδονάς*.

[64] The Greek is *μιγνύντας δ'*, which Heusde ingeniously altered into *μίγνυ· τας δ'*—

[65] As *μίξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν* is an insufferable tautology, it is evident that *μίξιν καὶ* or *ἥγουν*, (as may be seen in Bast's Palæograph. p. 893, appended to Schæfer's ed. of Gregorius on Dialects,) is the interpretation of *κρᾶσιν*.

[66] Instead of *κόσμος* one would have expected *θεὸς*: for reasoning may be compared to a deity, but not to a world. But perhaps *κόσμος* means here the "order," that regulates the world, not the world itself.

Prot. And to me say, Socrates, it has seemed thus.

[154.] *Soc.* Should we then, in saying that we are now standing at the very vestibule of the good, and the residence of a thing of such a kind, correctly perhaps in a certain manner say so?

Prot. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. What then would appear to us to be in this mixture the thing most valuable, and especially the cause of such a disposition being agreeable to all? For after having seen this, we will subsequently consider whether to pleasure or to mind it adheres the closer,[67] and the more intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

Prot. Right. For this will[68] conduce the most to our decision.

Soc. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause of mixture in general, through which it is worth every thing or nothing.

Prot. How say you?

Soc. No man is surely ignorant of this.

Prot. Of what?

[155.] *Soc.* That every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever its quantity,[69] if it does not meet with measure and a symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both the ingredients and itself. [70] For there exists not a tempering, but a certain unmixed bringing together, (and) confused truly of this kind on every occasion in reality to those who possess it.[70]

[67] In lieu of *προσφυές τε*, Heusde suggested *προσφυέστερον*, similar to "cognatius ac propius" in Ficinus.

[68] Instead of *ἐστὶ*, Cornarius proposed *ἔσται*, obtained from "conferet" in Ficinus.

[69] The Greek is *ὁπωσοῦν*, "however it be made." But the meaning is this, that every right and good mixture must be made "in one certain measure." Plato probably wrote not *ὁπωσοῦν* but *ὁποσηοῦν*. So Sydenham; who got the idea from "quæcunque et qualiscunque," in Ficinus. But Stalbaum says that *ὁπωσοῦν* is to be connected with the preceding *μὴ τυχοῦσα*. But this I think the very collocation of the words prevents.

[70]—[70] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where the words are strangely thrown out of their proper places. How much clearer is the version of Ficinus—"Neque enim temperies hæc est, sed, tanquam intemperatus quidam passim fortuitusque concursus nobis accidere solet." Perhaps Plato wrote, *Οὐδε γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀληθὴς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ὄντως, ἀλλά τις ἀκρίτως ξυμπεφορημένη, ἑκάστοτε τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.* i. e. For such a mixture becomes not in reality a true one, but having been brought together indiscriminately, it is on every occasion a calamity

Prot. Most truly so.

Soc. The power then of the good has fled from us into the nature of the beautiful. For surely every where moderation and symmetry happen to be a beauty and a virtue.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Now we have said that truth also was an ingredient in the mixture.

Prot. Entirely so,

Soc. If then we are not able to hunt out the good in one form, yet, taking it in three together, beauty, and symmetry, and truth,[71] let us say that we can most justly consider these[72] as one cause of the ingredients in the mixture, and that through this, as being good, the mixture is itself produced of such a kind.

Prot. Most truly indeed.

[156.] *Soc.* Now then, Protarchus, any person whatever would be a competent judge respecting pleasure and intellect, as to which of the two is more closely allied to the greatest good, and in higher honour both amongst men and gods.

Prot. (The decision) is clear indeed; yet it is better to go through it in our discourse.

Soc. Let us then compare each of the three severally with pleasure and with intellect. For we are to see to which of the two we must assign each of the three as being the nearer related.

Prot. Are you speaking of beauty, and truth, and moderation?

Soc. Yes. Now lay hold in the first place, Protarchus, of truth; and having laid hold of it, look at the three, mind, and truth, and pleasure; and after waiting a considerable time, answer to yourself, whether pleasure or mind is nearer related to truth.

[157.] *Prot.* What need is there of time? for I think they differ greatly. For of all things pleasure is the greatest brag-

to those who possess it." Respecting the union of ἀληθῆς ὄντως, see Stalbaum in ed. 2.

[71] Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, observes, "that Iamblichus appears to have bounded the intelligible in the three monads, symmetry, truth, and beauty; and through these to have unfolded the intelligible gods in the Platonic theology." T.

[72] Instead of τοῦτο Stalbaum, in ed. 2, says that one would have expected ταῦτα, applied to beauty, symmetry, and truth; but that no change is to be made. The expression, however, of οἷον ἓν would be otherwise unintelligible.

gart; and as the saying is, in the pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury has obtained pardon from the gods;[73] since pleasures, like children, possess not the least particle of mind. But mind is either the same thing as truth, or of all things the most like to it,[74] [and the most truthful.][74]

Soc. Consider then after this in the same manner[75] moderation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than intellect, or intellect more of it than pleasure.

Prot. And this inquiry too which you have proposed, is easy to be considered. For I imagine no person will find any thing more immoderate than pleasure and extravagant joy; nor a single thing of more moderation than mind and intellect.

Soc. You have spoken well. But however still mention the third thing. Has mind partaken of beauty more than any kind of pleasure, so that mind is more beautiful than pleasure, or the reverse?

[158.] *Prot.* Has then, Socrates, any man in a day-dream or night-dream seen or imagined that intellect and mind is in any matter or in any manner a thing that has been,[76] or is, or will be unhandsome?

Soc. Right.

Prot. But whenever we see any person whatever delighted with pleasures, and those too the greatest, and behold the ridiculous, or what is the most disgraceful of all things, following upon them, we are ashamed ourselves, and by putting them out of sight, conceal them by giving them, as far as possible, to night and darkness, all such things as not being fit for the light to look on.

Soc. To all then and every where[77] Protarchus, you will declare, sending by messengers (to the absent),[78] and speak-

[73] On the verse alluded to here, and partly quoted in Sympos. § 10, Stalbaum refers to several critical scholars. It was Ἀφροδίσιος γὰρ ὅρκος οὐκ ἐμποίνιμος.

[74]—[74] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[75] In lieu of ὡς οὕτως, Cornarius first suggested ὡσαύτως. And so the three oldest MSS. and Eusebius.

[76] Instead of γιγνόμενον, Eusebius quotes γενόμενον, adopted by Stalbaum. Plato wrote γεγενημένον, answering to "fuisse" in Ficinus.

[77] Instead of πάντῃ, Eusebius offers παντὶ, and Ficinus "cunctis," from which Stalbaum elicited πᾶσι. Plato, I suspect, wrote πᾶσι πάντῃ δὴ: for these words are constantly thus united.

[78] The balance of the sentence shows that τοῖς ἀποῦσι has dropt out before καὶ παροῦσι.

ing to those present, that pleasure is a possession, neither the first nor the second in worth, but that the first relates to moderation, and that the moderate and seasonable, and all that it is meet to consider as such, have [79]obtained the eternal nature.[79]

Prot. It appears so from what has been said already.

[159.] *Soc.* And that the second relates to symmetry and beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is of that family.

Prot. So it seems.

Soc. In placing, as my divination (says), mind and intellect the third, you would not greatly pass by the truth.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc. And are not the fourth those things, which we assigned to the soul herself, called sciences and arts, and right opinions? [80]that these are the fourth in addition to those three;[80] if, indeed, they are more nearly related to the good than to pleasure.

Prot. Perhaps.

Soc. That the fifth are what we laid down as pleasures, having defined them as painless, and denominated them pure; and following not[81] the knowledge of the soul, but its sensations.

Prot. Perhaps so.

Soc.

Of the song the order in the sixth race close,[82]

says Orpheus. And our discourse seems to be now closed

[79]—[79] Ficinus has "sempiternam vocem approbationem dixisse putandum." He therefore found in his MS. *εἰρῆσθαι*, which Grou corrected into *ῥῆσθαι*, found in the three oldest MSS. Moreover Stalbaum, in ed. 1, could not understand *ἀΐδιον φύσιν*, nor can I, as applied to moderation. Some MSS. offer *φάσιν*, answering to "vocem laudationemque" in Ficinus. Others omit *φύσιν* entirely. Perhaps Plato wrote *τὴν ἀϊδίου δόξης ῥῆσθαι φύσιν*. On the phrase *ἀϊδίου δόξης*, see my note on Cratylus, § 26, n. 73.

[80]—[80] I can discover no syntax in *ταῦτα εἶναι—τέταρτα, εἰ*. I could in *ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι—τέταρτα δεῖ, εἰ*—

[81] By reading *οὐ ταῖς* in lieu of *αὐτῆς* and *ἐπιστήμαις* with one MS. after correction, we get rid of all the difficulty. Sydenham proposed to expunge *ἐπιστήμαις*, and so after him Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum has followed in ed. 2, after rejecting in ed. 1, the words *τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς* likewise.

[82] This verse is quoted in Plutarch, t. ii. p. 391, from this passage of Plato. It was evidently taken from a Cosmogony, where man was feigned to be created the last.

with the sixth decision. After this, nothing remains for us but to affix[83] a head, as it were, to what has been said.

Prot. It is fit that we should.

[160.] *Soc.* Come, then, let us proceed in calling upon the same reason, as if it were the third cup to the saviour god, to bear witness.

Prot. What?

Soc. Philebus has laid down that the good was wholly and entirely a pleasure.

Prot. [84] The third you have, it seems, Socrates, said, just now, ought to resume the original argument.[84]

Soc. Yes. But let us hear what follows. I, having seen thoroughly what I have just now gone through, and disliking the doctrine not of Philebus only, but of other thousands frequently,[85] asserted, that mind was a thing far better, and better[86] for the life of man than pleasure.

Prot. That is the fact.

Soc. But then, suspecting that there were many other things, I stated that if something[87] should appear better than both of those, I would combat for the second prize, in behalf of mind against pleasure; and that pleasure would be deprived of the second prize.

Prot. So you said.

[83] From Sydenham's "to affix," obtained from "adhibeamus" in Ficinus, Stalbaum was perhaps led to read *ἐπιθεῖναι* for *ἀποδοῦναι*: while instead of *κεφαλὴν*, I wish MSS. had offered *κολοφῶνα*, similar to *κολοφὼν ἐπὶ τῷ—λόγῳ ῥηθέντι*, in Legg. ii. p. 674, C., and *κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεὶς τῇ σοφίᾳ*, in Euthyd. p. 301, E. § 71, where see my note.

[84]—[84] I do not quite understand this. One MS. has after correction *τὸ τὸν*, which seems to confirm the conjecture of Stalbaum, who suggested *τὸ* for *τὸν*—

[85] I cannot understand *πολλάκις* thus placed between *ἄλλων* and *μυρίων*. Perhaps Plato wrote *καὶ καλῶν παλλακίδων μυρίων*, "many thousand beautiful courtesans." There are no doubt those, who would translate *πολλάκις μυρίων*, "many times ten thousand." But as *μυρίων* is the definite number for the indefinite, it would not require the addition. On the other hand, the mention of *παλλακίδες* is properly introduced, for such persons are especially the votaries of pleasure.

[86] I must leave for others to explain the difference between *βέλτιον* and *ἄμεινον*.

[87] Stephens first elicited *τι* from "aliquid" in Ficinus for *τὸ*, and so the three oldest MSS.

Soc. Afterwards it very sufficiently appeared that neither of these were[88] sufficient.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. By this reasoning then both mind and pleasure were dismissed from being either of them the good itself, being deprived of self-sufficiency, and the power belonging to the sufficient and perfect.

Prot. Very right.

Soc. But when a third was discovered, superior to either of those two, mind appeared a thousand-fold nearer related and more closely adhering to the form of the conqueror than pleasure did.

Prot. How not?

Soc. The fifth[89] then would be, according to the decision, which the reasoning has declared, the power of pleasure.

Prot. So it appears.

Soc. But the first place I would not yield up, not if all the bulls and horses,[90] and all wild beasts whatever should assert it, to the pursuit of pleasure;[91] trusting to whom, just as augurs

[88] Instead of *ἐφάνη* Eusebius offers *ἀνεφάνη*: which leads to *εἶναι ἐφάνη*.

[89] An error has infected all the editions of Plato in this place. For they all read *πέμπτον*, "fifth," instead of *ἕκτον*, "sixth." Now the fifth rank was before assigned solely to the pure pleasures. The sixth and last rank, therefore, remains to pleasure; which according to Philebus was the chief good—pleasure in general, at random from any quarter, or, in Plato's own words, p. 40, *παράπαν, ὁπωσοῦν, καὶ εἰκῇ χαίρειν*. The very next sentence of Socrates shows, beyond all doubt, that sensual pleasure is here meant.—S. The error might have easily arisen from confounding *ε* with *ς*.

[90] Porphyry, *Περὶ Ἀποχῆς Ἐμψύχων*, iii. 1, says that "to certain persons, who were disputing whether pleasure was the ultimate end of man, Socrates observed, that, were all the swine and goats in the world to join in applauding the advocate for pleasure, he would never be persuaded that human happiness consisted in being pleased, so long as mind excelled and prevailed in all things." If Porphyry alluded to this passage in Plato, he would seem to have found in his copy *σύες τε καὶ τράγοι* instead of *βόες καὶ ἵπποι*. S.

[91] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οὐκ ἐῴην ἂν, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες—θηρία φῶσι*, and not *οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες—φῶσι*. The error seems to be of older date than the time of Eusebius; who quotes *οὐκ ἂν ἅπαντες—φῶσι*: where however lies hid *οὐκ ἐῴην ἂν πάντες*—Respecting the corruption of *ἐᾶν* in its moods and tenses, I have written in Class Journal, No 44, p. 376, No. 52, p. 367, on Plato's Criton, § 15, n. 27.

do to birds, the multitude decide that pleasures avail the most for living well; and think that the loves of wild animals are a stronger evidence, than the sayings of those who have spoken prophetically on every occasion in the Muse of Philosophy.[92]

Prot. That the greatest truth has been spoken by you, Socrates, we all now assert.

Soc. Now then ye dismiss me.

Prot. There is, Socrates, still a little left. For you will surely not march off before us; and I will put you in mind[93] of what is left unsaid.[94]

[92] This seems to have been a poem called Μοῦσα Φιλόσοφος, written by Euthyphron, to which there is an allusion in Cratyl. § 57.

[93] There is some error here, which I have pointed out and corrected on Hipp. Maj. § 49, n. 6.

[94] As a specimen of the ingenious trifling of the Neo-Platonic school, it is worth while presenting the reader with the following extract from Olympiodorus, as translated by Taylor; who evidently met with a MS. more full than the one at Nuremburg, from which Stalbaum first printed the Greek text. "To the question why this dialogue is without a beginning and an end, Olympiodorus replies—'Shall we say that this is because the good is uncircumscribed, and has neither beginning nor end? But it may be said, that on the contrary it is necessary the good should have a beginning and end; a beginning of such a kind, that there is not another beginning prior to it, and an end, beyond which there is not any other end. Perhaps, therefore, it is better to say with our preceptor, that the mixt life has an end, and such a one as is adapted to all animals. So that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpose of indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it investigates. And again, for the same reason, it is without an end; for there is also another end more ancient than its end.'" T

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHARMIDES,

ON

TEMPERANCE.

In this dialogue, which Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher have denied to be Plato's for reasons, that have failed to convince Ochsmann and Stalbaum, the object is to disprove what some of the Sophists had asserted in favour of the value of Temperance, which was considered one of the four cardinal virtues. By this, however, the philosophers of Greece did not understand, as we do, the abstinence from corporeal pleasures merely, and especially those relating to eating and drinking, but a steady self-control in the indulgence of all the feelings and habits, which it is the business of a sensible education to introduce; and hence, according to Xenophon, in M. S. iii. 9. 4, Socrates is said to have not distinguished it from wisdom.

But though it is defined in The Banquet, p. 196, C. § 22, as being the mastery over pleasure and desire, yet on the present occasion, instead of giving himself a definition, Socrates is represented as evading the difficulty of a definition, and being content to show that Temperance did not consist in what others fancied it did.

Of the speakers one is Critias, the admirer and teacher of Charmides. Now as Socrates seems to have been ever anxious to withdraw young persons from all connexion with those, from whom they frequently derived more harm than good, he enters into a conversation with Critias, and carries it on in such a way as evidently to

wound the self-love of the individual, who fancied himself to be, and was so considered by others, a man of no little talent. And as he had probably conducted himself in a similar manner upon other occasions it was only natural for the person, who had been once a friend of Socrates, to become his enemy; for it has been remarked by more than one observer of human nature, that

> No hate is so strong, as what from dead love springs.

CHARMIDES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, CHÆREPHO, CRITIAS, CHARMIDES.

[1.] THE day before yesterday I came in the evening from the army at Potidæa, and pleased, like a person who had returned after a long period, I went to my usual haunts for passing the time; and I entered the wrestling-place of Taureas,[1] which is opposite to the temple, close by the portico of the court of the Archon-king.[2] Here I fell in with very many persons, some unknown to me, but the greater part my acquaintances. As soon as they saw me entering unexpectedly, immediately from different sides they tendered at a distance their greetings. But Chærepho, as if he were mad,[3] leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand said, How, Socrates, were you saved from the battle? For a short time before we (the Athenians) came away, there was an engagement at Potidæa,[4] of which those present here have just now heard.—And I answering him, said, Thus, as you see.—[2.] Indeed, said he, it was reported here, that it was a hard-fought battle, and that many of our acquaintances had fallen in it.—And you were told, said I, what is very much the truth.—But, said he, were you in the engagement?

[1] The Taureas alluded was probably the person mentioned by Demosthenes in the Midian Orat. p. 562, D. ed. R., as having been struck, when he was a Choregus, by Alcibiades.

[2] This was the second Archon.

[3] On Chærepho's violence of temper, see Apolog. p. 21, A. § 5.

[4] To this battle, which took place in Ol. 87. 3, Thucydides alludes in ii. 58, but attributes the great loss of the troops rather to the plague than to the battle.

—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and tell us about it, for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias, the son of Callæschrus. On sitting down then, I saluted Critias and the rest, and, according as any one asked me, related what took place in the army. And some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of such matters, I, in return, made inquiries about affairs here, as regards philosophy, what was its state at present; and respecting the young men, whether they had been remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. [3.] Critias then, looking towards the door, and perceiving some young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, with regard to beautiful youths, that you will know something on the instant. For those, who are now entering, are the forerunners and lovers of one, who is thought to be the most beautiful[5] of all at the present time. And it appears to me, that, having advanced, he is already near.—But who, said I, is he, and of whom the son?—You surely know, said he—although he was not yet grown up before you went away—Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, and my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Zeus, said I; for he was not then to be despised, although but a boy; but now I think he must be almost a young man. —You will immediately know, said he, of what age, and what kind he is. And as he was thus speaking, Charmides entered. —And I, my friend, had no rule to go by; for with regard to handsome youths, I am a white rule;[6] since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. [4.] But he then appeared to me to be an object of wonder, both for his size and beauty;[7] and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those, who were behind him. And as to the men like us indeed, this was less wonderful; but I also paid attention to the youths, (and saw)

[5] Ficin. has "honestissimus et speciosissimus," as if he had found in his MS. καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου—answering to καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς in § 5.

[6] The rule alluded to was a string rubbed with a piece of red chalk, which, when applied to white marble, left a mark sufficiently distinct to work by; but if with white chalk, as it left none sufficiently discernible, it failed to answer the purpose of a rule.

[7] Ficin.—"Corporis proceritate et egregia indole."

that none of them turned their eyes elsewhere than on him, not even the smallest among them, but all looked upon him, as on a statue. And Chæropho calling me, said, What does the youth appear to you, Socrates? Is he not very beautiful?—Surpassingly, I replied.—And yet, said he, if he were to undress, he would appear to be faceless, so very beautiful is his form. And in this all the rest agreed with Chærepho. And by Hercules, I replied, you speak of a man not to be conquered, if only one small thing still happens to be his.—What is that? said Critias.—[5.] If in his soul, said I, he should happen to be well formed; and it is surely becoming, Critias, for him to be so, as being one of your family.—And he is, said he, very beautiful and good [in this respect].[8]—Why then, said I, do we not strip off this very thing of his, and look upon it prior to his (external) form? For since he is of such an age, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.[9]—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and, as it seems both to others and himself,[10] very poetic.[11]—This beauty, friend Critias, I replied, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon.[12] But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would be no disgrace for us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, in the presence of yourself, who art his tutor and cousin.—[6.] You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to his attendant, Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to bring him in contact with a physician, touching the

[8] By the words *καὶ ταῦτα*, Heindorf understands the soul. But as *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς* include the ideas of beauty bodily and mental, the words *καὶ ταῦτα* are superfluous; unless it be said that Plato wrote *πάνυ καλὸς καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα*: of which *ἀγαθὸς* would be the interpretation.

[9] This reasoning is rather inconclusive. For a person might be beautiful both in body and in mind, and yet feel no desire to hold a conversation. A similar difficulty exists in the word *τηλικοῦτος*, whether it is translated "of such an age," or "of such a size."

[10] Instead of *ἑαυτῷ*, Groen van Prinsterrer, in Prosopograph. Platonic. p. 214, would read *ἐμαυτῷ*, "to myself."

[11] Why Critias should fancy that Charmides would be willing to converse, because he was both a philosopher and poet, it is not very easy to understand. Such persons would rather be desirous to express their ideas in writings than by word of mouth.

[12] According to Proclus on Timæus, p. 25, this second Critias was the grandson of the first, who was the nephew of Solon.

weakness of which he lately spoke to me.—Critias then said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rises in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know of a cure for the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—And come he shall, said he. Which was indeed the case; for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour, till of those that were seated at the extremity, one we forced to rise up, and another to fall sideways on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. [7.] [13]Then, however, friend, I was perplexed, and the former confidence which I had felt, that I could easily discourse with Charmides, was cut down. But afterwards, on Critias telling him that I was the person who knew of a cure, he fixed his eyes upon me in a perplexing manner, and brought himself near as if to ask a question. Then all that were in the place of exercise, immediately gathered round us; and when, my noble fellow, I looked within his cloak, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself; and I thought that Cydias[14] was most wise in amatory affairs; who, when speaking of a beautiful boy, and giving a hint to another, said,

> [15] "Beware, when coming in the face of lion,
> To take a portion of the flesh of fawn." [15]

For I seemed to have been caught by an animal of this kind.[13] However, on Charmides asking me whether I knew of a remedy for the disorder in his head, with difficulty I replied, that I did know.—What is it? said he.—[8.] It is a certain

[13]—[13] All within the numerals are omitted in the ed. 1 of Ficinus.

[14] This is the reading adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum from nearly all the MSS., in lieu of Κριτίαν. For the same poet is mentioned, a Bernhardy was the first to remark, by Plutarch and the Scholiast on Aristophanes.

[15]—[15] Hemsterhuis on Lucian, Dialog. Mort. viii., was the first to remark, that there is an allusion here to some well-known story; with whom Ast agrees in Act. Seminar. Reg. et Societat. Philolog. Lips. t. i. p. 255, who says that μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν means "to take a portion of the prey;" not as Heindorf translated, "to be torn into pieces of flesh," which Stalbaum adopts; for one party saw that the genius of the language required one interpretation, and the train of thought the other The fact is, there is something wanting here to unite the language with the thought correctly.

leaf, I replied, and a certain incantation in addition to the medicine, which if any one chanted and used at the same time as the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—And he said, I will write down the incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you persuade me or not?—Upon this he said, laughing, I will, if I persuade you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied; and do you accurately know my name?—Unless I am doing wrong, said he; for there is no small talk about you amongst those of my age; and I can remember, too, that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I will now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But just now I was doubtful after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, Charmides, that it is able to make not only the head sound; but, as perhaps you have already heard from clever physicians, when any one comes to them with a pain in their eyes, who say that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to attend to the head, if the eyes are to be in a good state, and, on the other hand, that it would be great stupidity to think of attending to the head alone without the whole body. [9.] In consequence of this very reasoning, they turn themselves to the whole body, and by diet (and regimen) endeavour to attend to and cure the part together with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied. —Does it then appear to you that it has been well said; and do you admit their doctrine?—The most of all things, said he. —And I, on hearing him express his praise, took courage, and my confidence was again a little excited and I revived; and such then, I said, Charmides, is the power of this incantation; and I learnt it there during the expedition, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis,[16] who are said to render men even immortal. This Thracian said that "the Greek physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But our king Zamolxis," said he, "being a god, says that, as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper

[16] On Zamolxis see Valckenaer on Herodot. iv. 94, and Sturz on Hellanicus, p. 64, quoted by Stalbaum.

to cure the body without the soul; and that this was the reason why many diseases escape the Greek physicians, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid; for when this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well. [10.] For all things," said he, "proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as[17] from the head to the eyes; and that it is therefore requisite to attend to that point first, and especially if the parts of the head and the rest of the body are to be in a good state." And he said, thou happy youth, "that the soul was cured by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons; and that such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body." Having then taught me the medicine and the incantations, "Let none," said he, "persuade you to cure his head with this medicine, who shall not have first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time respecting men is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of either [temperance or health]."[18] [11.] And he very earnestly enjoined me that no person should be so rich, or noble, or beautiful as to persuade me to act otherwise. I therefore—for I swore to him that I would obey him, and hence I must—will obey him. And indeed if you are willing, according to the injunctions of the stranger, to present your soul first for me to enchant by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer also the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot do any thing whatever for you, friend Charmides.—Critias therefore, on hearing me speak thus, observed, This weakness in his head, Socrates, will be a godsend[19] to the youth, if he shall be compelled to become through his head better in his intellect likewise. I assure you moreover that Charmides is thought to surpass all his equals, not only in his

[17] Instead of ὥσπερ, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ὡσαύτως For his version is "similiter." I certainly cannot understand ὥσπερ.

[18] The words within brackets Heusde, with whom Bekker agrees, was the first to reject as an interpretation of ἑκατέρου: and they are omitted in one MS. On the other hand, Ficinus omits ἑκατέρου.

[19] Such is the best translation of Ἑρμαῖον, by which was meant literally any thing of value found in the road, of which Hermes was the tutelary deity. See The Banquet, p. 176, C. § 4.

form, but in that very thing for which you say you have an incantation. Now you mean temperance. Is it not so?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that he appears to be by far the most temperate of those living at present and that as regard all other points he is, as far as his age goes, inferior to none.—[12.] And it is just, I replied, Charmides, that you should excel the others in all such points as these. For I do not think that any one of those here could readily show two families among the Athenians uniting in the same race, who could probably produce a more beautiful and excellent offspring than those from whom you are sprung. For your family on the father's side, that of Critias the son of Dropides, has been handed to us as being celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and many other poets, for its excelling in beauty, and virtue, and the rest of what is called[20] good fortune. And on his mother's side again in like manner. For not one of those that dwell on the continent (of Asia) is said to have been thought a man of greater beauty and size than your uncle[21] Pyrilampes, as often as he went as an ambassador to the great king (of Persia), or to any one else on the continent; and indeed the whole of his family on this side is in nothing inferior to that on the other. It is likely then that, sprung from such persons, you should be the first in all things. Hence, with respect to your visible form, [22]you appear, thou dear son of Glauco, to me to disgrace none of your ancestors;[22] and if, according to the assertion of this person here, you are sufficiently endued by nature as regards temperance and the other virtues, [23]your mother, dear Charmides, has brought you forth blessed indeed.[23] [13.] The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias here asserts, and you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the

[20] Ficinus omits λεγομένη, a word apparently unnecessary.

[21] According to Pollux, iii. 22, the word θεῖος, which generally means an uncle on the father's side, is sometimes applied to one on the mother's.

[22]—[22] In lieu of οὐδένα τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν, the two best MSS. (Bodl. and Vienn.) offer a most remarkable reading, οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑπερβεβληκέναι. Plato probably united the two, by adding, after ὑπερβεβληκέναι, οὐδὲ νῦν σὲ τὰ τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν, i. e. "not one of those before you has surpassed you in any thing, nor do you now bring disgrace upon the deeds of your ancestors." The error is to be traced to the repetition of οὐδένα and οὐδὲ νῦν.

[23]—[23] Here is an allusion to Hom. Il. iv. 399; Od. iii. 95; iv. 25, as remarked by Heindorf.

incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris,[24] but the medicine for the head should be immediately given you. But if you seem to be still in any respect wanting in these things, we must have the incantation before giving the medicine. Do you then tell me yourself whether you agree with this here (Critias), and affirm that you participate sufficiently in temperance, or whether you are deficient. Hereupon Charmides, blushing, appeared in the first place to be still more beautiful—for bashfulness was suited to his age—and in the next, he answered me not without spirit. For, said he, It was not easy at present either to confess to or deny what was asked: for, said he, if I say that I am not temperate, it would be absurd for me to state so against myself, and at the same time I should show that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others, to whom I appear to be temperate: but if, on the other hand, I say that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—[14.] To this I replied, You appear to me, Charmides, to say what is reasonable; and it seems we should consider in common whether you possess or not that, which I am asking about, that you may neither be compelled to say what you do not wish, nor I, on the other hand, turn myself without due consideration to the medical art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I am willing to consider this matter together with you; but if it is not, to leave it alone.—Nay, but it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things; so that for this matter at least do you consider it in whatever manner appears to you to be the better.—In this way then, I replied, the inquiry respecting it seems to me to be the best, if temperance is present with you, for it is evident that you have some opinion about it; for it is surely necessary that if it is really inherent in you, it must furnish some sensation of itself, from which you would have an opinion respecting it, what it is, and of what kind a thing is temperance. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And could you not surely tell me, said I, since you know how to speak Greek,

[24] Respecting this Abaris, see Herodot. iv. 6. He is fabled to have received an arrow from Apollo, by the aid of which he was enabled to find his way through countries he had never before traversed. The arrow is supposed by Salverté to have been a kind of mariner's needle, that always pointed to the north.

what you think of it, and what it appears to you?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture, whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, said I, what say you is temperance according to your opinion? [15.] And at first, indeed, he was shy and not altogether willing to answer. Afterwards, however, he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things orderly and quietly, both in walking and discoursing in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else; and, in short, said he, a certain quietness appears to be what you are asking about.—[25] Are you then speaking correctly?[25] said I. At least, Charmides, persons say that the quiet are temperate. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose. For, tell me, is not temperance one of the things beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether then in a grammar-school is it more beautiful[26] to write letters of the same size[27] swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in reading, swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And in playing on the harp, rapidly, and in wrestling, briskly, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And is there not the like in boxing, and contests where boxing and wrestling are united?—Entirely so.—And in running and leaping, and all other actions of the body, do not those that take place briskly and rapidly belong to the beautiful, and those that are done[28] slowly, with difficulty,[28] and quietly, to the not beautiful?—It appears so.—It appears then to us, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and most brisk, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—[16.] But temperance was something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is a facility in learning more beautiful than a difficulty?—It is.—But a facility in learning, I said, is to learn swiftly;

[25]—[25] Here is some error in the words Ἆρ' οὖν—εὖ λέγεις, which Heindorf wished to correct by writing Ἆρ' οὖν—But ἄρα, the indefinite particle, could not commence a sentence.

[26] In lieu of κάλλιστον, Stephens suggested κάλλιον from "pulchrius" in Ficinus, which Heindorf and Bekker have adopted; but Heusde and Stalbaum prefer the other.

[27] Heindorf, whom Stalbaum follows, explains ὅμοια by "similar to the copy set by the writing-master."

[28]—[28] In the Greek βραδέως μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, Heindorf proposes to expunge βραδέως: but Stalbaum, μόγις. Ficin. "ignave remisseque."

and a difficulty in learning is to learn [quietly and][29] slowly. —It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—What then, is it more beautiful [30]to recollect and to remember[30] things quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And is not sagacity a certain acuteness, and not a quietness of the soul?—True.—To understand then what is meant in the school of the grammarian, harpist, and every where else, not in the most quiet, but in the most rapid manner, is the most beautiful.—Yes.—Moreover in the investigations of the soul, and in deliberating, not he, who is the most quiet, as I think, and deliberates and discovers a thing with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and rapidly.—It is so, said he.—[17.] Hence all things, I replied, relating to the soul and the body, and such as are performed with quickness and briskness, appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed with slowness and quietness.—It appears so, said he.—Temperance then will not be quietness, nor will a temperate life be a quiet one, at least from this reasoning; since a temperate one ought to be beautiful. For one of two things must take place, that either never, or very rarely, have quiet actions in life been shown to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, not fewer actions, as quiet as possible, happen to be more beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid, not even on this ground would temperance consist at all the more in acting quietly, than vehemently and rapidly, either in walking or in speaking, or in any thing else; nor would a quiet [orderly][31] life be more temperate than the unquiet one; since by our reasoning, temperance has been laid down as one of things beautiful; and things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than things quiet.—You appear to me, Socrates, he replied, to have spoken correctly.—[18.]

[29] The balance of the sentence requires the omission of *ἡσυχῇ καὶ*.

[30]—[30] The difference between *ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι* and *μεμνῆσθαι*, is not very perceptible.

[31] The Greek is *ἡσύχιος βίος κόσμιος*. Ficinus, "neque vita quieta quam inquieta decentior esset et temperantior," as if he had found in his MS. *ἡσύχιος βίος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου κοσμιώτερος καὶ σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη* Heindorf, in ed. 1, proposed to cut out *κόσμιος*, but in ed. 2 *ἡσύχιος* Stalbaum, with Schleiermacher and Schæfer on Gregor. de Dialect. p 1002, considers *κόσμιος* to be the intrusive word.

gain, therefore, I said, Charmides, be still more attentive, d looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person tem- rance, when present, causes you to be, and being what sort a thing itself, it would accomplish this. Reasoning, there- re, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a manly nner, what it appears to you.—And he, stopping a while, nsidering the matter thoroughly with himself, said,[32] in a ry manly manner, Temperance then seems to me to make a n ashamed and bashful: and temperance to be what shame —Be it so, I replied. But did you not just now acknow- ige that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, d he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.— ill therefore that be good, which does not render men good? It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful, t good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will u not believe that Homer speaks well, when he says, (Od. ii. 347,)

Shame ill accompanies a man in need?

lo, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not od, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; ce it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no ans bad.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Tem- rance, therefore, will not be shame, if it happens to be a od thing, while shame is not in any respect more a good ng than a bad one.—[19.] It appears to me, Socrates, said , that this is rightly asserted. But consider this, what ms to you on the subject of temperance. For I have just w recollected what I had heard some one saying, that tem- rance is to manage one's own affairs.[33] Consider, therefore, is, whether he, who says so, appears to you to have spoken rrectly.—Thou vile youth! I replied, you have heard this m Critias, or from some other of the sophists.—It seems, id Critias, from some other person; for he did not from me. But what difference does it make, Socrates, replied Char- des, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we e not to consider this, who said it, but whether it is said

[32] The words καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς ought to follow ἔφη, as I have trans ed, not precede πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, as is evident from the mmand of Socrates, εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρικῶς.

[33] The same definition is given in Tim. p. 72, A., quoted by Stalbaum

correctly or not.—Now you speak correctly, he replied.—By Zeus, I do, said I. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.—On what account? said he. Because, I replied, the person, who said that temperance is to manage one's own affairs, did not mean what his words expressed. Or do you think that the teacher of letters does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think (he does something), said he.—[20.] Does the teacher of letters, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And are ye not wont to write no less the names of your enemies than of your friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, ye were doing this, were ye busily employed, and not temperate?—By no means.—And, moreover, were ye not doing your own business, if to write, and to read, is to do something? It certainly is. And besides, my friend, to heal, and to build, and to weave, and to effect by any art whatever any of the works belonging to arts, is surely to do something.—Entirely so.—What then, I replied, would that city appear to you to be well regulated through a law commanding each person to weave and wash his own garment, and to be the cobbler of his own shoes, and (make)[34] an oil-cruse, and curry-comb, and every thing according to the same reasoning, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to [work and][36] manage his own affairs?—It would not appear to me so, he replied.—However, said I, a city temperately regulated would be well regulated.—How not? he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, would not be temperance.—It appears not.—[21.] He, therefore, who said, that to manage one's own business is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely; for he was surely not so stupid[36] (that his meaning should be the same as his words).[36] Or did you, Charmides, hear some silly person as-

[34, 35] According to Heindorf, the verb *ποιεῖν* is to be got out of *σκυτοτομεῖν*. But as shortly afterwards we meet with *ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν*, two verbs perfectly synonymous, it is evident, to myself at least, that *ἐργάζεσθαί τε* has lost its original place after *σκυτοτομεῖν*.

[36]—[36] The words between the numerals, absolutely requisite for the sense, have been preserved in the version of Ficinus alone, "ut idem ejus fuerit sensus, qui et verborum sensus." Stalbaum says that we are to understand after "so stupid," "as to think that temperance consists in managing one's own affairs."

rt this?—By no means, said he; since he appeared to be ry wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me, proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what the transacting one's own affairs.—Perhaps so, said he.—Can u then tell me, what it is to transact one's own affairs?—By us, said he, I do not know. But perhaps there is nothing hinder the person, who said this, from not knowing what he ant. And as he said this, he slightly smiled and looked at itias. And it was now evident that Critias, who had been for me while in an agony, and stimulated by ambition in the pre- nce of Charmides and those there, and who had with difficulty ntained himself, was then no longer able to do so. And it peared[37] to me more than ever, that what I suspected was ue, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance om Critias. [22.] Charmides, therefore, being willing not support himself the reason for the reply, but that the other ritias) should do so, and urged him on himself,[38] showed if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure; t appeared to me to be angry with Charmides, as a poet is ith an actor who exhibits his poems badly; so that, looking him, he said, Think you thus, Charmides, that, if you do not ow what he meant, who said, that temperance is to manage e's own affairs, he did not know?—And I said, It is. ritias, thou best of men, no wonder that Charmides, who is t a youth, should not know; but it is surely likely for you know, both on account of your age and attention to the sub- ct. If then you agree that temperance is, what this person serts, and will take up from him the conversation, I shall ith greater pleasure consider with you whether what has en said is true or not.—Nay, I do agree, said he, entirely, d accept the conversation.—And you do well, said I. But ll me, do you admit what I was just now asking, that all tists do something?—I do.—Do they appear to you to do

[37] From "visum est," the version of Ficinus, and his own "videbatur," rnarius seems to have wished to read ἐδόκει for δοκεῖ. Compare καὶ οὶ ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν, in Euthyd. p. 300, C., and καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει— γωνιᾶν in Protag. p. 333, F. The present passage is imitated by Helio- prus in Æthiop. ii. 18, as remarked by Boissonade on Philostratus eroic. p. 605.

[38] I cannot understand αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, nor could Ficinus, who has nitted the clause ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον. I could have understood ὑπεκίνει ἐκεῖνον καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη, i. e. "urged other on, and showed that he himself had been confuted."

only their own business, or the business of others likewise? —Of others likewise.—[23.] Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do their own business?—What should prevent them? said he.—Not myself, I replied, at all; but see whether there be not a hindrance to him, who, after having laid down that temperance is to transact one's own affairs, afterwards says, that nothing prevents those who transact the affairs of others from being temperate likewise.—For where, [39] said he, have I confessed that they, who transact the affairs of others, are temperate, like those, who I confessed make (something)? [39] —Tell me, said I, do you not say that to "make" a thing and to do is the same thing?—Not I indeed, said he, nor "to work" the same as "to make," for I have learned (so) from Hesiod, who says, "No work is a disgrace." [40]—Think you, then, that if he had called by the terms of "to work" and "to make," such acts as you were just now speaking of, he would have said that there was no disgrace to a person being [41] a cobler, or a seller of pickled fish, or of one who sits at a brothel? [41]—You must not think so, Socrates: but he I think did consider "a making" as something different from "action" and "working;" and that "making" is a disgrace, when it does not take place in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no "work" is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautiful and useful, he called "works," and "makings" of this kind workings and doings. [24.] You must say too that he considered such things (good) [42] alone as belong to home; but every thing hurtful, as foreign. Hence, you must think that Hesiod, and every other sensible person, calls him, who transacts his own

[39]—[39] I have adopted *ποῦ*, "where," instead of *που*, "surely," and *ᾖ* for *ἦ*, suggested by Morgenstern in Miscellan. Crit. Hildesiens. i. p. 91, and introduced *τι* before *ποιοῦνταϛ*. Ficinus has "an et eos, qui faciunt," as if he had found in his MS. *ἢ καὶ*—

[40] The Greek in the Works and Days, v. 309, is *Ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδοϛ*. But there, as remarked by Heindorf, *ἔργον* does not mean "work" generally, but only specifically "farming-work;" nor does *οὐδὲν* belong to *ἔργον*, but to *ὄνειδοϛ*.

[41]—[41] The three trades alluded to were considered the lowest at Athens. On the meaning of *οἴκημα*, applied, by an euphemism, to a brothel, see Harpocration, Pollux, and Hesychius.

[42] Stalbaum explains *τὰ τοιαῦτα* by the preceding *τὰ καλῶϛ καὶ ὠφελίμωϛ ποιούμενα*. But the balance of the sentence indicates that *ἀγαθὰ* has dropt out after *ἡγεῖσθαι*; to say nothing of the subsequent remark of Socrates, *ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίηϛ*.

airs, temperate.—As soon, Critias, as you began to speak, I rceived almost, that you called things belonging to home, a rson's own by the name of good, and "the making" of ings good, actions. For I have heard Prodicus, when speaking of terms, make some ten thousand distinctions; and I will low you to lay down every term as you please; but do you ly clearly state, to what you would refer the term, of which u may be speaking. Now therefore again from the beginning define more clearly. Do you say that temperance is e "doing," or the "making," or in whatever manner you oose to call it, of good things?—I do, said he.—He therefore not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He plied, Does it not, thou best of men, appear so to you?—ismiss this question, said I: for let us not consider what appears to me, but what you are saying now.—[25.] Nay, said e, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good t evil,[43] but that he is temperate, who does good and not il.[43] For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the ractice of things good. And perhaps there is nothing to revent you from speaking the truth. But nevertheless I ould wonder, if you thought that persons who conduct emselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate. —But I do not think so, said he.—Was it not, said I, asserted by u a little before, that there is nothing to prevent artists, who ake on the other hand[44] things belonging to others, from being mperate?—It was so asserted by me, said he; but what en?—Nothing. But tell me, does any physician appear to u, while making a person to be in health, to do what is useful both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he es.—Does not he, then, who acts thus, do what is fitting?—es.—And is not he temperate, who does what is fitting?—e is temperate.—Is it not then fitting for a physician to now when he is curing usefully, and when not? and for each rtist to know, when he will derive a benefit from the work hich he is doing, and when not?—Perhaps not, said he.—

[43]—[43] All the words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and onsequently by Taylor.

[44] I cannot understand αὖ here, nor could Heindorf, who thinks it was wing to καὶ—I suspect that Plato wrote καὶ τὰ αὐ-ῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, stead of καὶ αὖ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.

Sometimes then, I replied, when a physician acts usefully or hurtfully, he does not know himself how he is acting; although, according to your doctrine, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately; or did you not say so?—I did.—[26.] Does it not then seem, I replied, that sometimes, when he acts usefully, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is ignorant himself that he is temperate?—But this, said he, Socrates, could never take place; yet if you think that this necessarily results from what I have admitted above, I would rather retract some of those assertions; nor should I be ashamed to confess [45] that I have improperly asserted something,[45] rather than admit that the man, who is ignorant of himself, is temperate. For I almost assert, that to know oneself is temperance; and I agree with him who placed the precept upon the temple at Delphi, as being an address from the god to the comers, instead of "hail!" Since this last [to hail][46] is not a correct address, nor should we exhort each other to this, but to be temperate. [27.] Thus the god addresses those coming to the temple, in a manner somewhat different to what men do; as he had in his mind, it appears to me, who put up the inscription;[47] and he says to the person coming nothing else than "be temperate;" but, as being a prophet, he expresses it more enigmatically. For "Know thyself," and "Be temperate," is the same thing, as both the writings and myself assert.[48] But perhaps some one may think it to be different; which appears to me to have been the case with those, who placed the subsequent inscriptions, "Nothing too much,"[49] and "A surety is near to calamity."[50] For they

[45—45] The Greek is *ὅτι μὴ οὐχὶ*, where Bekker would read *ὅτι δὴ*—But *μὴ οὐ* thus follows *ἀνατίθεμαι* in Phædo, p. 87, A., and Meno, p. 89, D. He might have suggested *τό τι* for *ὅτι*. For thus *τὸ μὴ οὐ* are perpetually found between two verbs. According to Stalbaum, there is here a confusion of two constructions, one of which would require *ὅτι*, and the other reject it.

[46] The words *τοῦ χαίρειν* are evidently an explanation of *τούτου*: or else we must read with one MS. *τοῦ, χαῖρε*, as just above, *ἀντὶ τοῦ, χαῖρε*.

[47] I cannot understand *ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθείς*. I could have understood *ὡς διανοούμενος ἦν ὁ ἀναθεὶς*. Ficinus has "ut sensit ille, qui inscripsit."

[48] Ficinus has "ut literæ testantur, egoque interpretor," which is evidently more elegant.

[49,50] The authors of these apophthegms respectively are not known for certain. See Menage on Diogen. Laert. i. 41.

thought that "Know thyself" was a bit of advice, and not an address from the god for the sake of the comers; and then, that they might put up bits of advice not less useful, they put up these inscriptions. Now the reason, Socrates, for the sake of which I am saying all these things, is this—(that) I give up to you all that has been said before; for perhaps you have spoken more correctly about them; and perhaps, too, I; and there is, of what we have said, nothing very clear. But now I am willing to give you the reason for this, if you do not concede, that temperance is to know oneself. [28.] But, Critias, said I, you come against me, as if I asserted that I had a knowledge of what I am asking about, and if I wish, having agreed with you.[51] But this is not the case. For I am seeking with you continually what is placed before us, through being myself ignorant. Hence, after having considered, I am willing to say whether I agree or not. But do you stop, till I have considered.—Consider then, said he.—I do consider, said I.—For if to know a thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance would be some science, and of some thing. Or would it not?—[52] It is, he replied, and of itself.[52]—Is not then medical science, said I, the science of that which is healthy?—Entirely so.—If then, said I, you should ask me, for what is the medical science of that, which is healthy, useful to us, and what does it effect, I should reply, that it is of no small utility, because it effects for us health, a beautiful work. Do you admit this?—I do admit it.—And if then you should ask me, what work does

[51]—[51] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, who perceived, no doubt, that they were unintelligible. The Greek is, *καὶ, ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσαντος σοί*—But the idea of the future in *ἐὰν βούλωμαι* is at variance with the idea of the past in *ὁμολογήσαντος*. Ficinus has "offersque mihi te, si voluero, concessurum," as if he had found in his MS. *ὁμολογήσοντα σὲ δίδως*. But that Critias was certainly not likely to do. Heusde suggested *ὁμολογήσοντος σοί*, which Stalbaum is disposed to adopt. But the consent of Socrates, to be of any value, ought to be the result of his reason, not of his will. Instead then of *δὴ*, which has no meaning here, I would read *μὴ*—i. e. "and even if I do not wish it"—and, with Heusde, *ὁμολογήσοντος σοί*—"about to agree with you."

[52]—[52] The Greek is *Ἔστιν ὡς ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε* in one MS. But in all the rest *ὡς* is omitted. Ficinus has "Est utique sui ipsius videlicet," without *ἔφη*. But as the question is twofold, so ought to be the reply. Plato wrote *Ἔστι τις, ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ τε*—as Taylor has translated.

house-building, which is the science of house-building, effect, I should say, dwellings; and (I should reply) in a similar manner with respect to other arts. [29.] Since then, Critias, you say that temperance is the science of itself, you must, when asked, be able to tell in behalf of temperance, what beautiful work does temperance, being the science of itself, effect, and which deserves to be mentioned. Come then, tell me.—Nay but, Socrates, said he, you do not make the inquiry correctly. For temperance is not naturally similar to the other sciences, nor are the other sciences similar, some to some, and others to others. But you make your inquiry, as if they were similar. For tell me, said he, what work is there in the calculating or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a dwelling, the work of the house-building art? or with that of a garment, the work of the weaving art? and in other works of such a kind, many of which any one would be able to show, as belonging to many arts? Can you in these show me any such work? You will not be able.—You speak the truth, said I. But this I can show, of what thing each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from the science itself. Thus, for instance, the calculating science is the science of the even and the odd, how they are situated as regards multitude, with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely so, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the calculating science?—How not?—Moreover, the weighing science is that relating to a heavier and lighter weight; now the heavy and the light are different from the weighing science itself. Do you agree to this?—I do.—[30.] Tell me then, of what is temperance the science, and which is different from temperance itself?—This is that very thing, Socrates, said he, to which[53] you have arrived by seeking in what point does temperance differ from all (the other)[54] sciences: but you are seeking after some similitude in it to other sciences. This, however, is not the case. For all the other sciences are sciences of another thing, but not of themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself likewise. And these things ought to be far from lying hid from you.

[53] Instead of ἐπ' αὐτό, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ὅ—For his version is "quod quæris—" Cornarius has "ad idem—redis," which would lead to ἐπὶ ταὐτό—

[54] Ficinus alone has "omnibus aliis;" in Greek πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων.

But I think you are doing the very thing, which you just now said you were not doing: for you are attempting to confute me, after leaving alone that, about which is our discourse.—What are you doing, said I, by your thinking that if I should confute you as much as possible, I should do it on any other account, than for the sake of thoroughly searching out what I mean myself; as I am fearful lest, whilst I think I know something, I am unconsciously knowing nothing? And now I say I am doing this, while considering the argument, principally indeed for my own sake, but perhaps also for the sake of the rest of our friends. Or do you not think it as a good, common for nearly all men, that each thing should become apparent in what state it is?—Very much so, Socrates, said he.—[31.] Boldly then, said I, O give, thou blessed man, an answer when asked, how the matter appears to you, and leave, whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted, to go hang;[55] but giving your attention to the reasoning itself, consider whither it will go, when confuted.—I shall do so, he replied: for you appear to me to speak with moderation.—Tell me then, said I, what do you mean on the question of temperance?—I mean then, he replied, that this alone, of all other sciences, is both the science of itself and of the other sciences. Will it then, said I, be the science of ignorance, since it is of science?—Entirely so.—The temperate man therefore alone will know himself, and be able to examine what it is he happens to know, and what he does not; and in like manner he will be able to look into the rest of things, what it is that a person knows, and thinks (he knows), [56]if indeed he knows,[56] and what on the other hand he thinks he knows, but does not know; but no other person (will be able).[57] And this then is to be temperate; and it is temperance, and the knowledge of oneself, to know what one knows, and what one does not know. Are these the things you assert?—They are, he replied.—[32.]

[55] This is the nearest English equivalent to *ἔα χαίρειν*.

[56]—[56] These words, simple as they are, I confess I hardly understand The very balance of the sentences proves that they are not in their place.

[57] Ficinus alone has "poterit," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐδεὶς οἷός τε*. Stalbaum translates *τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδεὶς*—"just as no one of the rest of mankind." But there is nothing to answer to "just as," and if there were, it would destroy the antithesis between *μόνος*, just before, and *τῶν αλλων ουδ' εἷς*, here.

Again then, said I, let us consider the third point[58] from the beginning, as if it were (the cup) to the saviour deity. In the first place, whether it is possible or not to know, with respect to what a person knows, and does not know, that he does know, and does not know; and, in the next place, if this be ever so completely possible, what will be the utility of it, to us, who know it.—It is requisite, said he, to consider this.—Come then, Critias, said I, and consider whether you are more able to find a way on these points than myself. For I am in doubt, and where I am in doubt I will tell you.—By all means, said he.—[59] The following consequence then will ensue,[59] I replied, if there be, what you just now asserted, some one science, which is the science of nothing else than itself and the rest of the sciences, and of ignorance besides.—Entirely so.—See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavoured to argue. For if you consider this very same thing in other matters, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.—[33.] How and where?—In these. For consider, whether it appears to you that a seeing power exists, which is not the seeing power of those things, which are the objects of the rest of seeing powers, but is the seeing power of itself and the rest of seeing powers, and similarly of not seeing powers; and though it is a seeing power, it does not see any colour, but (sees) itself and the rest of the seeing powers. Does it appear to you that there is such a seeing power as this?—By Zeus, it does not to me at least. What then (say you) to the hearing power, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and the rest of the hearing powers, and the non-hearing power besides?—Nor yet this.—To speak briefly then, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which the other senses perceive.—

[58] I have translated as if the Greek were *τὸ τρίτον, ὥσπερ τῷ Σωτῆρι*, not *τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι ὥσπερ*.—For the third cup given to the saviour-god, as shown at Phileb. p. 66, D. § 160, is compared with the third inquiry, as remarked by Heindorf; for the first was whether temperance consisted in managing one's own affairs; the second, whether it consisted in self-knowledge; and the third is now to be mooted.

[59]—[59] Such is Taylor's English version of the Latin translation of Finus, "sequentur hæc—" which was introduced to render intelligible the Greek, *Ἄλλο τι οὖν—πάντα ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη*; literally, "Would all these things be any thing else?" I think, however, the passage is corrupt.

It does not appear to me at least.—But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of the rest of desires?—It does not. —Nor, as I think, is there any will, which wills no good, but wills itself alone and the rest of wills.—There is not.—But would you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and the rest of loves?—Not I, said he.—Have you ever conceived that there is any fear, which fears itself and the rest of fears, but fears nothing fearful?—I have not conceived, said he.—[34.] And (have you conceived) any fancy, which fancies fancies and itself, but which forms no fancy respecting those things, which are the subjects of the rest of fancies?—By no means. —But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no learning, but the science of itself and the rest of sciences.—We do say so.—[60] Would it not be strange[60] if there were (such a science)? For let us not strenuously assert that there is not, but consider if there be.—Right.—Come then, there is this science, the science of something; and it does possess some such power, as to be the science of something. Is it so?—Entirely so.—For we also say that the greater possesses some such power, as to be greater than something?—It does so possess.—Is it not then greater than something less, if it is (greater)?—Of necessity.—If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than the greater and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which the rest of things are greater, it would surely be in this situation, that if it is greater than itself, it would be also less than itself?—Of this there is, Socrates, a great necessity, said he.—[35.] If therefore there is any thing which is the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, it will be the double of the rest of doubles and of itself, in consequence of its being the half; for nothing can be the double of any thing else than of the half.—True.—But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? and being heavier, be lighter than itself? and being older, be younger than itself? and similarly as regards all other properties? For whatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will it not possess likewise that existence, to which that power is re-

[60]—[60] I have translated as if the Greek were *Οὐκ οὐν ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, εἰ ἄρα*—not *Οὐκ οὐν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα*—

lated? I mean some such thing as this. For instance, we say that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound.—Is it not so?—Yes.—If therefore it could hear itself, would it not hear itself, as having a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.—This is perfectly necessary.—The sight too, thou best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily have some colour. For sight would never be able to see any thing colourless.—It would not.—You see therefore, Critias, that the matters we have gone through, appear to us to be, some of them, altogether impossible; and of others it is greatly disbelieved that they could have a power of their own with respect to themselves. For as regards magnitudes, multitudes, and things of this kind, it is perfectly impossible. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—[36. Again,[61] [that hearing (hears itself), and sight (sees itself), and][61] that motion moves itself, and heat burns (itself), and all other such like assertions, would bring disbelief to some, but to some perhaps not. There is then, my friend, a need of some great man to draw sufficiently a distinction through all things on this point, whether of existing things not one [except science][62] has naturally a power of its own with respect to itself, but with respect to another thing, or that some have, and some not: and again, if there are certain things, which (have a power) with respect to themselves, whether amongst these is the science, which we say is temperance. For I do not believe myself to be sufficient to draw such a distinction. Hence I am not able to affirm positively, whether it is possible for this to take place, that there is a science of science; nor, if there is, will I admit that temperance is that science, until I have considered whether, being such, it would be useful to us, or not. For I divine that temperance is something useful and good. Do you then, son of Callæschrus,—since you lay down that temperance is this science of a science, and likewise of a not-science,—show in the first place this; that what I have just now mentioned [it] is possible [63][for you to show];[63] and in the next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it is

[61]—[61] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation. For the question relating to hearing and sight has been already discussed.

[62] The words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης were first rejected as an interpolation by Schleiermacher, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed.

[63]—[63] Ficinus has—"Ostende primum possibile hoc esse, quod supra

useful; and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that you are correctly speaking about temperance, what it is.—[37.] On Critias hearing this, and seeing that I was in doubt, he did, as they do, who, through looking in the face of those, who are gaping, are affected in the very same way; and he seemed to me to be compelled by my doubting to be seized with a doubt himself. However, being in great repute on every occasion, he felt a shame before those who were present; and was neither willing to concede that he was unable to draw the distinction on points that I had proposed to him, nor did he say any thing clearly, but concealed his perplexity. But, said I, —in order that the discourse might proceed—if it seems good to you, Critias, let us now concede this, that it is possible for a science of a science to exist. But let us consider again whether it is or not in this way. Come then, if it is in the highest degree possible, in what way is it the more possible to know what a person does know, and what he does not? For we surely said that this is to know oneself, and to be temperate. Or did we not?—[38.] Entirely so, he replied; and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if any one possesses the science, which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when any one possesses swiftness, he is swift; and when beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. So too when any one possesses the knowledge, that knows itself, he will surely then become knowing himself.—To this I replied, I do not doubt that when any one possesses that, which knows itself, he will be then knowing himself; but, what necessity is there for the person who possesses this knowledge, to know what he knows, and what he does not know?—Because, Socrates, this[64] is the same with that.—Perhaps so, I replied; but I am near to being always similar (to myself).[65] For I do not well[66] understand [67]how it is the same thing for a person to know, what he

dicebam;" whence Heindorf was led to reject *ἀποδεῖξαί σε.* whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The fact is that *ἀποδεῖξαι* is a various reading for *ἐνδεῖξαι.*

[64] Instead of *τὸ αὐτὸ*, Cornarius proposed *τοῦτο*, from Ficinus' "hoc."

[65] After *ὅμοιος* Heindorf supplies *ἐμαυτῷ.* He should have read *ἀεὶ ἐμοὶ ὅμοιος*: and in Sympos. p. 173, D. § 2, *Ἀεὶ ὅμοιος σοί, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρ', εἶ,* similar to "dispar sibi" in Horace; as I ought to have mentioned on that passage.

[66] In lieu of *αὖ* Plato evidently wrote *εὖ*—

knows, and to know what he does not know.[67]—How do you mean? said he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a science of science, will it be able to draw a distinction more than this; that of these things this is a science, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the science, then, and ignorance of that, which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of that, which is just?—By no means; but the one is, I think, a medical, and the other a political science; but this is nothing else than a science.—How not?—[39.] He therefore who does not know the healthy and the just, but knows only a science, as alone possessing a science of this, that he knows something, and that he possesses a certain science, would probably have a knowledge respecting both himself and the other things. Is it not so?—Yes.—But how will he by this science know what he knows? For he knows the healthful by medical science, and not by temperance; and the harmonical by musical science, and not by temperance; and house-building by house-building science, and not by temperance; and so in every thing else. Is it not so?—So it appears.—But how by temperance, if it is only a science of sciences, will he know that it knows the salubrious, or house-building?—By no means.—The person then ignorant of this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.—So it seems.—To know then what he knows and what he does not know, will not be to be temperate, nor will it be temperance, but, as it seems, only that he knows, and that he does not know.—It nearly appears so.—Nor will this person be able to examine another, who professes to know something, whether he knows, or does not, what he says he knows; but as it seems he will only know thus much, that he possesses a certain science, but of what thing, temperance will not cause him to know.—It does not appear it will.—[40.] Neither then will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician; nor any one else of those who are skilled or who are not. But let us view it from these points. If a temperate man, or any other person, intends to distinguish the true and false physician, will he not act in this way? He will not discourse with him respecting the medical science; for, as we have said, a

[67]—[67] Stalbaum, who once differed from Schleiermacher, who conceived this passage to be corrupt, now agrees with him.

physician attends to nothing but the healthy and the diseased, [68](the salubrious and the noxious).[68] Is it not so?—It is.—But of science he knows nothing; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—Yes.—The physician therefore will not know any thing of the medical art, since the medical art is a science.—True.—And the temperate man will know, that the physician possesses a certain science; [69]but some one else will look into the science of the physician, what it is, and of what things; which is then laid open, when it is known of what things it is the science.[69] Or is not each science defined by this, by not only being a science, but by being what, and of what things?—Yes.—And the medical science has been defined to be different from the rest of sciences by its being the science of the healthy and diseased.—It is.—[41.] Is it not therefore necessary, for the person wishing to consider the medical science, to view it in the things in which it is? For it is surely not (to be considered)[70] in things external, in which it is not.—Certainly not.—He therefore who considers rightly, will consider a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things healthy and diseased.—So it seems.—In what is thus[71] either said or done, he (will be) considering whether what is said is said truly, and what is done is done correctly?—It is neces-

[68]—[68] The words within numerals have been preserved by Ficinus alone in his version, "salubreque et noxium."

[69]—[69] Such is the English of the Latin of Ficinus. The text by Bekker is *ἐπιχειρῶν δὲ δὴ πεῖραν, λαβεῖν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὦντινων*: where *ἐπιχειρῶν* is due to two MSS. This has been twice adopted by Stalbaum, and translated each time in a different manner. So too Heindorf has in his two editions made two different attempts to restore the original; while Ast has made a third. Perhaps Plato wrote—*ἰατρόν, οὗ ἐπιχειρῶν δὴ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν, ἥ τις ἐστὶν, ἄλλος τις σκέψεται τῷ τινων εἶναι*, i. e. "whose skill some other person, endeavouring to comprehend what it is, will have a view of it by its being (the skill) in some things—" where *ἄλλος* is due to "alius," in Ficinus, adopted by Heindorf; while *ωντινων*, which being without accents or breathings, in MS. Bodl. gives the usual proof of a corruption, has been changed into *τῷ τινων εἶναι*, found in the very next sentence; where however we must read *ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισται ἑκάστη ἐπιστήμη τῷ μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τίς τινων τ' εἶναι*, as I have translated, instead of *ἐπιστήμη, μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς τῷ τινων εἶναι*, which I cannot understand.

[70] Ficinus has "quærenda videtur," as if he had found in his MS. *οὐ γὰρ δήπου σκεπτέον*, not *οὐ γὰρ δήπου* merely.

[71] Heindorf, justly objecting to *τοῖς οὕτως*, properly suggested *τοῖς τοιούτοις*, i. e. "in things of this kind."

sary.—But could any one without medical science be able to follow either method?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other person, as it seems, but the physician, nor truly[72] the temperate man. For he would be a physician in addition to temperance.[73]—So it is.—More than all, if temperance is merely the science of a science, and of ignorance, it will be able to distinguish neither the physician, who knows his art, nor him, who does not; the person who pretends to be, and him, who thinks he is (a physician); nor any other person, who knows any thing whatever, except a fellow-artist, as is the case with other operatives.—It appears so, said he.—[42.] What utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is of such a kind? For if, as we laid down at the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know—the former because he knows, and the latter because he does not know—and if he were able to consider respecting another person affected in the very same manner, there would, we assert, be some vast utility to us in being temperate. For both we, who possess temperance, and all the rest that were governed by us, would have passed through life without fault; for we should neither ourselves have endeavoured to do any thing, which we did not know, but finding out those who did know, we should have handed over those things to them; nor should we have permitted to the rest of those, whom we commanded, to do any thing else than what by doing they would do well; now this would be that, of which they possessed a knowledge. And thus a family governed by temperance, would be about to be well governed, and a state (correctly) administered, and every thing else, over which temperance rules. For error being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary for the persons thus situated to act honourably and well, and for those who act well, to be happy. [43.] Were we not, Critias, speaking[74] in this manner about temperance, saying how great a good it is to know what one

[72] Stalbaum has written an elaborate note about *οἵτε δὴ* thus following *οὔτε*. I wish it had occurred to him to suggest *οὔτ', οἷδ' εὖ*: for *οἷδ' εὖ* would thus be properly opposed to *ὡς ἔοικε*.

[73] The introduction of *τῇ σωφροσύνῃ*, instead of *τῷ σώφρονι*, seems very strange.

[74] Heindorf objecting to the version of Ficinus, "dicebamus," says that 'diceremus," in Cornarius, is more correct. But then *ἂν* would be required; and so it would to answer to Stalbaum's "dicturi eramus."

does know, and what one does not know?—Entirely so, he replied.—But now, said I, you see that no such science has appeared to us any where.—I see it, he replied.—Has not therefore, said I, temperance, which we have now found to be that, which knows both science and ignorance, this good, that he who possesses it, will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear in a clearer point of view to him, inasmuch as he is looking upon the science, which relates to each thing he may learn? And wiil he not examine other persons better respecting what he may learn? And must not they, who examine others without this, do it in a more weak and trifling manner? Are these, my friend, the things we enjoy through temperance? and do we look to something greater, and seek for it to be greater than it is?—Perhaps, said he, this would be the case.—Perhaps so, I replied; but perhaps too we have sought after nothing useful. [44.] And I conjecture so, because certain absurdities distinctly present themselves to me respecting temperance, if it be of such a nature. For let us see, if you please, admitting that it is possible for science to know,[75] and, what we laid down at the beginning, that temperance is to know what it does know, and what it does not know, let us not take this away, but concede it; and having conceded all these points, let us still better consider, if being such it will benefit us at all. For what we just now said, that temperance would, if it were of such a nature, be a great good, by regulating families and states, appears to me, Critias, to have been not correctly conceded.—How so, he replied.—Because, said I, we too easily conceded that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed those, which we did not know, to persons who did know.—Did we not then, said he, rightly concede?—To me, I replied, we did not appear so. —You are speaking, Socrates, said he, really absurdly.—By the dog,[76] said I, so it appears to me. And just now, looking to these points, I said, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered

[75] Heusde acutely saw that there was some error here; and by comparing p. 169, D. § 37, he wished to read *γενέσθαί ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης δυνατὸν εἶναι.* He ought rather to have suggested *ἐπίστασθαί τι δι' ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης*, i. e. "to know something through the science of a science."

[76] On this Socratic oath see my note on Hipp. Maj. § 18, n. 1.

them. [45.] For in reality, if temperance be ever so much of such a nature, it does not appear evident to me, what good it will effect for us.—How is this? said he; speak, that we may also know what you mean.—I fancy, I replied, that I am trifling; nevertheless it is necessary to consider that, which presents itself to our view, and not carelessly to pass it by, if any one takes the least thought of himself.—You speak well, said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, (no matter) whether it has passed through the gate of [77]horn or ivory.[77] For if temperance ruled us ever so much, would it not, being such as we have now defined it, be acted upon according to the sciences; and neither would he, who boasts to be a pilot when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, or a general of an army, or any other person, who pretends to know that, which he does not know, lie hid from us. But from this state of things something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthy than at present, and we should be preserved, when in danger at sea and in war; and all our utensils and garments, and all our shoes, and all the necessaries (of life), all things else, would be made more scientifically through our employing true artists. [46.] And if you are willing, let us grant that prophecy is the science of that, which is to be; and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the boastful diviners, but appoints over us the true prophets of things to come. Furnished then in this way, the human race would, I concede, act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it would not permit ignorance to interfere and cooperate with us. But that, by acting scientifically, we should do well and be happy, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—But, he replied, you will not however easily find any other method of doing well, if you despise the doing a thing scientifically.—Instruct me then still a little, said I, of what scientifical doing are you speaking? Is it that of leather-cutting?—By Zeus, it is not.—Is it that of brass-work?—By no means.—But is it that of working in wool, or wood, or any such things?—It is not.—[47.] We do then, I replied, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy, who lives scientifically. For

[77]—[77] Macrobius in Somn. Scip. c. 3, has preserved a fanciful explanation given by Porphyry of the fiction in Homer, Od. xix. 562, relating to the two gates of dreams, which the admirers of the Neo-Platonic school will do well to consult.

those artists, although living scientifically, are confessed by you to be not happy; [78] but you seem to me to separate the happy man from them, when they possess a science of certain things.[78] And perhaps you call (happy) the diviner, whom I just now mentioned, who knows all that is to be. Do you mean this, or any other person?—Both this, said he, and another.—What other? I replied. You surely do not speak of the person, who knows, in addition to future events, every thing past and present, and is ignorant of nothing; for let us admit that there is such a man, you will not say, I think, that any one lives more scientifically than he at least does.—Certainly not.—But this also I desiderate—Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences equally produce this effect?—By no means equally, said he.—But which the most? Is it that, by which he knows some of things present, past, and to come? Is it that, by (which he knows) the science of back-gammon?[79]—What back-gammon? he replied.—But is it that, by which (he knows) the calculating science?—By no means.—But is it that, by which (he knows) things healthful.—Rather so, said he?—[48.] [80] But is it, said I, that, of which I am speaking especially, by which (he knows) what?[80]—By which (he knows) good and evil.—O thou vile man, I replied; [81] who for some while hast been drawing me round in a circle, concealing from me, that to live scientifically was not the causing[81] to do well and to be happy, nor belonging

[78]—[78] This is the English of Stalbaum's Latin version, to which he seems to have been led by finding in Ficinus—"At forte e multis inscienter viventibus unum quendam certa ex scientia scienter viventem beatum determinas;" who must have met with something very superior to the common Greek text, which is literally, "but concerning some living scientifically you seem to me to set apart the happy."

[79] As in the game called *πεττεία*, mention is made both of pebbles, or dice, and of lines, it was probably something like the modern back-gammon.

[80]—[80] The Greek is *Ἐκείνη δ', ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, ᾗ τί*; out of which both Heindorf and Stalbaum have failed to make a satisfactory sense and syntax. Ficinus, "Illa vero, quam dico maxime, quâ quid norim." Perhaps Plato wrote *Ἐκείνην δ' οὖν λέγ' εὖ μάλιστα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τί*; i. e. "Do you then state in the best way, said I, that, by which (he knows) what?" where *ἐκείνην* is due to two MSS.

[81]—[81] Here again the version of Ficinus differs greatly from, and is in some respects superior to, the Greek—"jamdiu me clam circulo reflectis retrahisque ad id, ut beatum vivere non sit secundum universas scientias vivere; immo secundum unam quandam boni malive scientiam."

to all the other sciences, but to one (science) alone, relating to good and evil. Since,[82] Critias, if you were willing to take away this last science from the other sciences, the physician's science will no less cause one to be healthy; and that of the shoe-maker, to be shod; and that of the weaver, to be clad; and (no less) the pilot's science prevent one from losing one's life at sea, and the general's science in war?—No less, said he.—But, friend Critias, by this science being absent, it will be no longer left for each of those (other sciences) to turn out well and usefully.—You speak the truth.—But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the work of which is to benefit us: for it is not the science of sciences and ignorances, but that of good and evil. So that if this be useful, temperance would be something else than[83] useful. —[49.] What then, said he, would not temperance be useful? For if temperance is as much as possible a science of sciences, and presides over the other sciences, it will surely benefit us by ruling over that science which relates to the good.—But will temperance, I replied, cause us to be in health, and not the medical science? And will this perform the rest of the works of the arts, and not the rest, each its own work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is a science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?—So it appears.—It is not then the worker of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the work of another art. Is it not?—Of another.—Nor is it, my friend, of utility; for we attributed this very work to another art. Did we not?—Entirely so.—How then will temperance be beneficial, since it is the worker of no utility?—By no means, Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see then, Critias, that I felt very properly some time since a fear, and justly blamed myself, because I could descry nothing useful about temperance? For that which is confessed to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if there were any thing useful in myself towards making a search correctly. [50.] But now,[84] for we are vanquished on every side, and unable to discover for what purpose the name-

[82] In lieu of the unintelligible ἐπεὶ, Heindorf proposes to read εἰπὲ—

[83] Schleiermacher acutely supplied for the sense the ἢ, wanting in all the MSS.

[84] On this aposiopesis see Heusde and Heindorf.

founder[85] assigned to temperance this very name. And yet we have conceded many things that did not result (correctly)[86] from the reasoning. For we conceded, that there is a science of sciences, although the reasoning neither permits nor asserts this; and on the other hand, we conceded that we know by this science the works of the other sciences—the reasoning permitting not even this—in order that the temperate man might be one, who has a knowledge of what he knows, because he knows, and of those which he does not know, because he does not know. This indeed we conceded very liberally, without ever considering that it is impossible for a person to know in any way whatever what he does not know at all. [87] For our concession says that he knows those things, because he does not know them.[87] And yet as I think there is nothing which would appear more absurd than this. The inquiry however, having met with us so very easy tempered and by no means morose, is not a bit more able to discover the truth; but has rather laughed at it so much, that, what we formerly conceded to be temperance, and, after moulding it into some shape, laid it down to be, this it has very saucily shown to us as being of no use. [51.] On my own account then I am less indignant; but for your sake, Charmides, I am, said I, very indignant, if you, so beautiful in body, and most temperate to boot in mind, derive no advantage from this temperance, and if it does not by its presence bring to you any benefit during life. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from

[85] Instead of *νομοθέτης*, Heindorf suggested *ὀνοματοθέτης*, similar to "nominum auctor" in Ficinus. The reading has been subsequently found in five MSS., and though adopted here by Stalbaum, it has been uniformly rejected by him in the Cratylus. From this allusion to etymology, one might suspect that this dialogue preceded the Cratylus, where the idea of uniting etymological with philosophical inquiries is more fully developed.

[86] I suspect *εὖ* has dropt out before *ἐν*—

[87]—[87] This is the literal version of the Greek—*ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμέτερα ὁμολογία* which Heindorf renders "Dedimus enim eum de iis scire se ea nescire,' which I cannot understand. Stalbaum's version is "Concessimus enim eum scire nescire se illa, quæ nesciat," i. e. "We have conceded that he knows he does not know what he does not know." But neither scholar has taken any notice of *ὅτι*, while both seem to have wished to read *ὅτι γὰρ ἃ οὐκ οἶδε φησὶν αὐτὸν εἰδέναι*. Ficinus has "In hoc autem concessimus, videlicet aliquem ignorantem aliqua, quod non cognoscat, cognoscere," who thus took *ὅτι* as a pronoun, not *ὅτι* as a conjunction, and omitted *αὐτὰ*, for which one MS. offers *αὐτὸν*.

the Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have learnt it with so much labour. I do not then[88] [very much then][88] think that this is the case, but that I am a bad searcher; since (I consider) temperance to be a great good, and that, if you possess it, you are blessed indeed. But see whether you do possess it, and do not require at all the incantation. For if you do possess it, I would rather advise you to think me a trifler, and incompetent to search out any thing whatever by a course of reasoning, and yourself so much the happier, as you are the more temperate.—But by Zeus, Socrates, said Charmides, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, which not even you can discover what it is, as you say yourself? I am not however much persuaded by you; and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation; and no business of mine hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, until you shall say that I have had enough.—[52.] Be it so, said Critias. But, Charmides, if you act thus, it will be a proof to me at least that you are temperate, if you will give yourself up to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any thing, either great or small. —(Consider me,) said he, as about to follow and not to desert him. For I should act in a fearful manner, if I did not obey you, my tutor, nor do as you bid me.—Nay then, said Critias, I do bid you.—I shall therefore do so, said Charmides, beginning from this very very day.—But what, said I, are ye two deliberating to do?—Nothing, said Charmides: we have ceased to deliberate.[89]—Will you then, said I, use violence, and not grant me a previous inquiry?—(Consider me) as about to use violence, said he, since Critias commands me. Do you therefore take counsel about what you are to do.—But no consultation, said I, is left for me: for not one man will be able to oppose you, when endeavouring to do any thing yourself and forcing him.—Do not you then oppose me, said he.—I shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.

[88]—[88] The words within brackets Stalbaum rejects as arising from an error in transcription. In the Greek letters *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* lies hid *πάνυ ἀνεμιαῖα*: where *ἀνεμιαία*, literally "wind-heavy," is applied first to what are called "wind-eggs," in which there is no chicken; and secondly, to arguments that have no reason in them. The word is used by Plato in Theætet. p. 151, E., 161, A., and 210, B.

[89] The perfect passive is used here as in Criton, p. 46, A., *οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι*, and means "to cease to do." So in Eurip. Hippol. 1457, *Κεκαρτέρηται τἀμὰ*—is the reply to *καρτέρει*: and so too in Virgil, "Fuimus Troes."

INTRODUCTION TO THE LACHES,

OR

ON FORTITUDE.

As Plato had in the Charmides discussed the question relating to Temperance, one of the cardinal virtues, so in the Laches he has taken for his subject another, with the view of showing that it is equally difficult to give a definition of Fortitude. Like the Charmides too this dialogue has been rejected by Ast as a spurious production, fathered upon Plato, for reasons which Stalbaum asserts are not of the least weight; and who correctly remarks that there is such a similarity between the manner of the two dialogues, as to show that they must have been written by the same hand; and hence, until the Charmides can be proved to be not genuine, it is needless to inquire into the authorship of the Laches. For though there is some discrepancy in the view here taken of Fortitude, and what is stated in the Republic, iii. p. 386, and iv. p. 427—430, yet that, says Stalbaum, may be accounted for on the supposition that in this dialogue we have the opinion of Plato, when he began his career as a philosophical writer, but in the more elaborate work the result of his matured reflection. Schleiermacher indeed conceives that the Laches was a kind of supplement to the Protagoras. But as it wants the subtlety to be found there, Stalbaum is disposed to believe that it preceded rather than followed that dialogue.

Be however the author who he may—and I confess I can see no reason for doubting its genuineness—the dialogue alludes to some

curious circumstances not mentioned elsewhere, and which could hardly be known except to a person contemporary with Plato; who shows towards the end of the dialogue that the theory, which he was contending against, emanated from the school of Damon, the Pythagorean, of whom it would seem from the Protagoras, § 20, and Alcibiad. i. § 30, he had not so high an opinion as Pericles and others had.

LACHES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS,[1] MELESIAS,[2] NICIAS,[3] LACHES,[4] AND THE SONS OF LYSIMACHUS AND MELESIAS, AND SOCRATES.

LYSIMACHUS.

[1.] You have seen, Nicias and Laches, the man fighting in armour;[5] but on what account I and Melesias here invited you to see him with us, we did not then tell you; but now we will mention it; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults with them, they will not say what they think; but making a guess about the views of the persons consulting them, they speak what is contrary to their own opinion. Thinking however that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you would state simply what you think, we have thus taken you as our associates in the consultation respecting the matters we are about to communicate. Now the question, about which I have made this lengthy pre-

[1] A son of Aristides the Just.

[2] A son of Thucydides, one of the political opponents of Pericles.

[3] A general of the Athenians, who, after a victorious career, perished at last in the Sicilian expedition.

[4] An Athenian admiral, mentioned by Thucydides as a contemporary of Nicias.

[5] Dacier thought that this fighting in armour was an exercise similar to what is taught in fencing schools. It was more probably like the riding schools for the cavalry, where the soldiers are taught the sword exercise. According to Athenæus, iv. p. 154, E., the person who first taught this fighting in armour was one Demeas of Mantinea.

face is this. These are our sons That youth, the son of Melesias here, is called Thucydides, bearing his grandfather's name; and this one here, Aristides, is mine, and bears my father's name; for we call him Aristides. It has been determined therefore by us to pay all the attention to them in our power, and not to act as the many do who, when their children become lads,[6] suffer them to do as they please, but to begin already to take care of them as far as we can. Knowing then that you also have children, we have thought that there has been a care respecting them to you, if to any one else, how they might become the best by being attended to. If however you have not frequently paid attention to this matter, we will now remind you, that you ought not to neglect it; and we call upon you to take upon yourselves, in common with us, the charge of your sons. But from whence we have so determined, it is requisite for you, Nicias and Laches, to hear, although the narration be rather long.

[2.] I and Melesias here take our meals together, and these lads have their food at our side. As I stated then at the commencement of the discourse, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful feats of our fathers, which they did both in war and peace, while they were administering the affairs of our allies and of the state here. But neither of us have to relate deeds of our own. For this we feel, in the presence of these youths, a shame, and we find fault with our fathers because they permitted us to live the life of rakes when we became lads, and they were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, and tell them that if they neglect themselves, and do not obey us, they will be in disrepute; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they will perhaps be worthy of the name they bear. They say indeed they will obey us; but we are considering, by learning what and pursuing it steadily they will become the best of men. Now some one has introduced to us this kind

[6] The original *μειράκια* seems to correspond to the English "lads." For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books De Judiciis, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρέφος, παῖς, μειράκιον, νέος, ἀνὴρ, πρεσβύτης, γέρων*, i. e. "infant, boy, lad, youth, man, elderly man, old man;" T. who might have referred to Solon Epigr., 14, the counterpart of Shakspeare's Seven Ages.

of instruction, and said that it would be well for a young person to learn to fight in armour; and he praised the party whom you have just now seen exhibiting, and invited us to see him likewise. We determined then that it was requisite for us to come ourselves, and take you along with us to the sight, in order that you might not only be fellow-spectators, but fellow-counsellors and co-partners, if you were willing, in the matter relating to the care to be paid to children. These are the subjects on which we wish to communicate with you. It is now, therefore, your part to advise about this kind of instruction, whether it appears they ought to learn it or not, and about the rest, if indeed you are able to praise any kind of discipline or study for a young man, and to state what you will do touching this matter in common.

[3.] *Nic.* For myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your notion, and am prepared to do this in common, and so I think is Laches here.

Lac. You think with truth, Nicias. And what Lysimachus has just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs. For there nearly happens to them, what he says, both with respect to their children and the rest of private concerns, that they are considered of little account and treated negligently. On these points, therefore, Lysimachus, you have spoken correctly. But I marvel that you should call upon us to be fellow-counsellors about the education of youth, and not call upon Socrates here, who is, in the first place, of the same demus;[7] and secondly, has ever his haunts there, where there is any thing connected with the points you are in search of, relating to young persons, either of instruction or an honourable pursuit.

Lys. How say you, Laches? Does Socrates here make any thing of this kind his study?

Lac. Very much so, Lysimachus.

Nic. I too can assert this not less than Laches. For he lately introduced a stranger to me, as the instructor of my son in music, Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, a man most deserving of favour, not only for his skill in music, but in other

[7] By "demus" is meant a parish, being a part of what would be called in the city of London "a ward," as I have shown in the Glossary to my translation of the Midian oration of Demosthenes, p. 83.

respects worth what you will for young men such as these to pass their time with.

[4.] *Lys.* No longer, Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, do I and my equals in age have any acquaintance with younger persons, inasmuch as we for the most part pass the time with our family on account of our period of life. But if, son of Sophroniscus,[8] you have any thing to advise for the good of this[9] your fellow-wardsman, you ought to communicate it: and you are justified (in doing so); for you happen to be a friend on your father's side; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and he ended his days before he had any difference with me: and some recollection came round me as these persons were speaking; for these lads, while talking with each other at home, made frequent mention of Socrates, and very much praised him; but I never have asked them whether they spoke of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me now, children, is this the Socrates of whom you so often made mention?

Sons of Mel. and Lys. Yes, father, it is the same.

Lys. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you give a support[10] to your father, who was the best of men, in other respects, and this too, that your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Lac. And, moreover, Lysimachus, do not omit the acts of the man; for I have elsewhere beheld him, not only giving a support to his father, but to his country likewise. For, in the flight from Delium,[11] he retired along with me; and I tell you, that if the rest had been willing to be such (as he was), our city would have stood erect, nor would so great a disaster have befallen it.

[5.] *Lys.* This, Socrates, is indeed honourable praise, with which you are extolled by men worthy to be believed, and (to be praised)[12] for those very things, for which they praise you. Rest

[8] I have preserved the Latinized name as being better known than Heré.

[9] By "this" Lysimachus means himself.

[10] With the idea contained in the verb *ὀρθοῦν* may be compared the expression in Eurip. Iph. T. 57, *Στῦλοι γὰρ οἴκων παῖδές εἰσιν ἄρσενες*.

[11] To the courageous conduct of Socrates allusion is likewise made in The Banquet, § 43.

[12] Ficinus has what the sense evidently requires, "qui in iisdem laudandi et ipsi sunt, in quibus te laudant," having no doubt found in his MS. *καὶ εἰς ταὐτὰ, εἰς ἃ οὗτοί σ' ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἐπαινεῖσθαι.* Ast there-

assured, then, that in hearing this, I am right glad that you are in high repute; and do you consider me amongst those the most kindly disposed towards you. You should therefore have been the first to visit me, and to believe me your familiar friend, as it was just for you to be. Now therefore, from this very day, since we have recognised each other, do not do otherwise, but be with me, and become the acquaintance of myself and these youngsters, in order that you may preserve our friendship. You then will do this, and we will again recall it to your memory. But with respect to the matters about which we commenced, what say you? What, does it appear to you that this instruction is suited to lads, or not? [13][the learning to fight in armour.][13]

Soc. Nay then about these matters, Lysimachus, I will endeavour to advise, if I am able; and moreover to do all that you invite me to. It seems however to me to be the most just for myself, as being the younger, and the less experienced in these matters, to hear first what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I have any thing to say contrary to what has been stated by them, then indeed to teach and persuade both you and them. But, Nicias, why do not [14]one of you speak the first?[14]

[6.] *Nic.* There is nothing to prevent it, Socrates; for it appears to me that this kind of instruction is on many accounts useful for youths. For it is well to pass the time not in another place and in the pursuits, in which young men are wont to make for themselves an occupation, when they are at leisure, but in this, from whence they necessarily have the body in a better condition; for it is not inferior to any of the gymnastic exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time both the exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberally educated man. For where we are the combatants in

fore justly finds fault with the Greek *καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν*: which Stalbaum however would defend. Heusde too saw that *ἐπαινεῖσθαι* had dropt out; but he incorrectly wished to insert *καὶ ἐπαινεῖσθαι* after *πιστεύεσθαι*.

[13]—[13] The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of *τὸ μάθημα*.

[14]—[14] The MSS. vary between *πρότερος*, and *πότερος*, and *ὁπότερος*. Plato wrote either *λέγει πρότερος ὁπότερος*, or else *λεγεις πρότερος*, similar to "ipse prior loqueris"—in Ficinus: which Stalbaum once approved of, but subsequently rejected.

a contest, and in those (exercises) in which a contest is proposed to us, they alone contend who are exercised in these very instruments relating to war. In the next place, this instruction will be of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in a rank with many others. But it is the most useful, when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary in single combat either in pursuit to attack a person defending himself, or in flight to defend oneself, while another is making an attack. For he who is skilled in this art, will suffer nothing at the hands of one, and, perhaps, not at the hands of many; but will every where through this come off the best. And still further, a thing of this kind incites to the desire of another honourable kind of instruction. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the instruction respecting the arrangements of an army; and having obtained this, he will, through the love of honour in these points, press forward to every thing connected with generalship. And [15]it is already evident[15] that he will attend to all instructions and studies connected with them, both honourable and well worth while for a man to learn and attend to, and to which this instruction has been the leader. And we will add to this, a no trifling addition, that this very science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle [16]than he was before.[16] Nor let us hold it in dishonour to say, although it may appear to any one a rather small matter, that it gives a man a graceful bearing, where a man should appear the most graceful;[17] and where through this graceful bearing he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me then, Lysimachus, it appears that, as I have said, we ought to teach young men these things; and I have stated why it appears so. But if Laches has any thing to say contrary to this, I shall hear him with pleasure.

[7.] *Lac.* It is difficult, Nicias, to assert respecting any

[15]—[15] Heusde, justly offended with ἤδη δῆλον, proposed to read τί δεῖ δηλοῦν, i. e. "why need one show." Perhaps Plato wrote καὶ, ἃ ᾔδη Δήλιον, i. e. "and what Delium knew"—For the very spot, where the Athenians lost the day through their want of discipline, would be properly appealed to as a witness to the truth of the present remarks.

[16]—[16] This is Taylor's correct translation of αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, united to a comparative, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 452.

[17] I have adopted εὐσχημονέστατον, found in two MSS. and similar to "maxime aptum"—in Ficinus.

instruction whatever, that one ought not to learn it; for it appears to be good to know all things; and especially this science of arms; if it is a thing to be learnt, as those say who teach it, and such as Nicias speaks of, one ought to learn; but if it is not a thing to be learnt, and those are deceiving us who promise to teach it, or if, being a thing to be learnt, it is not of much worth, why should one learn it? this I say concerning it, through looking to these points, that, if it were of any value, I think it would not have lain hid from the Lacedæmonians, who have no other care in life than to seek and study that, by which they may surpass others in war. Now if this art were concealed from them, yet this fact would not have been concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians do, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind; and by them he would be honoured for it, and beyond[18] all others he would make the most money, just as a tragic poet is honoured by us. For he, who thinks that he composes tragedies well, does not go about to other cities at a distance from, and in a circle round, Attica, and make an exhibition there; but he straightway comes hither, and exhibits himself to the people here, for a very good reason. But I see that the persons who fight in armour, consider Lacedæmon as sacred ground, not to be trodden; and do not walk upon it even on tip-toe; but they go round it, and rather exhibit themselves to all, and especially to those who would acknowledge that many are before them in warlike matters. [8.] In the next place, Lysimachus, I have been acquainted with not a few of these men during the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. And we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance. For, as if with a fixed design, not one of those, who has applied himself to the science of arms, has ever become illustrious in war; although in all other cases men have become celebrated from among those, who have paid attention to each science. But these men, as it seems, have been, as compared with the rest, in this respect so very unfortunate. For this very same Stesileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, [19]and saying the great

[18] Instead of *παρὰ*, correct Greek requires *πέρα*—

[19]—[19] The words within numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus.

things in truth[20] which he said of himself,[19] I have seen him truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship, on which he was aboard as a marine, fell upon a merchant vessel, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe, a weapon as different [21](from other weapons)[21] as he was himself from the rest [22](of the combatants.)[22] Other particulars respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but how his plan of the spear in addition to the scythe turned out [23](must not be passed over in silence);[23] for while he was fighting, (the weapon) became somehow entangled in the tackling of the (enemy's) ship; Stesileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but he was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship holding by his spear. But when the enemy's ship had sheered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding by his spear, he let the spear down towards his hands, until he had only hold of it by the stump. Hereupon there arose a laughter and shout from those on board the merchant vessel, at the figure he made; and some one having pelted him with a stone that fell just at his feet, he threw himself from the spear upon the deck. And then indeed they who were in the trireme were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing the spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. [9.] Perhaps therefore this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the circumstances which I met with myself.[24] Hence, what I said at first, if it be a thing to be learnt, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, and persons say and pretend it is a thing to be learnt, it is not worth while to

[20] Stalbaum endeavours, I think, unsuccessfully to defend ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς.

[21]—[21] Ficinus has alone preserved the words requisite for the sense in his version, "instrumentum——ab aliis longe diversum."

[22]—[22] The words within numerals Taylor added to complete the sense. Plato probably wrote, not διαφέρων, but δορυφόρων; thus making a distinction between δορυδρέπανον and δόρυ.

[23]—[23] Here again we are indebted to Ficinus for a supplement necessary for the sense. His version is, "Hoc tamen non erit silentio præteundum." Perhaps Plato wrote ἀποσβῆναι οὐ χρὴ between ἀπέβη and μαχόμενον.

[24] Jacobs supposes that the story alluded to took place when Laches was the admiral of the fleet sent to Sicily, as stated by Thucydides, iii. 90

endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any one being a coward should think he ought to learn it, and through it become more bold, it would become only more apparent what he is; but if a brave man (learnt it), he would through being watched by every one have to endure, if he erred but little, calumnies of a grievous kind. For the pretension to this science is exposed to envy; so that unless he surpasses others n valour to a wonderful degree, it is not possible for him, who asserts that he possesses this science, to avoid becoming ridiculous. Of such value, Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this kind of instruction appear to be to myself. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to let this Socrates go away, but to request him to give his opinion as to the view in which the matter appears to him.

[10.] *Lys.* And I do indeed request you, Socrates: for it appears to me that the consultation requires a person to decide. For had these agreed, there would have been no need of such a person. But now—for you see that Laches has given an opposite (vote)[25] to Nicias—it will be well to hear from you with which of the men you are a fellow-voter.

Soc. What then, Lysimachus, are you about to make use of that, which the majority of us shall praise?

Lys. What else, Socrates, can any one do?

Soc. And will you too, Melesias, act in this manner? And if the consultation were about the contending art for your son, [26]what he ought to practise,[26] would you rather obey the many than one, who happened to have been instructed under a skilful teacher, and had practised himself.

Mel. It is reasonable, Socrates, (to obey) him.

Soc. You would therefore obey him rather than us four?

Mel. Perhaps so.

Soc. For that which is about to be judged correctly ought, I think, to be judged by science, and not by a multitude.

Mel. How not?

Soc. It is meet therefore to consider now this very thing in the first place, whether any one of us is an artist in the matter about which we are consulting, or not. And if any of us is, we should obey him, although he is but one, and dismiss

[25] After *ἐναντίαν* supply *ψῆφον*.

[25]—[26] The words within numerals are omitted by both Ficinus, and Taylor.

the rest. But if not, we must seek some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think that a hazard is run respecting a trifling thing, and not respecting that very possession, which is the greatest of all belonging to you? For by the sons being good, or the contrary, the whole of their father's house will be regulated in such a manner, as the children may turn out.

Mel. You speak the truth.

Soc. One must therefore have much forethought on this point.

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. How then, what I just now stated, should we have considered, if we had wished to inquire which of us is most expert in the contending art? [27] Is not he, who had learned and studied, and to whom there had been good teachers of this very thing? [27]

Mel. To me at least it appears so.

Soc. And prior to this, [28] (should we not have considered) what the thing is,[28] of which we are seeking the teachers?

Mel. How say you?

Soc. In this way, perhaps, it will be more manifest. [11.] It does not seem to me to have been conceded by us at first, [29] what is the thing about which we are consulting and considering,[29] which of us is (the most)[30] skilled, and for the sake of this has taken masters, and which of us is not.

Nic. Were we not considering,[31] Socrates, about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Soc. Entirely so, Nicias. But when any one considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it ought to be applied or not, whether think you should the consultation be about the remedy, or about the eyes.

[27]—[27] Stephens alone has seen that the sentence is incomplete; which is thus supplied by Ficinus—"nonne eum perscrutati essemus, qui et didicit et exercuit, cui videlicet idonei hujus rei præceptores exstiterint."

[28]—[28] Before *τίνος ὄντος τούτου*, Stalbaum would supply, as Taylor had done already, *ἐσκοποῦμεν ἄν*: but he prefers, in lieu of *οὗ ζητοῦμεν*, to read *ἐζητοῦμεν*.

[29]—[29] Ficinus has more tersely, "quid illud sit, in quo perquirimus—"

[30] Taylor has adopted the superlative from "peritissimus" in Ficinus.

[31] Ficinus—"quærebamus"—which leads to *ἐσκοποῦμεν* for *σκοπούμεν*.

Nic. About the eyes.

Soc. Hence too when any one is considering about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be applied or not, and when, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

Nic. True.

Soc. In one word then, when any one is considering any thing for the sake of any thing, his consultation is about that thing for the sake of which he is considering, and not about that, which[32] he was seeking for the sake of something else.[33]

Nic. Necessarily so.

Soc. It is necessary therefore to consider whether the fellow-counsellor is skilled in that thing, for the sake of which [34] we are considering what we are considering.[34]

Mel. Very much so.

Soc. Are we not saying then, that we are inquiring about a thing to be learnt for the sake of the soul of the young man?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. Whether then any one of us is skilled in the art of attending to the soul, and is able to well perform this attendance, and who has had good teachers, must be considered.

Lac. What then, Socrates, have you never seen persons become more skilful in some things without teachers than with them?

Soc. I have, Laches; to whom however you would not be willing to trust, if they said they were good artists, unless they could show you some well-finished work of their art, both one and many.

Nic. What you say is true.

[12.] *Soc.* And for us too, Laches and Nicias, it is requisite, since Lysimachus and Melesias have invited us to a con-

[32] To Cornarius is due ὃ for οὗ—

[33] Thus the horse is that, for the sake of which a man considers about a bridle; but the bridle is that, which is sought, for the sake of the horse. T.

[34]—[34] Bekker has properly adopted σκοποῦμεν ἃ σκοποῦμεν, the emendation of Matthiæ in Gr. Gr. § 558, for σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν, unsuccessfully defended by Stalbaum. For though σκοπεῖσθαι and σκοπεῖν are used by Plato indiscriminately, yet they could not be found thus united, where the perpetual phrase, like σκοποῦμεν ἃ σκοποῦμεν, is required.

sultation with them respecting their sons, through their being desirous that their souls should become the best possible, that we, if we say we have had masters, should show who they were, who [35]in the first place[35] being themselves good teachers, and having attended to the souls of many youths, appear in the next place to have instructed us likewise. Or, if any one of us shall say that he has had no teacher, he ought at least to be able to speak of his own works, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have become good confessedly through him. But if neither of these is in our power, we must be ordered[36] to seek after others, and not run the risk in the case of the sons of persons our friends, of incurring the greatest blame from their nearest relatives for doing them a mischief. Now with respect to myself, I am the first to say, Lysimachus and Melesias, that I have had no teacher in this matter; although, beginning from my youth, I have felt a desire for such a thing. But I am not able to pay the sophists their fees, who alone profess themselves able to make me a man beautiful in body and mind; and by myself even now I am unable to discover the art. If however Nicias or Laches have either discovered or learned it, I should not wonder; for they have a more money-power than myself, so as to be able to learn from others; and they are at the same time older, so that they may have already discovered it (themselves.)[37] And they appear to me to be able to instruct a (grown) man; for they would never have so fearlessly expressed their opinions about pursuits good and bad for a young person, unless they believed they had a sufficient knowledge of them. Now as to the other things, I do indeed believe them; but I have wondered that they differ from each other. [13.] Hence, as Laches just now bade you not dismiss but interrogate me, so now I make a request in turn for you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, nor is he competent to decide which of you speaks the truth; for he is neither the in-

[35]—[35] The Greek is *αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι*. Ficinus has "qui et ipsi primum," from which Bekker obtained *οἱ*, and Stephens "primum."

[36] I have translated as if the Greek were *κελευστέ' ἡμῖν*, not *κελεύειν*.

[37] The very antithesis in *παρ' ἄλλων* proves that *αὐτοὶ* has dropt out after *ὥστε*. Compare just below *μαθόντε παρά του—ἢ αὐτὼ ἐξευρόντε*.

[38] Ficinus omits *ἄνθρωπον*.

ventor nor the teacher of any thing relating to such matters. But do you, Laches and Nicias, one or the other, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the bringing up of youth; and whether you have learnt from any one, or discovered yourselves; and, if you have learnt, who was the teacher to each of you, and what others are their fellow-artists, in order that if amidst the affairs of the city you have no leisure, we may go to them, and induce, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not become depraved, and a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves are the discoverers of such a thing, give us an instance of what other persons you have had the care, and whom from being depraved you have made beautiful and good. For if you will now begin to give instruction for the first time, you must reflect that the risk is run not in the case of a Carian,[39] but in that of your own sons, and the sons of your friends; and truly will it happen to you, according to the proverb, for a pottery to be in a tub.[40] State then which of these matters ye say or deny is in our power and suited to you. This, Lysimachus, inquire of them, and do not let them off.

[14.] *Lys.* Socrates seems, my friends, to me to speak well. But whether it is agreeable to you to be interrogated about such matters, and to give reasons,[41] it is meet for you, Nicias and Laches, to know; for to myself and Melesias here it will clearly be very agreeable, if you are willing to go through in a discussion all that Socrates may ask. For at the commencement I began speaking from that point, that we had invited you to a consultation on this account, because we thought, as was likely, that you had paid attention to these things, espe-

[39] Of the low estimation in which the Carians were held, the earliest proof is found in Homer; while the Scholiast here quotes numerous passages from different authors where the proverb is found. To the other references given by Spanheim on Julian. Cæsar. p. 105, ed. Heusinger, and Valckenaer on Herodot. v. 66, Jacobs adds Cicero pro Flacco, § 27. The modern medical phrase is "Experimentum in vili corpore."

[40] This proverb, found likewise in Gorg. p. 514, E. § 149, was applied to those, who attempt to do great things before they can do little; or, as said of children, who endeavour to run, before they can walk.

[41] Stalbaum translates λόγον by "answer." But that meaning is not supported by the passages he quotes from Phædo, p. 78, D. For there λόγον is "a reason:" and so it is here, as shown by διδόντες καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον, a little below.

cially since your sons, as well as ours, are arrived at an age to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving reasons from each other: for he says this very properly, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that we ought to act thus.

Nic. You seem to me, Lysimachus, to know in good truth Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him yourself; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, he came near you, while following his father, amongst his wardsmen, or in a temple, or some other congregation of the people; but since he has grown older, it is evident that you have never fallen in with him.

Lys. Why say you this especially, Nicias?

[15.] *Nic.* You seem to me not to know that for him, who happens to be near to Socrates, through a conversation, as if through a family alliance, [42][and approaches towards him by conversing,][42] it is a matter of necessity that, even if he shall have previously begun to converse about any thing else, he will not cease to be led about by the person here during the conversation, until he falls into giving an account of himself, in what manner he lives now, and what is the life he has previously lived. And when he shall have so fallen, Socrates will not dismiss him, until he has tried, as by a touchstone, all these points well and truly. But I am accustomed to him, and I know that it is necessary for me to suffer thus at his hands; and I further know well that I shall suffer now. For I am delighted, Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded of what we have done or are doing not correctly; and that for the subsequent period of life it is necessary for the person to be more thoughtful, who does not fly from such an examination, but is willing and thinks it worth while, according to the saying of Solon,[43] to learn as long as he lives, and by not imagining that age itself will come

[42]—[42] The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of the preceding ἐγγύτατα—λόγῳ. Schleiermacher proposed to cut out ὥσπερ γένει: with whom Stalbaum at first agreed, but subsequently considered the text perfectly sound.

[43] The saying was, Αεὶ γηράσκω πολλὰ διδασκόμενος

bringing intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be tested by Socrates. But I have for some time known almost that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. Hence, as I said before, nothing as regards myself prevents me from passing the time in discourse with Socrates in the manner he wishes. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

[16.] *Lac.* With respect to conversations, Nicias, my state is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double; for to a person I should appear to be now a lover of talk, but again a hater. For when I hear a man talking about virtue, or concerning wisdom, if he be truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I am delighted beyond all bounds, perceiving at the same time both the speaker and what is spoken, how they become and suit each other. And, really, such a man appears to me to be a musician, who composes the most beautiful harmony, not through[43] the lyre, or instruments of play, but by living in reality[44] correctly, after having skilfully[44] made[45] his life to accord by words to deeds like [46]the Dorian strain, but not the Ionic, nor I conceive the Phrygian or Lydian,[46] but that which alone is the Hellenic. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, makes me to be glad, and to appear to any one whatever a lover of talk, with such avidity do I receive what is spoken by him. But he, who acts in a manner contrary to this man, gives me pain; and by how much the better he seems to speak, by so much the more does he (pain me), and make me on the other hand to appear a hater of talk. Of the discourses of Socrates I have not yet, indeed, had any experience; but of his deeds, as it seems, I have formerly had a

[43] I have translated as if the Greek were *οὐ* ΔΙΑ ΛΥ*ραν*, and not *οὐ* ΛΥ*ραν*.

[44]—[44] Here too, where the whole question is connected with what is done skilfully or not, the undefined *ἀτεχνῶς* could not be introduced in the place of the defined *ἐντέχνως*. Stalbaum, who once approved of the correction made by Cornarius, afterwards preferred the one suggested by Heusde, and eventually proposed himself a third.

[45] Here again, by merely changing *ἡρμοσμένος οὐ* into *εὐ εἰργασμένος*, I have, I trust, restored the very words of Plato, who most assuredly never repeated the same verb *ἡρμοσμένος* in two consecutive sentences.

[46]—[46] The Ionic harmony was effeminate; the Lydian, doleful; the Phrygian, vehement; but the Dorian, grave; and it was on this account preferred by Plato to all the rest. See Rep. iii. p. 398, E. T.

trial, and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful words and all liberty of speech. If then he possesses these properties, I agree with the party here; and I shall with the greatest pleasure be examined by such a person; nor shall I feel annoyed at being a learner. But though I assent to the saying of Solon, I will add just one thing, for I wish to be taught many things as I grow old, but by the good alone. Let this then be granted, that the teacher is himself a good man, that I may not appear hard to learn, when I learn without pleasure. But whether the teacher be younger, or not as yet in repute, or possesses any thing else of such a kind, I take no thought. I state then, as it were by the crier, to you, Socrates, that you may teach and confute me in whatever point you please; [47] and to learn on the other hand what I know; [47] for so you are laid up in my thoughts, from the day in which you were my companion in danger,[48] and gave such a proof of your virtue, as it is meet for man to give, who is about [49] to give it justly.[49] Say then whatever you please, and take no account of our age.

[17.] *Soc.* We cannot then blame, as it seems, your feelings, as being not ready to consult and investigate with us conjointly.

Lys. This then is our business, Socrates. For I put you down as one of us. Do you therefore consider, instead of me, in behalf of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them; and do you by conversing consult for them. For, through my age, I have forgotten the majority of things which I had intended to ask them; and moreover, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have laid before you; and I shall afterwards hear (the result); and having heard, I will, with Melesias here, do whatever shall seem good to you.

Soc. We must, Nicias and Laches, obey Lysimachus and

[47]—[47] Taylor, perceiving no doubt the absurdity of the clause within the numerals, tacitly omitted them. Plato, in lieu of *μανθάνειν αὖ*, probably wrote *ἀναμανθάνειν*, "to unlearn:" which, as we know from Horace, old persons are very unwilling to do.

[48] The fact alluded to is mentioned in The Banquet, § 43.

[49]—[49] This I cannot understand. Ficinus has "quisquis juste periculum est facturus," as if he had found in his MS *δικαίως κινδυνεύσειν*. The sense requires *δικαίως διδάσκειν*. For Laches had said just before that a teacher ought to be a virtuous person.

Melesias. The points then, which we just now endeavoured to consider, (namely,) who had been our teachers in such kind of instruction, or what other persons we had made better, it will not be improper, perhaps, to examine amongst ourselves. But I think that a consideration of this kind tends to the same point, [50]and would be almost and more from a beginning.[50] For if we happen to know respecting any thing, that, when it is present to any thing, it renders that thing better, to which it is present; and, moreover, (if) we are able to cause that thing to be present to the other, [51]respecting which we may be the fellow-counsellors,[51] so that a person might acquire it in the easiest and best manner—Perhaps you do not understand what I am saying; but in this way you will more easily understand it. If we happen to know that the sense of sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better; and, moreover, if we are able to cause the sense of sight to be present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sense of sight is, respecting which we may be the fellow-counsellors, so that a person may acquire it in the easiest and best manner. For if we did not know this very thing, what the sense of sight is, or what that of hearing is, we should be not at all[52] counsellors or physicians worthy of any account, respecting either the eyes or the ears, and as regards the manner in which a person might acquire in the best manner the sense of hearing or of sight.

Lys. You speak the truth, Socrates.

Soc. Do not then these persons, Laches, now invite us to consult with them respecting the manner by which virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may make them better?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Ought there not then to be at hand the power, namely, to know what virtue is? For if we do not know at all what virtue happens to be, in what way can we become fellow-counsellors to any one, so that he may in the best manner acquire it?

Lac. In no way, it appears to me, Socrates.

[50]—[50] This I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus; whose version is "et altius repetetur," which cannot answer to σχεδὸν δέ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἂν εἴη. Taylor's translation is equally wide of the Greek—"or nearly it will be something which rather flows from a principle."

[51]—[51] The words within the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[52] Literally, "at leisure." On σχολῇ thus used, see the commentators on Soph. Œd T 434.

Soc. Say we then, Laches, that we know what it is?

Lac. Yes, we say so.

Soc. What we know then, cannot we also tell, what it is?

Lac. How not?

[18.] *Soc.* Let us not, however, thou best of men, speculate forthwith about the whole of virtue—for that perhaps would be a rather great undertaking; but let us first see about a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it; and thus,[54] it is probable, the speculation will be more easy to us.

Lac. Let us do so, Socrates, since you wish it.

Soc. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Or is it not evident that it is that, to which the instruction in arms seems to tend? Now it seems to the many to tend to fortitude. Is it not so?

Lac. It seems very much so.

Soc. Let us then in the first place, Laches, endeavour to state what fortitude is; and in the next place, we will consider by what means it can be present to young men so far as it is possible for it to be present by study and instruction. But do you endeavour to state what fortitude is.

Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, it is not difficult to state. For if any one is willing to remain in his place, and defend himself from the enemy, and does not fly, rest assured that he would be a brave man.

Soc. You speak well, Laches; but perhaps from not speaking clearly myself, I am the cause of your not answering what I intended to ask, but something else.

Lac. How say you this, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, remaining in his place, fights with the foe.

Lac. So I say.

Soc. And I also. But what on the other hand is he, who, while flying,[55] fights with the foe, and does not remain in his place?

Lac. How flying?

Soc. Just as the Scythians surely are said to fight, no less

[54] Ficinus has "In hunc modum," as if he had found in his MS., εὕτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, not merely ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς—

[55] Jacobs refers to Horace, Od. i. 35, 9, "Scythas et versis animosum equis Parthum."

while flying than pursuing. And Homer some where, praising the horses of Æneas, says, (Il. v. 225,)

> Hither and thither swiftly to pursue
> And fly they know;

and for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, and calls him, through his skill in flying, "in flight expert."

Lac. And very properly, Socrates: for he is there speaking of chariots; but you are speaking about the Scythian cavalry; for so they fight; but the heavy-armed infantry of Greece (fight) as I say.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, when they engaged with the Gerrophori at Platæa,[56] were not willing to remain and fight against them, but fled;[57] but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus won the battle.

Lac. You speak the truth.

[19.] *Soc.* [58] This then I meant as the reason for saying),[58] that I was the cause of your not answering correctly, because I did not put the question correctly. For wishing to ask you not only about those, who are brave amongst the heavy-armed, but also about those in the cavalry, and in every form of war, and not only about those brave in battle, but also those in the dangers of the sea, and such as act a manly part in diseases, in poverty, and in political affairs, and still further, not only such as bear themselves bravely up against pain or fear, but also bear themselves up against desires or pleasures, both by remaining, or turning their backs—for there are surely some men, Laches, brave in things of this kind likewise.

Lac. And very much so, Socrates.

[56] These were some Persian troops, who carried bucklers made of osiers and willows united, probably not unlike the targets, at which persons shoot with a bow and arrows.

[57] This anecdote is not told elsewhere; although mention is made by Herodotus, in ix. 61, of an engagement, where a Lacedæmonian corps failed to make an impression on a body of Persian troops, who were protected by their so-called bucklers.

[58]—[58] This seems to be what Plato meant to say. But the Greek is merely *Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον.* Perhaps it was *τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ αἴτιον ὃν ἔλεγον λέγων.* Ficinus has "Merito ergo dicebam?"

Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. What then is each of these? This is what I was asking. Try then again to tell me, in the first place, what is that fortitude, which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I mean?

Lac. Not very well.

[20.] *Soc.* But I will speak in this way; just as if I had asked, What is the swiftness, which happens to be present with us in running, in playing on the harp, and in speaking, and in learning, and in many other things, and we nearly possess that, about which it is worth while to say any thing, in the acts of the hands or feet, or mouth or voice, or mind. Or do not you also say so?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me—What, Socrates, do you call that, which you denominate swiftness in all things? I should say to him, that I call by the name of swiftness that power, which accomplishes many things in a short time, as regards the voice, and running, and all other things.

Lac. And you would say rightly.

Soc. Do you then endeavour, Laches, in like manner, to define fortitude. What is that power, which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the things in which we just now said it is, and is afterwards[59] called fortitude.

Lac. It appears then to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if one must speak of that, which exists connected with fortitude taken universally.

Soc. And this must be, if we are to reply to the question asked by ourselves. This then appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. And I too infer it from hence; for I nearly know, Laches, that you think fortitude to belong to the things which are very beautiful.

[59] I cannot understand ἔπειτα; nor could Ficinus, whose version is "fortitudinem per singula nominari,"—which leads to εἰς πάντα—similar to εἰς ἅπαντα in § 21, or ἐς ἕκαστα. They, however, who wish for a long but unsatisfactory defence of ἔπειτα, may turn to the note of Engelhardt.

Lac. Rest assured that it does belong to things the most beautiful.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance, which subsists in conjunction with prudence, beautiful and good?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. But what of that endurance, which subsists with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and evil-working?

Lac. Yes.

Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is evil-working and hurtful?

Lac. This, Socrates, (would be) not just.

Soc. You do not then acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

Lac. You say true.

Soc. Prudent endurance therefore, according to your assertion, would be fortitude.

Lac. So it seems.

[21.] *Soc.* Let us see then in what it is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that, by thus spending it, he should obtain more, would you call him a brave man?

Lac. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Or if some one, being a physician, while his son or any one else is attacked with an inflammation in the lungs, and requests him to give something to eat or drink, should be inflexible and persist (in denying. Is this fortitude?)

Lac. Not even this at all.

Soc. But in the case of war, where a man is enduring and willing to fight, and reasoning prudently with himself, through knowing that others will give him assistance, or that he shall fight against foes fewer and of less account than those on his own side, and, further still, that he has the advantage of the ground, would you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and preparation, is braver than him in the opposite army, who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

Lac. The man in the opposing army seems to me, Socrates, to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the latter is more imprudent than that of the former.

Lac. You say true.

Soc. And will you say that the man, who endures in a cavalry engagement, with a knowledge of horses, is less brave than him, who endures without science?

Lac. To me at least it appears that he is.

Soc. And he too, who with the art of a slinger, or archer, or of any other kind, is enduring?

Lac. Entirely so.

[22.] *Soc.* And will you say, that such as are willing to descend into a tank, and there to endure swimming, although not skilled in that exercise, or in any thing else of that kind, are braver than those who are skilled in them?

Lac. What else, Socrates, could one say?

Soc. Nothing, if indeed he think so.

Lac. But I do indeed think so.

Soc. And yet, Laches, such persons encounter danger and endure more imprudently than those, who do this with art.

Lac. So they appear.

Soc. Did not then unseemly and imprudent boldness and endurance formerly appear to us to be hurtful likewise?

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged to be something beautiful.

Lac. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now on the other hand we say that the unseemly thing, namely, imprudent endurance, is fortitude.

Lac. We seem so.

Soc. Do we then appear to you to speak well?

Lac. By Zeus, Socrates, not to me.

Soc. In your own language, then, Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized; for our works do not accord with our words. For some one, as it seems, would say in deed that we have a share of fortitude; but he would not say in word, as I think, if he should hear us now discoursing.

Lac. You speak most truly.

[23.] *Soc.* What then, does it appear to you to be beautiful for us to be in this condition?

Lac. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to yield to what we said, to this extent?

Lac. To what extent, and to what assertion?

Soc. To that which orders us to endure. If then you are willing, let us persist in the inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely searching it out; if, perchance,[60] endurance itself is fortitude.

Lac. I indeed, Socrates, am prepared not to previously stand aloof, although I am unaccustomed to such like conversations. But a certain love of contention against what has been said has laid hold of me, and I am truly indignant that I am so unable to tell what I have in my mind. For I seem to myself to conceive what fortitude is; but I know not how it has just now escaped me, so that I cannot comprehend it in words and say what it is.

Soc. But ought not a good huntsman, my friend, to keep running in pursuit, and not to give up.

Lac. By all means.

Soc. Are you then willing for us to invite Nicias also to the hunting, if perchance he is at all more ready to find a path than we are?

Lac. I am willing; for how not?

[24.] *Soc.* Come then, Nicias, and if you possess any power, assist your friends, tossed, as it were, in a storm of words and in doubt; for you see how pathless are our affairs. Do you then state what you think fortitude is, and free us from this doubt, and confirm by reason what you conceive it to be.

Nic. You appear to me, Socrates, for some time past, not to have well defined fortitude; for of that, which I have heard you correctly asserting, you make no use.

Soc. What is that, Nicias?

Nic. I have often heard you asserting that each of us is good, as regards the things in which he is wise, but bad, as regards those of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Zeus, Nicias, you speak the truth.

Nic. If, therefore, the brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Soc. Do you hear, Laches?

Lac. I do; but I do not very well understand what he means.

[60] Heusde after Abresch in Dilucid. Thucyd. p. 174, renders πολλάκις by "perchance." But how the word, which means literally an act frequently done, can be applied to one rarely done, I cannot understand. The notion has however been frequently adopted by Stalbaum.

Soc. But I seem to understand; and the man seems to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

Lac. What kind of wisdom, Socrates?

Soc. Why do you not ask this of him?

Lac. I do.

Soc. Come then, Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude would be according to your reasoning; for it is surely not that belonging to the hautboy.

Nic. By no means.

Soc. Nor yet that belonging to the harp.

Nic. Certainly not.

Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

Lac. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates; and let him tell us what he says wisdom is.

Nic. I say then, Laches, that it is the science relating to things of dread and daring, both in war and in all other things.

Lac. How absurdly, Socrates, he talks!

Soc. Looking to what do you say this, Laches?

Lac. To what? Wisdom is surely separate from fortitude.

Soc. Nicias does not say so.

Lac. He does not, by Zeus; and therefore he is a trifler.

Soc. Let us then teach, but not revile him.

Nic. It is not so. But Laches seems to me, Socrates, to be desirous for me likewise to appear to say nothing to the purpose, because he too appeared just now to be such a kind of person.

[25.] *Lac.* Entirely so, Nicias; and I will endeavour to show this. For you do say nothing (to the purpose); since, for example, in diseases do not physicians know things of dread? Or do brave men seem to you to know this? Or do you call physicians brave men?

Nic. By no means.

Lac. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, although they know things of dread in agriculture; and all other artificers know things of dread and daring in their own arts; and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Soc. What, Nicias, does Laches appear to you to say? He appears, however, to say[61] something.

[61] Instead of *μέντοι*, I should prefer *ἔμοιγε*, on account of the antithesis in *Νικία*.

Nic. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Soc. How so?

Nic. Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able[62] to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful. Now they do know only so much as this. But whether to be well is a thing of dread to any one rather than to be ill, think you, Laches, that physicians know this? Or do you not think that it is better for many not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this. Do you say that it is better for all men to live, and that it is not better for many to die?

Lac. I think that the latter is the case.

Nic. To those then, to whom it is an advantage to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is (an advantage) to live?

Lac. Not I.

[26.] *Nic.* But do you grant physicians to know this, or to any other artificer beside the man, who knows what are things of dread, [63]and what are not,[63] whom I call a brave man?

Soc. Do you understand, Laches, what he says?

Lac. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for who else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And yet, Nicias, do you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet,[64] or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

Nic. What then, do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things of dread and daring?

Lac. I do; for to whom else does it?

Nic. Much more, thou best of men, to him of whom I was speaking; since it is necessary for a prophet to know merely the signs of future events, whether there will be to any one death, or disease, or the loss of property, or victory, or defeat, either in battle or in any other contest. But which of these

[62] Such is Taylor's translation, as if he read with Stephens, *οἷοί τε εἶναι*, and thus met the difficulty which Stalbaum seems to find here. Stephens suggested likewise *οἷόν τι*—

[63]—[63] The words between the numerals Bekker first restored from four MSS. They were in the MS. of Ficinus likewise, as shown by his version, "metuenda et non metuenda."

[64] This is rather a hard hit at Nicias; who, as we know from Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Plutarch, placed no little confidence in diviners.

things it is better for any one to suffer or not to suffer, how does it belong to a prophet, more than to any other person, to judge of?

Lac. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say. For he does not show whom he calls brave, either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. To me then Nicias appears to be unwilling to ingenuously confess that he is saying nothing to the purpose; but he turns himself upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; and both you and I would have been able to turn ourselves in this way, had we wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, our speeches had been in a court of justice, he would have had some reason to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should you vainly deck yourself with empty words?

Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, Laches. But let us see, lest Nicias thinks he is saying something to the purpose, and does not assert this merely for the sake of talking. Let us then inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

[27.] *Lac.* Do you then, Socrates, if you will, question him; for I have questioned him enough.

Soc. Nothing prevents me, for the questioning will be in common, both on my account and yours.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me then, Nicias—for I and Laches unite in the speech—do you say that fortitude is the science of things of dread and daring?

Nic. I do.

Soc. But it does not belong to every man to know this; since neither a physician nor a prophet knows it, nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Did you not say so?

Nic. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb[65] then, in reality every sow would not know this, nor would it become valiant.

Nic. It does not seem to me it would.

[65] The proverb—"This e'en a sow would know"—was applied to those who could, although ever so stupid, still learn.

Soc. It is then evident, Nicias, that you do not believe that even the Cromyonian sow[66] was brave. I do not say this in jest; but I think it is necessary for him, who asserts this, to admit that no wild beast is brave; or to grant that any wild beast, a lion, or a leopard, or any boar, is so wise, as to be born to know[67] what few men, through the difficulty of knowing, do. But he who lays down fortitude to be, what you lay it down, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag and a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

[28.] *Lac.* By the gods, Socrates, you speak well; and do you, Nicias, truly answer us. Do you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknowledge to be brave, are wiser than we are? or, in opposition to all, dare you to call them not brave?

Nic. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast or any thing else brave, which through ignorance[68] has no fear of things of dread, but (I call it) fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call children brave, who through ignorance, fear nothing? But I am of opinion, "the fearless" is not the same with "the brave." For, I think, that of fortitude and forethought very few have a share; but of confidence and boldness, and fearlessness, together with the want of forethought, very many men and women and boys and wild beasts have. Those acts therefore which you and the many call courageous, I call rash,[69] but the brave are the prudent, about whom I am now speaking.

Lac. Behold, Socrates, how well this man bedecks himself, as he thinks, with fine words; for those, whom all men ac-

[66] The sow of Cromyon, a village in the Corinthian territory, which the animal laid waste, was killed by Theseus, as we learn from Ovid. Metam. vii. Plutarch, in Gryll. ii. p. 987, has preserved an hexameter taken from a poem on that subject—*Θησεῖ Πράγματα πόλλ' ἔτι θηλὶ παρέσχεν θηρίον οὖσα.*

[67] Instead of *φάναι*, which Stalbaum would defend by passages hardly in point, Plato wrote, as I have translated, *πεφυκέναι*, as shown by the subsequent *πεφυκέναι.*

[68] The reading of *ἀγνοίας* has been hitherto found only in the MS used by Ficinus, as shown by his version, "propter ignorantiam." All the rest have *ἀνοίας.*

[69] To this passage has been referred the expression of Cicero De Offic. i. 19, "Animus paratus ad periculum—audaciæ potius nomen habent quam fortitudinis."

knowledge to be brave, he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

Nic. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lamachus[70] are wise, if you are brave, and many others of the Athenians likewise.

Lac. Against this I will say nothing; although I could say something, lest you should say that I am in reality an Aixōnean.[71]

Soc. Say nothing, Laches; for you seem to me to have not at all[72] perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our friend Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus,[73] who appears indeed to distinguish the best of the sophists' such kind of terms.

Lac. For it becomes a sophist, Socrates, to be ingenious on such kind of subjects, rather than the man, whom the city thinks fit to place in a post of pre-eminence.

Soc. It does, thou blessed man, indeed become him, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to have the greatest share of wisdom. But it appears to me a thing worthy of consideration, with a view to what does Nicias thus define fortitude.

[29.] *Lac.* Consider, Socrates, this yourself.

Soc. This I intend to do, thou best of men. Do not, however, imagine that I shall dismiss you from your share in the conversation; but do you apply your mind, and ponder with me upon what has been stated.

Lac. Let it be so, if it seems to you to be necessary.

Soc. Nay, but it does seem. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning. You know that [74][at the begin-

[70] Lamachus was one of the three generals of the Athenians united in command with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the Sicilian expedition, where he was killed. Of his answering to his name, which means, "Great-Fighter," a proof is furnished in the Acharnians of Aristophanes.

[71] From hence it would seem that Laches was of the ward of Aixōnes, the people of which were noted for their evil-speaking. A similar character has been given to the locality of Billingsgate in London.

[72] Instead of οὐδὲ μή, which is defended by Hermann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, Jacobs on Athenæus, Indic. p. 393, correctly suggested οὐ δαμῇ.

[73] To the attention paid by Prodicus to the different meaning of names Plato has made frequent allusion.

[74]—[74] The words between the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

ning of our conference][74] we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.[75]

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Did not you answer also, that it was a part, there being likewise other parts, which, taken together, are called virtue?

Nic. How not?

Soc. Are you then speaking of the same[76] parts as I am? For in addition to fortitude, I call temperance, and justice, and certain other things of such kind, (parts of virtue). Do not you too?

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. Hold,[77] then. For in these we agree. But let us consider about things of dread and daring, that you may not think some of them one thing, and we another. What then we consider such, we will state; and do you, if you do not agree with us, instruct us. We consider then those to be things of dread, which occasion fear; but those to be things of daring, which do not occasion fear. Now neither evils past, nor present, occasion fear; but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not appear so to you, Laches, likewise?

Lac. Very much so, Socrates.

Soc. You hear then, Nicias, our assertions, that future evils are things of dread; but future things, either not evil or good, are things of daring. On these points say you in this way or in another?

Nic. In this.

Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

Nic. I do.

[30.] *Soc.* Let us then still further consider, whether, on the third point, you think with us.

Nic. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and to Laches

[75] Compare The Statesman, § 44, p. 306, B., *ἀνδρίαν—μέρος ἓν ἀρετῆς εἶναι.*

[76] Ficinus has "eadem, quas ego, partes." He therefore found in his MS. *ταὐτὰ*, not *ταῦτα*.

[77] Hermann on Viger. n. 252, renders Ἔχε, "keep your mind upon what we have said." Heindorf on Gorg. § 35, and Protag. § 96, "Stop here." I have translated, "Hold," as in Shakspeare: "Lay on, Macduff; And damned be he, who first cries, 'Hold, enough.'"

here, that of whatever things there is a science, there is not one science of a thing past, [78](so as) to know[78] how it has been, another of things present, (to know) how they are, and another (to know) how that, which has not yet been, may be and will be in the most beautiful manner; but the science is the same. For instance, with respect to healthiness at all times, there is no other than medical science, which, being one, sees what is, and has been, and will be healthy, and how it will be so. And with respect to things constantly[79] growing out of the earth, agriculture is in a similar state. So too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves would testify that the science of a general thinks beforehand in the most beautiful manner of other things and of what is about to be; nor does it think it ought to be subservient to the prophet's art, but to rule over it, as knowing better what does and will take place in war. And the law enjoins this; not that the prophet shall rule over the general, but the general over the prophet. Shall we say so, Laches?

Lac. We will say so.

Soc. What then, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same science has a knowledge of the same things, future, and present, and past?

Nic. I do; for so it appears to me, Socrates.

[31.] *Soc.* Is not then fortitude, as thou, the best of men, sayest, the science of things of dread and daring?

Nic. It is.

Soc. But things of dread and daring have been confessed to relate, the latter to future good, the former to future evil.

Nic. Entirely so.

Soc. But the same science is relating to the same things, and to [80][those about to be],[80] and existing in every way.

[78]—[78] The Greek is *εἰδέναι* simply, without any thing to govern it; and hence probably it was omitted by Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὥστε εἰδέναι*: for *ὥστε* might easily have dropt out after *γεγονότος*.

[79] Instead of *αὖ*, the balance of the sentence requires *ἀεὶ*, to answer to the preceding *εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους*.

[80]—[80] The words within brackets are evidently a partial interpolation; but which was more full in the MS. of Ficinus, as shown by his version, "earundem rerum, præteritarum præsentiumque et futurarum," who however omits *καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων*. On the other hand, Stalbaum was the first to reject *καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων*, in the next speech of Socrates.

Nic. It is so.

Soc. Fortitude, then, is not the science of things of dread and daring alone; for it not only has a knowledge of future good and evil, but also of things present and past, [and existing in every way] like the other sciences.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. You have therefore, Nicias, given us in your answer some third part nearly of fortitude. And yet we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your (former)[81] assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things of dread and daring, but, as your present reasoning on the other hand (shows), fortitude would be that which nearly relates to all things good and evil, and [82]existing in every way.[82] [83]To change again thus,[83] or how say you, Nicias?

Nic. To me, Socrates, it seems good.

Soc. Does then such a person as this appear to you, blessed man, to be deficient at all in virtue, if he knows every good, and how in every point they are, and will be, and have been, and every evil in the same manner? And do you think that he is wanting in temperance, or justice, or holiness, to whom alone it belongs in matters relating to gods and men to practise caution touching the things of dread and not, and to obtain for himself what is good by knowing how to associate in a proper manner (with others)?

Nic. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

[32.] *Soc.* That then which is now, Nicias, adduced by you, would not be a part of virtue, but virtue in general.

Nic. So it seems.

Soc. And yet we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

[81] The antithesis in *νῦν αὖ* just afterwards requires us to read here *κατα τὸν πρὶν σὸν λόγον*, not merely *τὸν σὸν*—

[82]—[82] Ficinus has more fully, "omniumque simpliciter quomodolibet sese habentium."

[83]—[83] This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is, "Sicne modo an aliter judicas, Nicias." Stalbaum however, after Engelhardt, says that in the Greek, *Οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις*, the infinitive depends upon *λέγεις*, i. e. "Say you that you change your mind thus, or how?" But he forgot that to a bipartite question there could not be a single answer.

Nic. We said so.

Soc. But that which is now said, does not appear to be so.

Nic. It seems not.

Soc. We have not therefore, Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

Nic. We do not appear (to have done so).

Lac. And yet I thought, friend Nicias, that you would have discovered it, since you had a contempt for myself, when I answered Socrates; and I had very great hope that you would discover it by the wisdom, which has come from Damon.

Nic. It is an excellent thing indeed, Laches, for you to think it a matter of no moment, that just now you appeared to know nothing about fortitude, and that you are looking to this, whether I shall appear to be another such (ignorant person); and it will be, as it seems, of no consequence for you together with myself to know nothing of things, which it is fitting for a man to have a knowledge of, who thinks himself something. You therefore appear to me to act in reality after the general manner of men, in looking[84] not to yourself, but to others. I think, however, on the points which he have spoken about, there has been said something in reason; and, if any thing has not been stated sufficiently, it shall be afterwards set to rights, with the assistance both of Damon, whom you somehow fancy you are ridiculing—and this too, although you have never seen him—and of others also; and, when I shall have fortified these assertions, I will instruct you too without grudging; for you appear to me to be in very great need of instruction.

Lac. You are, Nicias, wise indeed; but, however, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would do the very same thing, if my children were of a proper age.

Nic. I too agree with you in this, to seek no other person, if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care; since most gladly would I intrust Niceratus[85] to him, if he is willing; but when I put him in mind at all on this subject,

[84] I have followed Schleiermacher, who reads βλέπων for βλέπειν which Stalbaum would defend by quoting Sympos. p. 180, D. But there it is easy to alter φράσαι into φράσας.

[85] This Niceratus is said to have been subsequently killed by the thirty tyrants. Demosthenes alludes to another in Midian, p. 567, R.

he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to (do aught) himself. But see, Lysimachus, whether Socrates will hearken more to you.

[33.] *Lys.* This at least, Nicias, is just; since I should be willing to do many things for him, which I would not be very willing to do for many others. How say you then, Socrates? Will you hearken to me and make an effort with us for these lads to become the very best.

Soc. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, Lysimachus, not to be willing [86] to make an effort for any to become the best.[86] If, therefore, in the conversations just now held, I have appeared to know something, but these not to know, it would be just to invite me especially to this employment; but now (not); for we are all similarly in a doubt. Why then should any one select any of us? To me indeed it seems that (he should select) none. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly. Now, men, I say it is requisite—for there will be a carrying out into public of our discourse—that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves—for we need one—and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any thing else; but to let ourselves be in the condition we now are, I do not advise. And if any one ridicules us, because at this time of life we think proper to frequent a school, it seems to me that it will be meet to bring forward Homer in our defence, who says, (in Od. xvii. 34,)

> "Shame ill is present to a man in need."

We therefore, bidding a person go hang, if he says a word against us, let us take care in common of ourselves and the lads.

Lys. To me indeed, Socrates, what you say is very agreeable; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more willing am I to learn together with the youths. Do you then act in this way. Come to-morrow morning early to my house, and do not do otherwise, in order that we may consult about these very things. For the present let us break up the meeting.

Soc. This, Lysimachus, I will do; and, god willing, I will come to you to-morrow morning.

[86]—[86] The words within numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MENEXENUS.

Although it is generally a matter of little moment, how the dialogues of Plato follow each other, yet it is not without a purpose that I have placed the Menexenus after the Laches. For while in the one there is a discussion on Fortitude considered abstractedly, in the other are to be found convincing proofs of the manner in which the Athenians conducted themselves, when their Fortitude was put to the severest test, during their wars abroad, and dissensions at home; and when, like some states of modern times, they met, after a series of victories, with signal reverses, and found their very capital in the hands of their enemies, and a new form of government imposed upon them by the victors.

The object of the dialogue, or rather of the oration contained in it, is to celebrate the country, and the deeds of those who were to be honoured by a public funeral, after they had fallen in the fight that took place near Nemea, according to Xenophon in H. Gr. iv. 2, 8, and to which Demosthenes alludes in Leptin. § 41, as the great battle near Corinth.

But as that event occurred after the death of Socrates, Plato has, it would seem with the view of showing that the whole is a fiction, put the speech into the mouth of his master, and feigned, as in the case of Diotima in the Banquet, that the philosopher had been the pupil of Aspasia, and merely repeated what he had learnt as a lesson from her.

With regard to the details of a public funeral at Athens, it will be sufficient to refer to Thucydides ii. 34., who has there attributed to Pericles what he had written, no doubt, himself, just as Plato has done in the case of Socrates.

According to Dionysius, the Athenians commenced the practice

of pronouncing funeral orations at the close of the Persian invasion under Xerxes: and if any reliance is to be placed on Philostratus, Gorgias wrote the one spoken over those who had fallen at Salamis. And it was perhaps with the view of showing himself, if not superior, at least equal, to that celebrated Sophist, that Plato was induced to compose his own speech; from the perusal of which Cicero was led to declare, that had the philosopher chosen to become a pleader, his style would have been at once fluent and grave.

Despite however the testimony of the Roman orator, who has on various occasions alluded to this speech, and translated even a portion of it, Schleiermacher, with whom Ast and Goettling on Aristotle's Polit. ii. 6, p. 328, agree, has ventured to call in question its genuineness by arguments, to which Loers has in his edition given a full and, as I conceive, a satisfactory reply. But as the discussion is too long, even if it were requisite, for insertion here, it will be sufficient to state, that, as the dialogue is twice referred to by Aristotle, if it be not Plato's, it must be the production of some unknown writer, who, living between the time of Plato and Aristotle, was clever enough to imitate so completely the style of a man generally considered inimitable, as to deceive not only his most ardent admirer Cicero, but his perpetual opponent Aristotle.

With respect to one of the grounds on which the accusation of spuriousness rests, that Plato has made some statements at variance with the truth of history, Stalbaum acutely observes that such a step was doubtless taken designedly; for Plato would otherwise have failed to preserve the correctness of his ridicule of the orators; who, with the view of tickling the ears of their audience, were guilty of similar aberrations from the strict line of truth, as seems to have been proved by Cæcilius in his lost work, mentioned by Suidas, Περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἱστορίαν ἢ παρὰ ἱστορίαν εἰρημένων τοῖς ῥήτορσι—"On the statements made by the orators according to history, or contrary to it."

The first translation of the dialogue into English was by Gilbert West, in 1749, which Taylor says he has followed, except where it was not sufficiently close. The second was by myself anonymously printed at Cambridge in 1835, to which I added a few notes on the Greek text. A portion of it was translated likewise by Mitchell in the Quarterly Review, No. 54, p. 399; and the commencement of it up to the speech itself, by Shelley, is given in his posthumous Essays and Letters, Ed. Lond. 1845.

MENEXENUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS

SOCRATES.

[1.] FROM the Forum,[1] or from whence,[2] Menexenus?[3]

Men. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Council-Hall.[4]

Soc. What business had you especially at the Council-Hall? Or is it indeed evident that you deem yourself to have finished your course of learning and philosophy,[5] and as being now all-sufficient,[6] you think of turning yourself to matters of greater moment, and to become, O wonderful man, a ruler at your age over us your elders,[7] so that your family may never fail in supplying us[8] with some person as a guardian?[9]

[1] Although "Forum" is a Latin rather than an English word, yet it has become almost naturalized, as answering the best to the Greek ἀγορά.

[2] This ellipse of εἶ, is similar to that of "es," in Horace, "Unde et quo, Catius?"

[3] Of this Menexenus nothing more is known than that he was a friend of the Ctesippus mentioned in the Euthydemus, and very captious in argument, and that both of them visited Socrates when in prison. See Lysis, p. 206, D., 211, B., and Phædo, p. 59, B.

[4] The Council-Hall was near the Forum, as stated by Pseudo-Plutarch in ii. p. 842.

[5] By παίδευσις καὶ φιλοσοφία were meant all that a youth or man had learnt, or ought to know.

[6] A similar sarcasm is in Clitophon, p. 407, B., directed against those, who, having gone through the education of a youth, fancy themselves to be quite sufficient for the duties of a life of virtue.

[7] Melitus is similarly sneered at in Euthyphr. p. 3, A. § 1.

[8] According to Lucretius in i. 43, "Memmi clara propago," seems "nunquam communi deesse saluti."

[9] The sneer in the word ἐπιμελητής will be best understood by a passage

Men. If you, Socrates, will permit it, and advise me how to rule, I should be ready to do so; but if otherwise, not. However I went just now to the Council-Hall, on hearing that the Council were about to select[10] the party who is to speak (an oration) over the dead. For you know they are about to ordain a public funeral.

Soc. (I know it) very well. And whom have they selected?

Men. Not one. But they have put it off till to-morrow. I think, however, Archinus[11] or Dion will be selected.

[2.] *Soc.* In good truth, Menexenus, it appears on many accounts to be very nearly a beautiful thing to fall in battle.[12] For if a person dies so, although poor, he meets with a fine and gorgeous burial, and with praise, if he be a person of no mark,[13] from men at once clever, and not extolling at random; but who, having had their speeches prepared for a long time, eulogize so very beautifully that, by saying what is and is not to the purpose upon each point, and making a beautiful tissue of words, they bewitch our very souls, pouring forth in every way encomiums upon the state, and upon those who have died during the war, and upon all [14] [our ancestors],[14] who have lived before us, and [15] [bestowing praise] [15] upon us ourselves, who are still living, so that I feel myself, Menexenus, vastly ennobled in being praised by them, and I stand constantly on tip-toe,[16] and am charmed; fancying that I have be-

in Aristophanes Plut. 908, Πῶς οὖν διέζης ἢ πόθεν, μηδὲν ποιῶν; Τῶν τῆς πόλεώς εἰμ' ἐπιμελητὴς πραγμάτων Καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πάντων. Σύ; τί παθών; Βούλομαι.

[10] According to Demosthenes, Περὶ Στεφάν. p. 321, the people at large, and not the Council alone, selected the speaker.

[11] On this Archinus see Valesius on Harpocration, p. 253. Photius, on Bibliothec. cod. 240, says that Isocrates introduced into his Panegyric much from a funeral oration of Archinus; while Dionysius Halic. p. 1027, ed. R., asserts that Plato imitated those two orators.

[12] So Horace, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."

[13] Compare Cicero Pro Quinctio, § 15, "Mors honesta turpem vitam exornat:" and Shakspeare, Henry V., "For he, who sheds this day his blood with us, Shall be my brother, be he ne'er so vile."

[14]—[14] The words within brackets, τοὺς προγόνους, are evidently an interpolation of τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν. In like manner προγόνων has been inserted after τῶν ἄνωθεν ἔτι in § 5.

[15]—[15] The word ἐπαινοῦντες is perfectly unnecessary after the preceding ἐγκωμιάζοντες.

[16] I have adopted αἰωρούμενος for ἀκροώμενος, the splendid restora-

come on the instant [17]taller, and nobler, and handsomer (than before);[17] and as is wont, ever some strangers accompany me, and are fellow-hearers; to whom I appear to be immediately a greater object of respect. For they too seem to be affected in the same way as I am, both towards myself and the rest of the state, being persuaded by the speaker that it is more worthy of wonder than before. And this feeling of self-importance remains with me for more than three days; so greatly does the speech and even the tone of the orator ring in and sink into my ears, that scarcely on the fourth or fifth day do I recollect myself, and perceive where upon earth I am; and for awhile fancy myself only not living in the isles of the blessed.[18] So clever are our orators!

[3.] *Men.* You are always, Socrates, making fun with the orators. For the present however I think the person selected will have no easy task, for the choice is made altogether on a sudden, so that the orator will be compelled to speak perhaps off-hand.

Soc. How so, my good (friend)? The speeches of each of these are ready prepared. Besides it is not difficult to speak

tion of Valckenaer on Callimach. p. 244, who refers to § 20, where *αἰωρεῖται* is used in a sense not very dissimilar. With regard to the idea, compare Eurip. Ion, 1180, *ἐν δ' ἄκροισι βὰς ποσίν.* El. 845, *ὄνυχας ἐπ' ἄκρους στάς.* Soph. Aj. 1239, *Ὑψήλ' ἐκόμπεις κἀπ' ἄκρων ὠδοιπόρεις*: where Musgrave quotes Libanius, i. p. 326, *ἐπ' ἄκρων πορεύεσθαι δακτύλων*: and Aristoph. Ἀχ. 581, *κἀπειδὴ τοῦτό τις εἴποι, Εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς στεφάνους ἐπ' ἄκρων τῶν πυγιδίων ἐκάθησθε*: where the Scholiast observes that *οἱ ἐπαίνων εἰς ἑαυτοὺς γινομένων ἀκούοντες εἰώθασι τὴν πυγὴν, τῆς καθέδρας ἐξαίρειν.* Compare too Lucillius, Sat. viii. "Gallinaceu quum victor se gallus in hostem Sustulit in digitos, primoresque erigit ungues:" and Virgil, "Constitit in digitos arrectus." But the most apposite passages are in Shakspeare, Henry V., "He that outlives this day, and comes safe home, Shall stand on tip-toe, when this day is named." So too in Troilus and Cressida, "'Tis he, I ken the manner of his gait; He rises on the toe; that spirit of his In aspiration lifts him from the earth." Stalbaum defends *ἀκροώμενος* by translating *ἕστηκα*, "I stand astonished." But such is the meaning of *ἐξέστηκα* alone, which is found here in a solitary MS.

[17]—[17] This is well put into the mouth of Socrates, who was of small stature, ignoble birth, and ugly face.

[18] This idea Plato got from Aristophanes in *Σφηκ.* 640, *ὥστ' ἔγωγ' ηὐξανόμην ἀκούων, κἂν μακάρων δικάζειν αὐτὸς ἔδοξα νήσοις, ἡδόμενος λέγοντι*: while Plato himself was probably in the mind of Milton, who says in Comus—"Who, as they sang, would take the prison'd soul, And lap it in Elysium."

off-hand upon such topics. But if it were requisite to speak well of the Athenians amongst Peloponnesians, or of Peloponnesians amongst Athenians, there would be need of a good speaker to persuade (others) and gain (for himself) renown. But when a man enters upon such a contest before those whom he is praising, it seems not a great thing to speak well.

Men. Do you think it is not, Socrates?

Soc. It is not, by Zeus.

Men. Do you think that you would be able to speak yourself, if it were requisite, and the Council were to select you?

Soc. It would, Menexenus, be nothing wonderful, if even I were able to speak, whose teacher happens to be a woman by no means contemptible in oratory; but who has made many other persons good speakers, and, one superior to (all)[19] the Greeks, Pericles,[20] the son of Xanthippus.

Men. Who is she? Or (rather), it is plain that you mean Aspasia.[21]

Soc. I do mean her; and Connus too,[22] the son of Metrobius. For these two are my masters, he in music, and she in oratory. Now that a man thus educated should be a skilful speaker is nothing wonderful; since even he, who has been worse educated than myself, [23][having learnt][23] music from Lamprus,[24] and oratory from Antipho[25] of Rhamnous,[26] would be able to gain a reputation by praising Athenians, at least in the presence of Athenians.

[4.] *Men.* And what would you have to say, were it requisite to speak?

Soc. Myself perhaps nothing from myself. But only yes-

[19] Ficinus alone has "Græcorum omnium."

[20] Respecting the oratorical powers of Pericles, see the commentators on Phædrus, p. 269, E., Aristoph. Ach. 476, Eupolis Δήμοις Fr. vii., and Quintilian x. 1, 82.

[21] For an account of this remarkable woman see the commentators on Xenophon, M. S. ii. 6, Aristoph. Ach. 472, Maxim. Tyr. xxiv. and xxviii., and Harpocration in Ἀσπασία.

[22] Connus is again mentioned in Euthyd. p. 272, C., as the music-master of Socrates.

[23]—[23] The word παιδευθεὶς is evidently unnecessary after ἐπαιδεύθη.

[24] Of Lamprus little is known except what is to be gathered from C. Nepos in Epaminond. § 2, Plutarch ii. p. 1142, and Athenæus ii. p. 44.

[25] Respecting this orator, see Ruhnken's "Dissertat. de Antiphonte." According to Thucydides viii. 68, "he was the best to think upon a question, and, what he had thought upon, to express."

[26] This was one of the wards of Athens.

terday I heard Aspasia going through a funeral oration on these very persons. For she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose the person to speak. And then she went through partly on the instant what it would be proper to say, and partly what she had formerly thought of, when it seems she was composing the funeral oration that Pericles pronounced,[27] and was glueing together some scraps from that.

Men. Could you remember what she said?

Soc. Unless I do her wrong. At least I learnt it from her, and I almost received some cuffs, because I was forgetting it.

Men. Why then do you not repeat it?

Soc. (I fear) my mistress may be offended, if I make her discourse public.[28]

Men. (Fear) not, Socrates, at all; but tell it, and you will gratify me greatly, whether you choose to call it the speech of Aspasia, or of any one else; only speak it.

Soc. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, an elderly man, appear to be still acting the boy.

Men. Not at all, Socrates: but do speak it by all means.

[5.] *Soc.* Since then I must gratify you,[29] so as even, should you order me, to undress myself and dance,[30] I will gratify you; since we are alone.[31] Listen then; for she spoke, commencing, as I think, with the mention of the dead themselves in this manner.

As regards our acts, these here have received all the honours due to them; and after receiving them, are now proceeding on their fated road, having been sent onward by the state in

[27] To this passage is to be traced the notion of Synesius, that the funeral oration put into the mouth of Pericles by Thucydides, ii. 35, was the production of Aspasia.

[28] On this use of ἐκφέρειν, see Fischer on Xenophon K. Π., vi. 1, 5, τοῦτο ἐτόλμησε ἐξενεγκεῖν. The Latin word is "efferre." Cicero de Orator. § 24, "Petamque a vobis ne has meas ineptias efferatis." There is an allusion here to the secrets of the Mysteries. See Lucian in Νεκυομαντ. § 2.

[29] This is said because Socrates feigned himself to be unable to resist the charms of beauty in young persons. Compare Meno, § 9.

[30] On the dancing of Socrates see Lucian Περὶ Ὀρχησ. § 25, and Xenophon, M. S., quoted by Athenæus i. p. 21.

[31] This formula is found in Aristoph. Thesm. 472, and in Plato, Parmen. p. 137, A.

thing that brings forth, possesses food fitted for that which it may bring forth; by which fact is clearly shown what woman is really the mother, and who is not, but merely a supposititious one, should she not possess the fountain[41] of nourishment for the child. This very sufficient proof does our land and mother afford of her having produced men; for at that time she alone and first brought forth the corn of wheat and barley,[42] as the food of man, and by which the human race is nourished in the best and easiest[43] manner, as having in reality produced that very animal. And such proofs it is fitting to receive rather in favour of the earth than of the woman. For the earth did not in conceiving and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated the earth; neither did this land enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. In the next place, she sent up for her offspring the olive, an assistance in toil;[44] and after she had nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods[45] for their rulers and teachers, whose names it is fitting upon such an occasion[46] to omit. For we know who have given the materials for life, by teaching us first[47] the arts requisite for our daily subsistence, and instructed us in the acquirement and the use of arms for the protection of our country.

[8.] Thus born, and educated, lived the ancestors of these persons, after having framed a polity, which it is well to bring in a few words to your recollection. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of good men, and the contrary of bad. It is necessary then to show, that our ancestors were brought up under a good polity, through which both they became good, and those also who are now; amongst whom

[41] This expression Plato adopted perhaps from *πηγὰς—μόσχων* in Eurip. Iph. T. 162.

[42] This story is repeated by Lucretius, vi. 1.

[43] To avoid perhaps an hendyadis, Ficinus has "commodissime." Plato wrote, I suspect, *κάλλιστα καὶ ῥᾷστα*, not *καὶ ἄριστα*—

[44] So in Protag. p. 334, B., *τὸ ἔλαιον—σώματι ἀρωγόν.*

[45] The gods alluded to are Athéné, Ares, and Hephæstos, as shown by Legg. p. 920, D.

[46] During a funeral; as is shown by Demosthenes in Timocrat, *τῆς δὲ (Σεμέλης) υἱὸν ὄντα οὐ πρέπον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου ὀνομάζειν.*

[47] The word *πρώτους*, which is an evident corruption, is omitted by Ficinus.

the dead here happen to be a part. The same polity was then, as it now is, an aristocracy; under which we still live as citizens, and for the most part (have done so) from that time to this. One person calls it a democracy, another by another name, such as he pleases. But it is in truth [48] a government by the best, combined with a good opinion of the people.[48] For kings have ever existed with us, at one time hereditary, at another elected,[49] but the people possessing for the most part the power of the state, has delegated the offices and government to those, who were successively deemed to be the best; and no man has ever been excluded from the want of influence or wealth,[50] or his ignorance of his parentage,[51] nor held in honour for the contrary qualities, as is done in other cities; but there was only one limitation; that he, who was deemed to be wise and good, should possess the power and office. Now the cause of this polity is the equality of birth. For other states are made up of men of every country, and of unequal conditions; so that their polities, as well tyrannies as oligarchies, are of unequal character. They therefore live, some considering each other as slaves, and some as masters. But we and ours, born all brethren, from one mother, consider ourselves neither the slaves nor the lords of each other; but that the equality of our births, according to nature, compel us to seek an equality of government, according to law, and to yield to each other upon no other ground, except the reputation of valour and of mind. [9.] Hence it is that the fathers of these men, and ours also, and themselves too, being thus nurtured in all freedom, and nobly born, have exhibited before all men many and glorious deeds, both in private and public, deeming it their duty to fight for freedom and in behalf of Greeks even against Greeks, and against

[48]—[48] Such seems to be the meaning of the words *μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους, ἀριστοκρατία.* Compare Thucyd. ii. 65, *ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μεν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου* (or rather *ἀρίστου*) *ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή*: and Aristotle Polit. iii. 3, *εἴ τίς ἐστιν, ἣν καλοῦμεν ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἐν ᾗ κατ'ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν.*

[49] This alludes to the second Archon, called Βασιλεὺς, "king."

[50] The same fact is mentioned by Thucyd. ii. 37. According to Plutarch, Aristides was the person, who got a law passed to enable the Archons to be selected from the poorer people, as well as the richer.

[51] To such ignorance Juvenal alludes—"Vos humiles, inquis, vulgi pars ultima nostri, Quorum nemo queat patriam monstrare parentis."

thing that brings forth, possesses food fitted for that which it may bring forth; by which fact is clearly shown what woman is really the mother, and who is not, but merely a supposititious one, should she not possess the fountain[41] of nourishment for the child. This very sufficient proof does our land and mother afford of her having produced men; for at that time she alone and first brought forth the corn of wheat and barley,[42] as the food of man, and by which the human race is nourished in the best and easiest[43] manner, as having in reality produced that very animal. And such proofs it is fitting to receive rather in favour of the earth than of the woman. For the earth did not in conceiving and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated the earth; neither did this land enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. In the next place, she sent up for her offspring the olive, an assistance in toil;[44] and after she had nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods[45] for their rulers and teachers, whose names it is fitting upon such an occasion[46] to omit. For we know who have given the materials for life, by teaching us first[47] the arts requisite for our daily subsistence, and instructed us in the acquirement and the use of arms for the protection of our country.

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[46] During a funeral; as is shown by Demosthenes in Timocrat, *τῆς δὲ (Σεμέλης) υἱὸν ὄντα οὐ πρέπον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ τάφου ὀνομάζειν.*

[47] The word *πρώτους*, which is an evident corruption, is omitted by Ficinus.

the dead here happen to be a part. The same polity was then, as it now is, an aristocracy; under which we still live as citizens, and for the most part (have done so) from that time to this. One person calls it a democracy, another by another name, such as he pleases. But it is in truth [48] a government by the best, combined with a good opinion of the people.[48] For kings have ever existed with us, at one time hereditary, at another elected,[49] but the people possessing for the most part the power of the state, has delegated the offices and government to those, who were successively deemed to be the best; and no man has ever been excluded from the want of influence or wealth,[50] or his ignorance of his parentage,[51] nor held in honour for the contrary qualities, as is done in other cities; but there was only one limitation; that he, who was deemed to be wise and good, should possess the power and office. Now the cause of this polity is the equality of birth. For other states are made up of men of every country, and of unequal conditions; so that their polities, as well tyrannies as oligarchies, are of unequal character. They therefore live, some considering each other as slaves, and some as masters. But we and ours, born all brethren, from one mother, consider ourselves neither the slaves nor the lords of each other; but that the equality of our births, according to nature, compel us to seek an equality of government, according to law, and to yield to each other upon no other ground, except the reputation of valour and of mind. [9.] Hence it is that the fathers of these men, and ours also, and themselves too, being thus nurtured in all freedom, and nobly born, have exhibited before all men many and glorious deeds, both in private and public, deeming it their duty to fight for freedom and in behalf of Greeks even against Greeks, and against

[48]—[48] Such seems to be the meaning of the words *μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους, ἀριστοκρατία.* Compare Thucyd. ii. 65, *ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μεν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου* (or rather *ἀρίστου*) *ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή*: and Aristotle Polit. iii. 3, *εἴ τίς ἐστιν, ἣν καλοῦμεν ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἐν ᾗ κατ'ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν.*

[49] This alludes to the second Archon, called Βασιλεὺς, "king."

[50] The same fact is mentioned by Thucyd. ii. 37. According to Plutarch, Aristides was the person, who got a law passed to enable the Archons to be selected from the poorer people, as well as the richer.

[51] To such ignorance Juvenal alludes—"Vos humiles, inquis, vulgi pars ultima nostri, Quorum nemo queat patriam monstrare parentis."

barbarians in defence of Greeks combined. But how when Eumolpus and the Amazons[52] brought an army against the country, and enemies even still before them, they defended themselves, and how they defended the Argives against the Cadmeans,[53] and the Heracleidæ against the Argives,[54] the time is too short to relate worthily; and poets too have already hymned sufficiently their valour in verse, and pointed it out to all; and should we now attempt to adorn the same subject in a prose discourse, we should perhaps appear to be only second to them. For such reasons then it seems right to pass over these matters, especially since they have received their due. But such acts, as no poet has yet thrown round[55] them a renown suited to their worth, and which are still in remembrance, all these it seems I ought by praising to call to mind, and by introducing them to others make them a subject for songs and other kind of poetry in a manner becoming the actors. Now of those to which I am alluding, the chief are these. When the Persians were taking the lead in Asia and attempting to enslave Europe, the children of this soil and our forefathers arrested their course; whom it is both just and necessary to remember first and to praise their valour. He however who would praise it properly, ought to have been born in word,[56] and lived an eye-witness at that very period,

[52] Valckenaer on Eurip. Phœn. 541, observes that Plato has been here guilty of an anachronism. For the Amazons invaded Attica not in the time of Eumolpus, but of Theseus, by whom they were conquered; whereas it was against Eu[illegible]eus that Eumolpus was engaged in war, as stated by Thucydides, ii. 15. Isocrates has taken especial care to avoid the anachronism in Panegyr. § 19, Ἦλθον εἰς τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν Θρᾶκες μὲν μετ' Εὐμόλπου τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος, Σκύθαι δὲ μετ' Ἀμαζόνων, τῶν Ἄρεως θυγατέρων, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον: who has however in § 18 alluded to the story of the Amazons, which Strabo, in xi. p. 770, considers to be merely a fable.

[53] The story alluded to is told briefly by Herodotus, ix. 27, and by Isocrates, in Panegyr. § 15, and rather differently in Panathen. p. 524. For the length of time doubtless made it difficult to arrive at the truth.

[54] On this story see the Heracleidæ of Euripides.

[55] The Greek is λαβὼν: which I altered many years ago into βαλων. —For the poet does not "receive," but "confer" glory, as shown by "Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori." And though one would expect περιβαλὼν, as in Isocrat. Archidam. § 44, αἰσχύναις ἡμᾶς περιβαλεῖν, yet the preposition is omitted in λύπην—βαλεῖς in Soph. Phil. 67, and βαλεῖς χαρὰν in Eurip. Ion, 751.

[56] In lieu of λόγῳ, omitted by Ficinus, Stephens suggested λέγω, with which may be compared φημὶ in § 10, and λέγω in § 12.

when the whole of Asia was subject to its then third monarch. The first of these was Cyrus; who after effecting the freedom of the Persians, his countrymen, did through his high spirit reduce the Medes his (former) masters to slavery, and became the ruler of the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son (Cambyses) subdued Egypt, and as much of Libya as it was possible to march against. The third, Darius, made Scythia the boundary of his empire by land, and by his fleet commanded the sea and islands, so that no one presumed to be his opponent. The very thoughts of all men were enslaved; so many, and great, and warlike nations did the Persian power reduce to subjection.

[10.] Now Darius having accused us and the Eretrians of plotting against Sardis,[57] made it a pretence for sending an army of five hundred thousand men[58] [59] in ships and transports, and a fleet[59] of three hundred sail, and ordered Datis, their commander, to return and bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive, if he wished to keep his own head on. Datis sailing to Eretria against a people, who amongst the Greeks of that time were in the highest repute for the affairs of war, and not few in number, got these very men into his power in three days;[60] and that none might escape, he searched through the whole country after this fashion. His troops having marched to the boundaries of Eretria, and extending themselves from sea to sea, they joined their hands, and thus went through the country, that they might be able to say to the king, that not a person had escaped. With the same design they sailed down from Eretria to Marathon, as being an easy thing for them to unite in the same fate the Athenians with the Eretrians, and to carry them off. During these transactions, some of which were done and others attempted, none of the Greeks gave any assistance to the Eretrians; nor, except the Lacedæmonians, to the Athenians; and they did not arrive till the day after the battle.[61] All the rest, struck with terror, and

[57] See Herodotus, v. 101.

[58] Cornelius Nepos says there were only 200,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Pausanias and Valerius Max. 300,000 foot.

[59]—[59] This repetition of ἔν τε πλοίοις καὶ ναυσὶ, ναῦς δὲ τριακοσίας, does not look like Plato's style; to say nothing of πλοῖα in the sense of "transports." The passage is evidently corrupt.

[60] Herodotus, in vi. 101, says in seven days.

[61] For according to Herodotus, in vi. 106, they were detained at home

contented with their present safety, kept themselves quiet. Now a person living at that period would have known what men of valour they were, who at Marathon sustained the strength of the Barbarians and punished the pride of all Asia, and first erected trophies over the Barbarians, and became the leaders and teachers to the rest (of Greeks),[62] that the power of Persia was not invincible, and that all wealth and all numbers must yield to valour. I say then that these men were the fathers, not only of our bodies, but of the liberty likewise of ourselves and of all together on this continent.[63] For by looking upon that exploit did the Greeks dare to hazard subsequent battles for their own preservation, and to become the pupils of those at Marathon. [11.] To these, then, must we in reason assign the first honours; and the second to those, who fought and conquered in the sea-fights at Salamis and Artemisium. Now of the deeds of those men, one would have much to tell, both as to what masses of troops, advancing by sea and land, they stood up against, and how they repelled them. But that, which seems to me to be their noblest act, I will bring to your recollection; because they worked out the deeds that followed upon those of Marathon. For they at Marathon only proved thus much to the Greeks, that it was possible for a few of them to repel many of the Barbarians; but by sea it was still uncertain. For the Persians had the reputation of being invincible at sea, through their superiority in numbers, and wealth, and skill, and strength. Truly then was this deed worthy of praise on the part of those men, who then fought at sea; inasmuch as they dispelled the dread, by which the Greeks had been fast bound, and caused them no longer to fear a multitude of ships and men; and it resulted from those, who fought at Marathon and Salamis, that the other Greeks were taught; and by learning from one party on land, and from the other at sea, they became accustomed to feel no fear of the Barbarians. The action at Platæa was the third, I assert, in number and in valour, that took place

by a sacred festival; while the Scholiast says here that they were prevented from marching, because the moon was not at the full.

[62] In lieu of *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, the train of ideas evidently leads to *τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι*, as just afterwards *τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας*.

[63] By "this continent" is meant Greece. Without the deictic article it would have meant Asia.

(for)[64] the safety of Greece; in which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had a common share. Now this the greatest and most difficult exploit did they all assist;[65] and for this their valour they are both now celebrated by us, and will be by those hereafter in the time to come. Subsequent to this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian; and the king himself was reported to have a design of making an attempt once more upon the Greeks.

[12.] It is just then for us to bear in remembrance those, who to the exploits of their forefathers put the finish in our deliverance, by clearing themselves from, and driving away, the whole Barbarian power from the sea. Now these were they, who fought in the naval battle at Eurymedon,[66] and they, who were in the expedition to Cyprus,[67] and who sailed to Egypt,[68] and to many other places. Of these we ought to have a recollection, and to acknowledge our thanks to them; because they caused the king[69] to fear for, and to attend to, his own safety, and not to be plotting for the destruction of the Greeks. Now (the whole of)[70] this war was endured to the end[71] by the whole power of the state in behalf of ourselves and others, speaking a common language, in opposition to the Barbarians. But when peace[72] was made, and the city held in honour, there fell, as is wont, upon the successful, first rivalry from men, and after rivalry envy, which placed

[64] As there is nothing on which *τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας* can depend, Ficinus seems to have introduced "causam" after "salutis Græciæ" out of his own head; unless he found in his MS. *πέρι* after *σωτηρίας*.

[65] The Greek is *ἤμυναν*, to which Gottleber was the first to object, and in lieu of it he suggested *ἤνυσαν*, what Stalbaum feels half disposed to adopt. Bekker has edited *ἠμύναντο*, found in five MSS. Perhaps Plato wrote *ὑπέμειναν*, i. e. "endure."

[66] This took place in Ol. lxxviii. 3, B. C. 466. Thucydides, in i. 100, says that the Athenians took thirty triremes, and destroyed in all about two hundred vessels.

[67, 68] On these combined expeditions, see Thucyd. i. 94 and 104, and Diodor. Sic. xi. p. 459, ed. Wess.

[69] "The king" of Persia.

[70] Before *πάσῃ*, Stalbaum ingeniously conjectures that *πᾶς* has dropt out.

[71] With *διηντλήθη ὁ πόλεμος* compare "bella exhausta" in Virgil.

[72] This is generally supposed to be the peace made by Cimon with the Persians, to which there is an allusion in Isocrates, Aristides, and Plutarch. Some, however, of the scholars of Germany have asserted that no such peace was ever made.

this city, although unwilling, in a state of hostility with the Greeks. [13.] Hereupon a war breaking out, the Athenians came in collision with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, and fought in defence of the liberties of Bœotia; and as the battle was undecisive,[72] the action afterwards[73] brought matters to a decided issue. For some went away, leaving the Bœotians,[74] whom they had been assisting; while our troops, after obtaining a victory, on the third day,[75] at Œnophyta, justly brought back those, who had been unjustly driven out. These then were the first after the Persian war, who, in behalf of liberty, gave their assistance to Greeks against Greeks; and being men of bravery, they freed those whom they were assisting; and, held in honour by the state, were buried in this cemetery here the first. After this, a great war arose, and all the Greeks brought an army against us, ravaged our country, and unworthily repaid the obligation they owed to the state. But our troops, after defeating them in a sea-fight, and taking the Lacedæmonian[76] leaders prisoners in the island of Sphagia,[77] did, when it was in their power to destroy, spare and give them up, and made a peace, conceiving that in a war with a fellow-tribe[78] one ought to carry on the contest only to the point of victory, and not, through the resentment of a particular state, to destroy the common interest of Greece; but against the Barbarians to war even to utter destruction. Fitting then is it to praise such men, who after being engaged in that war, now lie buried here; because they showed that,

[72] Thucydides says, in i. 108, that the victory was on the side of the Lacedæmonians.

[73] This alludes to the battle of Œnophyta, where the Athenians gained the day.

[74] Bekker would expunge Βοιωτοὺς entirely. For the Lacedæmonians assisted the Thebans, and not the Bœotians.

[75] According to Thucydides, it was the sixty-second day. Hence in lieu of τρίτῃ, Clinton, in Fast. Hellenic. p. 256, proposed to read τρίτῃ ξ', i. e. "sixty-third."

[76] As not only the leaders of the Lacedæmonians were taken prisoners, but their whole army likewise, Stalbaum says we must either read with two MSS. ἡγεμόνας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους or ἡγεμόνας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους—

[77] This island near Pylus is more commonly called Σφακτηρίᾳ—and so read seven MSS. at least.

[78] How the Athenians and Lacedæmonians could be called τὸ ὁμόφυλον, I cannot understand. The sense requires rather τὸ ὁμόφωνον—as in § 12.

if any one doubted whether in the former war against the Barbarians some others were (or not) superior to the Athenians, he doubted without reason. For they there proved, when Greece was in a state of dissension, their superiority in war, by their getting into their hands even those, who had stood forward in defence of the other Greeks, and by defeating single-handed those, with whom formerly they had conjointly overcome the Barbarians. [14.] After this peace,[79] there was a third war, unexpected and terrible, in which many brave men fell, who lie buried here; and many too about Sicily, after they had erected very many [80] trophies in behalf of the liberty of the Leontines, to assist whom in accordance with their oaths[81] they sailed to those regions; but when, through the length of the voyage, the state was in difficulties, and unable to minister to their wants, their hearts failed them, and they were unsuccessful; [82] of whose temperate conduct and valour their enemies and antagonists have poured forth greater praise than have friends on the conduct of the others.[82] Many likewise (fell) in the Hellespont,[83] after having taken all the ships of the enemy in one day, and gaining many other

[79] This peace of one year is mentioned by Thucyd. iv. 117.

[80] These, says Stalbaum, were the victories at Myle and Syracuse, mentioned by Thucydides and Diodorus. But they were too few in number to be called *πλεῖστα*. I suspect however that Plato wrote *κάλλιστα*—For though not many, they were still most honourable.

[81] This refers to the fact stated by Thucyd. in iii. 86, and vi. 19.

[82]—[82] Loers and Stalbaum agree in rejecting all the words between the numerals as an interpolation. I trust however I restored the author to himself, in my edition of the Greek text, by simply altering *ἔχουσι* into *χέουσι*—where *χέειν* is applied to praise, as "fundere" is to "laudes" by Lucretius. The origin of the metaphor is to be traced to Homer; who has in Οδ. Λ. 432, *αἶσχος ἔχευε*: in Οδ. Ξ. 38, *ἐλεγχείην κατέχευας*: in Οδ. Χ. 469, *κατ' ὀνείδεα χεῦαν*. So too Æschylus—*εὐκταῖα χεούσας* in Suppl. 631, and *Εὐοδίαν—χέομεν* in Glauc. Fr. Pindar likewise in Pyth. x 86, *ὄπα—προχεόντων*: in Isthm. viii. 128, *Θρῆνον—ἔχευαν*, after the Homeric *χέει πολύγηρυν ἀοιδήν*: from whence Fritzsche has happily corrected *ἰὰν χέων* for *ἰακχέων* in Œd. T. 1222. With regard to the sentiment, compare Suidas in Κράτερος—Κράτιστος δ' ἄρ' οὗτος, *ὅτου τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τῷ ἐπαίνῳ συμφωνούσης ἔχει*. With respect to *τοῖς ἄλλοις*, the allusion is to the Lacedæmonians, who had assisted the Syracusans, but had probably given offence by the austerity of their manners to the more luxurious inhabitants of Sicily.

[83] Engelhardt refers this to the naval engagement at Cyzicum, (B. C. 410,) mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. i. 1, 18.

victories. But what I said as to the terrible and unexpected nature of the war, by that I mean, that the other Greeks carried to such an extent their feeling of animosity to this state, as to dare to make overtures by an embassy to the king of Persia,[84] their greatest foe, and to bring in again for their particular interests that person against the Greeks, whom they had, in common with us, driven out, and to collect an allied army of all[85] the Greeks and Barbarians against this city. Upon which occasion the strength and valour of the state became very conspicuous. For when our enemies fancied it to be already beaten down in war, and had intercepted[86] our ships at Mitylene, then did these men, confessedly the bravest, go in person on board the vessels, and giving assistance with sixty sail, gained a victory[87] over the enemy, and delivered their own friends; but meeting with unmerited misfortune in not having their bodies picked up at sea,[88] [89] they lie where they ought not.[89] These it is our duty ever to remember and to praise. For by their valour we were victorious, not in that engagement only, but through the rest of the war; for through them the state gained the reputation, that it would not be beaten down in war,[90] not even by all men (combined).

[84] This was Darius Nothus; whose name is not mentioned by Thucydides in viii. 18, where the terms of the alliance are given.

[85] As the Athenians were themselves Greeks, the word *πάντας* would include them too amongst the others. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἐπιόντας*—For it was not sufficient merely to collect an army; but it should be stated likewise that the troops marched against the city; and it was to fill up this idea that Ficinus translated "ad hanc urbem obsidendam colligere."

[86] By the Spartan admiral Callicratidas. See Xenophon Hellen. i 6, 24.

[87] This was gained B. C. 406, near Arginusæ, a small island between Lesbos and the continent. Above seventy triremes were taken or destroyed, and of the ten Lacedæmonian vessels only one escaped.

[88] As the bodies were not recovered, they were left without the rites of burial, which the Greeks held to be a great misfortune; and hence, for their neglect, the Athenian commanders were tried, and six of them executed.

[89]—[89] The Greek is *κεῖνται ἐνθάδε*. But as the bodies were not picked up at all, they could not be lying at Athens. Hence Wesseling wished to read *οὐ κεῖνται ἐνθάδε*: in lieu of which I suggested, sixteen years ago, *κεῖνται, ἔνθ' οὐ δεῖ*, as I have translated. To meet the difficulty, Stalbaum considers the words *οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντες ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης* an interpolation.

[90] This could hardly be said with truth in the face of the victory gained by

And the reputation was founded in truth. We have been beaten by our dissensions, not by others. By them at least we are even now unsubdued. But we have subdued ourselves, and (in turn) have been subdued. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and peace made[91] with all the others, a domestic war[92] was carried on in such a manner, that were it fated for men to fall into dissensions, every person would pray that his country might be no otherwise in disorder. For how delightedly and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks, with how much moderation[93] did they lay aside their hostility against those at Eleusis! And for all these acts there was no other cause than their real consanguinity, producing a firm friendship and clanship, not in words, but deeds.

[15.] It is meet then to hold in remembrance those too who died in that war by each other's hands, and to reconcile them, as we best can, by offering prayers and sacrifices on these occasions to the deities,[94] who now have them in their power, forasmuch as we ourselves are also reconciled. For not through malice and hatred did they lay hands upon each other, but through their evil fortune. And of these facts we are ourselves the living witnesses; for, being of the same family with them, we have forgiven each other for what we have done and suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, pardoning the Barbarians, who, having been ill enough[95] treated by this state,

Lysander at Ægos-Potamos; and which led to the occupation of Athens itself by the successful Spartan commander—events on which Plato has very cleverly said nothing.

[91] This alludes to the peace made with Lysander, by which the Athenians were forced to destroy the long walls that united the city with the sea.

[92] This refers to the period, when Thrasybulus acted against the thirty so-called tyrants, appointed by Lysander to govern the city.

[93] Of the moderation shown by the people towards the partisans of the thirty tyrants who had retired to Eleusis, Cornel. Nep. in Thrasybul. § 2, gives a remarkable proof, by stating that when the peace was made, it was agreed that no one but the thirty tyrants should suffer in person or in purse.

[94] The deities were the powers below. Compare Eurip. Alc 257.

[95] Bekker would omit *ἱκανῶς* after *κακῶς*. But Engelhardt, with whom Stalbaum agrees, defends it, as being balanced by *οὐκ ενδεῶς*.

defended themselves not insufficiently; but she felt a resentment against the Greeks, when she remembered what a return they had made, after they had been well treated by her, by uniting with the Barbarians, and depriving us of the very fleet, which had formerly saved them, and by pulling down our walls, by which[96] we had prevented their own from falling. The city then having determined not to assist Greeks, enslaved by each other or the Barbarians, remained thus.[97] While then we were in this mood, the Lacedæmonians, fancying that we, the aiders of freedom, were fallen, and that now was the time for them to enslave the rest, attempted to do so. [16.] But what need is there to be prolix? For I should speak of subsequent events that are not of old date, [98]nor before the time of many men still living.[98] For we know that, to obtain the aid of this city, there came terror-struck the leading men amongst the Greeks, Argives, and Bœotians, and Corinthians; and, what was the greatest miracle[99] of all, how even the king came into such a difficulty, as to think there was no safety from any other quarter than from this very city, which he had [100]previously, with great eagerness,[100] attempted to destroy. And indeed, should any one wish to accuse the state on just grounds, he would rightly accuse her by stating this alone; that she is ever too full of pity, and the hand-maid of the weaker party. For at that very time she was not able to be firm, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those, when in the act of being enslaved, who had injured her own citizens:[1] but she was bent from her purpose, and did give assist-

[96] In lieu of *ἀνθ' ὧν* Ficinus found in his MS. *ὑφ' ὧν*, as shown by his "quibus." Boissonade however, on Nicetas, p. 322, defends *ἀνθ' ὧν*, and says it is put for *ἀνθ' οὗ*.

[97] Instead of *οὕτως*, I have suggested *αὖτως*, "at leisure." Compare Hom. Il. A. 133, *αὐτὰρ ἔμ' αὖτως Ἥσθαι δευόμενον*.

[98]—[98] The MSS. vary between *οὐδὲ πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν* and *οὐδὲ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων*. Heindorf on Gorg. p. 448, A. § 3, suggested *οὐδὲ πολλῶν ἄνω γενεῶν*. Bekker, *οὐδ' ἐπ' ἄλλων*—By uniting the readings of the MSS., I elicited, sixteen years ago, *οὐδὲ πρὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔτι ὄντων*, as I have translated.

[99] This is the best rendering of *θεῖον*, by which was meant a thing sent by a divine power, or was the work of one.

[100]—[100] In lieu of *προθύμως*, Stalbaum has adopted *πρόσθεν* from two MSS. Plato probably wrote both, as I have translated.

[1] The pronouns *σφᾶς αὐτοὺς* are to be referred to *πολίτας*, which is to be obtained from *πόλις*

ance; and by such aid so delivered them from slavery, that they were free men, until they again made themselves slaves. She did not however dare to assist the king, through a feeling of reverence for the trophies of Marathon, and Salamis, and Platæa; but, by permitting merely the exiles[2] and volunteers to assist, she did confessedly preserve him; and after building her walls and fleets, and undertaking a war, when compelled to do so, she carried on hostilities with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the people of Paros.[3]

[17.] The king however being afraid of the city, when he saw the Lacedæmonians declining a war by sea, and desirous to withdraw himself, made a demand[4] for the Greek colonists on the continent, whom the Lacedæmonians had previously consented to give up,[5] if he were to join with us and our allies in war; conceiving that, as we should not comply with it, there would be a pretence for withdrawing himself. In the case of the other allies he was deceived; for the Corinthians, and Argives, and Bœotians, were willing to give them up,[6] and entered into a treaty, and confirmed it by oaths, [7][to give up the Greeks on the continent,][7] if he would furnish the money supplies. But we alone did not dare to give them up, nor to be a party to the oaths. To such an extent was carried the noble and liberal conduct of the state, at once solid and

[2] This alludes to Conon, who, after the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Ægos-Potamos, fled to Euagoras, the ruler of Salamis in Cyprus; by whom other exiles from Greece and Athens especially were favourably received, as we learn from Isocrates in Euag. p. 302.

[3] Of the war undertaken by the Athenians in defence of the Parians nothing is told elsewhere. Krüeger, in Histor. Philolog. Studien. p. 225, would read Ῥοδίων, referring to Xenophon Hellen. iv. 8, 20—25, and Diodor. xiv. 94—97. Bentham thinks the allusion is to a naval victory, gained by Chabrias over the Lacedæmonians between Naxos and Paros, as mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. v., and Diodorus, xv.

[4] See Thucyd. viii. 56.

[5] This was actually done subsequently at the peace of Antalcidas. See Xenophon Hellen. v. 1. But the chronological order of events which Plato has generally followed; makes such an allusion to be here out of place.

[6] Schoenborn conceives that Plato alludes to the bribery, of which the Corinthians, Argives, and Bœotians were guilty, when, as stated by Xenophon in Hellen. iii. 5, Timocrates the Rhodian was sent by Tithraustes to purchase a confederacy against the Lacedæmonians; in which the Athenians joined indeed, but with clean hands.

[7]—[7] The words within brackets are evidently superfluous.

sound, and naturally a hater of Barbarians, through our being of pure Greek blood, with no mixture of Barbarian. For neither the [8] Pelopses, Cadmuses, Ægyptuses, Danauses,[8] and many others, Barbarians by birth, but Greeks by law, are dwelling with us; but we are very Greeks; not a mixed Barbarian breed; and hence the genuine hatred of a foreign nature has been instilled into the state. Designedly,[9] then, we were again[10] left alone, from our unwillingness to do a deed disgraceful and unholy by giving up Greeks to Barbarians. Returning then to the same condition as when we were formerly beaten down in war, we did, with a god's assistance, lay down hostilities more successfully than at that period. For we were freed from it, possessing ships, and walls, and our own colonies; and so too,[11] contentedly, were our enemies freed from it. We lost, however, in this war some brave men, who met with a difficult country[12] in Corinth, and with treachery at Lechæum. Brave, too, were those, who freed the king, and drove the Lacedæmonians from the sea.[13] These are the men I am bringing to your recollection; and such as these it becomes all of you to join in praising and investing with honours.

[18.] Such were the exploits of the men who lie buried here, and of the rest, who have died for the state. But though many and honourable are the deeds already related, still many more and more honourable are those, that have been left (untold); for many days and nights would not suffice[14] for him,

[8]—[8] On the use of these plural proper names Loers quotes Theæt. p. 169, B., Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες. Add Phædr. p. 229, D., Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων. Lucian, in Micyll., Κέκροπας—ἢ Σισύφους ἢ Τηλέφους. So Shakspeare, "I think there be six Richmonds in the field:" and Milton, "Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimeras dire."

[9] In lieu of ὅμως, which I cannot understand, Plato wrote, I suspect, as I have here translated, ἐννόως.

[10] It is not easy to state what was the previous occasion.

[11] Instead of οὕτως, the sense requires, as I have translated, ὡσαύτως.

[12] This difficulty of the country may be inferred from Xenophon, in Hellen. iv. 4, who states, moreover, that by the treachery of Pasimeles and Alcamenes, Praxilas was admitted into Lechæum, a harbour in the bay of Corinth.

[13] These were the troops, military and naval, under Conon, as shown by Xenophon in Hellen. iv. 8.

[14] So Cicero, "Dies me deficiat, si, quæ dici possint, coner exprimere." Athen. xi. p. 506, ἐπιλίποι μ' ἂν ἡμέρα, quoted by Gottleber; who might have added Hom. Od. Λ. 327, Πάσας δ' οὐκ ἄρ' ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι— Πρὶν γάρ κεν καὶ νὺξ φθεῖτ' ἄμβροτος.

who should go through them all. It is the duty then of every man to bear those deeds in mind; and, as in battle, to exhort the offspring of such men not to leave the ranks[15] of their ancestors, nor, yielding to cowardice, to retire rearwards. And I do myself both now exhort you, the children of brave men, and shall hereafter, wherever I may meet with any of you, remind and exhort you to be ever ready to be the bravest of men. But for the present, I feel justified in telling you what the fathers of these men enjoined me to proclaim to their survivors, if they themselves suffered aught, when they had determined to encounter danger. I will tell you then what I heard[16] from them, and what, if they possessed the power, they would now gladly say to you themselves, as I conjecture from what they said then. Imagine, then, you hear them speaking what I now relate as their messenger. These were their words.

[19.] O children! that ye are indeed the offspring of courageous fathers the present deed itself declares. For when it was in our power to live with dishonour, we chose to die with honour, rather than bring you and those after you into disgrace, and shame our own fathers and all our ancestors,[17] conceiving that to him, who dishonours his family, life is no life; and that to such a fellow there is no man or god upon earth a friend, while (living),[18] nor under it, when dead. It behoves you then to keep these our words in remembrance; and if you practise any thing else, to practise it with valour, well knowing that, deficient in this, all other possessions and pursuits are base and wrong. For neither does wealth bring honour[19] to him, who possesses it with a want of manliness, since such a one is rich for another and not for himself; nor do beauty and strength of body, when they dwell with the coward and the knave, appear becoming, but unbecoming

[15] Compare Herodot. vii. 10; ix. 48, Thucyd. ii. 87, and Demosth. Ol. iii.

[16] As Plato does not state when, where, or how he heard the subsequent speech of the dead, there is probably some error in ἐκείνων.

[17] There is a similar sentiment in Homer, Ιλ. Ζ. 209, Μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχύνεμεν.

[18] To preserve the balance of the sentence, ὄντι must be inserted between οὔτε and ἐπὶ—

[19] So I have translated to prevent the repetition of καλλος. For Plato wrote, I suspect, πλοῦτος καλὸν φέρει τι—

(rather), and make the possessor more conspicuous, and show off his cowardice. Moreover, all knowledge, when separated from justice and the other (parts) of virtue, appears to be knavery[20] and not wisdom. On this account then endeavour to have, as the first and last aim, through all time and by all means, every readiness to surpass to the utmost ourselves and ancestors in glory. For if not, rest assured that, should we conquer you in valour, the victory brings disgrace upon us; but defeat, if we are defeated, a state of blessedness. Now we shall be vanquished the most, and you obtain the victory, if you prepare yourselves not to abuse the glory of your ancestors, nor to expend it wastefully; being convinced that, for a person who thinks himself to be something, there is nothing more disgraceful, than to exhibit himself as held in honour, not on his own account, but the renown of his forefathers.[21] For hereditary honour[22] is to descendants a treasure honourable and magnificent. But to use up the treasure of riches and renown, and from the want of one's own wealth and good repute, [23]not to hand it down to posterity is an act both disgraceful and unmanly.[23] Should you then pursue these objects, you will come to us as friends to friends, whenever your destined fate shall bring you below; but if you disregard them and become debased, not one of us will receive you kindly. Thus much let it be told to our children. [20.] But our fathers and mothers, that are surviving,[24] it is very meet to soothe into the supporting as easily as possible their calamity, should any such happen to arise, and not to lament with them—for they do not need any thing to pain them—for their present misfortune is sufficient to produce

[20] So Cicero, Offic. i. 19, "Scientia, quæ est remota a justitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda."

[21] Instead of *προγόνων*, two MSS. and ed. Bas. 2, offer *προτέρων*; answering to "superiorum" in Ficinus. Perhaps Plato wrote *ἑτέρων*, as opposed to *ἑαυτὸν*—So Juvenal in vii. 70, "miserum est aliorum incumbere famæ."

[22] Cicero Offic. i. 23, "Optima hæreditas a patribus traditur liberis—gloria virtutis."

[23]—[23] A similar sentiment is to be found in Thucyd. i. 71, ii. 62, and Arist. Polit. v. 11.

[24] Instead of *οἷς εἰσὶ*, where there is no syntax, one MS. has **οἷοι εἰσὶ**, which leads to *ὅσοι σῶοί εἰσι*—

that—but to heal and mitigate their sorrow, by reminding them, that the gods have hearkened to what they especially prayed for. [25] Since they did not pray for their children to be immortal, but to be brave and renowned,[25] both of which, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained; although it is not easy for every thing to turn out in the case of a mortal in this life according to his wishes. By bearing too their misfortunes like men, they will be thought to be in reality the parents of manly children, and to be such themselves; whereas by giving way they will raise a suspicion that they are none of ours, or that the persons who praise us are telling an untruth; neither of which things ought to be; but they ought rather to be themselves our eulogizers, exhibiting by their acts [26] themselves as seeming to be in reality [26] the fathers, men of men.[27] For the old proverb, "Nothing too much," [28] seems to be well said; and in fact is well said. [29] For by what person so ever all that leads to happiness, or nearly so, is made to depend upon himself, and not upon others, by whose well or ill doing his own acts are compelled to waver, by such a one has the best preparation been made for living (well).[30] This is the man of moderation; [31] this the man of courage and prudence;[31] and this is he, who, whether his property and children exist or are destroyed, will best obey the proverb; for through trusting to himself, he will be seen to indulge neither in joy nor sorrow overmuch.[29] Such men do we hold, and wish, and assert our relatives to be; and such we now exhibit ourselves, by not feeling too much of reluctance, nor

[25]—[25] So Xenophon, on hearing of the death of his son, said, "I have prayed to the gods not for my son to be immortal, but to be brave,"—as we learn from Plutarch. Hence Addison makes Cato say, on a similar occasion, "The gods be thanked; my boy has done his duty."

[26]—[26] The Greek is *αὐτοὺς φαινομένους τῷ ὄντι πατέρας ὄντας*—where Engelhardt alone has seen that *φαινομένους* and *ὄντας* could not be thus united. Plato wrote, I suspect—*αὐτοὺς, οὐ τοὺς φαινομένους, τῷ δὲ ὄντι*—i. e. "themselves not the seeming, but being in reality—" Compare Aristoph. Ach. 416, *Εἶναι μὲν, ὥσπερ εἰμὶ, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή.*

[27] On this collocation of words see Heusde Specim. Crit. p. 129.

[28] The same proverb is alluded to in Charmid. § 27.

[29]—[29] The whole of this passage is translated by Cicero in Tuscul. v. 12, and alluded to in part in Epist. Famil. v. 13.

[30] Between *ζῆν* and *οὕτως* I suspect *εὖ* has dropt.

[31]—[31] To these three virtues Cicero, De Invent. ii. 53, adds justice; and the four together are called the cardinal virtues.

too much of fear, should it be needful to die on the instant.[32] We entreat then both our fathers and mothers to pass the remainder of their lives in adopting the very same sentiment; and to be assured that they will gratify us the most by not lamenting and bewailing us; and that if the dead have any feeling[33] for the living, they will be the least agreeable to us by disfiguring[34] themselves and bearing ill their misfortunes, but that they will please us the most by supporting them lightly and with moderation. For our state is about to have[35] an end, which is the most honourable among men; so that it is becoming rather to glorify than to lament it. By acting then as guardians and nurses to our wives and children, and by turning their minds to such employments, they will in the best way become forgetful of their misfortune, and lead a life more honourable and more correct, and more agreeable to us. Such does it suffice to tell our relatives from us. But we would exhort the state to be the guardian of our parents and children, by giving to the youth of the latter a well-regulated education, and to the old age of the former a worthy support; although we are well assured, that even if we did not so exhort, there would be taken a sufficient care.

[21.] Such then, ye children and parents of the dead, did they enjoin us to tell you; and I have, with the greatest readiness possible, told you their message. And I do myself beseech some of you to imitate your relatives, and others to feel a confidence in yourselves, that we are all, in our private and public capacities, about to support the old age of some, and to be the guardians of others, wherever each one may meet with any of them. And surely ye know yourselves the carefulness

[32] This sentiment is strangely put into the mouth of those already dead. Instead then of εἰ δεῖ τελευτᾶν, one would have expected εἰ δεῖ δὶς τελευτᾶν, "if it were needful to die twice." See myself on Crito, § 6, n. 4, and the Commentators on "bis patiar mori" in Horace.

[33] A similar sentiment is to be found in Isocrates Euagor. p. 368, Plataic. § 24, Lycurgus in Leocrat. § 136, Hyperides, quoted by Stobæus, p. 618, Galen. Protrept. § 7, and Sulpicius in Ciceron. Epist. Famil. iv. 5.

[34] This alludes to the custom of women especially, disfiguring their persons, and beating their breasts, and tearing their hair, under the influence of excessive grief for the death of those dear to them.

[35] The future ἕξει seems strangely said of those, who had arrived already at the end of their life. The sense requires rather ἔχει—

of the state, how that by laying down laws[36] respecting those who have died in war, it takes charge of their parents and children; and how it has been enjoined upon the magistracy, that is the greatest,[37] to watch over them especially, above all the other citizens, so that the fathers and mothers of such may receive no injury; while it brings up together[38] the children, through its great desire that their orphanhood may be as little conspicuous as possible; since it stands in the place of a father to them, while they are still children; and when they come to man's estate, sends them to their own homes,[39] having first dressed them in a complete suit of armour, thus pointing out and reminding them of the pursuits of their fathers, and giving them the instruments of their fathers' valour; and at the same time, by way of a good omen, (bidding them)[40] commence their return to the paternal hearth, about to command[41] with strength, as having been decked in arms. The dead too it never fails to honour, by performing each year the established rites for all in common, which have taken place, as is fitting,[42] individually for each; and in addition to this, by appointing games both gymnastic and equestrian, and of all kinds of poetry; and by standing really in the place of an heir and son to the dead, and in that of a father to children, and in that of a guardian to parents and such-like relatives, it takes upon itself all care of all for all time. Keeping then these things in mind, you ought to bear

[36] According to Aristotle, in Polit. ii. 6, the law at Athens was the imitation of a similar one first introduced at Miletus by Hippodamus.

[37] That is the first Archon, according to Meier, De Lite Attica, p. 44. But Pseud-Ulpian, in Demosthen. Timocrat. p. 445, says it was the third Archon, called Πολέμαρχος.

[38] This was in the Orphan-House, situated in the Acropolis, as may be inferred from the Meno, p. 89, B., *τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν Ἀκροπόλει, ἵνα,—ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι ἐγίγνοντο.* The fact is alluded to in Thucyd. ii. 46, but the place is not mentioned; and so it is in a fragment, probably of Ælian, quoted by Suidas in *Ἀμύνασθαι.*

[39] As the pronoun *σφέτερας* is reflective, it cannot be applied with propriety to the homes of the youths. Æschines, in Ctesiph. § 154, has more correctly *ἀφίησι τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν.*

[40] Ficinus has alone, what the sense requires, "jubet."

[41] I cannot understand *ἄρξοντα.* I could have understood *πράξοντά τι,* "about to do something."

[42] The Greek is *ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ ἴδια·* where Bekker would expunge the second *ἴδια*; which I would alter into *οἷα δεῖ,* as I have translated.

your calamity more lightly; for thus you will be the most dear to the dead and living, and most ready to give and to receive comfort. And now do you and all the rest, having in common, according to custom, wept fully the dead, depart.

[22.] Such, Menexenus, is the speech of Aspasia of Miletus.

Men. By Zeus, Socrates, you proclaim Aspasia to be a happy person, if, being a woman, she is able to compose such speeches as these.

Soc. If you do not credit it, follow me, and you shall hear her speak it herself.

Men. I have often, Socrates, met with her, and know what kind of woman she is.

Soc. What then, do you not admire her, and owe you no thanks to her for this oration?

Men. I owe indeed, Socrates, many thanks either to her or to him, whoever was the person who told it you; and before all others, to him who has now spoken it.

Soc. All will be well; but see that you do not say a word against me, in order that I may hereafter tell you many and beautiful discourses on state affairs.

Men. Be full of confidence. I will say nothing. Do you only tell them.

Soc. So shall it be.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MAJOR.

Of all the dialogues of Plato, the Hippias Major is perhaps the one best calculated to give a correct idea of the easy and playful manner, in which Socrates, who confessed he knew nothing, was accustomed to confute those, who pretended to know every thing. But it is to be lamented that Plato should have done here, as elsewhere, an injury to the cause he was espousing, by not keeping strictly to the line of truth. For, as remarked by Ast, Hippias the wise is represented as a very silly person; since such alone would think of giving the absurd definitions of beauty put into the mouth of Hippias. But in this very conduct of the writer, we have an internal proof in favour of the genuineness of the dialogue, which some have called in question. For in consequence of similar misrepresentations, Gorgias called him "the modern Archilochus;" and even Socrates himself, after hearing the Lysias, exclaimed, "Ye gods, what lies this young man tells." It is possible, however, that Hippias had in reality given some definitions of beauty, similar to those which are here attributed to him, but which were wanting in the precision of language, that alone gives value to a definition. For unless this had been the case, the whole of the ridicule would have been like the dart of Priam, "telum imbelle, sine ictu."

Hence too I was led to suggest, that in the examples of beauty selected by Plato, there was a parody of those which Hippias had given, with the view of showing, what Sydenham was the first to remark, that the Sophists intended to exhibit a gradation in four different forms of beauty, of which the first was rational; the second irrational; the third affecting the mind, through the medium

of the body; and the last affecting the body alone: and thus while the speculative philosophers defined Beauty as existing, first, in the Mind; secondly, in the Body; thirdly, in Morals; and lastly, in Arts; the practical philosopher, Socrates, said, as shown by Xenophon, in M. S. iii. 8. 4—10, and iv. 6. 9, that Beauty consisted in utility and the fitness of things to their proposed ends; but that of Beauty in the abstract we know nothing, as remarked by Plato in the Parmenides, p. 134, C.

With regard to the theories of modern metaphysicians, viewed either abstractedly, or with reference to objects of Nature and Art, the inquisitive reader may turn to Burke "On the Sublime and Beautiful;" and Payne Knight's "Principles of Taste;" and Alison's "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste."

To the editions of this dialogue by Heindorf and Stalbaum, is to be added my own, published anonymously in 1831, under the title of "Plato's Four Dialogues, the Crito, Hippias, Alcibiades, and Sisyphus, with English Notes;" to which I have referred in difficult and doubtful passages, or where the Notes were too long or too learned to be given here entire, or even to be abridged without detriment to their utility.

HIPPIAS MAJOR.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] O THOU, the handsome[2] and clever[3] Hippias, after how long a time[4] hast thou now again[5] arrived at Athens!

Hip. I have had no leisure time, Socrates. For when Elis wants to transact any business with any other[6] state, she always comes to me the first, selecting me as an ambassador from the

[1] This dialogue is called "major," to distinguish it from another shorter one called "minor." It is feigned, as remarked by Stalbaum, to have taken place, probably when Hippias, according to Xenophon, in M. S. iv. 4, 5, had, on his return to Athens after a long absence, a conversation with Socrates.

[2] Sydenham refers the appellation of καλὸς to the beauty of Hippias' apparel, mentioned in § 25, Hipp. Min., p. 568, B., and Ælian. Var. Histor. xii. 32; but Heindorf says it was merely a common form of address. It seems however never to have been adopted except towards those, who were remarkable for the beauty of their person or dress.

[3] Heindorf says that by σοφὸς is meant a sophist. But as Socrates held the sophists in little estimation, he would rather address Hippias by the name of "wise;" and thus ironically put him even above Pythagoras, who was content to call himself φιλόσοφος, "a lover of wisdom," rather than σοφὸς, positively "wise."

[4] Heind. properly remarks that ὡς χρόνῳ means "after a long interval." Ficinus has incorrectly, "raro."

[5] Ficinus, unable to understand ἡμῖν, has omitted it altogether. Perhaps it conceals αὖ νῦν, as I have translated.

[6] The Greek is τινα τῶν πόλεων. Ficinus has "externis gentibus," as if he had found in his MS. either τιν' ἀλλοδαπῶν πόλεων, or τιν' ἄλλων πόλεων—

citizens, from her conceiving that I am the most competent to be a judge of the arguments urged by each of the states, and to report upon them. Hence I have often gone to other cities as an ambassador, but most frequently and on points the most in number and of greatest importance to Lacedæmon. Hence it is why, as regards your question, I do not often come to these parts.

[2.] *Soc.* This it is,[7] Hippias, to be a person truly wise and accomplished. For, as a private individual, you are able to obtain no little money from young men, and to impart more benefit than you receive; and as a public man are able[8] to do your own state good service, as he should do, who would not be held in contempt, but be in good repute with the many. But, Hippias, what is the reason why those men of the olden time, whose names are so renowned for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales of Miletus, and his disciples,[9] and those who come after, down to Anaxagoras, appear all, or most of them, to have kept aloof[10] from public affairs?

Hip. What else, Socrates, can you suppose than that they were unable or not sufficiently fit to reach by their intellect to both subjects, public and private?

[3.] *Soc.* Shall we then, by Zeus, affirm, that as the other arts have improved, and the operatives of former times were of no mark as compared with those of the present, so the art of you, sophists, has improved likewise; and that those of the ancients, who were engaged in the study of wisdom, were persons of no mark in comparison with you?

Hip. You speak perfectly correctly.

[7] Ficinus omits *μέντοι*, which he could not understand; nor can I. Perhaps Plato wrote *μὰ τὸν*—with the usual ellipse of *θεὸν*, or *κύνα*—

[8] The repeated *ἱκανὸς* is omitted by Ficinus. One MS. has *ἱκανῶς*: which would lead to *διανεκῶς*, "perpetually," found in § 48.

[9] Both Sydenham here, and Matthiæ in Gr. Gr., § 583, and Stalbaum, take the expression *τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν—Θαλῆν* as applied to Thales and his disciples; Heindorf, to Thales alone.

[10] Cicero however says, De Rep. i. 7, "Eos septem, quos Græci sapientes nominaverunt, omnes pœne video in media republica esse versatos:" where "omnes pœne" answers to *πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ* in Plato. So too De Oratore iii. 34, "Septem fuisse dicuntur—sapientes—hi omnes, præter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis præfuerunt." See likewise Ælian Var. Hist. iii. 17, where it is stated that all the philosophers of antiquity took a part in public affairs

Soc. If then, Hippias, were Bias to come now to life again, he would be exposed to ridicule, as compared with you; just as our modern statuaries assert that Dædalus, were he alive to execute such works as those from which he gained his great name, would become ridiculous.

Hip. It is as you say, Socrates. I am however accustomed myself to praise highly the men of the olden time, or even our immediate predecessors before,[11] and more than the moderns, acting with a feeling of caution as regards the envy of the living, and of fear as regards the anger of the dead.[12]

Soc. Correctly, Hippias, as it seems to me, are you [13]thinking upon and considering[13] the matter. And I too can testify that you are speaking the truth, and that your art has in reality improved in enabling you to transact public affairs conjointly with private. [4.] For Gorgias,[14] the great sophist of Leontium, came hither on an embassy[15] from his country, as being the man most competent among the Leontines to transact public affairs, and was thought to speak the best before the people here; and at the same time, by making a display of his powers in pri-

[11] Instead of *προτέρου*, I formerly suggested *προτέρως*, which the sense requires; and so I have translated.

[12] This alludes to one of Solon's laws mentioned by Plutarch, i. p. 89, E., *Μὴ λέγειν κακῶς τὸν τεθνηκότα*, "not to speak ill of the dead." But this sentiment was of much earlier antiquity, as appears from Homer, Od. xxii. 412, *Οὐχ ὅσιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι*, i. e. "It is unholy o'er dead men to boast;" and Archilochus, Fragm. 18, *Οὐ γὰρ ἐσθλὰ κατθανοῦσι κερτομεῖν ἐπ' ἀνδρασι*, i. e. "For against dead men it is not good heart-cutting taunts to say." This respect for the dead arose partly from the notion that the ghosts of the departed had a power to hurt the living, by haunting them. Hence Dido thus threatens Æneas, (iv. 386,) "Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, poenas." S.

[13]—[13] Apparently to avoid the tautology in *νομίζων τε καὶ διανοούμενος*. Ficinus has "et sentire et loqui;" unless it be said that he found in his MS. *διαλεγόμενος*. But as thirteen MSS. read *ὀνομάζων*, and one *ὀνομάζονται* without *τε*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ νομιζόμενα εἶ διανοούμενος*, i. e. "you are thinking upon what has been established by law."

[14] The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dialogue inscribed with his name. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe, that Gorgias was by profession, like Hippias, an orator as well as sophist, and set up teaching both philosophy and the art of rhetoric. S.

[15] The object of the embassy was to obtain the assistance of the Athenians in behalf of the people of Leontium against those of Syracuse, as we learn from Diodorus Sic. xii. 53; and Pausanias v. 17. HEIND.

vate, and associating with young men, he gained[16] and carried away great sums of money from this city. Or, if you wish for (another) instance, our friend,[17] Prodicus himself, has frequently come hither in a public capacity from elsewhere:[18] but on arriving the last time, not long since, [publicly][19] from Ceos, and speaking before the Council, he was held in high repute; and by making a display of his powers in private, and associating with young men, he gained a wonderful heap of money.[20] But of those ancient sages, not one ever thought proper to demand money by way of a fee for making a display of their wisdom before persons of all climes. Such simpletons[21] were they, and so completely did it escape them, that money was a thing of great value. Whereas each of the preceding[22] made more money from his wisdom, than has any operative[23] in whatever trade you will; and even prior to these did Protagoras.

[5.] *Hip.* You know nothing, Socrates, about these beautiful[24] things; for if you knew how much money I have made, you would be amazed. The other instances I pass by. But having gone once to Sicily, while Protagoras was residing

[16] The price, which Gorgias demanded from each of his scholars, was 100 minæ, equal to £322 18*s.* 4*d.* S.

[17] Socrates calls himself here the friend of Prodicus, as he does in Protag. p. 311, A., Meno, p. 96, D., and Cratyl. p. 384, § 2. HEIND.

[18] The antithesis in ἐκ Κέω evidently requires ἄλλοθεν, an adverb of place, not ἄλλοτε, of time.

[19] This repeated δημοσίᾳ is an evident interpolation.

[20] The price paid by each of his auditors was fifty δράχμαι, or £1 12*s.* 3*d.* See Plat. in Cratyl. p. 384, and Aristot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 14. S.

[21] Such a simpleton too was Socrates himself, who gave instruction gratis, as we learn from Xenophon.

[22] In Greek οὗτος, like "hic" in Latin, generally refers to the persons last mentioned; but here it must be applied to the more remote, like "ille."

[23] Plato uses the word δημιουργὸς rather than τεχνικὸς, to mark his contempt of the Sophist, who, in the dialogue so called, is ranked below the meanest handicraft. S.

[24] The Greek is τῶν καλῶν περὶ τούτων. But in the first place περὶ ought to follow rather than precede τούτων. And, secondly, as nothing has been said as yet about things or persons of beauty, I suspect there is a lacuna here, in which was originally found the connexion of ideas wanting at present. It is true indeed that τούτων is found in the two best MSS. alone in lieu of τοῦτο: which is omitted entirely in another. But from this notning is gained. Ficinus has "Nihil egregium hac in re nosti." Some however will be perhaps content to render καλῶν "fine," without any eference to beauty.

there in high repute and rather advanced in years, I did, although much younger, gain in a very short time more than 150 minæ:[25] nay, from Inycum, a very small town, I took above 20.[26] This, when I arrived home, I carried and gave[27] to my father, so that it struck him and the rest of the citizens with wonder and astonishment. And I almost think I have made more money than any two sophists together, whom you choose to name.

[6.] *Soc.* You bring forward, Hippias, truly a good and great proof, both of your own wisdom, and of the men of the present day, how superior they are as compared with those of the olden time. For of your predecessors, down to Anaxagoras,[28] great is proclaimed the folly, according to your statement. For to Anaxagoras, they say, happened the very opposite to what has befallen you. For of the great wealth left him he took no care, and lost it all; in so silly a manner did he act the sophist. And of the other ancient sages other stories of a similar kind are told. You seem then to produce this as a good proof of the wisdom of the moderns, as compared with the ancients. And many indeed agree with you, that [29]the wise man should be wise for himself especially;[29] and of such a person this is the one [30] definition—He who can make the most money. [7.] Let this then suffice. And now tell

[25] Equal to £484 7*s.* 6*d.* English money. S.

[26] Equal to £64 11*s.* 8*d.* In these calculations, an ounce of the silver coin of Athens is valued at 5*s.* 2*d.*, and the Attic *δράχμη* is supposed equal to the Roman denarius; although, as Arbuthnot observes, there is reason to think it was of greater value. S.

[27] Although *φέρων ἔδωκα* be correct Greek in itself, the phrase does not express what Plato probably wrote, *τροφεῖα τῷ πατρὶ ἔδωκα*, i. e. "I gave to my father for my former maintenance." Compare especially Legg. iv. p. 717, C., *ἀποτίνοντα δανείσματα ἐπιμελείας* to parents. Ælian, N. A. ii. 6, *τὰ τροφεῖα τοῖς θρέψασιν ἀπεδίδου*: and see Valckenaer on Phœn. 44, *λαβὼν ὀχήματα Πολύβῳ τροφεῖ δίδωσιν.*

[28] The Greek is *περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου*: where Sydenham was the first to reject *Ἀναξαγόρου*: whom Heind. and others have followed. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου*, as in § 2.

[29]—[29] This alludes to the verse of Euripides, quoted by Cicero Epist. Famil. xiii. 5, *Μισῶ σοφιστὴν, ὅστις οὐχ αὑτῷ σοφός.* Compare also De Offic. iii. 15; Aristot. Eth. vi. 7. HEIND.

[30] The Greek is *ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρα ὃς*—i. e. "there is a definition." But the sense requires, "there is one definition," in Greek *ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρ' εἷς, ὃς*—as I stated many years ago; where I should have quoted *εἷς ὅρος* in Menex. p. 238, D., and Thucyd. iv. 92.

me from which of the cities, whither you went, did you gain the greatest money? Is it not plain it was from Sparta, whither you went the oftenest?

Hip. Not, by Zeus, from thence, Socrates.

Soc. How say you? The least then?

Hip. Never any thing at all.

Soc. A monstrous and marvellous account you are giving, Hippias. But tell me, has not that wisdom of yours the power to make those [31] who associate with you and learn it [31] better as regards virtue.

Hip. Yes, very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Were you then able to make the sons of the Inycians better, but unable to make the sons of the Spartans?

Hip. Far from it.[32]

Soc. Are the Siciliotes desirous of becoming better, but the Spartans not?

Hip. The Lacedæmonians are, Socrates, very (desirous)?

Soc. Was it then from their want of money that they shunned your society?

Hip. By no means; for they have enough of it.

[8.] *Soc.* What then could it be, that although they were desirous of virtue, and had money, and you were able to benefit them to the greatest extent, they did not send you away loaded with wealth? Was it that the Lacedæmonians can educate their sons better than you? Shall we say this? and do you concede it is so?

Hip. By no manner of means.

Soc. Were you then unable to persuade the young men at Lacedæmon, that by associating with you they would make a greater progress in virtue than by associating with their own people? Or were you unable to persuade their fathers that they ought to hand over their children to you rather than take that care upon themselves, if they had any regard for

[31]—[31] The Greek is *τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῇ καὶ μανθάνοντας*—I have translated as if it were *τοὺς σοὶ συνόντας καὶ αὐτὴν μανθάνόντας*. For thus *σοὶ συνόντας* is similar to *συνὼν τοῖς νέοις* twice in § 4, and to *σοὶ—συνόντες* in § 8.

[32] To a bipartite question there could not be a single answer. There is a lacuna here, to be supplied from Suidas, Πολλοῦ δὴ δέω καὶ λέγειν· σιωπῶ: where, if we read *γε* for *καὶ*, we shall have an expression similar to *οὐκ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε* in § 9, explained by *σιωπῶ*.

their children? For surely they did not grudge their sons becoming as virtuous as possible.

Hip. I do not think they felt any grudge.

Soc. In good truth Lacedæmon is a well-regulated city.

Hip. How not?

Soc. Now in well-regulated cities virtue is most highly prized.

Hip. Certainly.

[9.] *Soc.* And to impart this to another you know the best of all men.

Hip. By much so, Socrates.

Soc. Now would not the man, who could best impart the art of horsemanship, be the most honoured, and acquire the most wealth in Thessaly,[33] or wherever else in Greece[34] this art is cultivated the most?

Hip. It is likely.

Soc. Will he then, who can impart instruction of the greatest value with respect to virtue, be honoured the most, and make the most money if he wishes it, not at Lacedæmon and any other of the well-regulated states in Greece, but in Sicily[35] rather, as you think, my friend, or at Inycum? Shall we, Hippias, give credit to this? for if you command, I must (do so).

Hip. It is not, Socrates, the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians to disturb their laws, nor to educate their children[36] contrary to established usages.

Soc. How say you? Think you[37] that it is the custom of the country for the Lacedæmonians not to act correctly, but to do wrong?

Hip. I would not say so, Socrates.

Soc. Would they not do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

[10.] *Hip.* (They would do) right; but it is not lawful for

[33] See Meno, § 1. S.

[34] As there is nothing on which *τῆς* Ἑλλάδος can depend, I have transated as if the Greek were *ἢ τῆς* Ἑλλάδος *ἄλλοθι*—not *τῆς* Ἑλλάδος ——*καὶ ἄλλοθι*.

[35] On the luxury of the Sicilians Sydenham refers to the Greek proverb, Σικελικὴ *τράπεζα* in Plato, Legg. iii. p. 404, D., and the "Siculæ dapes" in Horace.

[36] Instead of *νέους* the two best MSS. have *υἱεῖς*, similar to "filios," in Ficinus.

[37] The two best MSS. have preserved *οἴει*, wanting in all the rest.

them to give a foreign education. Since, rest assured that if any one else ever took away money from thence by teaching, I should have taken by much the most. For they delight greatly[38] in listening to me, and give me praise. [39]But what I am saying is not law.[39]

Soc. Say you, Hippias, that the law is an injury or a benefit to a state?

Hip. It is enacted, I presume, for a benefit; but sometimes the law, when improperly enacted, does an injury.

Soc. What then, do not they who enact a law, lay it down as the greatest good to a state? For without law it is impossible to live in a state of good government.

Hip. You speak the truth.

Soc. When, therefore, they who undertake to frame laws, fail in procuring a good, they have missed [40]what is lawful and law.[40] Or how say you?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, such is the case; but men are not used to give that name.[41]

Soc. Do you mean, Hippias, those, who know the truth, or who do not know it?

Hip. I mean the many.

Soc. Are the many then those, who know the truth?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But surely they, who do know it, do in reality conceive that what is to all men more beneficial is more agreeable to law than what is less beneficial. Or do not you grant this?

Hip. I grant that (they do hold so) in reality.

Soc. [42]Do not (things) exist, and are in the state,[42] as those, who are knowing, conceive?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

[11.] *Soc.* Now it is, as you assert, more beneficial for the

[38] In lieu of *χαίρουσι γοῦν*, where *γοῦν* is useless, I have translated as if the Greek were *χαίρουσ' ἄγαν*—

[39]—[39] Such is the literal version of the Greek *ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω οὐ νόμος*. By comparing however Protag. § 80, it would not be difficult to recover what Plato probably wrote.

[40]—[40] I cannot understand *νομίμου καὶ νόμου*— The natural train of ideas would lead to, "they fail in that, for which laws are laid down"—

[41] Here again I am at a loss, unless we read *νομίζειν*, "to think," in lieu of *ὀνομάζειν*, "to name," as I suggested long ago.

[42]—[42] The Greek is, *Οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε καὶ ἔχει οὕτως*. To avoid the tautology I suggested *Οὐκ οὖν ἅ ἐστί γε, ἔχει οὕτως*. Stalb. has edited *ἔστι τε*, from the two best MSS.

Lacedæmonians to receive a foreign education under yourself, than after the system of their own country.

Hip. And I assert the truth.

Soc. Because what is more beneficial is more conformable to law. And this, Hippias, do you say?

Hip. I have so said.

Soc. According then to your reasoning, it is more conformable to law for the sons of the Lacedæmonians to be instructed by Hippias, and less so by their fathers, if perchance they shall in reality be more benefited under you.

Hip. And benefited they would be, Socrates.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians then act contrary to law, in not giving you their gold, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. In this I agree with you: for you seem to produce an argument in my favour, and there is no need for me to oppose it.

Soc. We find then, my friend, the Lacedæmonians to act contrary to law, and this too in matters of the greatest moment; they who are thought to be most observant of law. And yet, by the gods, did they praise you, and were delighted at hearing—what? Or is it not evident that the subjects were those which you know the best, relating to the stars and celestial events?[43]

Hip. Not at all. Such subjects they cannot endure.

Soc. But they delight in hearing something about geometry.

Hip. Not at all; for many of them know not, so to say, even how to reckon.

[12.] *Soc.* They are then far from enduring you, while making a display on the keeping of accounts.[44]

Hip. Very far indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. But the subjects then were those, in which you can the most accurately of (all[45]) men draw distinctions, respecting the powers of letters and syllables, and rhythms and harmonies.

Hip. What harmonies, or letters, my good man?

Soc. What then are the subjects, which they gladly hear

[43] The Greek is πάθη. Ficinus has "progressus."

[44] Ficinus, uncertain how to translate λογισμῶν, has 'ratiocinationes computationesque;" and hence Sydenham, "of numbers and accounts."

[45] Ficinus alone has "omnium hominum

from you, and commend? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find them.

Hip. Respecting the genealogies,[46] Socrates, of their heroes and men, and settlements (of tribes), (and)[47] how cities were founded of old, and, in a word, to every thing relating to archæology, they listen with the greatest pleasure; so that I was forced to learn my lesson myself thoroughly for their sakes, and to practise myself well on those points.

Soc. By Zeus, Hippias, you were fortunate in that the Lacedæmonians did not take a delight in hearing a man who could reckon up our archons from the time of Solon. For otherwise you would have had some trouble in learning the list.

Hip. How so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names only once, I can repeat them from memory.

[13.] *Soc.* You speak the truth; but I did not bear in mind that you had a system of mnemonics;[48] so that I understand[49] why, reasonably enough, the Lacedæmonians are pleased with you, as being a person who knows many things, and they make use of you, as children do of old women, to tell them pretty stories.

Hip. And by Zeus, Socrates, I was lately in high repute there by going through a lecture upon the honourable pursuits to which a young person should devote himself. For I have by me a very beautiful discourse upon that subject, [50]well put together in other respects, and in the words.[50] The form and

[46] There is an article by Osann in the Rheinische Museum for 1843, p. 495—501, on the archæological writings of Hippias.

[47] I suspect ὡς has dropt out after καὶ—

[48] According to Pseudo-Plato in Hipp. M., in p. 368, D., the sophist had, like Simonides, cultivated the art of memory; which, before the invention of printing, was necessary for every one who aspired to be a pantologist.

[49] The Greek is ὥστ' ἐννοῶ—which seems rather strange after οὐκ ἐνενόησα. Ficinus has "jam intelligo"—which leads to εἰς τὸ νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ—

[50]—[50] The Greek is καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι. But διακείμενος could hardly follow συγκείμενος: and if it could, it would not be united to the dative ὀνόμασι. Besides, it is not easy to say, to what ἄλλως can be referred, as opposed to ὀνόμασι. Ficinus has "verborum elegantia pollet"—from which I formerly elicited εὖ διακοσμούμενος: but I would now prefer διεσκευασμένος, similar to λόγοι παρεσκευασμένοι in Menex. p. 235, D., while in καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ τοῖς lie hid, I suspect, καὶ Λυσίου—καλλίστοις ὀνόμασι. For thus Lysias would be praised here ironically, as he is in the Phædrus.

commencement of the discourse is something of this kind.—"After Troy was taken, the story goes, that Neoptolemus inquired of Nestor what were the honourable pursuits a young man should follow to gain a good name. Upon this Nestor is the speaker, and suggests a great many and very excellent precepts laid down by law." [14.] Of this dissertation[51] I made a display there; and on the third day hence I intend to display it here and several other pieces of mine, worth the hearing, in the school of Philostratus.[52] For so has Eudicus, the son of Apēmantus, requested. See then that you are present yourself, and bring with you others, who on hearing will be competent to decide upon what is then said.

Soc. This, if a god is willing, Hippias, shall be. But at present answer me a short question relating to it.[53] For you have opportunely put me in mind of it. A certain person has, thou best of men, very lately, during some conversations, thrown me into a difficulty—when I was finding fault with some things as being ugly, and praising others as being beautiful—by asking me, in a very saucy manner, "From whence do you, Socrates, know, said he, what things are beautiful, and what ugly? [54]Come then, tell me,[54] if you can say a word, what is the beautiful?" And I, through my want of wit, was at a loss, and had it not in my power to answer him with propriety. [15.] So, quitting his company, I grew angry with, and vented reproaches upon, myself, and threatened that the first time I met with any of you wise men, I would hear (his opinion) and learn it; and after studying

[51] According to Philostratus in the life of Hippias, p. 495, the dissertation was in the form of a dialogue. Its title was *Τρωικὰ* or *Ἡρωϊκὰ*—For these two words are constantly confounded, as remarked by G. C. Lewis in Cl. Jl. No. 76, p. 277, and No. 78, p. 190. So too in Schol. Οδ. Λ. 546, instead of *ὑπὸ ὁποτέρου τῶν Τρῴων*, Bentley would read *Ἡρώων* in his letter to Davies, first published in the Monthly Review, vol. xiv. p. 202.

[52] I have adopted *Φιλοστράτου*, found in the two best MSS., in lieu of *Φειδοστράτου*—a word that seems scarcely compounded correctly. On the other hand, the Philostratus here mentioned is probably the same as the person nicknamed *Κυναλώπηξ* by Aristophanes in *Ἱππ.* 1066.

[53] As there is nothing to which *αὐτοῦ* can be referred, Plato wrote, I suspect, *περί γέ του*, "about something."

[54]—[54] The Greek is—*Ἐπεὶ φέρει ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν*—But *ἐπεί*, "since," has no meaning here. I have translated, as if the words were—*Εἶπ' οὖν, φέρ', εἰ ἔχοις ἀνειπεῖν.*

it thoroughly, that I would return to my questioner, and figh out again the matter with him. Now, therefore, as I said, yo are come opportunely; and do you instruct me sufficientl what is beauty in the abstract, and endeavour to give me as accurately as possible your answers; in order that I may no be confuted a second time, and pay the penalty of a laugh against myself. For assuredly you know it quite clearly, and it would be but a mite of the learning, with which you are conversant on so many[55] points.

Hip. By Zeus, a mite indeed, Socrates; and, so to say, o no value at all.

Soc. Easily then shall I learn it; and no one will hereafter confute me.

[16.] *Hip.* Not one indeed. For otherwise mean would be my profession, and suited to a common person.

Soc. By Juno, Hippias, you speak bravely, if we shall get the man into our clutches. [56]But shall I be any hindrance by imitating him, if I lay hold of your arguments, while answering me, in order that you may exercise me the most. For I am nearly skilful in laying hold (of arguments).[56] If then it makes no difference to you, I am willing to lay hold of them, in order that I may learn[57] with greater strength.

Hip. Take hold then: for, as I said just now, the question is not a great one; and I will teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, so that not a single person will be ever able to confute you.

Soc. Ye gods,[58] how bravely you talk! But come, since you bid me, I will become him, and, as well as I can, try to question you. Now, if you shall give the lecture you men-

[55] To avoid the incorrect Greek in *ὧν σὺ τῶν πολλῶν*, we must read *ὧν σὺ οὕτω πολλῶν*— The critics quoted by Stalbaum neither do, nor pretend to, defend this union of the relative pronoun with the definite article.

[56]—[56] Such is the literal translation of the Greek. But how Socrates could, by imitating the nameless saucy fellow, be any hindrance to Hippias, I cannot understand.

[57] In lieu of *μάθω*, which I cannot understand, I have suggested *μιχθῶ*. For the idea of "mingling in fight" here correctly coincides with the preceding *ἀναμαχούμενος*. Others perhaps would prefer *ἐρρωμενέστερον με θῶ*, i. e. "make myself of greater strength."

[58] Instead of *φεῦ*, which never, I think, precedes *ὡς εὖ λέγεις*, I have translated as if the Greek were *ὦ θεοί*.

tion, upon beautiful pursuits, he will, after hearing it, when you have ceased speaking, inquire about nothing else except about the beautiful—for such a habit he has—and he will say, "Art not, (say) thou stranger from Elis, the just just through justness?" Answer now, Hippias, as if he were questioning you.

Hip. I answer,[59] through justness.

[17.] *Soc.* There is then such a thing as justness?

Hip. Clearly so.

Soc. Are not then the wise wise through wisdom? and all that is good good through goodness?

Hip. How not?

Soc. By those things existing really; for it is not surely by their non-existing.

Hip. By their existing really.

Soc. Are not all things, that are beautiful, beautiful through beauty?

Hip. Yes, through beauty.

Soc. By such a thing existing?

Hip. By its existing. For what should it be?

Soc. Tell me now, stranger, he will say, what is this beauty?

Hip. Does he, who asks this question, want to know what is a beautiful thing?

Soc. I think not, Hippias: but what is beauty.

Hip. How does this differ from that?

Soc. Seems there to you no (difference)?

Hip. There is not any difference.

Soc. But, however,[60] it is evident that you know better.

[59] I have adopted *ἀποκρίνομαι*, found in one MS., in lieu of *ἀποκρινοῦμαι*. Ficinus omits the word entirely.

[60] The Greek is *Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δῆλον*, where I cannot understand *μέντοι*: nor could, I think, Ficinus, whose version is "Constat autem." Hence I suggested, many years ago, *Ἀλλὰ μύοντί τῳ*, "But to any one blinking," an expression similar to the Latin, "conniventibus oculis," and to the English, "with half an eye." The phrase in Aristoph. Plut. 49, is *δῆλον τυφλῷ*, quoted by the Schol. on Plato, Sophist. p 241, D., *φαίνεται καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ, τυφλῷ*: and is found in Rep. iii. p. 465, D., and viii. p. 550, D. With regard to the verb *μύειν*, which Plato has used in Sophist. p. 239, E., *δόξει τοι μύειν ἢ πα· άπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα*, and elsewhere, see Creuzer on Plotinus, *Περὶ Κάλλους*, p. 357

Consider, however, good sir, the question (well).[61] For he asks you, not what is a beautiful thing, but what is beauty.

Hip. I understand you, good sir. And I will answer his question, "What is beauty?" nor shall I ever be confuted.[62] For rest assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing.[63]

[18.] *Soc.* By the dog,[64] you have answered, Hippias, beautifully and gloriously.[65] Shall I then, when I answer thus, have answered the question correctly? and shall I never be refuted?

Hip. For how could you be refuted, Socrates, on that point which seems correct to all the world; and where all who hear you will testify in your favour that you are speaking properly?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But come, Hippias, let me consider again with myself what you are saying. For the man will question me in some such manner as this: "Come, Socrates, answer me, [66] if beauty exists in the abstract, all

And to the passages there quoted add Lucian in Rhetor. Præcept. § 11, *κἂν μύοντι—εἴποι τις.* Shakspeare says in Lear, "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes."

[61] After *ἄθρει*, it is pretty evident that *εὖ* has dropt out.

[62] By comparing the expression of Socrates, *οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῶ*, it is quite certain that Hippias said *οὐ μή ποτε ἐλεγχθῇς.*

[63] Ficinus has "virginem pulchram ipsum pulchrum esse," as if his MS. read *παρθένος καλὴ τὸ καλόν*, not *παρθένος καλὴ καλόν.*

[64] This was one of the oaths adopted by Socrates; another was, "by the plane-tree," as in Phædrus, p. 236, D., and the third was, "by the goose," as we learn from the Scholiast on Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 521. To these might be added "the goat," as appears from Tertullian Apolog. 14, quoted by Gottleber on Phædo, p. 99, A. "Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, quercum et hircum et canem dejerabat." Of the different reasons assigned for such strange forms of adjuration an account is to be found in the notes of Menage on Diogen. Laert. p. 92. But as none of them are satisfactory, the truth remains to be still found, if worth the search, elsewhere.

[65] The Greek is *εὐδόξως*: which is never, I believe, thus connected with the idea of an answer. I suggested long ago *οὐ λοξῶς*, i. e. "not obliquely," referring to Suidas, *Λοξά· σκόλια, καμπύλα, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας γινόμενα*: and to Lucian, Vit. Auct. § 14, *ὥσπερ ὁ Λοξίας οὐδὲν ἀποσαφεῖς.* Dialog. Deor. xvi. § 1, *Λοξὰ—πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἀποκρινομενος.* Alexandr. § 10, *ἀμφιβόλους καὶ λοξοὺς χρησμοὺς συγγράφων*: and I will now add in Jov. Confut. § 14, *λοξὰ καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα.* See too Boissonad. in Eunap. p. 162, and 564.

[66]—[66] Such is the literal version of the Greek text. But the train of thought requires, "Come now, Socrates, and answer me this correctly. All

those things which you say are beautiful, would these be beautiful?"[6] And I will then say that,[67] if a beautiful maiden be a beautiful thing, through which the things would be beautiful."[67]

Hip. Think you then that he will still attempt to confute you, (by asserting) that what you say is beautiful, is not so? or that, should he attempt it, he will not be laughed down?

Soc. That he will, thou wondrous man, I am well assured; but whether, after making the attempt, he will be laughed down, the thing itself will show. However,[68] I wish to tell you what he will say.

Hip. Tell it then.

[19.] *Soc.* What a sweet[69] creature, Socrates! he will say, you are. Is not a beautiful mare, which even a god has praised in an oracle,[70] a beautiful thing? What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we say aught else than that [71] the

the things which you say are beautiful, if there be such a thing as beauty in the abstract, would they not be beautiful?" This in Greek would be Ἴθι μοι ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι τοῦτ' εὖ. Τὰ πάντα, ἃ φὴς καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἔστι αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὐ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά; Ficinus however has "Age, responde mihi, Socrates, Quid est ipsum pulchrum? quod si sit, hæc omnia, quæ pulchra dicuntur, per ipsum pulchra sunt," which it is uncertain whether he did or did not find in his MS. Sydenham however was led from thence to suspect that δι' ὃ had dropt out between τὸ καλὸν and ταῦτ' ἂν—and so was Schleiermacher after him.

[67]—[67] The Greek is Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἔστι, δι' ὃ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλά. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστι, κ. τ. λ. S. Heindorf says we must omit εἰ, or all the words after καλόν. But the train of argument leads to something of this kind—"If there be such a thing as a beautiful maiden, there must be the beautiful, by which all the things beautiful would exist"—in Greek, Εἰ παρθένος καλὸν ἔστι, ἔστι τὸ καλὸν, δι' ὃ πάντ' ἂν εἴη καλά, as I stated many years ago.

[68] The origin of this proverb is told by the Scholiast on Theætet. p. 200, E., who says, that when some person was going to cross a river, he asked his guide whether it was deep; to which the latter replied, "The event itself will show."

[69] Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 132, says that γλυκὺς and ἡδὺς were used ironically as a polite way of calling a person a simpleton.

[70] The oracle alluded to has been preserved entire by the Schol. on Theocritus, Id. xiv. 48, and by Tzetzes, in Chil. ix. 291, and x. 330, and partially by Euseb. Præp. Evang. v. 29. For when the people of Megara had inquired of the god to whom the palm of superiority was to be assigned, they were told, amongst other things, that the mares of Thrace, or as Tzetzes testifies, of Thessaly, were the best.

[71] [71] The Greek is τὴν ἵππον καλὴν εἶναι τήν γε καλήν And so

mare is beautiful? at least the beautiful.[71] For how should we dare to deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

Hip. You speak, Socrates, what is true,[72] especially since the god rightly said it;[72] for with us there are mares very beautiful.[73]

Soc. Be it so, he will say; but what, is not a beautiful lyre a beautiful thing? Shall we allow it, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And after this he will say—as, guessing from his usual manner, I nearly know full well—My excellent fellow, is not a beautiful soup-dish a beautiful thing?

Hip. Who is this man, Socrates? What an uneducated fellow! who thus presumes to express himself in words so low in an affair so solemn.

Soc. Such is the fellow, Hippias, not a fine gentleman, but a man of the mob, who cares for nothing but truth. He must however have an answer; [74] and I appear speaking for him[74]—

Ficinus, "Pulchram equam nonne pulchram esse." This, says Heindorf, might stand; but *καλὸν εἶναι*, suggested by Cornarius, is preferable. He did not however perceive that, as the article could not be thus repeated, it must be omitted before *ἵππον*; nor that *γε Θεσσαλὴν* lie hid in *γε καλὴν*, to answer to the Thessalian mare, mentioned in the oracle, according to Tzetzes; and hence just before in lieu of *θήλεια* one would prefer *Θεσσαλὴ*, as I remarked many years ago.

[72]—[72] Such is the literal version of the Greek; which I confess I cannot understand. For Socrates did not say what was true, because the oracle spoke truth; nor did the oracle speak truth, because there were beautiful mares in Elis. What Hippias meant to say is, that, as the oracle had spoken of the beauty of mares, it had spoken of what an Elean, who was a judge of such matters, would confess to be beautiful. Plato therefore wrote perhaps, as I suggested many years ago,—*ἐπείτοι καὶ, ὃ ὀρθῶς ὁ θεὸς εἶπεν, εἶπον ἂν αὐτός*, "since, what the god has correctly said, I would have said myself;" a sentiment that exhibits the vanity of Hippias in a marked manner, as he thus puts himself upon an equality with the god.

[73] As the chariot-races in the Olympic games were run in the country of Elis, the people there had an opportunity of seeing the best horses, and of becoming, like persons living at Newmarket and Doncaster in England, the best judges of horse-flesh; while from the number of prizes gained by mares, it was found that the female was better suited than the male for a long race, as remarked by Servius on Virgil, Georg. i. 59.

[74]—[74] The Greek is *καὶ ἔγωγε προαποφαίνομαι*: which would mean "I give my opinion the first," as shown by *Ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην* in Protag. p. 340, A. Ficinus has "Præfabor." But this could be said only if Socrates were going to reply, not to put a question. Plato wrote, I suspect, *καὶ λέγων γε πρὸ αὐτοῦ φαίνομαι*, as I partly suggested many years ago, when I should have quoted Alcest. 336, *πρὸ τούτου—λέγειν*.

If the soup-dish be made by a skilful potter, smooth and round, and well baked, like some of the beautiful soup-dishes with two handles, containing six choes,[75] very beautiful,[76] if he inquires about such a soup-dish, we must confess it to be beautiful. For how could we say that what is beautiful, is not beautiful?

Hip. Not at all, Socrates.

Soc. Is not a beautiful soup-dish then, he will say, a beautiful thing? Answer.

[20.] *Hip.* But, Socrates, the case is, I think, this; even such a vessel, when beautifully made, is a beautiful thing. But this taken as a whole does not deserve to be considered as beautiful, as compared with a mare, and a maiden, and the other things of beauty.

Soc. Be it so. I understand you, Hippias, that we must thus reply to the person who puts such a question. You are ignorant, my man, that correct is the saying of Heracleitus, That the most beautiful ape, as compared with another kind,[77] is ugly; and that the most beautiful of soup-dishes is ugly as compared with the maiden-kind; as says Hippias the wise. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. You have answered, Socrates, quite correctly.

Soc. Hear then—for I know well he will say after this—What then, Socrates, should any one compare maiden-kind

[75] According to Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic χοῦς contained three quarts. S.

[76] This repetition of πάγκαλαι after the preceding τῶν καλῶν, justly gave offence to a friend of Heindorf. But he did not see, as I remarked many years ago, that in τῶν καλῶν lies hid perhaps τῶν Σικελῶν—for Eubulus, quoted by Athenæus, i. p. 28, C., mentions Σικελικὰ βατάνια.

[77] The Greek is ἄλλῳ γένει. But we ought to read ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, as is evident from what is quoted presently after from the same Heracleitus, ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται. For however dark his writings were, there is no reason to think he wrote absurdly. The absurdity is owing to the transcribers, who instead of ἀνῳ, an abbreviated form for ἀνθρωπίνῳ, wrote ἀλλῳ. S. This correction, or rather ἀνθρωπείῳ, which is more after Plato's manner, appears to be indubitable; for we have thus a climax of ideas—"The most beautiful monkey is ugly, as compared with a man: and the man most wise, as compared with a god." HEIND., who, in ed. 2, prefers ἀνθρώπων, as Bekker does likewise. But a single monkey would scarcely be compared with the whole race of man. The true reading is probably ἀνῳ ἑνί γε, i. e. "to even a single man." On a similar allusion to the monkey, see my note on The Statesman, § 9, p. 205.

with god-kind, would he not be in the same case, as when the maiden-kind was compared to the soup-dish kind? Would not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? [21.] Or does not Heracleitus, whom [78] you bring forward,[78] say [79] this very same thing,[79] that the wisest of men, when compared with a god, appears an ape in wisdom and beauty, and every thing else?[80] Shall we confess, Hippias, the most beautiful maiden is ugly as compared with the god-kind?[81]

Hip. Yes; for who, Socrates, would gainsay this at least?

Soc. Should however we confess this, he will laugh and say, Do you then remember, Socrates, what you was asked? I shall reply, I do; (it was this,) What is beauty in the abstract? Whereupon he will rejoin—When you are asked about beauty in the abstract, you answer (by mentioning) [82] that which happens to be, as you say yourself, not more beautiful than ugly.[82] So, it seems, I shall say. Or what else, my friend, do you advise me to say?

Hip. This (I advise) you; [83] For that the human kind, as compared with the gods, is not beautiful,[83] he will say the truth.

Soc. If I had asked you at the outset, he will say, what is a

[78]—[78] Here is evidently a slip on the part of Plato. For, as remarked by Sydenham, it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who had brought forward the dictum of Heracleitus; unless we are to understand with Heindorf, that the reference to Heracleitus must be supposed to be made by the fictitious speaker, and not by Socrates. But this is at variance with the preceding narrative. There is some disorder here, which I might perhaps be able to cure; but the remedy, I am afraid, would be considered too violent.

[79]—[79] As "this very same thing" is different from the preceding dictum, we must read *τοιοῦτόν τι ἐπιλέγει*, "says in addition some such thing as this," in lieu of *ταὐτὸν τοῦτο λέγει*.

[80] In this apophthegm of Heracleitus is to be found the original of the idea in Pope—

> Superior beings, when of late they saw
> A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
> Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
> And showed a Newton, as we show an ape. S.

[81] To avoid the impropriety of a single maiden being compared with the race of the gods, it is easy to read *πρὸς θεάν γ' ὁμοιως*, i. e. "similarly as compared with a goddess," instead of *πρὸς θεῶν γένος*—

[82]—[82] i. e. "that which is beautiful or ugly according as it may happen."

[83]—[83] This I do not very well understand. For in the preceding questioning of Socrates by the fictitious person, nothing is said of a man being beautiful or not, as compared with the gods.

thing beautiful and ugly, had you answered me as you have done just now, would you not[84] have answered correctly? And still[85] does it seem to you that the beautiful itself, by which every thing else is decorated, and looks beautiful; whenever that species (of beauty) is present to it, is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

[22.] *Hip.* If this, Socrates, he is seeking, it is of all things the easiest for me[86] to tell him in answer what is that beauty, by which all other things are decorated, and by which being present they appear beautiful. [87]The man is the greatest simpleton, and knows nothing about beautiful chattels.[87] For if you tell him in answer, that the beautiful about which he is inquiring, is nothing else than gold; he will be in a difficulty, and not attempt to confute you. For we all surely know that wherever gold is present to a thing, how ugly soever it may have seemed before, it will appear beautiful, when it is decorated at least with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how difficult he is, and admitting nothing easily.

Hip. What matters it, Socrates? For what is correctly asserted he must admit; or, not admitting it, be laughed at.

Soc. And yet he will not only not admit this answer, thou best of men; but he will treat me with derision, and say, O thou, puffed up with conceit, thinkest thou that Phidias was a bad workman? And I shall reply, I think so by no manner of means.

Hip. And you will answer rightly, Socrates.

[23.] *Soc.* Rightly indeed. Hereupon when I have con-

[84] Ficinus, displeased perhaps, as Heindorf was, with the interrogation, omits *ἄρα οὐκ*—while to meet the difficulty Ast would read *ἆρ' οὖν*—But *ἆρ' οὖν* always, I think, begins a sentence. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μειράκιον ὀρθῶς ἄν τι ἐκέκρισ' ὄν*, i. e. "you would have been correctly judged to be still a stripling." See § 31, n. 17.

[85] Instead of *ἔτι*, the two best MSS. read *ὅτι*. The sense seems to require, "But tell me, child," in Greek *εἰπὲ δὲ, παῖ*, which differs but little from *ἔτι δὲ καὶ*—For it would thus be seen that Socrates was in the eye of the fictitious person, not even a stripling, but only a child. On the confusion of *καὶ* and *παῖ* see Porson Orest. 614.

[86] In lieu of *μέντοι*, Plato wrote *ἐμοί ἔνεστι*, as I guess.

[87]—[87] Instead of *κτημάτων*, five MSS. offer *ἐρωτημάτων*: which led me to suspect many years ago, as I still do now, the existence of a lacuna. At all events the words between the numerals would be said better by Socrates, who knew the fictitious person, than by Hippias, who did not.

fessed that Phidias was a good workman, he will say, Do you imagine then that Phidias was ignorant of that, which you call the beautiful?—Why (say you) this especially? I shall reply. —Because, he will rejoin, if[88] Phidias has made the eyes of Athéné not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face, nor the feet, nor even the hands—since a thing of gold[89] would have looked the most beautiful—but (not) of ivory,[90] it is evident that he erred in this through ignorance, not knowing that gold is that, which makes all things beautiful, wherever it is present. When he says this, what answer, Hippias, shall we give him?

Hip. The answer is not difficult. For we will say that he acted rightly; for ivory is, I presume, beautiful likewise.

Soc. Why then, he will rejoin, did he not make the middle part of the eyes of ivory, but of stone? having found in the stone a similarity as great as was possible to ivory. Or is a beautiful stone a beautiful thing? Shall we say so, Hippias?[91]

Hip. We will say so, if it be becoming.

Soc. But, where it is unbecoming, it is ugly. Shall I confess it, or not?

Hip. Confess; at least when it (the stone) is not becoming.

[24.] *Soc.* What then, he will say; do not ivory and gold, thou wiseacre, when they are becoming, cause things to appear beautiful; but when not, ugly? Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

Hip. We must acknowledge this, at least, that whatever is becoming to any individual thing, causes it to appear beautiful.

Soc. When then, he will say, some one shall have cooked the beautiful soup-dish, of which we have been speaking, full

[88] To avoid the difficulty in the text, of which Heindorf justly complains, I have translated as if *εἰ* had dropt out after *ἐρεῖ*.

[89] Kühner, in Gr. Gr., says that *χρυσοῦν* is to be referred to *πρόσωπον*. But one noun could not be thus selected out of five, to all of which the same epithet is equally applicable. Plato wrote, I suspect, *εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γέ τι δὴ*—and *ἀλλ' ἐλεφάντινον οὔ*, as I have translated.

[90] All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of massive gold; as we collect from Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxvi. 6. S. Respecting this statue, see Junius Catalog Art. Veter. p. 157, and Davis on Cicero Tusc. i. 15. Heind. To this union of gold, ivory, and marble, Virgil alludes in Æn. i. 593, "Quale manus addunt ebor decus, aut ubi flavo Argentum Pariusve lapis circumdatur auro."

[91] The sense requires, "Shall we say it, or not?" in Greek, *φήσομεν ἢ οὔ*;

of beautiful porridge,[92] whether does a ladle of gold become it, or one of fig-tree wood?[93]

Hip. By Hercules! of what kind of fellow, Socrates, are you speaking? Will you not tell me who he is?

Soc. No; for you would not know him, should I tell you his name.[94]

Hip. But I know already that he is some ignorant fellow.

Soc. He is a man of much thought, Hippias. But, however, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles becomes the porridge and the soup-dish? Or is it clearly the one of fig-tree wood; for this makes the porridge of a pleasanter flavour; and at the same time, my friend, it would not by breaking the soup-dish let the porridge run out, and extinguish the fire, and cause the guests, just about to feast on it, to be without a very noble dish.[95] But all this the one of gold would do.

[92] According to Athenæus, ix. p. 406, the Athenians were wont to bring to table the very vessels in which the more exquisite soups were cooked. The material of such vessels was a kind of porcelain, and their form not unlike our tureens. The composition of some of their soups is to be found in Athenæus and Apicius Cælius, v. 3. S.

[93] The Greek is *συκίνη*; but we ought rather to read *συκαμίνη*; for the wood of the fig-tree was so unfit for any use, that Horace calls it "inutile," useless; whereas the wood of the sycamore-tree, *συκάμινος*, is said by Theophrastus to be *ξύλον πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμον*, Hist. Plant. iv. 2. S. "But," asks Heindorf, "is the wood of the fig-tree unfit for making a soup-ladle? On the contrary, on account of its softness, and, as Plato says, its sweet smell, I believe it was most useful. At all events a wood of the least value ought to be mentioned, as opposed to gold." But so far from the mention of any wood being requisite here, it is evident, from the words *οὐκ ἂν συντρίψασα τὴν χύτραν*, that the soup-stirring instrument was made of something that would not readily break the vessel. What Plato really wrote and meant, is detailed in the Excursus on *Χύτρα*, appended to my anonymous edition of "The Four Dialogues of Plato."

[94] "How could Socrates be sure of that? Hippias might still have known the man, if he really existed. There is probably here an obliterated allusion to Homer's *Οὖτις*, the name assumed by Ulysses, when he deceived Polyphemus. If so, Plato would have written *Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνοίης, εἴ σοι εἴποιμι Οὖτιν τοὔνομα*, i. e. No; for you would not know him if I were to tell his name, No-man." Such was the note I printed many years ago. And I will now add that the same word, *Οὖτις*, has been corrupted likewise in Alcibiad. ii. § 23, and is there restored by myself.

[95] Ficinus renders *ὄψου πάνυ γενναίου* by "obsonio pretioso." But as such is not the meaning of *γενναῖος* elsewhere, I still adhere to the opinion I have ever entertained, that the reading *γενναίου* is corrupt, although it seems similar to *γενναῖα σῦκα* in Legg, p. 844, E., and may be compared with *γεννικὸν κρέας* in Aristoph. Ἱππ. 455.

So that it seems to me, we ought to say that the one of fig-tree wood is more becoming than the one of gold; unless indeed you say otherwise.

[25.] *Hip.* It is indeed, Socrates, more becoming. But, for my part, I would not converse with a fellow, who asked such questions as these.

Soc. And rightly so, my friend; for it would not become you to be polluted with such dirty words, you in a dress so beautiful,[96] and with such beautiful sandals, and in such high repute amongst all the Greeks for wisdom. But for me, it is nothing to mix myself up with the dirt of the man. Teach me then beforehand; and for my sake give a reply. For the man will say, If the ladle of fig-tree wood be indeed more becoming than the one of gold, is it not more beautiful? especially since you have confessed that the becoming is more beautiful than the unbecoming. Shall we confess that the ladle of fig-tree wood is more beautiful than the one of gold?

Hip. Do you wish me, Socrates, to say that, by saying which, I think,[97] you will free yourself from his much talking?

Soc. By all means; but not before you tell me which of the two ladles, that we have been speaking of, is the (more)[98] becoming and more beautiful.

[26.] *Hip.* Well then, if you will, tell him in answer, that it is the one made from the fig-tree.

Soc. Now say what you was just about to say. For in this answer, by which I assert that gold is the beautiful, gold[99] will not, as it seems to me, appear to be at all a thing more beautiful than fig-tree wood. But what do you now say is the beautiful?

[96] The dress in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is related by Plato in Hipp. Min. p. 368, B., who says that Hippias had made himself every thing he then wore. Ælian too, Var. Hist. xii. 32, tells us, that whenever the sophist appeared abroad he wore a scarlet dress; where Kuhn refers to Apuleius Florid. ii. S.

[97] As the infinitive *εἶναι* has nothing to depend upon, it is probably a corruption of *οἶμαι*.

[98] Ficinus has "decentiorem," as if he had found in his MS. *μᾶλλον* before *πρέπουσαν*, to answer to *καλλίω*.

[99] But the last assertion was, not that gold, but that the becoming was the beautiful. There is therefore probably some error here.

Hip. I will tell you. For you seem to me to seek to answer a question of this kind—what is that beauty, which at no time and in no place will appear ugly to any one.

Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you understand me perfectly well.

Hip. Listen then. For rest assured, that if any man has any thing to say against this, I will say that I know[100] nothing whatever.

Soc. By the gods, then, tell it as quickly as possible.

Hip. I assert then, that it is at all times, and to all persons, and in all places, the most beautiful thing for a man, in wealth, health,[1] and in honour amongst Greeks, and having reached old age, and having laid his deceased parents handsomely in the grave, to be buried himself by his own children in a handsome and splendid manner.

Soc. Capital! Hippias. How wondrous well, and gorgeously, and how worthy of yourself, have you spoken! and by Juno I am delighted with you for the good-will with which, as far as you can, you assist me. But we do not as yet [2]reach the man's mind.[2] But he will laugh the most at us, rest assured.

[27.] *Hip.* Truly a silly laugh, Socrates. For when he shall have nothing to say against this, and merely laugh, he

[100] Instead of ἐπαινεῖν, acknowledged by "laudaturum" in Ficinus, Cornarius and Muretus suggested ἐπαΐειν, subsequently confirmed by two MSS.

[1] This mention of health is rather strange in a passage where a man is said to be buried; unless by ὑγιαίνοντι is to be understood, sound in mind, rather than in body.

[2]—[2] So Stalbaum renders τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ τυγχάνομεν. But the fictitious person had explained himself so clearly, that Socrates had no reason to make such an assertion. Ficinus has "virum nondum comprehendimus," which is similar to Stalbaum's version, if "comprehendimus" is to be taken in a mental sense; but if in a bodily one, it seems still more strange; for the man was not going to run away. Sydenham's version is, "We reach not the point." But τοῦ ἀνδρὸς could not mean "a point." I suggested many years ago, what I still adhere to, τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὔ τι ἐγχάνοιμ' ἄν, i. e. "I shall not grin at the man." For there is thus a proper antithesis between τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐγχάνοιμ' ἂν and ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, as in Protag. p. 357, D., νῦν δὲ, ἐὰν ἡμῶν καταγελᾶτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. With regard to ἐγχανεῖν, it is found at least five times in Aristophanes, and once in a fragment probably of Ælian, quoted by Suidas in Μέλιτος.

will laugh at himself, and be the laughing-stock of (all)[3] who are present.

Soc. Such perhaps will be the case; perhaps, however, after such an answer, there will be a danger, as I prophesy, of his not merely laughing at me.

Hip. What then?

Soc. That, should he happen to have a staff in his hand, unless I escape from him by flight, he will endeavour to reach me with a smart blow.

Hip. How say you? Is the man a master of yours? and will he not, for having done so, be brought to trial, and pay damages? Or is your state not under the laws of justice, and permits the citizens to beat each other unjustly?

Soc. By no manner of means does it permit them.

Hip. Will he then not suffer punishment, for striking you unjustly?

Soc. I think not, Hippias; not at all; if I gave such an answer; but justly, as it seems to me.

Hip. It seems then so to me, Socrates; especially since you are of that opinion yourself.

Soc. Shall I then state why I think I should be justly beaten, on giving such an answer? Or will you too beat[4] me without a trial? or will you receive a reason?

Hip. It would be hard indeed, Socrates, if I did not receive it. But how say you?

[28.] *Soc.* I will speak to you in the same manner as I did just now, when imitating that person, in order that I may not say to you, what he will to me, words both harsh and producing an angry feeling. For rest assured he will say, Tell me, Socrates, do you think a person would receive blows unjustly, who should chaunt such a long rigmarole, little in unison with, and far distant from, the question proposed?—How so? I shall reply. How? he will rejoin; cannot you remember that I asked you what is the beauty, that enables[5] every thing, to which it is present, to become beautiful, be it stone, or wood, or man, or god, or any act, or any science.

[3] Ficinus alone has "omnium—"

[4] This "beat" seems strange; as if Hippias were likely to do, what he had reprobated in the case of the fictitious personage.

[5] Instead of ὑπάρχει, Ficinus found in his MS. παρέχει, what the sense requires, as shown by his version, "efficiet."

For I am asking, man, what is beauty in the abstract; and yet I am no more able to bawl[6] any thing into you, than if you were lying by my side a stone, and this too a mill-stone,[7] without ears and brains. Now, Hippias, would not you be annoyed, if I, in a fright, were to say after this (abuse), Nay, it was Hippias who said that this was the beautiful; although I asked him, as you do me, what is the beautiful to all persons and things, and at all times?—What say you? will you not be annoyed if I say so?

[29.] *Hip.* I am quite certain, Socrates, that what I said is the beautiful in every case, will appear so.

Soc. But will it be so? he will say; for surely the beautiful must always be beautiful.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And always was so, he will say.

Hip. It was.

Soc. Did the Elean stranger assert, he will say, that it was a beautiful thing for Achilles to be buried after his progenitors, and for his grandfather Æacus, and the others born of the gods, and even the gods themselves?

Hip. What is this! [8] Hurl him to the blessed (land)![8] Such questions as these of the fellow, Socrates, are not to be spoken even, as being of ill omen.

Soc. How so? It is surely no very ill-omened speech,

[6] Ficinus has, "tu vero non magis audisti"—as if he did not know the meaning of *γεγωνεῖν*, which is rarely found except in poetry; for the prosaic word is *γεγωνίσκειν*, found in Thucyd. vii. 76. See Heringa, Observ. Crit. p. 64.

[7] The Greek is *καὶ οὗτος μυλίας*. But a mill-stone, as I remarked many years ago, is no more able to hear than any other stone. Plato wrote *ἢ καὶ ὄνος τις μυλίας*: where *ὄνος μυλίας* means "an ass working at a mill," that becomes deaf and more stupid than other asses by the noise of the mill. There is too a kind of pun in *λίθος* and *ὄνος*—a word by which the upper or lower mill-stone (for Helladius differs from other lexicographers in this respect) was designated. Compare Soph. Œd. T. 379, *Τυφλὸς τά τ' ὦτα, τόν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὄμματ' εἶ.*

[8]—[8] Of the different explanations given of this proverb, the one most simple is that by Timæus; who says that as the dead were called "the blessed," the land of the dead or blessed would be the grave. A similar expression was *Εἰς ὀλβίαν*, explained by Photius, *εἰς μακαρίαν*. The Schol. on Aristoph. *Ἱππ.* 1148, compares *Βαλλ' ἐς μακαρίαν* with *Ἄπαγ' ἐς μακαρίαν*, and *Ἔρρ ἐς, μακαρίαν*. Sydenham prefers the novel interpretation suggested by Erasmus in Adag. ii. 1. 98, and which, he says, Schottus has given as his own in Schol. on Zenob. p. 42.

when one person asks a question, (for the other[9]) to say—Such is the fact.

Hip. Perhaps so.

Soc. Perhaps then you are the man, he will say, who asserts that it is a beautiful thing for every person, and at all times, to be buried by his descendants, and to bury his parents. Now was not Hercules one of the all? and those too whom we have just now mentioned?

Hip. But I did not say it was so for the gods.

Soc. Nor for the heroes, as it seems.

Hip. Nor for such as were children of the gods.

Soc. But for such only as were not.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. According to your reasoning then, it seems, that amongst the heroes it was a grievous and unholy thing for Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus; but to Pelops, and to the others so born,[10] it was a beautiful thing.

Hip. So it seems to me.

[30.] *Soc.* It seems then to you, he will say, what you have lately denied, that to some persons and at some times, it is not a beautiful thing after burying[11] their progenitors to be buried by their progeny; and further, as it seems, that this cannot take place to all, and be a beautiful thing. So that this very thing is in the same case as those before, namely, the maiden and the soup-dish: and still more ridiculously, to some it is a beautiful thing, but to others it is not beautiful: and even today, he will say, you are unable, Socrates, to answer the question, touching the beautiful, what it is. In these or suchlike terms will he reproach me justly, should I answer him in this manner. For very nearly after this fashion, Hippias, does he for the most part converse. Sometimes, however, as

[9] I have translated, as if the Greek were *ἐρομένου ἑτέρου ἕτερον φάναι*, not *ἐρωτωμένου ἑτέρου φάναι*: where *ἐρομένου* is due to the Bipont editor, who elicited that reading from "percontante" in Ficinus; while *ἕτερον*, evidently required by *ἑτέρου*, might easily have been lost when following its correlative.

[10] By *οὕτω γεγονόσι* Heindorf understands those born of mortal parents, but *οὕτω* could not have such a meaning. Besides, there is nothing to which *τοῖς ἄλλοις* can be referred. Perhaps Plato wrote *τοῖς ἄλλως πως ἀπό του*—i. e. "for those born in any other way from some one—"

[11] The Greek is *θάψαντι*, which is without regimen. The syntax requires *θάψασι* to agree with *ἐνίοις*.

if in pity for my want of skill and learning, he proposes a problem, and asks if such a thing as this seems to be the beautiful; [12] or he (talks) upon any other subject which he happens to have heard, and about which there is a talk.

Hip How say you, Socrates, this?

[31.] *Soc.* I will tell you.—Thou godlike Socrates, says he, do cease to give such answers and on such grounds; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful [13] be something of that kind, which we just now touched upon in the answer, when we said of gold, that where it is becoming it is beautiful; but where not, it is not so, and of all the rest likewise, to which the becoming may be present. On the becoming then itself, and on its nature, do you reflect becomingly,[14] whether this happens to be the beautiful. Now, I am accustomed in such matters to assent on every occasion. For I know not what to object.[15] But does it seem to you that the becoming is the beautiful? [16]

Hip. Assuredly, completely so, Socrates.

Soc. Let us reflect; [17] lest we be cheated like children merely.[17]

Hip. It is meet to reflect.

Soc. Observe then. Do we call the becoming that which, by its presence, causes each of those things, to which it may be present, to appear beautiful? or that which causes them to be so really? [18] Or neither of these?

[12] On this difficulty see the note in my edition.

[13] Ficinus has "ipsum pulchrum," in Greek *τὸ καλὸν*, not *καλὸν*—

[14] By omitting *τοῦ* with the two best MSS., and reading *πρέποντος* for *πρεπόντως*, I have restored a play upon the words *τὸ πρέπον—πρεπόντως σκόπει*. See at Phileb. § 57, n. 56. Add Gorg. p. 475, *καλῶς ὁρίζει—ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν*.

[15] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "quid objiciam." He therefore found in his MS. *ὅτι ἀντιλέγω*, not *ὅτι λέγω*.

[16] Here again Ficinus has correctly, "ipsum pulchrum," in Greek *τὸ καλὸν*, not *καλόν*.

[17]—[17] The Greek, *μή πη ἄρα ἐξαπατώμεθα. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ σκοπεῖν.* Now although *πη ἄρα* might be defended, the subsequently *ἀλλὰ* could not. Plato wrote, as I remarked many years ago, *μὴ παιδάρια ἐξαπατώμεθα ἄλλως. Χρὴ σκοπεῖν.* For *παιδάρια ἄλλως* mean "children merely." Compare Protag. p. 342, E., *ὥστε φαίνεσθαι—παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω*: where Heindorf quotes Theæt. p. 177, C., *ὥστε παιδων μηδὲν διαφέρειν*. Add Crito, § 10, *παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες*. So *μειράκιον* has been before corrupted into *ἄρα οὐκ ἂν*, as I have shown in § 21, n. 84

[18]—[18] A gross blunder, unnoticed by all the translators, has corrupted

Hip. It appears so to me.

Soc. Whether[18] that which causes things to appear beautiful? as when a person puts on clothes or shoes, which fit him, he looks more beautiful, although he is a laughing-stock.[19] [32.] Now, if the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, the becoming must be a deception with regard to the beautiful; and it would not be that, which we are seeking, Hippias. For we are in search of that, by which all things beautiful are beautiful; as in the case of the surpassing,[20] by which all things are great.[21] [For by this all things are great,][21] and though they may not appear so, yet, if they do surpass, they must of necessity be great. So we say of the beautiful, by which all things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming. For the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, as your reasoning (says), and does not suffer them to appear as they are. But, as I said just now, that which causes them to be really beautiful, whether they appear so or not, this we must endeavour to tell what it is; for this we are seeking, if we are seeking the beautiful.

Hip. But the becoming, Socrates, causes by its presence things both to be and to appear beautiful.

Soc. It is impossible then for things really beautiful not to appear to be beautiful; at least when that is present, which causes them to appear so.

Hip. It is impossible.

the Greek text in *οὐδέτερα*, instead of which we ought to read *ἀμφότερα*. S. This alteration, says Heindorf, is of no value, although it is confirmed by § 32; while to avoid the incongruity of a single answer to a tripartite question, he suggests a new arrangement of the speeches; and so too does Stalbaum by reading, ΙΠΠ. *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα.* ΣΩ. *ἆρ' ὃ ποιεῖ—φαίνεται.* ΙΠΠ. *ναί.* ΣΩ. *οὐκοῦν.* But this does not meet the difficulty in *οὐδέτερα.* Perhaps Plato wrote, what I partly suggested many years ago. *ἢ ὁδὸς ἑτέρα τούτων ἦν*, i. e. Or is there a road different from these?

[19] Ficinus, doubtless perceiving the incongruity here of *γελοῖος*, translated, perhaps designedly, "deformis." I once thought that Plato wrote *κἂν ᾖ γελοῖος κολοιὸς*, in allusion to the Æsopic story of the daw with borrowed feathers. But I now think that Ficinus found his MS. *κολοβὸς*, i. e. "dwarfish" or "mutilated."

[20] Sydenham, justly objecting to *τῷ ὑπερέχοντι*, would read *τὸ ὑπερέχον τι.* But as *τι* is unnecessary, he should have proposed likewise *ὥστε*—For thus *ὥστε καὶ* would be united to *ἀνάγκην* (not *ἀνάγκη*) *εἶναι*—

[21]—[21] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[33.] *Soc.* Shall we then, Hippias, confess that all things really beautiful, both institutions and pursuits truly beautiful, are reputed to be beautiful, and appear so always to all men? Or,[22] (must we say) quite the contrary, that they are unknown, and that dissension and contest take place respecting these points most of all, both amongst individuals privately and publicly amongst states?

Hip. In this way[23] rather, Socrates, that they are unknown.

Soc. This would not (have been unknown)[24] [25]if the appearing to be beautiful had been added to the reality:[25] and added it would have been, had the becoming been the beautiful, and had caused things not only to be beautiful, but to appear so likewise: so that the becoming, if it were that, which causes things to be beautiful, would be that beauty in the abstract, of which we are in search, and not which causes things to appear beautiful. But if, on the other hand, the becoming merely causes things to appear only beautiful, it cannot be the beautiful, of which we are in search; for this causes them to be so really. Now to cause things to appear to be beautiful, and to be really so, is not in the power of the same thing, nor of any thing else whatever. Let us then choose, whether you think the becoming causes things to appear beautiful, or to be so really.

Hip. I think, Socrates, to appear so.

Soc. Alas! gone and fled away from us, Hippias, has the knowledge of what the beautiful is; especially since the becoming has been seen to be a thing different from the beautiful.

Hip. So, by Zeus, it has, Socrates, and to me at least very unexpectedly.[26]

[34.] *Soc.* But let us not, my friend, give up seeking[27] for

[22] The two best MSS. read *διαλέγεσθαι* instead of *ἀγνοεῖσθαι*: from which, many years ago, I elicited *δεῖ λέγειν, ἀγνοεῖσθαι*, as I have here translated.

[23] In lieu of *οὕτω*, correct Greek would require *Τοῦτο*—

[24] Ficinus supplies the ellipse by his "ignoraretur—"

[25]—[25] So Sydenham translates the Latin of Ficinus, "si, ut pulchra sunt, ita pulchra etiam apparerent," as if he had found in his MS. *εἴ γέ που καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι καλοῖς οὖσιν αὐτοῖς προσῆν*, not *εἴ γέ που τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς προσῆν*.

[26] I have adopted *ἀσκόπως*, found in three MSS., in lieu of *ἀτόπως*. Compare *ἀσκέπτως* in § 48.

[27] In *μέντοι* lies hid, I suspect, *ματεύοντε*, as I have translated.

it. For I have still some hope that what the beautiful is will appear again.[28]

Hip. Altogether assuredly,[29] Socrates: for it is not difficult to find. At least I know well that, were I to retire into solitude for a little time and commune with myself, I should describe it to you more accurately than accuracy itself.[30]

Soc. Hold! Hippias, talk not so big—you see what trouble it has given us already—lest it should grow angry[31] with us, and run away still further than before. And yet I am saying nothing to the purpose; for you will, I think, easily find it out, when you come to be alone. And do, by the gods, [32] find it out in my presence; but if you are willing, seek it as now with me.[32] And if we find it, it will be the best of all; but, if we do not, I shall be content, I think, with my misfortune; while you going away will find it easily. But if we find it now, depend upon it, I shall not trouble you by inquiring what that was, which you had discovered by yourself. [33] For the present consider it, if it seems to you to be the beau-

[28] In lieu of ἐκφανήσεσθαι, the train of ideas leads to αὖ φανήσεσθαι. On the confusion of εκ and αυ, see at Prometh. 229.

[29] The formula πάντως δήπου, expressive of an assent given from a thorough conviction, could not be introduced here in answer to the expression of a hope merely. Hence I still abide by my original conjecture, πάντως ζῇ ἐλπίς, similar to Ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσιν in Æsch. Ag. 792, and in Suidas Ζεῖ χύτρα· ζῇ φιλία, i. e. Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot.

[30] The Greek is τῆς ἀπάσης. But in this formula, where a personification takes place, the language requires αὐτῆς τῆς— See Porson on Hec. 779, and myself on Æsch. Eum. 865. To the passages there quoted I could now add many more.

[31] This is rather a violent prosopopœia. Beauty in the abstract could hardly be said to put itself into a passion. From the Greek words ὀργισθὲν ἡμῖν I long ago elicited ὄρνις ὡς εἰς θαμνὸν, "like a bird into a bush," and compared Rep. iv. p. 432, B., where Justice is feigned to fly like a hunted animal εἰς θάμνον.

[32]—[32] These words are strangely put together. "Find it—if you will —seek it with me." But if Hippias found it, he need not seek for it with Socrates. The words should have been, "Find it—but, failing, be willing to seek it with me," in Greek, ἔξευρε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, βούλου—συζητεῖν. There is moreover a difficulty in ὥσπερ νῦν, for which Ficinus found in his MS. ὡς πρὶν, καὶ αὖ, as shown by his version, "ut hactenus, sic deinceps."

[33]—[33] I cannot understand αὐτὸ—Heindorf explains it by ἐκεῖνο. But that is, to myself at least, equally unintelligible. For both αὐτὸ and ἐκεῖνο are applied to something already spoken of; whereas Socrates is about to enter upon a new subject. The sense required is evidently to

tiful. I say that it is. But keep your eye on me,[33] and give me all your attention, that I may not say any thing silly. Let then that which is useful, be for us the beautiful. And this I say from thinking on these points. The eyes, we say, are beautiful, not when they seem to be such, but are unable to see, but when they are able and useful for seeing. Is it not so?

Hip. It is.

[35.] *Soc.* Say we not then of the whole body thus, that one part of it is beautiful for running, another for wrestling? and further, that all the animal kind, as a beautiful[34] horse, and a cock, and a quail, and all utensils, and vehicles, for land and sea, [ships and triremes,][35] and all instruments both for music and the other arts, and pursuits and laws, and nearly every thing we call beautiful, are in the same position; and looking to each of them, in what way it has been born, made, or laid down,[36] we speak of a thing which is useful, as being beautiful in what it is useful, and for what it is useful, and when it is useful; but another thing, which is entirely useless, we call not beautiful. Does it not so seem to you, Hippias?

Hip. To me it does.

Soc. Correctly then do we now say, that the useful happens to be more than all beautiful.

Hip. Correctly, Socrates.

Soc. Now is not each thing, which is able to effect any thing, useful, so far as it is able? but that, which is unable, useless?

Hip. Entirely so.

[36.] *Soc.* Power then is beautiful, and want of power is not beautiful.

Hip. Very much so. And the rest of things, Socrates,

this effect, "Do you then consider well, whether the beautiful seems to you to be, what I say it is; and what I shall say, do you look into thoroughly—" But whether Plato really wrote so, is another question.

[34] Instead of *καλὸν*, which is here out of place, I suggested many years ago, *καὶ κυνίδιον*. For Plutarch combines the same four animals in ii. p. 471, E., *κύνας—καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρτυγας καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνας*—quoted by Heind. on Lys. p. 211, E., *ὄρτυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνα—ἢ ἵππον ἢ κύνα.*

[35] The words *πλοῖά τε καὶ τριήρεις* are evidently an interpretation of *ὀχήματα—τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ.* Plato had probably a recollection of *Θαλασσόπλαγκτα—ναυτίλων ὀχήματα* in Prometh. 477.

[36] Unless *κεῖται* be said here in reference to the *ἐπιτηδεύματα* and *νόμοι*, one would prefer *ἀπόκειται*, "are appropriated."

testify in our favour that such is the case, but particularly as regards matters of state. For of all things it is the most beautiful for a person to be powerful in state-affairs, and in his own city; but to be powerless, the least so.

Soc. You say well. By the gods then, Hippias, is not wisdom on this account the most beautiful of all things, and ignorance the least so?

Hip. What else[37] do you think, Socrates?

Soc. Softly, my dear friend; since I have a fear about what I am saying.

Hip. What do you fear, Socrates? For your reasoning has proceeded very beautifully at present.

Soc. I wish it had. But do you consider this with me. Could a person do any thing, of which he knows nothing, and for which he has no power?

Hip. By no means. For how could he do that, for which he has no power?

Soc. Are then they, who err, and act wrong, and do a thing unwillingly, [38]other than those, who[38] would not have so acted, unless they had possessed the power?

Hip. It is evident.

[37.] *Soc.* But, however, they who are powerful are powerful through power; for assuredly it is not through want of power.

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. All then, who do any thing, are able to do what they do.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And all men, beginning from boyhood, do many more evil things than good, and err unwillingly.

Hip. The fact is so.

Soc. What then, shall we say that this power and these means, however useful they may be for the doing evil, are beautiful? or do they want much of being so?

Hip. (They want) much,[39] in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. The powerful then and the useful, Hippias, are not, it seems, the beautiful.

[37] I have translated, as if the Greek were Ἄλλο τί οἴει, not Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει.

[38]—[38] The Greek is ἄλλο τι οὔτοι, εἰ—which I long ago corrected, as the sense requires, into ἄλλο τι οὔτοι ἢ οἵ, εἰ—

[39] After δεῖ at the end of the question, has dropt out δεῖ in the commencement of the answer.

Hip. If[40] indeed, Socrates, it has power to do good, or is useful for things of that kind.

Soc. Away then has fled[41] that thing, at once the powerful and the useful, as being[42] without exception beautiful. Now this was that very thing, Hippias, which our soul[43] meant to say, that the beautiful consists in utility and the power to produce some good.

Hip. So it seems to me.

Soc. Now this is the advantageous. Is it not?

Hip. It is.

[38.] *Soc.* Thus then beautiful bodies, and beautiful institutions, and wisdom, and all these things we just now mentioned, are beautiful, because advantageous.

Hip. Evidently so.

Soc. The advantageous then appears to be, Hippias, to us, the beautiful.

Hip. Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. But the advantageous is that, which effects a good.

Hip. It is.

Soc. Now that, which effects, is nothing else than a cause. Is it not?

Hip. It is so.

Soc. The beautiful therefore is a cause of the good.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Now the cause, Hippias, [44]and that of which it is the cause, are different.[44] [45]For the cause cannot surely be a

[40] Instead of "If," the sense requires "Unless." In Greek not *ἐὰν*, but *ἂν μὴ*, as I remarked long ago.

[41] In *τοίνυν* lies hid *πτάμενον*. Compare Legg. iii. p. 686, A., *ταῦτα δὴ τὰ μεγάλα—διέπτατο*: and *οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος* in Sympos. p. 183, E.

[42] This use of *εἶναι* after *οἴχεται* seems scarcely correct Greek.

[43] Although the power of speech is given to the soul in Sympos. p. 192, D., *ἡ ψυχὴ—δύναται εἰπεῖν*, and in Soph. Antig. 227, *ψυχὴ—ηὔδα*: yet as nothing has been said of the soul, unless we adopt the reading of the two best MSS. in § 34, of *ψυχῇ* for *τύχῃ*, but a great deal about *χύτρα*, it is evident, as I remarked long ago, that Plato wrote here *χύτρα*, and there *χύτρᾳ*.

[44]—[44] The Greek is *καὶ οὗ ἂν αἴτιον ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον*, i. e. "and that, of which the cause is a cause." But the sense requires, "and that of which it is the cause;" in Greek, *καὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον*. Correctly then has Ficinus, "Aliud vero est causa; aliud id, cujus causa est."

[45]—[45] The Greek is *τό γε αἴτιον αἰτίου αἴτιον*. But Ficinus, "causa ipsius causæ causa:" from whence Sydenham, "the cause—the cause of

cause of a cause.[45] Consider it in this way. Did not the cause appear to be a maker?

Hip. Clearly.

Soc. That, which is made by the maker, is nothing else but the produced; but is not itself the maker.

Hip. Such is the fact.

Soc. The produced then is one thing, and the producer is another.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. [46]The producer then is not the cause of itself,[46] but of that, which is produced by it.

Hip. Entirely so.

Soc. If then the beautiful is the cause of a good, such a good must be produced by the beautiful; and for this reason, as it seems, we attend to intelligence, and all other beautiful things, because their work and issue are worthy of attention, as being the good; and from what we are discovering, the beautiful is near to being in the form (as it were)[47] of a father to the good.

Hip. Entirely so. For you speak beautifully, Socrates.

[39.] *Soc.* Say I not this too beautifully, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father?

Hip. Beautifully indeed.

Soc. Nor is the cause the thing produced; nor is, on the other hand, the thing produced the cause.

Hip. You say what is true.

Soc. By Zeus then, thou best of men, neither is the beautiful the good, nor is the good the beautiful. Or does it seem to you from what has been said, that it is possible?

itself," as if he wished to read *αὐτοῦ* in lieu of *αἰτίου*. But the train of thought requires, "that, of which there is a cause, cannot be itself a cause;" in Greek, *Οὐ γάρ που, ὅτου γ' ἔστιν αἴτιόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ αἴτιον ἂν εἴη*: where *ὅτου* for *οὔτινος* has been, as usual, the cause of error; as I showed in my note printed many years ago, to which I will here refer the inquisitive reader.

[46]—[46] The Greek is *Οὐκ ἄρα τό γ αἴτιον αἴτιον αἰτίου ἐστὶν.* But this is at variance with the chain of argument, which requires a reference to the producer. Plato could have written only *Οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ποιοῦν αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν*, as I stated long ago, and have here translated.

[47] In *τινὸς εἰ ἰδέα*, found in the two best MSS., lies hid *τινος ὡσεὶ ἰδέα*, as I remarked long ago.

Hip. By Zeus, it appears to me not possible.

Soc. Does it then please us, and are we willing to assert, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful?

Hip. By Zeus, it does not please me at all.

Soc. And, by Zeus, Hippias, to me too it pleases the least of all the assertions we have made.

Hip. And reasonably so.

Soc. The assertion then, which just now appeared the most correct of all, that the advantageous and the useful and the powerful to do some good, was the beautiful, runs the risk of not being so; but if possible, of being more ridiculous than the first (mentioned), in which we conceived the maiden, and each of the things before mentioned, to be the beautiful.

Hip. It seems so, indeed.

[40.] *Soc.* And I too, Hippias, have no longer where to turn myself, but am at a loss. Have you any thing to say?

Hip. Not at least for the present. But, as I said just now, I know well that on reflection I shall find it out.

Soc. But, through my eagerness to know, I seem to myself unable to wait your delay. [48] For after being somewhat in doubt,[48] I think I have just now found out a way. For consider, if we call that beautiful, which causes us to be delighted, —I do not mean all pleasures,—but that which arises through the hearing and the sight, [49] how and for what could we contend?[49] For surely beautiful men, Hippias, and embroidery of all kinds, and pictures of animals, and earthenware, do, when they are beautiful, delight us, while we look upon them; [50] and so likewise do beautiful sounds,[50] and music in general, and conversations, and story-telling produce the very same effect. So that should we say in reply to that swaggering

[48]—[48] The Greek is *καὶ γὰρ οὖν δή τι καὶ*—an accumulation of particles, which defy an exact translation. Plato probably wrote *Καὶ γὰρ ἀπορῶν δή τι*, as I have translated.

[49]—[49] The Greek is *πῶς τί ἄρ' ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα.* To avoid the doubled interrogatives Sydenham suggested *πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀγωνιζοιμεθα*; or *πρὸς τί γὰρ*—"For what purpose should we contend about it?"—But Heindorf defends the two interrogatives by quoting five similar passages from Plato alone. I suspect however we ought to read *πῶς τε καὶ πρὸς τί*—as I have translated. See my note on Æsch. Suppl. 927, where to the passages already quoted I could add as many more.

[50]—[50] The Greek is *καὶ οἱ φθογγοὶ οἱ καλοὶ*—But the balance of the sentence requires—*καὶ οἱ φθογγοὶ αὖ καλοὶ* to answer to—*οἱ καλοὶ ἄνθρωποι.*

fellow—My man of mettle, the beautiful is that, which produces pleasure through the hearing, and the sight—think you that we should restrain him from his swaggering?

Hip. What the beautiful is seems, Socrates, to me at least, to be well defined.

[41.] *Soc.* What then shall we say, Hippias, that pursuits[51] and institutions being pleasant through the hearing, or through the sight, are beautiful? or have they some other kind (of beauty)?

Hip. These beautiful things will, perhaps, Socrates, lie hid from the man.

Soc. (But)[52] by the dog, not from the person, Hippias, before whom I should be the most ashamed to trifle, and to pretend to say something to the purpose, when I was saying nothing.

Hip. Who is he?

Soc. The son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to [53] say off-hand [53] what has not been investigated, than to speak, as if I knew what I did not know.

Hip. To myself too it appears, since you have mentioned it, that the case is different as regards institutions.

Soc. Softly, Hippias. For we have fallen into the very same difficulty respecting the beautiful, as we were in just now; and we are in danger of conceiving ourselves to be in a pretty[54] easy road.

[51] After *ἐπιτηδεύματα* is inserted *τὰ καλὰ*, at variance with the language and logic. On the other hand, *τὰ καλὰ* have dropt out in the answer of Hippias, where instead of *κἂν* we must read *τὰ καλὰ ἂν*—and so I have translated.

[52] "Before *μὰ* is manifestly required *ἀλλὰ*: for otherwise Socrates would seem to indicate that he was himself the fictitious person. On the other hand, to the remark of Hippias, 'This will perhaps lie hid from the man,' Socrates would well reply, 'But not from the person before whom I should be the most ashamed to talk nonsense.'" Such was the note I printed many years ago, knowing that ΑΛΛΑ might easily have been lost before ΜΑ. And thus we are relieved from the necessity of considering with Schleiermacher, whom Stalbaum follows, the question of Hippias and the reply of Socrates, as interpolations. Of this passage Cicero had perhaps a recollection when he wrote, "Hunc autem esse unum hominem ex omnibus, quo præsente, ego ineptus esse minime vellem." De Orator. § 24.

[53]—[53] Ficinus has "facile judicarem," as if his MS. read *κρίνειν*, not *λέγειν*.

[54] The Greek is *οἴεσθαι ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι εὐπορίᾳ εἶναι*. But *ἄλλῃ εὐπορίᾳ* could not be opposed to *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπορίᾳ*. Heindorf once considered

Hip. How say you so, Socrates?

Soc. I will state what to me [55] appears to be beautiful,[54] if indeed I am saying any to the purpose. That which relates to institutions and pursuits would perhaps appear to be not removed from the sensations which arise through the hearing and sight. But let us abide awhile by the definition, that what is through those senses pleasant, is beautiful, without bringing before us the question relating to institutions. [42.] Now should the man I mentioned, or any one else, ask us—Why have ye, Hippias and Socrates, separated from the pleasant in general that species of it, in which ye say consists the beautiful, and yet deny that what relates to the other sensations (connected with) [56] food and drink and sexual intercourse, and all the rest of such a kind, are beautiful? Or do ye assert that (these) [57] are not pleasant, and that there are no pleasures at all in such sensations, nor in any thing else except seeing and hearing? What shall we say, Hippias?

Hip. We will say by all means, Socrates, that in the other things likewise there are very great pleasures.

Soc. Why then, he will say, do ye take away from (these) [58] pleasures, really existing no less than those, their very name, and deprive them of the property of being beautiful? Because, we will say, there is not one, who would not laugh at us, were we to say that to eat is not a pleasant, but a beautiful thing, and to smell sweet not a pleasant thing, but beautiful. [43.] But with regard to sexual intercourse, all would surely admit [59] that it is to us a thing the most pleasant; but it is meet so to carry it on, if a person will do it, as that no

εὐπορία an interpolation; but subsequently interpreted ἐν ἄλλῃ τινι by "rursus in alia." But that would be ἐν ἄλλῃ αὖ, or rather without ἄλλῃ: for which I would now read καλῇ, with a play on the word καλῇ, just as in πρεπόντως in § 31. Ficinus has "dum putamus quiddam certi nos habere," and thus avoids all the difficulties of the text.

[55]—[55] I have translated as if the Greek were ἅ γ' ἐμοὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, not ὅ γέ μοι καταφαίνεται. See the reasons for the change in my edition

[56] To avoid the strange expression αἰσθήσεις σίτων, we may insert ἕνεκα between ποτῶν and καὶ—

[57] Ficinus has "dulcia hæc," as if he had found in his MS. οὐδὲ τάδε ἡδέα οὐδὲ—

[58] Before ἡδονὰς the antithesis in ἐκείνας requires τάσδε—

[59] Instead of μάχοιντο, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were ἀνέχοιντο, while ἡμῖν depends upon ἥδιστον—

one see him; since it is a deed the most disgraceful to behold.[59] On our saying this, Hippias, he will perhaps remark,—I now perceive that you have been of old ashamed to say that these pleasures are beautiful, because they do not seem so to men. Now I did not ask what seems to be beautiful to the multitude, but what is so in reality. Whereupon we shall, I presume, state in reply, that we asserted that this part of the pleasant, arising from the sight and hearing, was a beautiful thing. [60]But have you it in your power to use the reasoning for any thing?[60] Or shall we, Hippias, say any thing else?

Hip. Against what has been urged, Socrates, it is necessary to say no other than this.

Soc. Truly do ye say well, he will reply. If then the pleasure, coming through the sight and hearing, be a beautiful thing, that which does not happen to be a part of such[61] pleasant sensations, it is clear cannot be beautiful. Shall we confess it?

Hip. Yes.

[44.] *Soc.* Is then that which is pleasurable, he will say, through the sight, pleasurable through the sight and hearing (conjointly)?[62] Or that which is pleasurable through the hearing, pleasurable through the hearing and the sight (conjointly?[63] By no means, we shall answer, would that which exists through either, exist through both; for this you seem to us to say; whereas we assert, that each of these pleasurable things would be beautiful, taken by themselves and both together. Should we not answer thus?

[59] Shakspeare—"He loved the deed of darkness; but he blushed To own it." Compare Phileb. p. 66, A. § 158. Plutarch Sympos. ii. p. 654, B.; Cicero de Offic. i. 35; Pythagor. Fr. p. 710, ed. Gale.

[60]—[60] This is the literal version of the Greek, Ἀλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is, "Tu vero, Hippias, quo te vertis?" as if he had found in his MS. Ἀλλ' ἔχεις ὅ, τι χρῇ σαυτῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, similar to ὅ, τι χρῷο σαυτῷ in Crito, § 4. But the balance of the sentence requires τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, to answer to μὴ ἄλλα—ἢ ταῦτα in the reply of Hippias. Compare Demosth. p. 590, ed. Wolf., ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχω τι χρήσομαι τοῖς τούτου μάρτυσι, quoted by Zeune on Viger. p. 323.

[61] The Greek is ὃ μὴ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τῶν ἡδέων. But Ficinus has "quod per alium sensum delectat," from which Stephens would elicit τούτῳ. He should have suggested τούτων—as I have translated.

[62], [63] The word ἅμ' has twice dropt out between ἐστιν and ἡδύ.

Hip. By all means.

Soc. [64]Does then, he will say, any pleasure whatever differ from any other pleasure whatever in this, namely, in being a pleasure? For (I ask not) whether any pleasure is greater or less, or more or less; but whether any one differs by this very thing, in one of the pleasures being a pleasure, but the other not a pleasure. Does it not seem so to us?

Hip. For it does not seem so.[64]

Soc. For some other reason then, he will say, than because they are pleasures, have ye selected these from all the rest; and having some such view with regard to both, that they differ in some respect from the rest, did ye not, looking to this, say that they are beautiful? For seeing is surely not a beautiful thing on this account, that it is through seeing. For, if this were the reason of its being beautiful, the other pleasure [65][that through hearing][65] would not be beautiful, [66]as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing.[66] Shall we say, you speak the truth?

Hip. We will.

[45.] *Soc.* Nor, on the other hand, is the pleasure through the hearing beautiful on this account, that it is through hearing. For then that through seeing would not be beautiful, [67]as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing.[67] Shall we say, Hippias, that the man, in speaking so, speaks correctly?

Hip. Yes, correctly.

Soc. But both, he will rejoin, are beautiful, as you assert. For so we say.

[64]—[64] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is manifestly corrupt.

[65]—[65] The words within brackets, *ἡ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς*, are evidently an explanation of *ἑτέρα*.

[66]—[66] So Sydenham; thus adopting the correction of Cornarius, *οὐκ οὖσα ἔτι γε*, which was suggested, probably, by the version of Ficinus, "cum per visum nequaquam efficiatur." The Greek is, *καλή· οὐκ οὖν ἔστι γε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονή*: from whence it is easy to elicit, as I did many years ago, what the sense requires, *καλή· ᾗ οὐ κοινόν ἐστί τι τῇ τε δι' ὄψεως ἡδονῇ*, i. e. "to which there is nothing in common with the pleasure of sight:" and a similar correction is requisite in § 45, where a similar idea occurs.

[67]—[67] See the preceding note.

Hip. We do.

Soc. They have then something in common and the same, which causes them to be beautiful, and which belongs to both conjointly, and severally to each. For otherwise they would not be beautiful conjointly and severally. Give to me a reply, as if to him.

Hip. I answer, that it appears to me as you say.

Soc. If then these pleasures, taken conjointly, are affected by any circumstance, but not so, if taken separately, they could not, at least under that circumstance, be beautiful.

Hip. How could it be possible, Socrates, that when neither are affected by any circumstance whatever, that both should be affected by that [68][by which neither is affected]?[68]

Soc. You think it is impossible.

Hip. [69]Yes; for a great want of acquaintance with the nature of those things would possess me, and of speaking the present speeches.[69]

[46.] *Soc.* (You speak) pleasantly, Hippias.[70] For I am in danger equally of fancying I see something so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible; but yet I see nothing (clearly).[71]

Hip. You are in no danger, Socrates; but you very readily look aside.[72]

[68]—[68] The words within brackets are an evident interpolation, and were properly omitted by Ficinus in his version, "ut, quod neutra illarum patitur, ambæ perpetiantur." Nor is this the only error here. For in one of the best MSS. are found the remains of the following words, which ought to close the next speech of Hippias: Εἰ γὰρ ἕκασται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπονθυῖαι ἂν εἶεν, i. e. For if each had been so circumstanced, it is evident both would have been.

[69]—[69] Such is the literal version of the Greek; for which I think I have suggested something more worthy of Plato in my edition.

[70] After ἡδέως γε, there is either an accidental omission or a grammatical ellipse of λέγεις: while in ἡδέως there is perhaps a play on the words closely connected with the things conveying the sensation of pleasure. On a similar play see § 31 and § 41.

[71] The Greek is ὁρῶ δὲ οὐδέν. Perhaps δ' εὖ should be read for δὲ. Compare Eurip. Phœn. 165, Ὁρῶ δῆτ' οὐ σαφῶς· ὁρῶ δέ πως. Heracl. 495, λέγει μὲν οὐ σαφῶς, λέγει δέ πως.

[72] Here again I have restored in my edition what Plato probably wrote. Stalbaum's version is, "you purposely neglect the true reason;" but ἑτοίμως does not mean "purposely;" nor is there any thing in the Greek to answer to "true reason."

Soc. [73]And yet many things of such a kind appear to me before my soul.[73] But I distrust them; because they do not present themselves to you, who have made the most money of all now famed for wisdom, but only to myself, who have never made any. And I have an idea, my friend, that you are playing with me, [74]and are willingly deceiving me; such strong and so many.[74]

Hip. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am playing with you or not, if you will only endeavour to tell me, what are those things that have presented themselves to you. For you will be seen to say nothing to the purpose. For you will never find that both of us have been affected by circumstances together, by which neither you nor I have been separately.

Soc. How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you are speaking something to the purpose, and I do not understand it. Do you then hear from me what I wish to state more clearly. [75]For it appears to me, that what neither I have been under the circumstance of being, nor am, nor, on the other hand, what you are under such a circumstance, it is possible for both to be; and on the other hand, that other things, which both of us are under the circumstance of being, neither of us are.[75]

[47.] *Hip.* You appear to me, Socrates, to exhibit in your answers again[76] still greater wonders than when you answered before. For just consider, if both of us were just, would not each of us be so? or if each unjust, would not both be so? if both were in health, would not each be so? or if each were wearied, or wounded, or struck, or were affected in any other way whatever, would not both of us be affected in the

[73]—[73] and [74]—[74] On both of these passages I must again refer the reader to the notes in my edition. For they are too long, and perhaps too learned, for the present work; especially as I could now add not a little to confirm the views there brought forward.

[75]—[75] Such is the literal version of the Greek, with which Stalbaum, in ed. 2, is satisfied; although, in ed. 1, he had transcribed Heindorf's note, who saw with Sydenham that there was something wrong here. But they do not appear to have seen that the train of ideas was originally something to this effect: "For it appears to me that, what neither I nor you have suffered, and what neither I am nor you are, this it is possible for both of us to suffer and to be; and on the other hand, what both of us have suffered and are, for neither of us to have suffered and to be."

[76] Instead of *αὖ* Sydenham would read *νῦν*, antithetical to *ὀλίγον πρότερον*.

same[77] way? Still further, if both of us happened to be made of gold, or silver, or ivory, or if you will, well-born, or wise, or held in honour, or old, or [young],[78] or in any state you will, incident to man, is there not a great necessity for each to be so?

Soc. Most assuredly.

[48.] *Hip.* But neither do you, Socrates, consider things as wholes, nor do they, with whom you are wont to converse. For taking separately the beautiful and each of things existing, you discuss it in your discourses, cutting it into fractions; and hence things of great size, and of continuous[79] length escape your observation. And to such an extent have they escaped you now, that you conceive there is something, either circumstance or being, which, as regards two things taken jointly, does exist, but does not, as regards them taken singly; or on the other hand, does exist, as regards each, taken singly, but not as regards both, taken jointly. So illogically, and inconsiderately, and sillily, and unreflectingly, do you conduct yourselves.

Soc. Such is our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man wishes, say the persons using every where the proverb,[80] but what he can. But[81] you are always assisting us with your admo-

[77] The Greek is *τοῦτο*—But "idem," in Ficinus, leads to *ταὐτὸ*—

[78] "The words *ἢ νέοι* are omitted by three MSS. correctly; for neither Socrates nor Hippias were young when the dialogue is supposed to have taken place. Should it however be said that the qualities, thus brought forward as examples, have been taken at random, it may be replied that Plato is not wont to speak without some definite design. In the words *χρυσοῖ, ἀργυροῖ,* and *ἐλεφάντινοι* there is an allusion to the subjects discussed in § 23; while in the words *γενναῖοι, σοφοὶ, τίμιοι, γέροντες,* Hippias alludes to himself as being of a good family, wise, honoured, and aged." Such is the note I wrote many years ago. But instead of rejecting *ἢ νέοι* entirely, I would now consider *γέροντες νέοι* as an explanation of *ὡμογέροντες,* restored again to Plato in Euthyd. p. 272, § 3, by myself in Poppo's Prolegom. p. 219.

[79] "In considering any subject, Plato is wont to speak of it in general terms, and then to divide it into its several species; and after distinguishing each species by its peculiar character, to arrive at the real nature of the thing in question." So remarks Sydenham; who might have referred for a notable instance of this method, to the Sophist and Statesman throughout, but more especially the latter, p. 258, B. § 2.

[80] The proverb in Greek was—*Ζῶμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα,* translated by Terence, "Ut quimus, aiunt; quando, ut volumus, non licet."

[81] I confess I cannot perceive here the requisite train of thought.

nitions. Since even now,[82] before I had been thus admonished by you how sillily we conduct ourselves, shall I give[82] you still a plainer proof, by stating what were our thoughts upon those points? or shall I not?

Hip. You will speak to one who knows already, Socrates. For I am conversant with each one of those who are engaged in disputations, and how they are situated. Still, if it is more agreeable to yourself, say on.

Soc. To me indeed it will be more agreeable. For we were, thou best of men, so silly before you said so of us, as to conceive with regard to myself and you, that each of us was one person, and that both could not be what each was; for we are not one, but two persons. Such a simpleton was I! [49.] But now we have been taught the contrary, that if both together are two persons, each of us also is of necessity two; and that if each of us be one, it is necessary for both of us to be one. For by a continuous argument (respecting) being,[83] it is not possible, according to Hippias, for it to be otherwise; but now having been persuaded by you, that whatever both of two things are, this too each of them is, I sit down here.[84] But first remind[85] me, Hippias, whether you and I are one, you and I together; or you are two, and I two.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. What I say. For I am afraid to speak plainly to you,[86] because you are harsh with me, whenever you seem to yourself[87] to speak something to the purpose.[87] But

[82]—[82] This is rather strange language, "Before I had—shall I." There is some error here. Perhaps Plato—*ἵν' ἂν τὸ πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ ταῦτ' εὖ νουθετηθῆναι φανῶ*, i. e. "in order that I may be shown to have been properly admonished thus by you."

[83] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας*. But Sydenham's, though less literal, is more intelligible, "by reason of the continuity of being."

[84] Between *ἐνθάδε* and *κάθημαι* has dropt out, I suspect, *κάνθων*, "a pannier'd ass." The word is found in Aristoph. Σφηκ. 179, and Εἰρ. 81, while its synonyme *ὄνος* is seen in the proverb alluded to in Plato Theætet. p. 146, A., *ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτὼν καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος.*

[85] Instead of *ὑπόμνησον*, which can hardly suit with *πότερον*, I suggested long ago *ὑπομήνυσον*, similar to "memora," in Ficinus.

[86] In lieu of *σε* Heindorf suggested *σοὶ*, answering to "coram te," in Ficinus.

[87]—[87] But this could be no reason for Hippias having a harsh feeling towards Socrates. What Plato probably wrote may be seen in my edition.

however tell me, is not each of us one? and so affected as to be one?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. If then each of us be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

Hip. I think it is.

Soc. Are we then both odd, being two?

Hip. This, Socrates, could not be.

Soc. But both together are even. Is it not so?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Now, because both together are even, is each of us on this account even?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. It is not then necessary, as you said just now, that what we both are together, we should be singly; and that, what each is, we should both be.

Hip. Not in these cases, but in those I spoke of before.

[50.] *Soc.* These are sufficient, Hippias; for we must be content with these, since it appears that some things are so, but others not. For I stated, if you remember, at the point from whence this conversation diverged,[88] that the pleasures through the sight, and through hearing, could not be beautiful in that, by which each happened to be affected (singly) and not both (jointly), or both (jointly) and not each (singly), but by what they were affected jointly and singly. And hence you admitted that both together and each singly were beautiful. On this account then I conceived that, by the existence which follows upon both, they ought, if both were beautiful, to be themselves[89] beautiful; but not by the existence wanting to the other.[90] And I think so still. But tell me, as if at the beginning (of our inquiry), if the pleasure through the sight and that through hearing are beautiful, both (jointly) and each (singly), does not that, which makes them so, follow on both (jointly) and each (singly).

Hip. Certainly.

[88] The MSS. vary between ἐλέχθη, ἐλέγχθη, and ἠλέχθη. Plato wrote, as I have translated, ἐπλάγχθη.

[89] Instead of αὐτὰ the train of thought evidently requires ἕκαστα, "each."

[90] In lieu of ἕτερα, Sydenham correctly suggested ἑκάτερα. Stalbaum translates ἕτερα "alterutrum." But such is not its meaning in correct Greek.

Soc. Is it then because each singly is a pleasure, and both too jointly, that they are beautiful? Or on this account alone,[91] because all the other pleasures would be in no respect less beautiful? For, if you remember, the latter were shown to be pleasures no less than the former.

Hip. I remember it well.

[51.] *Soc.* But because these are through the sight and hearing, on that account it was asserted they were beautiful.

Hip. It was so asserted.

Soc. See now, whether I speak the truth. It was stated, as my memory serves me, not that the pleasurable of every kind was beautiful; but such as was through the sight and hearing.

Hip. It is true.

Soc. Does not this circumstance then attend on both taken together? but not on each taken singly? [92] For by no means does each of them, as was said before, exist through both, but both through both, and each not.[92] Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Each of them is not beautiful through that which does not attend each. For the both does not attend upon (the) either.[93] So that we can by the hypothesis call both beautiful, but we cannot (call) either so. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

Hip. So it appears.

[52.] *Soc.* Shall we then say that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

Hip. What is to prevent it?

Soc. This seems to me, my friend, to prevent it; [94] because there were to us some things so appertaining to each, that, if they appertained to both, (they would appertain)[94] likewise

[91] Instead of *μὲν*, which has no meaning here, Plato doubtless wrote *μόνον*—

[92]—[92] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which is evidently corrupt.

[93] Before *ἑκατέρῳ* the article *τῷ* has dropt. Compare § 52, *τὸ ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἀμφότερον.*

[94]—[94] Ficinus has—"ut, si ambobus adsunt, adsint et singulis"—thus showing that he found supplied in his MS. the very words requisite for the sense and syntax—*εἴπερ—ἐπίγίγνοιντο, ἐπιγίγνοιντ' ἂν*—

to each; and, if to each, [95] to both likewise—all such you went through.[95] Is it not so?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. [96] But what I went through, (were) not so; of which was itself the each and the both.[96] Is it so?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Of what kind then, Hippias, does the beautiful seem to you? whether, as you asserted, that if I and you are strong, both are so; and if I and you are just, both are so; and if both, so too is each; and similarly, if I and you are beautiful, both are so; and if both, so too is each? Or is there nothing to prevent it; as (in the case of numbers, where) some things taken together being even, may be, when taken [98] singly, odd, and perhaps even:[97] or, when each, being taken separately, is perhaps irrational, but taken both together may be rational, or perhaps irrational,[98] and there are other things of this kind infinite in number, which I said presented themselves to me. [53.] Now, on which side do you place the beautiful? On that, as it appears to me, or to yourself. For it appears to me a great absurdity, for both of us to be beautiful, yet each of us not so; or for each to be beautiful, yet both not so; or as regards any other thing whatever of such a kind. Do you choose (to say)[99] in this way or that?

Hip. In this way, Socrates.

Soc. And you do wisely, Hippias, in order that we may be freed from a further search. For, if any of these things is the beautiful, the pleasurable, which comes through the sight and hearing, would no longer be the beautiful; for (the plea-

[95]—[95] The error in these words is corrected in the notes to my edition.

[96]—[96] To point out all the difficulties in the words between the numerals, and how they might be overcome, would require a longer note than is suited to this place.

[97] For instance, the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make the even number, ten; and the two even numbers, six and four, make the very same number. S.

[98]—[98] "Surd" quantities are called in Greek *ἄρρητα* or *ἄλογα*, and in Latin "irrationales." To illustrate this passage Heindorf justly says that $\sqrt{3}$ and $\sqrt{6}$ are *ἄρρητα*; but $\sqrt{3+6}$ is *ῥητόν*. Sydenham, he observes, translated *ῥητὰ* and *ἄρρητα* by "commensurable and incommensurable;" but that would be in Greek *σύμμετρα* and *ἀσύμμετρα*.

[99] Instead of *αἱρεῖ*, the two best MSS. read *ἐρεῖ*, which leads to *εἰδοῖ ἐρεῖν*—

surable)[1] that comes through the sight and hearing, causes both, taken together, to be beautiful; but not either singly. This however cannot be, as I and you, Hippias, have agreed.

Hip. We have agreed.

Soc. It is impossible then for that, which is pleasurable through the sight and hearing, to be the beautiful; since a thing being produced as beautiful exhibits something of the impossible.

Hip. Such is the case.

Soc. Say then again from the beginning, he will say, since you have erred in this, what, say you, is that beauty, which (attends) upon both these pleasures, for the sake of which you honoured them before the others, and called them beautiful? [54.] To me, Hippias, there seems a necessity to say, that these are of all pleasures the most harmless,[2] and the best, taken together and singly. Or have you to state any thing else, by which they are different from other pleasures?

Hip. By no means: for they are in reality the best.

Soc. This then, he will say, do you now assert the beautiful to be, namely, pleasure that is advantageous? So it seems, I shall answer. But what you?

Hip. I too (the same).

Soc. Is not then, he will say, the advantageous that, which is the efficient of good? Now the efficient, as shown lately, is a thing different from the effect; and the reasoning has now [3]come to you to the former reasoning;[3] for neither would the good be a beautiful thing, nor would the beautiful be a good thing; since each of these [4]is something else.[4] This we shall more than all assert, if, Hippias, we are of sound mind. For it is surely not just not to agree with him, who speaks correctly.

[1] The word ἡδὺ has probably dropt out between τὸ and δι', as is shown by the train of thought.

[2] What are here called ἀσινέσταται are described as ἀβλαβεῖς in Rep. ii. p. 257, D., and καθαραὶ in Phileb. p. 66, C.

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "relabimur," in Greek ἀνήκει: while in ἥκει ὑμῖν lies hid ἥκει κυκλούμενος, as in English, "reasoning in a circle."

[4]—[4] This is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what the sense requires, "each of these being different from the other."

[55.] *Hip.* But what, Socrates, do you conceive to be all this, taken together? They are the parings and snippings, as I said just now, of reasonings, separated into little bits. But that is a thing both beautiful and of great worth, to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech before a court of justice, or the Council-Hall, or any other official tribunal, before whom the speech may be addressed; and after producing conviction, to depart, carrying off not the least, but the greatest, of prizes, in the preservation of oneself and one's own property, and that of one's friends. These then you ought to lay hold of, and to bid adieu to such petty disputes, in order that you may not seem to be a simpleton, by taking, as just now, trifles and inanities in hand.

Soc. You, my dear Hippias, are a happy man; for you know what pursuits a simpleton[5] should follow, and have followed them, as you say, sufficiently.[6] But the misfortune of an evil genius, as it seems, lays hold of me, who am wandering continually and in doubt. For when I make a display of my doubts before you wise men, I am ever bespattered with dirt by you [7]when I make a display. [56.] For ye tell me[7] what you tell me now, that I busy myself about matters foolish, trivial, and worthless. But when, on the other hand, convinced by you, I say as ye do, that it is by far the best thing to be able to put together well and beautifully a speech, and to go through it before a court of justice, or any other concourse of people, I hear myself ill spoken of in all ways, both by some others here, but especially from that person who is always confuting me; for he happens to be my nearest of kin, and lives in the same house.[8] Whenever then I enter

[5] As Hippias called Socrates *ἀνόητον*, I suspect he returned the compliment by calling Hippias *ἄνουν*, which would be easily altered into *ἀνοῦ*, the usual abbreviation in MSS. for *ἄνθρωπον*.

[6] Instead of *ἱκανῶς*, Plato no doubt wrote, *οὐ κενῶς*, in allusion to the money that Hippias said, in § 5, he made by his lectures.

[7]—[7] There are several errors in the words between the numerals.

[8] Stalbaum justly remarks, that Socrates here discovers himself to be the fictitious person so frequently alluded to. Hence we must read, *ἐγγύτατα γένους καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἴκῳ ἄν*: where *οἶκος* means not only the house for the body, but for the soul likewise; for such the body was supposed to be. See at Phileb. § 54, n. 52. Add Etymol. M. *Σῶμα· οἰονεὶ δῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς.*

my dwelling [9][at home],[9] and he hears me talking in this way, he asks me if I do not feel a shame in presuming to converse about beautiful pursuits, after I have been so clearly convicted, that on the subject of the beautiful I do not know what it is in the abstract. And how then, says he, will you know, who has put together a beautiful speech or not, or (done) any other (beautiful) act, while knowing nothing of the beautiful? and when you are in such a situation, think you it is better for you to live than to die? Thus it has happened, as I told you, for me to hear myself ill-spoken of, and reproached by you, and to be abused by him. But, perhaps I must endure all this for nothing is out of place, if only I am benefited; and benefited, Hippias, I think I am by my intercourse with both of you. For I seem to myself to understand what the proverb[10] means, "difficult are the beautiful."

[9]—[9] The word *οἴκαδε* is an evident interpretation of *εἰς ἐμαυτοῦ*.

[10] To this proverb Plato has alluded in Rep. iv. p. 435, C., vi. p. 497, D., and Cratyl. p. 384, A. § 2. But as *καλὰ* in the proverb means elsewhere "honourable," but here "beautiful," Socrates advisedly says he *seems* to understand, that which was otherwise plain enough.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPIAS MINOR.

After showing, in the Hippias Major, that the very person, who had written and spoken on "the beautiful," had very confused ideas on that question taken in detail, and knew nothing at all of it when considered abstractedly, Plato has, in the Hippias Minor, represented Socrates as pursuing with no less keenness, though with scarcely equal vigour, the same unhappy Sophist, at the very moment when he was thought by his admirers to have made a more than ordinarily brilliant display of his intellectual powers.

Schleiermacher and Ast have condemned this dialogue as spurious; though of the reasons which have led them to this conclusion, I know nothing; nor can I imagine even what they are. They do not appear, however, to have been very convincing; for they have been called in question by Socher, and rejected by Stalbaum. For both these scholars knew, what Sydenham was the first to remark, that Aristotle has alluded, covertly, as usual, to a paralogism introduced into this dialogue; and that Cicero obtained from the same source his knowledge of some circumstances in the life of Hippias, which it is not likely he found elsewhere. And hence it is fair to infer, as I stated in the Introduction to the Menexenus, where something similar occurs, that, if the dialogue were not written by Plato himself, it must be the production of one, who could imitate his style so completely, as to evade detection, till more than two thousand years had elapsed after the commission of the forgery. Winckelmann however conceives that the Hippias Minor was written by Antisthenes, to whom has been attributed the Second Alcibiades; while Zeller, in his "Platonische Studien," Tübing. 1839, agrees with Schleiermacher in considering it as not a genuine production of Plato.

HIPPIAS MINOR.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

EUDICUS.

[1.] WHY, Socrates, are you so silent, after Hippias has made such a display? and why do you not either join in the praise of what has been said, or confute it, if he seems to you to have spoken any thing not correctly; especially since we are left by ourselves, we, who would lay an especial claim to share in an exercise relating to philosophy.

Soc. There are indeed, Eudicus, some things, which I would gladly inquire of Hippias, touching the points, of which he has just now been treating, relating to Homer. For I have heard from your father Apēmantus, that the Iliad of Homer is a more beautiful poem than the Odyssey; and so much the more beautiful, as Achilles is a better man than Ulysses; for each of those poems, he said, was composed, one in honour of Ulysses, and the other in that of Achilles. If then it is agreeable to Hippias, I would gladly inquire on this very point, what he thinks of those two persons, and which of them he says was the better man; especially since he has exhibited a great variety of other matter, relating to other poets, and to Homer likewise.

[2.] *Eud.* Nay, it is evident that Hippias will not grudge you an answer, if you ask him a question. If Socrates puts a question to you, Hippias, will you give him an answer; or how will you act?

Hip. I should act in a shocking manner, Eudicus, were

I now to fly from a question put by Socrates—I, who, when I go from my home at Elis up to Olympia to the general meeting of the Greeks, at the period of the Olympic games, constantly offer myself at the temple to speak upon any point that any person may wish, relating to the subject which has been prepared for my display, and to give a reply to any one upon any question he may put.

Soc. Your case, Hippias, is a happy one indeed, if at each Olympic festival you arrive at the temple, so full of hope touching the cleverness connected with the soul. For I should marvel much, if any one of those engaged in bodily contests came thither to contend in the body with so little fear, and with so much confidence, as you say you do, in the case of intellect.

Hip. With reason, Socrates, is such my case. For, from the time when I began to contend at Olympia, I have never met with a person my superior in any thing.

[3.] *Soc.* A beautiful offering, Hippias, do you proclaim your reputation for wisdom[1] to be to both the Elean state and your own parents likewise. But what were you saying to us about Achilles and Ulysses? Which of the two said you was the better man, and for what? For when many were within, and you were making the display, I missed what was said by you; for I feared to put a question, because the crowd was great, and lest I might by asking be an impediment to the display. But as we are now fewer in number, and Eudicus here commands me to ask, state clearly, and instruct us, what you said about those two men, and how you drew a distinction between them.

Hip. Nay, Socrates, I am willing to go through more clearly than I did then, what I said about those men, and others too. I assert then, that Homer has made Achilles the bravest of those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Ulysses the most versatile.

Soc. Ho! ho! Hippias! will you grant me some such favour as this? not to laugh at me, if I apprehend with difficulty what is said, and ask you frequent questions; and do you endeavour to answer me in a mild and good-tempered manner.

Hip. (I will do so), for it would be, Socrates, a disgraceful thing if I, who instruct others on these very points, and deem

[1] Ficin. omits τῆς σοφίας—

myself worthy to receive money on that very account, should, when I am interrogated by you, not show pardon towards you nor answer mildly.

[4.] *Soc.* You speak very fairly. For when you said that Achilles was represented as the bravest, I seemed to understand what you meant; and (so I did) when (you said) that Nestor was the wisest; but when you said that the poet had represented Ulysses as the most versatile, by this, to tell the truth, I did not thoroughly know what you meant. Tell me then, if I can better understand from this way. Is not Achilles represented by Homer as being versatile?

Hip. The least of all, Socrates, but the most simple. Since in "The Supplications,"[2] when he represents Achilles and Ulysses conversing with each other, Achilles says to Ulysses,

> Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove,
> Ulysses, full of many plans, 'tis meet
> Curtly a speech to say, as I will do,
> And to an end I think it will be brought.
> Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
> Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
> Another says. What I say, will be done.

Now in these verses he delineates clearly the habit of each hero; how that Achilles was truthful and simple, but Ulysses versatile and false. For he represents Achilles as speaking these verses to Ulysses.

Soc. Now indeed, Hippias, I am near to understanding what you mean by versatile. For you call, it seems, such a person false.

Hip. Exactly so, Socrates. And such a person has Homer represented Ulysses in many places both of the Iliad and Odyssey.

Soc. By Homer then, it seems, the man of truth was considered as one character, and the man of falsehood another; but not (both)[3] the same.

Hip. How should they not, Socrates?

Soc. And are you too of the same opinion, Hippias?

[2] The books of Homer are quoted by ancient authors with reference to their subjects, not, as now, by their number. See at Cratylus, § 95. The passage here alluded to is in ix. 308.

[3] Ficinus has "neque utrumque eundem esse," as if he had found in his MS. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφότερος.

Hip. Most certainly. For it would be a terrible thing if I were not.

[5.] *Soc.* Homer, then, let us dismiss; since it is impossible to inquire of what he was thinking, when he composed those verses. But as you appear to take upon yourself his cause, and, what you assert that Homer meant, seems to you likewise, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.

Hip. So it shall be. Ask then briefly any question you like.

Soc. By men of falsehood do you mean such, as are unable to do a certain act, as persons labouring under sickness, or such as are able.

Hip. I mean such as are very able (to do) many other things, and likewise to put upon persons a deceit.

Soc. The versatile then it seems, according to your account, are men able to do something. Are they not?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is it through silliness and want of intellect that they are versatile and deceivers? or through knavery and a certain kind of intellect?

Hip. Through knavery the most of all, and intellect.

Soc. They are then men of intellect, it seems.

Hip. They are, by Zeus, very much so.

Soc. Since they are men of intellect, are they ignorant of what they are doing? or do they know it?

Hip. They know it very well. And through this they act wickedly.

Soc. Knowing then what they know, are they untaught, or wise?

Hip. Wise on this very point, to deceive.

[6.] *Soc.* Hold now; let us recollect what you have said You assert that men of falsehood are men of power, and in tellect, and knowledge, and wisdom, on those points wher they are men of falsehood.

Hip. I assert it.

Soc. And that men of truth and men of falsehood are different, and opposed to each other.

Hip. This I assert.

Soc. Come then, amongst the men of power and wisdom, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. When you say that men of falsehood are men of power and wisdom as regards those very things,[4] do you mean that they are able to be false, if they wish it? or unable as regards those things, in which they are false?

Hip. That they are able.

Soc. To sum up the whole then, have men of falsehood the wisdom and power to be false?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. The man, therefore, who is unable, or has not been taught (to be false), cannot be a man of falsehood.

Hip. Such is the case.

Soc. Each person then, who is able to do what he wishes at the time when he wishes, is a person of power. I am not speaking of a person, prevented by some disease or any other thing of that kind; but, I mean, (that he is able,) as you are, whenever you wish, to write my name. Do you not call the person who is in this state, a person of power?

Hip. I do.

[7.] *Soc.* Tell me now, Hippias, are you not skilled in numbers and accounts?

Hip. Most especially, Socrates.

Soc. Were a person then to ask you, "What number is thrice seven hundred," you could, if you would, say of all persons the quickest and truest respecting it.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Is it because you are the man of the greatest power and wisdom on those points?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Are you merely the man of the greatest wisdom and power? or are you the best[5] likewise with respect to those points, in which you are of the greatest power and wisdom?

Hip. The best assuredly, Socrates.

Soc. You would therefore, upon these subjects, speak the truth with the greatest power possible. Is it not so?

Hip. I think so.

Soc. But what, are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the very same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as

[4] Namely, of falsehood, says Stalbaum. Ficinus has "ad eadem," in Greek *εἰς αὐτὰ ταὐτὰ*—

[5] By "best" Sydenham understands "the most veracious."

you did before, nobly and with a high bearing. If then a person were to ask you, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" whether would you be false the most, and say always and according to the same circumstance what is false, if you wished to be false, and never at any time to give a true answer? Or would a person unskilled in accounts be better able than yourself, if so inclined, to be false? Would not the person unskilled, although desirous of being false, frequently speak the truth unwillingly, by accident, through his knowing nothing? But you, being wise on those points, could, if you were inclined to be false, be ever and according to the same circumstances false.

Hip. Yes; the case is as you state it.

Soc. Whether then is the person, who is false upon other points, not so in the case of numbers? nor would he be false in numbers?

Hip. By Zeus, in numbers too.

[8.] *Soc.* Let us then, Hippias, suppose that there is a certain person false upon the subject of numbers and accounts.

Hip. Well.

Soc. Now what kind of person must he be? Must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, possess, if he intends to be false, the power to be false? for it was, if you remember, said by you, that he who wants the power to be false would never be false.

Hip. I remember; it was said so.

Soc. Were you not just now shown to possess the greatest power to be false in the case of accounts?

Hip. Yes; and this too was said.

Soc. And do you not possess the greatest power to speak the truth relating to accounts?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The same person then possesses the greatest power to say what is false and true relating to accounts. [6]Now he who is the best on such subjects is the accountant.[6]

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals were considered an interpolation by Bekker. But Stalbaum says that to ἀγαθὸς in this speech of Socrates there is an allusion in the subsequent one of the same speaker; while he compares ἀγαθὸς—ὁ λογιστικὸς with "bonos rationatores" in Cicero De Offic. i. 18.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Who else then, Hippias, is the man of falsehood[7] with regard to accounts, than the good (accountant)? for he is the person of power, and he too of truth.

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. You see then that the same person is on these points both false and true; and that he, who is true, is not a better man than he, who is false: for surely he is the same, and has not, as you just now fancied, qualities the most opposite.

Hip. It appears so in this case at least.

Soc. Are you willing then for us to consider the question on another ground?

Hip. [Otherwise],[8] if you wish it.

[9.] *Soc.* Are not you skilled in geometry likewise?

Hip. Yes, I am.

Soc. What then, is it not so in geometry likewise? Is not the same person, who has the greatest power to be false and to speak the truth respecting diagrams, the geometrician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is there any other, who is good at diagrams?

Hip. No other.

Soc. The good and clever geometrician then has the greatest power in both ways. And, if there be any one else, who is false on the subject of diagrams, it would be the good one: for he has the power; whereas the bad (geometrician) wants the power to be false: so that he, who wants the power, could not be false, as has been admitted already.

Hip. It is so.

Soc. Let us now consider further the third instance, that of an astronomer; in which science you conceive yourself still

[7] Aristotle, in Metaphys. v. 29, observes that there is here a paralogism; for by ψευδὴς, "a man of falsehood," is meant a man δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι, "capable of telling a falsehood;" whereas the word properly signifies a man apt to speak falsities through choice, and with the intention to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristotle however does not condemn Plato, whose name is not mentioned, as guilty of arguing unfairly; but appeals to this passage as a singular instance of the improper use of the term ψευδὴς, "false." S.

[8] Bekker, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would expunge ἄλλως, omitted by Ficinus; whose version is, "ut lubet;" but Graser, in Adversar. p. 99, would retain it. We might perhaps read ἄλλοθι, to answer to the preceding ἄλλοθι.

more skilled than in those (mentioned) before. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Do not the very same things hold good in astronomy?

Hip. It is probable, Socrates.

Soc. In astronomy likewise, if there be any one else who is false, the good astronomer will be the man of falsehood, as having the power to be false; for it cannot be the man, who wants the power; for he is unskilled.

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. The same person therefore in astronomy likewise will be the man of truth and falsehood.

Hip. It seems so.

[10.] *Soc.* Come then, Hippias, and consider freely in this manner through all sciences, whether the case be otherwise than this. Now you are of all men the most skilled in every way in the greatest number of arts,[9] as I once heard you boasting, when you were detailing your abundant and enviable wisdom in the market-place by the tables of the usurers.[10] For you said you once went to Olympia, having as the work of your own hands all that you wore about your body:[11] first, the ring which you had on your finger—for you began with that—was your own work, proving your skill in cutting rings; and you had another[12] seal of your own workmanship, and a strigil,[13]

[9] The origin of this universal knowledge in arts and sciences, Sydenham conceives is to be traced to the fact mentioned by Iamblichus in his life of Pythagoras, that Hippias was for a short time a disciple of Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania; who taught that the perfect man was *αὐτάρκης*, "self-sufficient." But instead of the mental self-sufficiency, which his master had in mind, Hippias conceived that the doctrine had reference to all the conveniences, and even the ornaments of life, and that the philosopher should know and practise the arts and sciences by which he might become self-sufficient, and attain a resemblance to the deity; for, according to Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. i., "to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is to approach the nearest to it." S.

[10] Such is Stalbaum's interpretation of *ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις*. But I would refer it rather to the tables, which mountebanks made use of to exhibit the tricks of their trade.

[11] From this passage Cicero drew the facts mentioned in his De Orator. iii. 32.

[12] Instead of *καὶ ἄλλην* I should prefer *καὶ καλὴν*—

[13] This was an instrument used by the Greeks to scrape the skin, and similar to the modern flesh-brush (or rather, curry-comb). After using

and an unguent-box, which you had made yourself; moreover the shoes you then had on, you said you had cut out yourself and made; and that you had woven the upper and the under cloak which you then wore. But what seemed the strangest thing to all, and a proof of the greatest cleverness, was—when you stated that the belt which you wore round your vest—and it was of the costly kind made in Persia—you had plaited yourself; and in addition to all this, you came there bringing your own poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, and many and various compositions in prose; and that in the arts, which I have just now mentioned, you had reached a pre-eminence in skill above all the rest, and in accuracy on points of rhythm and harmony, and grammar; and in addition to these (you spoke of) many other things, as I appear to myself to remember. But I had like to have forgotten, it seems, your art of memory, in which you deem yourself to shine the most; and, I presume, I have forgotten very many others. [11.] But what I mean is this—Do you, turning your eye upon your own (arts)—and they are quite enough—and upon those of others, tell me—if perchance you can discover from what has been acknowledged by myself and you—where is the man of falsehood and the man of truth apart and not the same? Consider the matter in any kind you please, of wisdom, or knavery, or whatever else you delight to call it; and you will never find it, my friend; for it does not exist; but (if it does), do you mention it.

Hip. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the instant, at least.

Soc. Nor will you, as I think, ever be able. If then I am speaking what is true, do you remember, Hippias, what results from the reasoning?

Hip. I do not very well understand, Socrates, what you mean.

Soc. For you do not perhaps at present make use of your art of memory. For it is evident that you think there is no need of it. But I will remind you. You know that you said

the strigil, they took a bath, and afterwards anointed themselves, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood put into circulation, and the joints made supple and pliant. S. The practice has been introduced from the East into England, under the name of "shampooing." Stalbaum refers to Persius v. 136, "I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer;" and says that Boeckh, in his Domest. Œconom. Athen. ii. p. 330, explains στλεγγὶς by "a comb."

Achilles was a man of truth, but Ulysses a man of falsehood, and versatile.

Hip. I did so.

Soc. But you now perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have been proved to be the same person; so that, if Ulysses is a man of falsehood, he becomes no less a man of truth: and if Achilles is a man of truth, he (becomes) likewise a man of falsehood; and the men do not differ from, nor are they opposite to, each other, but are similar.

Hip. You are always, Socrates, weaving some discourses of this kind, and, cutting off that portion of the argument which is the most difficult, you lay hold of it in the way of something minute;[13] but you do not grapple with the question as a whole, respecting which the debate happens to be. For even now, if you wished it, I could show from many proofs in a satisfactory speech, that Homer has represented Achilles as a man of greater bravery than Ulysses, and free from falsehood, but the latter as crafty, and frequently false, and worse than Achilles. And do you, if you will, place (your) reasonings opposite (to mine), (to prove) the other is the better man; and (thus) the persons here will the better know, which of us is the better speaker.

[12.] *Soc.* I have no doubt, Hippias, of your being cleverer than myself. But I am ever accustomed, when any one says any thing, to give my attention—especially when the speaker seems to be a clever person—as being desirous of learning what he is speaking about, and ask him questions, and I think over the question again, and I put together what has been said, in order that I may understand it. But if the speaker appears to me to be a person of no mark, I neither ask him any questions, nor give myself any thought about what he has been talking. Now by this you may know what persons I consider to be clever. For you will find me solicitous about what has been said by such[14] a person, and making inquiries of him, in order that I may be benefited by learning. Since even

[13] The same complaint is made by the Sophist in Hipp. Maj. p. 301, A. § 48, and p. 304, A. § 55.

[14] Instead of *τούτου* Ficinus has "illorum," as if he had found in his MS. *τούτων*. Sydenham prefers *τοιούτου*—

now I have been thinking, while you were speaking, that, in the verses, which you just now recited to show that Achilles was speaking, as if he were a cheat, to Ulysses, something appeared to me to be strange; if, what you assert, is the truth, that the versatile Ulysses no where appears to be a man of falsehood, while Achilles appears to be versatile according to your expression; at least he tells a falsehood. For Achilles having spoken those very words, which you have just now recited,

> Hateful to me, as are the gates of hell,
> Is he, who one thing in his bosom hiding,
> Another says—

he states shortly afterwards, that he would not be dissuaded (from his purpose) by either Ulysses or Agamemnon; nor would he stay at all in the Trojan land; but he says,

> To-morrow, after paying holy rites
> To Zeus and all the gods, I will my ships
> Load well, and drag them to the deep; and then
> Thou'lt see, if such thy wish, and such thy care,
> At dawn of day my vessels sailing o'er
> The Hellespont fish-feeding, and my sailors
> Eager to ply the oar; and should the voyage
> Prosperous the god, for shaking earth renowned,
> Grant, fertile Phthia reach I the third day:

and still before this he says, while abusing Agamemnon, (in Il. i. 169,)

> But now I'll go to Phthia; since 'tis far
> Better to homeward wend with ships, [15] whose sterns
> Are rounded; [15] nor, myself dishonour'd thus,
> Think I, that here thou'lt yearly riches gain.

Now though he had said this at one time in the face of the whole army, and at another to his friends, he no where appears to have made any preparations, or even an attempt, towards dragging down his vessels to the sea, as being about to sail homeward, but very [16] nobly deemed it a little thing to tell the truth.[16] I therefore, Hippias, proposed at the beginning the question, as I was in doubt which of these two had been repre-

[15]—[15] Such is the conventional version of *νηυσὶ κορωνίσι*. But as *κορώνη* is a kind of an aquatic bird, it seems more natural to understand by *ναυσὶ κορωνίσι*, "ships" shaped like a sea-fowl.

[16]—[16] Perhaps Horace had in mind this passage of Plato, when he wrote his "Splendide mendax."

sented by the poet as the better man; and deeming both to be very good, it was difficult to decide which was the better, as regards falsehood and truth, and every other virtue; for in that point likewise both seemed to be nearly on a par.

[13.] *Hip.* You do not consider the matter, Socrates, correctly. For, though Achilles tells a falsehood, he appears to do so not with any fixed design, but against his inclination; as he was compelled, by the distresses of the army, to remain and give his assistance. But what Ulysses says falsely, is willingly and with a design.

Soc. My dearest Hippias, you are deceiving me, and are yourself imitating Ulysses.

Hip. By no means, Socrates. But what are you saying, and for what purpose?

Soc. Because you assert that Achilles told a falsehood not designedly—he, who was such a juggler, and in addition to his vain-boasting, a plotter, as Homer has represented, that he appears to have a higher notion of himself than of Ulysses to such an extent, with regard to lying hid from him while vain-boasting, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. And lie hid he did from Ulysses. At least Ulysses does not appear to have said any thing to him, as (not)[17] perceiving that Achilles had said what was false.

Hip. What is this that you are speaking of, Socrates?

Soc. Know you not that, on saying afterwards[18] to Ulysses, that he would set sail in the morning, he says to Ajax, on the other hand, no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

Hip. Where?

Soc. Where he says, (Il. ix. 646,)

> For of the blood-stain'd war I'll take no thought,
> 'Till god-like Hector, thoughtful Priam's son,
> Shall reach of Myrmidons the tents and ships,
> And, Argives slaying, set the fleet on fire.
> But round my tent and dark ship Hector coming,
> And eager for the fight, I guess, will stop.

[17] Ficinus has "utpote qui mendacium non advertit," what the sense evidently requires. Stephens therefore proposed to insert *μὴ* after *ὡς*, which both Sydenham and Beck have adopted.

[18] The common reading was *ὕστερον ἢ ὡς*, out of which as Ficinus could make nothing, he omitted the words *ὕστερον ἢ*—while Stephens thought there was something wanting here. Bekker has edited from the majority of MSS. *ὑστερόν πως*—

[14.] Now do you imagine, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the most clever Chiron was so forgetful, as that, after previously abusing with the extreme of abuse those, who speak what they do not mean, he would immediately say to Ulysses that he would sail away, and then to Ajax, that he would remain, and this too without a fixed design, or holding Ulysses to be a simpleton,[19] and that he should get the better of him by this very trickery and speaking falsely?

Hip. It does not, Socrates, seem so at least to me. But being dissuaded on these points by his own easy temper, he spoke to Ajax in a different manner to what he had done to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, speaks always with a fixed design, and so too, when he speaks a falsehood.

Soc. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

Hip. Surely, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. Why, were not they, who speak false willingly, proved to be better[20] than those (who do so) unwillingly?

Hip. But how, Socrates, can they, who do an injury willingly, and plot against a person willingly, and do mischief, be better men than those, who do so unwillingly; to the latter of whom it seems that pardon is greatly due, should any one unconsciously do an injury, or tell a falsehood, or do any other wrong. And even the laws are surely more severe against those, who do evil and tell falsehoods wilfully, than against those, who act so unwillingly.

[15.] *Soc.* You see, Hippias, that I spoke the truth in saying how pressing I am in regard to putting questions to the clever. And yet I run the risk of possessing this solitary good, the rest that I possess being trifling. For in what manner things are, I am at fault; nor do I know where they are. And of this there is evidence sufficient for myself. For whenever I

[19] The Greek ἀρχαῖος is used similarly in Euthyd. p. 295, C., and Aristoph. Plut. 323.

[20] This is another instance, similar to the one noticed by Aristotle, of an argument founded on the ambiguity of an expression. For the truth of the position contended for, has indeed been proved; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary insinuated. S. We may quote in illustration of the ambiguity of the word "good," the passage in Shakspeare's Merchant of Venice, where on *Shylock* saying that "Antonio is a good man," *Bassanio* asks, "Have you heard any imputation to the contrary?" to which the Jew replies, "No, no; my meaning, in saying that he is a good man, is to have you understand me that he is sufficient."

am in the company of any of you in high repute for your cleverness, and for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of your wisdom, I appear as one knowing nothing; for scarcely on a single point, so to speak, am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater proof can there be of a man's want of instruction, than when he differs from men of wisdom? Yet I have this one wonderful good, which is my preservation; for I am not ashamed to learn; but I make inquiries, and ask questions, and am very thankful to the person, who gives me an answer; nor do I ever deprive any one of the thanks (I owe). For I never deny that I have learnt a thing, by pretending that what I have learnt was a discovery of my own; but I pass encomium upon the person, who has taught me, as being a clever man, by showing forth what I learnt from him. And now I do not agree with what you assert, but differ very greatly. And this, I know well, takes place through myself; because I am such as I am, that I may not speak too highly of myself. To me, Hippias, every thing appears the contrary to what you say. They then who hurt (other) persons, and do an injury, and speak falsehoods, and deceive, and commit a fault willingly, (appear to me)[21] to be better men than those, (who act so) unwillingly. Sometimes, however, I am of a contrary opinion; and my mind wanders on these points, evidently through my knowing nothing. But at present there has come around me, as it were, the periodical return of my disorder; and they, who commit an error willingly, seem to me to be better than those, who commit it unwillingly. And for this my present state of mind I blame the previous discussion as the cause; so that for the present it appears that they, who do each of these things unwillingly, are more wicked than those who do them willingly. Do then indulge me, nor grudge to heal the disorder of my mind. For you will do me a much greater good by causing my mind to cease from its ignorance, than my body from disease.[22] If however you wish to speak a lengthened speech, I tell you beforehand, that you will effect no cure; for I cannot follow you.

[21] Stalbaum says that δοκοῦσι is to be supplied here from the preceding δοκεῖ, referring very appositely to Apolog. p. 25, B.

[22] So Macbeth, in Shakspeare, after inquiring of the Doctor, whether he cannot minister to a mind diseased, and hearing that therein the patient must minister to himself, rejoins, "Throw physic to the dogs; I'll none of it."

But if you are willing, as lately, to answer my questions, you will benefit greatly myself; nor do I think you will receive any harm. Justly then do I call upon you, son of Apēmantus; for you have urged me to converse with Hippias; and now if Hippias is unwilling to give an answer, do you intercede with him in my behalf.

Eud. There will be, I think, Socrates, no need for my intercession with Hippias. For nothing of such a kind has been previously stated by him; but rather that he never shrunk from the question of any man. Is it not so, Hippias? Was not this what you said?

Hip. I did say so, Eudicus. But Socrates is always making a confusion in the arguments; and he is like to a person who is doing wrong.

[16.] *Soc.* My very good Hippias, I do it not willingly—for I should then be a clever and terrible fellow according to your account—but unwillingly, so that do you pardon me; for pardon, you say, is due to him who does wrong unwillingly.

Eud. Nay, Hippias, do not act otherwise; but for the sake of me, and of your own words previously spoken, give an answer to whatever Socrates shall ask.

Hip. Well, at your entreaty, I will give an answer. Ask, then, what you like.

[16.] *Soc.* Truly, Hippias, I am very desirous to consider thoroughly what has been just now mentioned—Which are the better men, they, who err willingly or unwillingly. Now to this inquiry I think we shall arrive by the most direct road thus—and do you give an answer. Do you speak of a runner as being good?[22]

Hip. I do.

Soc. And (of one as being) bad?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Is not he, who runs well, good? and bad he, who runs badly?

Hip. Yes.

[22] In the instances selected by Plato, the four first relate to the acts that depend upon the structure of the body, such as running, wrestling, dancing, and singing. To perform these exercises properly, there are requisite agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice; all of which arise respectively from the elasticity of the fibres, the firmness in the fabric of the bones, the pliantness in the joints, and the expansion and contraction of the lungs and larynx S.

Soc. Does not he, who runs slow, run badly? but well he who (runs) quick?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. In a race then, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness a bad thing.

Hip. What else should it be?

Soc. Which then is the better runner? he who willingly runs slow, or unwillingly?

Hip. He (who runs so) willingly.

Soc. Is not to run to do something?

Hip. It is to do (something).

Soc. And, if to do, is it not to perform some act?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. He then, who runs ill, performs in a race an act bad [and unseemly].[23]

Hip. Yes, bad; for how not?

Soc. Now he who runs badly, runs, you say, slowly.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. The good runner then performs willingly this bad act, [and the unseemly]:[24] but the bad runner (does so) unwillingly.

Hip. It seems so.

Soc. In a race then, he who performs bad actions unwillingly, is worse than he (who does so) willingly.

Hip. Yes, in a race.

Soc. And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler? he who falls willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. Probably he who falls willingly.

Soc. Now in wrestling, is it worse and more unseemly to fall, or to throw down?

Hip. To fall.

Soc. In wrestling then likewise, he who performs willingly bad and unseemly acts, is a better wrestler than he who (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. It is probable.

Soc. What then is the case in all the other uses of the body? Is not he, who is (stronger and)[25] better in his body, able to

[23, 24] The words within brackets are shown by the answer of Hippias to be an interpolation; and the same observation applies, for the same reason, to *καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν*, just afterwards. They owe their origin to *αἴσχιον*, a little below.

[25] From the words of Ficinus, "Nonne qui corpore robustior atque

perform acts both strong or weak, and unseemly and beautiful? So that when one performs acts, which as regards the body are bad, he, who is better in body, performs them willingly, but he, who is worse, unwillingly?

Hip. It is probably so as regards at least the strength of the body.

Soc. And what as regards a good conformation of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to the better body, to perform willingly gestures unseemly, and bad; but to the worse, (to do so) unwillingly? or how does it seem to you?

Hip. In this way.

Soc. A bad conformation then, when voluntary, is on the side of virtue; when involuntary, on that of vice.

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. And what say you as to the voice? Which do you say is the better? that which sings out of tune willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. That which does so unwillingly.

Soc. And (you say) the more wretched voice is that, which (sings out of tune) unwillingly.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Would you choose to possess things[26] that are good or bad?

Hip. Those that are good.

Soc. Would you then choose to have your feet lame willingly, or unwillingly?

Hip. Willingly.

Soc. Is not lameness in the feet a depravity and a bad conformation?

aptior est," Heusde saw acutely that his MS. read, what the train of thought requires,—*οὐχ ὁ ἰσχυρότερος καὶ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα*—

[26] Plato's five next instances are taken from those parts of the body which are the immediate servants of the mind: 1. The outward instruments of motion, such as the feet, by which the will of the mind is executed; 2. The outward organs of sensation, through which the mind perceives outward things; 3. That immediate source of motion and sensation, the brain; to which Plato applies the metaphor of a rudder, that steers the body as the mind pleases; 4. Those inward instruments of motion and sensations, the nerves; which he compares to the strings of musical instruments, braced up or let down by the passions of the soul, and vibrating as they are touched by sensations from without or from within; and lastly, the organs of speech, signified by musical wind-instruments, through which the mind expresses what is passing within itself. S.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And is not indistinct vision a depravity in the eyes?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Which sort of eyes now would you choose to possess? and with which to live? Those, with which a person willingly sees indistinctly or squints, or unwillingly?

Hip. Those with which (he does so) willingly.

Soc. Of the things, then, which are your own, you deem those, that perform depraved actions willingly, better than those, that (do so) unwillingly.

Hip. In things of such kind I do.

Soc. One reasoning then embraces all such things, as the ears, and nose, and mouth, and all the senses, namely, that those, which perform what is bad unwillingly, ought not to be possessed, as being bad, but that those, which (do so) willingly, ought to be possessed, as being good.

Hip. So it seems to me.

Soc. What then as regards instruments, with which is it better to be familiar? those, with which a man performs badly willingly, or those, with which he (performs so) unwillingly. Is a rudder, for example, the better, with which a person shall unwillingly steer badly, or that, with which (he shall do so) willingly?

Hip. That, with which (he shall do so) willingly.

Soc. Is it not so with the bow and lyre, and hautboy, and the rest of instruments?

Hip. You say the truth.

[17.] *Soc.* What then,[27] is it better to have a horse of such a spirit as that one may unwillingly ride him badly, or (such as one may ride him so) willingly?

Hip. Such (as one may ride him so) willingly.

Soc. Such a spirit then is the better.

Hip. Yes.

Soc. With the better spirit of the horse a man would per-

[27] From the just frame of the body, Plato proceeds to describe the other parts of *εὐφυΐα*, "a good natural disposition," which he holds to be the necessary foundation of virtue. He begins accordingly with the passions, which, in the Platonic system, were *ἐπιθυμία*, "desire," and *θυμός*, "anger." The first of these kinds is under the emblem of a horse, and the latter under that of a dog: for although both these animals are irrational, they are still manageable by and serviceable to man, when their powers and feelings are regulated by his reason. S.

form the mischievous acts belonging to such a spirit willingly, but unwillingly (the similar acts belonging to the worse).

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And is it not so with respect to a dog? and all other animals?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. What then, as regards the talent of an archer? Is it better to possess that, which misses the mark willingly, or that, which (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. That, which (does so) willingly.

Soc. Such a talent then is the better for the archer's art?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And the talent then, which errs unwillingly, is worse than that, which (does so) willingly.

Hip. Yes, in the case of the archer's art.

Soc. And how is it in the medical art? Is not the talent, which causes willingly mischiefs to bodies more like the medical art?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Such a talent then, in such an art, is better than that, which is not [28] [like the medical art].[28]

Hip. It is better.

Soc. And how in the case of the talent devoted to playing on the harp and hautboy, and all the other things relating to arts and sciences? Is not that the better talent, which willingly performs what is bad and disgraceful and commits errors, while the worse (does so) unwillingly?

Hip. It appears so.

Soc. And moreover we should certainly choose to have the possession of slaves with such talents, as would commit faults willingly, rather than such (as would do so) unwillingly, as (the former) is better for these things.[29]

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. What then, would we not desire to have our own soul the best possible?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Will it then not be better, if it did evil willingly, than if it did so unwillingly?

[28]—[28] The words within brackets Schleiermacher was the first to reject as an interpolation. For he saw they were omitted in the version of Ficinus—"peritior est quam illa, quæ per ignorantiam peccat."

[29] Ficinus has—"ad hæc opera meliores," which would lead to εἰς τὰ ἔργα, i. e. "for their works."

Hip. It would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if they, who do an injury willingly, were better than those, who (do so) unwillingly.

Soc. And yet from what has been said it appears so.

Hip. But not so to myself at least.

[18.] *Soc.* To you, I thought, it had appeared so. Answer me then again—Is not honesty either a kind of power, or knowledge, or both? Is it not necessary that honesty should be one of these?

Hip. It is.

Soc. If honesty then be a kind of power in the mind, the more powerful the mind the more honest it is. For, my very good man, the mind of such a kind, has surely been shown to be the better.

Hip. It did so appear.

Soc. What then if it is knowledge? Is not the wiser mind the more honest, but the less instructed the more dishonest?

Hip. Yes.[30]

Soc. What if it is both? Is not the mind, which possesses both knowledge and power, the more honest; but the more uninstructed (and powerless)[31] the more dishonest? Is it not necessary for such to be the case?

Hip. So it appears.

Soc. Was not the mind of greater power and wisdom shown to be the better, and more able to perform both beautiful and disgraceful doings, relating to every kind of action?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. When therefore it performs the disgraceful, it does so willingly, through its power, and its knowledge. Now these, either both or either, appear to belong to honesty.

Hip. Probably.

Soc. Now, to do injustice is to do ill; but not to do injustice (is to do) well.

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The mind then which is the more powerful and better,

[30] This answer of Hippias, first restored by Heusde from the version of Ficinus, has been subsequently found in two MSS. from a correction.

[31] To preserve the balance of the sentences, Sydenham proposed to insert *καὶ ἀδυνατωτέρα* after *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα*, but Heusde, *καὶ ἀσθενεστέρα*—and while Stalbaum would read *ἡ δὲ μὴ* instead of *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα*, Beck considered the words *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα* as interpolated from what had gone before.

when it does injustice does it willingly; but the worse (does so) unwillingly.

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. Is not he, who possesses a good mind, a good man; and he (who possesses) a bad one, a bad man?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. It belongs then to the good man, to do injustice willingly, but to the bad man, unwillingly; since the good man possesses a good mind.

Hip. This moreover is so.

Soc. The man therefore who errs, and does things disgraceful and dishonest, willingly, if there be such a man, Hippias, can be no other than the good man.

Hip. I know not, Socrates, how to agree with you in this.

Soc. Nor I with myself, Hippias. It must however of necessity appear so to us at present, from the course of the reasoning. But, as I said before, upon these points, I wander up and down, nor do things ever appear to me in the same light. Now that myself or any other unskilled individual should be wandering thus, is not at all to be wondered at. But if you, the wise, wander also, this will be to us a dreadful thing indeed; since we shall never cease from our wanderings, not even by coming to you.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ION.

In placing the Ion next to the Hippias Minor I have followed the example of Stalbaum, who doubtless perceived a marked similarity in the two dialogues. For while in the one the pretensions of Hippias are exposed, after he had made a display of his talents as a lecturer upon Homer, in the other the scarcely less clever Ion of Ephesus is similarly treated, previous to the exhibition he was about to make as a Rhapsodist at the approaching Panathenaic festival at Athens, after he had recently gained at Epidaurus the first prize of victory in a similar professional contest.

As regards the object of the dialogue, it may be briefly stated that it is intended to prove, that as a poet is born and not made, so is a poet's interpreter—for partly such was the Rhapsodist of old—and that all which art can do is to slightly improve the talents, given by what Plato calls "a divine allotment."

With respect to the conflicting opinions, promulgated by different scholars of Germany touching the matter, manner, and genuineness of the dialogue, Stalbaum refers to Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Nitzsch, and Wiegand. Of these it seems that Schleiermacher considers it a kind of supplement to the Phædrus, and that only a portion of it was really written by Plato; while Ast rejects the whole as a spurious production—an opinion which not one of the other critics appears disposed to adopt. For as Xenophon testifies that Socrates considered the Rhapsodists to be the silliest of men, it was surely very natural for Plato to feel a desire to embody the ideas of his master in a dialogue; where, while every honour is paid

to Homer, none is given to those, who presumed in the case of the "tale divine of Troy," and its sequel the wanderings of Ulysses,

"To scent the lily, and to paint the rose."

As Stalbaum laments that it has not been his good fortune to obtain a sight of Sydenham's translation reprinted by Taylor, which Müller has praised so highly, and of the notes, which the same editor has frequently put into Latin, I have introduced in an abridged form some of the latter; and should have occasionally adopted a portion of the former, had it been as literal as is required by the nature of this work; and a similar observation is applicable to the translation by Shelley, published in his Posthumous Essays, Letters, Translations, &c. Lond. 1840. There is likewise a French translation of the Ion by L' Abbé Arnaud in Mémoires de L' Academie des Inscriptions, t. xxxix. p. 249—278, which Stalbaum says he never saw; and he therefore did not know that the French translator has proposed to supply what he considers to be a *lacuna* in § 4, by reading, *Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὰν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ὅλην, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεως περὶ ἐκείνης τέχνης ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἁπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν*, in lieu of *τῆς σκέψεως ἐστὶ περὶ ἁπασῶν*—

ION.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND ION.

SOCRATES.

[1.] HAIL[1] to thee, Ion; from whence have you come to sojourn with us[2] for the present? Is it from your home at Ephesus?

Ion. By no means, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the feast of Æsculapius.[3]

Soc. Do the Epidaurians too[4] ordain a contest of rhapsodists,[5] in honour of the god?

Ion. They do; and other kinds of the muse's art likewise.

[1] In Greek χαίρειν was used both by persons meeting or leaving each other. The latter more commonly; but the former is found in Theocrit Id. xiv. 1, quoted by Nitzsch.

[2] Stalbaum says that ἡμῖν is here, as elsewhere in Plato, a form of familiar address.

[3] Æsculapius, the god of physic, was the tutelary deity of Epidaurus, now called "Epidavra."

[4] This is said because the most celebrated contests of the Rhapsodists took place at Athens during the Panathenaic festival.

[5] The rhapsodists were a kind of itinerant minstrels, similar to the Troubadours of the middle ages; who strung together and sung portions chiefly of the Homeric poems. They wore a particular dress of scarlet or purple—the latter to represent the colour of the sea, the former of blood—while they were chanting portions of the Odyssey and Iliad respectively; and when they had a contest, the victor gained a lamb as the prize; as we learn from Eustathius, Ἰλ. Α. According to Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2, Socrates said they knew Homer indeed accurately enough, but were in other respects great simpletons; and so after him does Maximus Tyr. in Dissertat. xxiii.

Soc. [6] What then? did you contend?

Ion. I do not deny it.

Soc. And how did you contend?[6]

Ion. We carried off, Socrates, the first of the prizes.

Soc. You say well, come then, in order that we two may win at the Panathenæa.[7]

Ion. And this will be if a god is willing.

Soc. Often have I indeed, Ion, been envious of the art of you rhapsodists. For that both your body[8] is decorated (so as) to be always becoming to your art, and to appear the most beautiful,[9] and at the same time that it is necessary for you to be conversant with many other excellent poets, and especially Homer, the best and most divine of all, and to learn thoroughly his meaning, not his words merely, is indeed a thing to be envied. For a man would never be a (good)[10] rhapsodist, unless he understood what was said by the poet; for a rhapsodist ought to be an interpreter to the audience of the meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to do well, without knowing what the poet means. Now worthy is all this to be envied.

[6]—[6] The Greek is Τί οὖν ἠγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἠγωνίσω. But one MS. has τί οὖν ἠγωνίζων τέ τι ἡμῖν. But as ἡμῖν is perfectly unintelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were Τί οὖν; ἠγωνίζου τι; Οὔ τι ἀναίνομαι. Καὶ πῶς σύ γ' ἠνωνίσω; Stalbaum too conceives there is some deep-seated disorder here, and proposes therefore to omit τι ἠγωνίσω: while Ficinus felt himself no less at a loss, as shown by his version. "*Soc.* Contende ergo nobiscum. *Ion.* Quamobrem tecum contendam? Primus, O Socrates, prœmiis potiti sumus." Shelley has, "*Soc.* And in which did you contend? And what was the success of your efforts?"

[7] This was an annual festival kept at Athens in honour of Athéné. In every fifth year it was celebrated with more than ordinary pomp; and was then called the Great Panathenæa, to distinguish it from those held in the intermediate periods, termed the Less. It was just previous to the greater festival, probably, that Ion came to Athens. For says Lycurgus in his speech against Leocrates, c. xxvi. p. 223, ed. Taylor, (= 209, R.) "Your ancestors conceived Homer to be so useful a poet as to make a law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenæa his poems alone should be recited by the rhapsodists:" and a similar account is given in the dialogue called Hipparchus, transcribed almost verbatim by Ælian in V. H. viii. 2. S.

[8] After κεκοσμῆσθαι it is evident that ὥστε has dropt out.

[9] In lieu of καλλίστοις, which is without regimen, one MS. has καλλίσ-
ου
τοις, which leads directly to κάλλιστον—

[10] Sydenham had inserted "good," confirmed subsequently by a MS. at Venice.

Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true. At least this very portion of my art has given me the greatest trouble. I fancy however I can speak most beautifully about Homer, so that neither Metrodorus[11] of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus[12] of Thasus, nor Glauco,[13] nor any one else of those who have ever existed, had it in their power to express so many and such beautiful sentiments as I can do, relating to Homer.

Soc. You speak beautifully, Ion. For it is evident that you will not grudge me an exhibition (of your talent).

Ion. Indeed, Socrates, it is well worth your hearing how well I have set off Homer; so that, I conceive, I am worthy to be crowned by the Homeridæ[14] with a golden crown.

[2.] *Soc.* I will make for myself still a leisure time to hear you. But for the present, answer me thus much. Are you skilled on the subject of Homer alone, or of Hesiod and Archilochus likewise?

Ion. By no means; on the subject of Homer alone. This seems to be enough for me.

Soc. But there is that, about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things.

Ion. There are, I think, many such.

Soc. Respecting these, can you better explain what Homer says than what Hesiod does?

[11] We are told by Diogenes Laert. ii. 3, that Metrodorus wrote a treatise on the physiology of Homer, where, as it would seem from Tatian in Λόγ. προς Ἕλλην· he explained Homer's theology from the various operations and phænomena of nature: and thus gave a rational account of the poet's mythology, in lieu of the literal sense, in which it was received by the vulgar. S.

[12] Stesimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xenophon's Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer; and his abilities are contrasted with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. According to Plutarch, he was exactly of the same age with Cimon. S.

[13] Although a Glauco of Tarsus is mentioned by an old Greek scholiast upon Homer in the Medicean library, quoted by Holsten. de Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii., yet, as he seems to have been a grammarian of a much later age, we are inclined to read Γλαῦκος. For Glaucus of Rhegium flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise Περὶ Ποιητῶν, as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. p. 833, C., or Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν τε καὶ μουσικῶν, as stated in t. ii. 1132, E. So Sydenham. Nitzch however refers to Aristotle Poet. § 25, where mention is made of one Glaucon.

[14] By the Homeridæ are meant here, as in Phædr. p. 252, B., and Rep. x. p. 599, F., quoted by Muller, the admirers of Homer, as Sydenham had translated.

Ion. Equally, Socrates, respecting those, where they say the same.

Soc. But how, where they do not say the same? For instance, Homer and Hesiod say something about the prophetic art.

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, whatever those two poets say about the prophetic art, either agreeing or disagreeing, could you explain better, or one of the clever prophets?

Ion. One of the prophets.

Soc. But if you were a prophet, would you not know, if you were able to give an explanation where they agree, to explain likewise where they disagree?

Ion. It is evident I should.

Soc. How then are you skilled as regards Homer, but not as regards Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Does Homer speak of other things than what other poets have, taken all together? Has he not gone through the greater part of subjects relating to war, and to the intercourse with each other of men, good and bad, and unskilful and practised in arts, and relating to the gods, as having an intercourse, such as they have, with one another and with human beings; and to such as relate to celestial events and those in Hades, and the birth of gods and heroes. Are not these the subjects, relating to which Homer has composed his poetry?

Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true.

Soc. Well then, and do not the rest of the poets (write) about these very things?

Ion. They do, Socrates; but they have not composed their poetry as Homer has his.

Soc. What then, in a worse way?

Ion. Very much so.

Soc. But Homer in a better?

Ion. Better indeed, by Zeus.

[3.] *Soc.* Now, thou dear head,[15] Ion, when many persons are speaking about numbers, and one of them speaks the best, assuredly some person will know who speaks correctly.

Ion. I admit it.

[15] On this Platonic formula, imitated from the Homeric Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφάλη, Stalbaum refers to Phædr. p. 264, B., Gorg. p. 513, C, and Euthyd. p. 293, E.

Soc. Will it be the same as he, who (knows) likewise those speaking incorrectly, or some one else?

Ion. The same person, certainly.

Soc. And is it not he, who knows the science of arithmetic?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. What then, when many persons are speaking about wholesome food, of what kinds they are, and one speaks the best, will one person know that he, who speaks the best, does speak the best, and another (know) that he, (who speaks) worse, (does speak) worse, or will the same person (know both)?

Ion. The same person, clearly.

Soc. Who is he? What is his name?

Ion. Physician.

Soc. Let us say then universally, that, when many are speaking upon the same subject, the same person will always know who speaks correctly and who incorrectly. For[16] if a person shall not know the party speaking incorrectly, it is evident that he will not (know) the party speaking correctly, at least upon the same subject.

Ion. Just so.

Soc. The same person then will be skilled respecting both.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, amongst whom there are both Hesiod and Archilochus, write about the same things, though not in the same manner? but that the one does so well, the others worse?

Ion. And I said what is true.

Soc. If then you know the party who speaks well, you will know those likewise, who speak worse, that they do speak worse?

Ion. It is probable.

Soc. In saying then, thou best of men, that Ion is clever on the subject of Homer and all the other poets, we shall not err; since he acknowledges himself that the same person is a competent judge of all such as speak upon the same subjects, and that nearly all poets take the same subjects for their poetry.

[16] So Sydenham, as if he wished to read καὶ γὰρ in lieu of ἢ.—Ficinus has "et—"

Ion. What can be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever any one is discoursing upon any other poet, I pay no attention, and am unable to contribute any thing whatever (to the discussion) worth mentioning, and really begin to nod; but when any one brings Homer to my recollection, I am immediately awake, and give my mind to the subject, and am at no loss what to say.

Soc. It is not difficult, my friend, to guess the reason of this. For it is clear to every one that you are unable to speak[17] about Homer by art or science. For if you were able by art, you would be able to speak about all the other poets; for the whole is surely poetry. Or is it not?

Ion. It is.

[4.] *Soc.* When a man shall have laid hold of any other art whatever as a whole,[17] is there not the same method of viewing it (as) all the arts? Why I say this, do you, Ion, request to hear from me?

Ion. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do; for I delight to hear you wise men.

Soc. I would wish, Ion, that you were saying what is true; but you surely are the wise men, you the rhapsodists and performers,[18] and those whose poems you recite; whereas I speak nothing but the simple truth,[19] as becomes a mere unskilled person. Since the question, which I just now asked you, see

[17] After ὅλην, Ficinus seems to have found something supplied in his MS., wanting in all the rest, to answer to his version—"æque de omnibus, quæ sub arte sunt, judicat." Sydenham, however, conceived they were inserted by Ficinus himself, to preserve the justness of the reasoning, and he therefore proposed to read περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τεχνοσύνων. For the question is not about arts, but artists. Shelley's version is, "The same mode of consideration must be admitted with respect to all arts, which are severally one and entire," omitting the clause at the commencement.

[18] Plato here, and in Rep. ii. p. 373, B., and iii. p. 295, A., joins the rhapsodists with performers, as cognate artists. For according to Eustathius, p. 5, 18, Bas., the rhapsodists used frequently to recite in a somewhat dramatic manner. Hence in the Dionysia, or dramatic entertainments, the rhapsodists had anciently a share; and one of the festival days was called ἑορτὴ τῶν ῥαψῳδῶν, as we learn from Athenæus, v. p. 275. Hesychius therefore well explains ῥαψῳδοί, "rhapsodists," by ὑποκριταὶ ἐπῶν, "actors of epic poems." S.

[19] Stalbaum says, that in lieu of τὰ ἀληθῆ, one would have expected a word in Greek to answer to the Latin "vulgaria," and "omnibus nota." Perhaps he would have preferred τὰ ἐνήθη, similar to εὔηθες λέγει, ὁ Μένων, in Phædon, p. 87, C.

how trifling it is, and suited to an unskilled person, and for every man to know, namely, that, which I spoke of as presenting the same view, when a person lays hold of the whole of any art. [20]Let us then lay hold in our discourse of painting; for[20] it is an art (whole in itself), is it not?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Are there not, and have been, many painters good and bad?

Ion. Very many.

Soc. Now then, did you ever see any person who, as regards Polygnotus,[21] the son of Aglaophon, is skilled in showing what he paints well and what ill, but is unable to do so as regards other painters? and whenever any exhibits the works of those other painters, grows drowsy, and is at a loss, and has not what to contribute to (the conversation); but when it is necessary to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other painter you please, immediately wakes up and gives all attention, and is at no loss what to say?

Ion. Not at all, by Zeus.

Soc. Well then, in the statuary's art, did you ever see any one who, as regards Dædalus,[22] the son of Metion, or Epeius, the son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was skilled in explaining what each had executed well, but as regards the other statuaries, was at a loss, grew drowsy, as having nothing to say?

Ion. No, by Zeus, I never knew such a person as this.

Soc. Nor, as I think, in the case of playing on the hautboy

[20]—[20] I have adopted Stalbaum's version of λάβωμον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ, words that had given no little trouble to previous translators and editors, and which Shelley entirely omits. To complete, however, the sense, it was requisite to suppose that the author wrote δὲ—γραφικήν· ἡ γὰρ, not γὰρ—γραφικὴ γὰρ—

[21] This artist was, in the days of Socrates, called the Homer of painters. He was the first to express the manners and passions by attitudes, and a change of countenance, and to give a flattering likeness; and, amongst other improvements, invented the method of showing the skin through transparent drapery. See Aristotle, Polit. viii. 5, and Poet. ii. and vi., Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxv. 9, and Ælian's Var. Hist. iv. 3. S.

[22] Plato has purposely chosen three statuaries, famous in three different styles of art, when he is proving the sameness of the principle in passing judgment upon different poets. For Dædalus was celebrated for his self-moving statues, mentioned in the Meno, p. 97, D. § 39; Epeius, for the Trojan horse of a stupendous size; and Theodorus, for the minuteness of his works. See Pliny's Nat. Hist. xxxiv. 8. S.

or harp, and in singing to the harp, and in the recitations of the rhapsodists, you never saw a man who, as regards Olympus,[23] or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca,[23] is a skilful interpreter, but as regards Ion the Ephesian, is at a loss and unable to give an opinion whether Ion does well or not as a rhapsodist.

Ion. I have nothing to say against you upon that point, Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself, that as regards Homer I speak the best of all men, and am least at a loss, and every body else says that I do speak well, but not, as regards the rest. Consider then why is this.

[5.] *Soc.* I do consider, Ion, and I commence showing you how this seems to me. This faculty of speaking well about Homer is not an art, as I said just now, but a divine power, which moves you, like that in the stone, which Euripides[24] calls the Magnesian, but the common people Heraclean. For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but imparts a power to the rings, so that they are able to do the very same things as the stone does, and to attract other rings, and sometimes a very long series of iron rings,[25] hung (as in a chain),[26] one

[23]—[23] These four persons severally excelled in the four arts just before mentioned. According to Plutarch and Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxiv., Olympus played on the *αὐλός*, Thamyris on the *κιθάρα*, as stated by Hom. Il. ii. 600, but without the accompaniment of his voice, as we learn from Pliny; Orpheus was *κιθαρῳδός*, playing and singing together; while Phemius recited poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the same time, as appears from Hom. Od. i. 153. S.

[24] The passage of Euripides has been preserved by Photius and Suidas in *Ἡρακλείαν λίθον*, both of whom probably derived their information from the lost Scholia on this passage. It is a fragment of the Œneus—*τὰς βροτῶν Γνώμας σκοπῶν—ὥστε Μαγνῆτις λίθος Τὴν δόξαν ἕλκει καὶ μεθίστησιν πάλιν*—where Sydenham would supply *ὅδ'* before *ὥστε*, but Stalbaum *ὃς*—According to Aristotle *Περὶ Ψυχῆς* i. 2. Thales was the first to apply the attractive property of the magnet in the way of a philosophical illustration; while a poetical account of the manner, in which five rings hang together, is given by Lucretius, vi. 910, who, says Gesner on the "Magnes" of Claudian, merely followed Plato.

[25] Sydenham has thus adopted "ferreorum annulorum" in Serranus' version. For neither of them could understand *σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων*. Nor could Shelley, who has, "a long chain of rings and other iron substances." But the whole question is about iron rings alone.

[26] Sydenham seems to have added this, with the view of showing that the iron rings were not united in the inside, as rings generally are, but merely touched each other on the outside, as appears partly from Lucretius—"Unus (annulus) ubi ex uno dependet subter adhærens;" but

from another; but from that stone depends the power in all of them. Thus too does the Muse herself move men divinely inspired, and through them thus inspired, a chain hangs together of others inspired divinely likewise. For all the good epic poets compose all their beautiful poems, not by art,[27] but by being divinely inspired and possessed (by the Muse); and so too the good lyric poets, just as the Corybantes[28] dance, not being in their sound senses,[29] compose their beautiful lyrical poems, when they are not in their sound senses; but when they go on according to the harmony and rhythm, they become mad, possessed (by a god), as are the priestesses of Bacchus, (who,) possessed by a god, draw from rivers honey and milk;[30] but are unable to do so, when in their senses; and the soul of the lyric poets does that, which they say they do. For assuredly they say to us, [31] that (drawing) from fountains flowing with honey, and gather-

more fully from S. Augustine De Civit. Dei xx. 4, quoted by Kirchmann De Annulis, C. 15, p. 97, as remarked by Müller. The words of the Latin father are too remarkable to be omitted here. "Magnetem lapidem novimus mirabilem ferri esse raptorem. Quod cum primum vidi, vehementer inhorrui. Quippe cernebam a lapide ferreum annulum raptum atque suspensum; deinde cum tamquam ferro, quod rapuerat, vim dedisset suam communemque fecisset, idem annulus admotus est alteri, eumque suspendit atque, ut ille prior lapidi, sic alter annulus priori annulo cohærebat. Accessit eodem modo tertius; accessit et quartus. Jamque sibi per mutua connexis circulis non implicatorum intrinsecus sed extrinsecus adhærentium quasi catena pependerat annulorum."

[27] Plato however, in the Phædrus, does not exclude art entirely, but considers it only as the handmaid of inspiration. S.

[28] On the followers of Demeter, called Corybantes, and their doings, see the authors quoted by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 163, and the commentators on Crito, § 17.

[29] After *ὀρχοῦνται* follow *οὕτω καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ*, words evidently interpolated.

[30] According to Euripides the honey and milk were obtained from the ground and trees, not from streams. But Sydenham aptly refers to Aristides, T. ii. p. 20, Jebb, who quotes a passage from Æschines, a disciple of Socrates, so as to lead to the belief that this dialogue was written by that philosopher. The words are, "The Bacchantes, when they become inspired, draw honey and milk from wells, out of which the rest of persons are not even able to draw water."

[31]—[31] The Greek is *ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινων καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται.* Ficinus has more fully, "a fontibus, quibus mel scaturit, haurientes, et a Musarum viridariis collibusque decerpentes carmina, ad nos transferunt, quemadmodum mel ex floribus apes," as if he had found in his MS., *ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἀρυτόμενοι καὶ ἐκ—δρεπόμενοι ἄνθη, τὰ μελη*——

ing (flowers) from the gardens and glades of the Muses, they bring us their songs, as bees do (their honey),[31] and are ever[32] too on the wing. And they tell us too what is true. For a poet is a thing light,[33] and with wings, and sacred,[34] and unable to compose poetry until he becomes inspired,[35] and is out of his sober senses, and his imagination is no longer under his control. For so long as a person is in complete possession of it, he is unable to compose verses or to speak oracularly. Hence as they compose not by art,[36] they say many beautiful things relating to their subjects, as you do about Homer; but each is able to compose that alone through a divine allotment, to which the Muse has impelled them, one to dithyrambics,[37] another to panegyrics,[38] another to hyporchemata,[39] another to epic verse, and another to iambic; but in the other kinds each makes no figure; for they do not compose by art, but through a divine power; since if they knew how to speak by art upon one subject correctly, they would (be able to do so) upon all others. And on this account a deity has deprived them of their senses, and employs them as his ministers, and oracle-singers, and divine prophets, in order that when we

ὥσπερ μέλι αἱ μέλιτται, and so I have translated. Sydenham was the first to see that μέλι had dropt out here, quoting very opportunely from Horace—"Ego, apis Matinæ More modoque, Grata carpentis thyma per laborem Plurimum, circa nemus uvidique Tiburis ripas operosa parvus Carmina fingo." With regard to the comparison between flowers and songs, it is sufficient to refer to Valckenaer on Eurip. Hippol. 73.

[32] Instead of οὔτω the author wrote, I suspect, ἀεί ποτε—

[33] On the use of χρῆμα the commentators refer to Aristoph. Lys. 678, Theocrit. Id. xv. 83, and Valckenaer on Phœn. 206.

[34] Why bees were considered sacred is shown by Virgil in G. iv. 150; while poets were held so, as being under the protection of Apollo.

[35] Cicero de Oratore ii. 46, Sæpe audivi poetam bonum neminem, id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt, sine inflammatione animorum existere posse."

[36] A similar doctrine is promulgated, in Apolog. p. 22, C. where poets are mentioned as here with oracle-singers. For it seems that at different oracular shrines poets were kept to put the answers of the prophetic deity into verse, as we learn from Strabo, p. 642, A.

[37] The author probably alludes to the lost dithyrambs of Pindar.

[38] Of the nature of the panegyrics a faint idea may be formed from the lifeless hymns of Callimachus, whom Ovid has so happily described by his "Quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet."

[39] The hyporchemata were poems composed to accompany a dance unconnected with the drama. The great writer of them was Pratinas, a fragment of whose poetry has been preserved by Athenæus, xv. p. 617.

hear them, we may know it is not they to whom sense is not present, who speak what is valuable, but the god himself who speaks, and through them addresses us.[40] And of this assertion Tynnichus [41] the Chalcidian affords the greatest proof; who never composed any other poem, which any one would think worth remembering, but the Pæan, which every body sings, of almost all hymns the most excellent, and as he himself states,

"An invention of artless Muses."[42]

For in him most especially does the god seem to me to point out to us, that we are not to doubt about those beautiful poems being not human but divine, and the work not of men but of gods; and that poets are nothing else but interpreters of the gods,[43] possessed by whatever deity they may happen to be. And in pointing out this, the deity has through a poet the most indifferent sung a melody the most beautiful. Or do I not seem to you, Ion, to say what is true?

Ion. To me at least you do. For you somehow, Socrates, touch my very soul by your arguments; and the good poets seem to me, by a divine allotment, to be in this way to us the interpreters of the gods.

[6.] *Soc.* Now do not you rhapsodists interpret, on the other hand, the writings of the poets?

Ion. And this too you truly assert.

Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion. By all means.

Soc. Mind now, Ion, and tell me this; and do not conceal

[40] So Cicero de Divinat. i., "Deus inclusus corpore humano jam, non Cassandra, loquitur." S.

[41] Of this Tynnichus no mention has been found except in a fragment of Ptolomæus Hephæstion, preserved by Photius in Biblioth. p. 485, and in an anecdote related by Porphyr. Περὶ Αποχῆς i. 18, where Æschylus is reported as bearing testimony to his excellence as an old writer of Pæans, a kind of hymn in honour of Apollo. MUELLER.

[42] The Greek is *ἀτέχνως εὕρημά τι μουσᾶν.* But it is evident, that Plato, in citing this verse, means by *ἀτέχνως*, "artlessly," or, as Cornarius renders it in Latin, "sine arte:" so Sydenham; who should have suggested *ἀτέχνων*, as I have translated. The verse is an Anapæstic Paræmiac. Stalbaum refers to Fritzche in Quæst. Lucian. p. 128, where passages are quoted not in point.

[43] So Orpheus is called "sacer, interpresque deorum," by Horace, Art. Poet. 391. S.

whatever I shall ask about. Whenever you are spouting well any verses, and astonishing your audience the most, or when you are reciting how Ulysses,[44] leaping on the threshold (of his house), appeared manifest to the suitors, and poured out his arrows before their feet; or how Achilles rushed against Hector; or tell any of the tales of pity relating to Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times are you quite in your senses, or beside yourself?[45] and does not your soul fancy itself carried away in a state of ecstasy by the deeds you are telling, whether they occur at Ithaca or Troy, [46]or however else the verses may be.[46]

Ion. How clear a proof have you, Socrates, produced! For so I will say, concealing nothing. For when I am reciting any tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears; [47]but when any thing of horror, my hairs stand erect through fear, and my heart leaps.[47]

Soc. What shall we say then, Ion? that the man is in his sound senses, when, decked in a many-tissued garb, and with a crown of gold, he bursts into tears at festivals and feasts, without having lost any of those (ornaments)? or feels a fear when he is standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all friendly to him, and no one is stripping him or doing him an injury?

Ion. He is not, by Zeus, to confess the truth, Socrates.

[7.] *Soc.* Know you that you (rhapsodists) produce this very same effect upon the majority of your spectators.

Ion. I know it very well. For I am constantly looking down from my standing-place above upon those, who are weeping, or looking fiercely,[48] or astonished, in unison with

[44] The passages alluded to are Od. xxii. 2; Il. xxii. 311, and 405, and 437.

[45] So Cicero says of Æsop the actor, in Divinat. i. 37, "Vidi—in Æsopo tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut eum vis quædam abstraxisse a sensu mentis videretur." S.

[46]—[46] The Greek is *ἢ ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ*. But Ficinus has "seu quocunque alio carmina rapiant te," translated by Shelley, "or wherever else the poem transports you." Ficinus, no doubt, found in his MS. *ἢ ὅποι σ' ἂν τὰ ἔπη ἄγῃ*.

[47]—[47] Stalbaum quotes Sympos. p. 215, E. § 39, *ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐνχεῖται*, and refers to Abresch on Aristænet. ii. 5, Boissonad. on Eunap. p. 257, and Jacobs on Achill. Tat. p. 833.

[48] This is the literal meaning of *δεινόν*. But why the audience should look so, I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, Sydenham, or

what is narrated. For indeed I must pay a great attention to them, in order that, if I set them weeping, I may laugh on receiving their money; but if laughing, that I may weep myself on losing their cash.

Soc. Know you not, then, that this spectator (of yours)[49] is the last of the rings, which, I said, receive their power from one another by means of the Heraclean stone? The middle ring are you the rhapsodist and the actor; but the first ring is the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men,[50] having suspended from each other the power.[50] And, as if from that stone, there is suspended a very numerous series of chorus-singers and dancers, and under-masters,[51] hang the rings depending from the Muse, hanging sideways.[52] But from one Muse one of the poets hangs; another from another. [53] And this we call by the expression "he is possessed;" for the (meaning) is very similar; since he is held fast.[53] From these first rings some

Shelley, who have translated respectively—"graviter," and, "as if horror seized them," and, "with eyes fixed earnestly on me."

[49] So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *ὁ σὺς* instead of *οὗτος*.

[50]—[50] Such is the literal version of the Greek, *ἀνακρεμαννὺς ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν*. The sense requires, "having imparted the power of hanging from each other."

[51] The hindmost rows of the chorus sang an under part, and had peculiar masters of their own to teach it them, called under-masters. S. Ficinus has "discipuli." But *ὑποδιδάσκαλος* is a word acknowledged by J. Pollux, iv. 106.

[52] Why the rings should be said to hang sideways, I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. some words properly transposed; for his version is, "series longa dependet, qua e latere gradatim nectuntur hi, qui in choro saltant, et præceptores atque discipuli; hujusque catenæ a Musa annuli suspenduntur." But there too "a latere" is equally unintelligible.

[53]—[53] "The Greek is *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται· τὸ δέ ἐστι παραπλήσιον· ἔχεται γάρ*: which is itself unintelligible, and is thus unintelligibly rendered by Ficinus; "Vocamus autem id nos occupari, (altered by Grynæus into 'mente capi,') quod quidem ille proximum est: tenetur enim:" and by Cornarius thus; "Hoc vero 'corripitur' nominamus, quod consimile est: hæret enim"—whom Bembo follows, omitting however *ἔχεται γάρ*. The passage will become quite clear by reading *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται, τὸ δέ ἐστι, παραπλήσιον ἔχεται*: or, what is preferable, by reading *ὀνομάζομεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατέχεται· τὸ δέ ἐστι, παραπλήσιον ἔχεται· ἔχεται γάρ*. The omission of a word, where it is thus repeated, is a common fault in manuscripts. So Sydenham; whom Müller felt half disposed to follow. Stalbaum thus translates the passage (in English)—"We call this *κατέχεται*, which comes near to that, which we said,

of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and become inspired by them; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by Musæus; but the majority [54] are inspired by Homer, and held fast by him.[54] Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer. Hence when any one sings the verses of any other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but when any one recites a strain of that poet, you wake up immediately, and your soul dances (with joy),[55] and you are at no loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through being possessed. (For)[56] the Corybantes have an acute perception of such music only, as belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted to that melody; but care not for any other music. So you, Ion, when any one makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss, but are at a loss (when mention is made) of other poets. And this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why as regards Homer you are not at a loss, but are so as regards other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allotment, a skilful panegyrist of Homer.

Ion. You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyrize Homer through being possessed and mad. Nor, as I fancy, should I appear so to you, if you were to hear me speaking about Homer.

[8.] *Soc.* And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not before you shall have answered me this. On which of the subjects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For surely it is not about all.

Ion. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what (I speak well about).

Soc. Surely you do not (speak) about those, of which you happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions.

Ion. And what are those, which Homer mentions, but which I do not know?

that he was suspended from a god, for he is held by him, if he *κατέχεται*" —and wonders that Sydenham and Müller should have laboured so hard in explaining the passage.

[54]—[54] From this passage it is evident why *κατέχεται* and *ἔχεται* are said just before to be very similar in meaning.

[55] In Æsch. Cho. 156, the expression is *ὀρχεῖται φόβῳ*.

[56] Ficinus has "et—" but *γὰρ* has probably dropt out after *ὥσπερ*—

Soc. Does not Homer speak much and often of arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Ion. I will recite them; for I remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning in the chariot-race, run in honour of Patroclus.

Ion. His words are these (in Il. xxiii. 335—340):

> Thyself upon the polish'd chariot bend
> To the left gently; but the right-hand horse
> With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield,
> Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed
> Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost
> Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt
> If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid.

Soc. It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not, Ion, correctly express himself in these words, who would know the better, a physician or a charioteer?

Ion. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether because he possesses that art, or for some other reason?

Ion. For no other than that (he possesses) the art.

Soc. Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the deity, to be able to know a work? for what we know by the pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor what (we know) by the physician's art, (shall we know) by the builder's art.

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by another? But answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that when there is a science, one of some things, and another of other things, I call one by one name, and the other by another; and do not you (call them) so?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For surely [57]if of the same things there were some science,[57] why should we call one by one name, and another

[57]—[57] This I cannot understand.

by another, when it would be possible to know the same things from both? as, for instance, I know that these fingers are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same art.

Ion. Yes.

[9.] *Soc.* The question then, which I was lately about to ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you, as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the same art to know the things; and for a different art (to know) not the same things? but whether, if (the art) be different, it is necessary for it to know different things?

Ion. It seems to me, Socrates, in this way.

Soc. He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to know what is said or done well, relating to that art.

Ion. You speak the truth.

Soc. As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or not?

Ion. A charioteer.

Soc. For you are a rhapsodist, but not a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. If the science be different, it is conversant likewise about different things.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded, a potion to drink,[58] he says, composed

> [59] Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates,
> With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made,
> And for the potion onion as a relish;[59]

to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this cor-

[58] After πίνειν δίδωσι the words καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως, which could not be inserted between ὅταν λέγῃ and φησίν, Ficinus has properly omitted

[59]—[59] In this quotation from Home. the author has brought together some verses separated from each other by an interval of nine lines. See Il. xi. 630 and 639. To the same passage Plato refers in Rep. iii. p. 406, A.

rectly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapsodist's art?

Ion. To the physician's.

Soc. Well then, where Homer (in Il. xxiv. 80) says,

> She to the bottom went, just like the lead,
> Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living,
> (Is placed upon the line,) and rushes eager,
> To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fate—[60]

shall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the rhapsodist's art, to decide on what he says, and whether correctly or not?

Ion. It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art.

[10.] *Soc.* Consider now, [61] you asking, if you asked me,[61] Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art, are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill—consider how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the Odyssey, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance, where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melampus,[62] says to the suitors—

> [64] Why by doom fated suffer ye this ill?
> Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads,
> And nether limbs; and [63] burns the loud lament [63]
> Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet.
> Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall,
> To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun
> From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on.[64]

[60] I have adopted *κῆρα*, found in Homer, in lieu of its interpretation *πῆμα*, read here in all the MSS. but one. On the other hand, *ἐμμεμανῖα* here is far more elegant than *ἐμβεβανῖα*, read in the common text; which has arisen merely from the perpetual confusion of *ω* (*β*) and *μ*.

[61]—[61] Such is the literal version of the Greek—*σοῦ ἐρομένου, εἰ ἔροιό με*, where *εἰ ἔροιο* is evidently the interpretation of *σοῦ ἐρομένου*. Ficinus has—"Si præterea me interrogares," as if his MS. omitted *σοῦ ἐρομένου*.

[62] See Od. xv. 225.

[63]—[63] On the mixed metaphor in *οἰμωγὴ δέδηε* see my note on Æsch. Prom. And to the passages there quoted I could now add a dozen more. The most apposite is "clamore incendunt cœlum" in Virgil.

[64]—[64] See Od. xx. 351—357, where however between the 4th and 5th verse is another, omitted here—"And walls and handsome rooms bemeared with blood."

And often too in the Iliad, for example in the fight near the mound-wall (of the Greeks). For there too he says (Il. xii. 200—207):

> To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle,
> High-flying bird, appear'd upon the left,
> And the army check'd. For in its claws it bore
> A snake, of size enormous, with blood stain'd,
> Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet
> Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit
> The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck;
> Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold,
> And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng
> It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew.[65]

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of?

Ion. Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates.

Soc. And you too, Ion, speak the truth, in this. Come then, and, as I have selected for you from the Odyssey, and the Iliad, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physician, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, Ion, as belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist's art; which it is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, (better than) other men.

Ion. [66] I say, Socrates, all things.[66]

Soc. You did not, Ion, say all. Or are you so forgetful? And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Ion. Of what then am I forgetful?

Soc. Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist's art is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion. I do remember it.

Soc. And did not you confess too, that, being different, it would know things different?

Ion. Yes, I did.

[65] I have adopted πέτετο, found in one MS., in lieu of ἕπετο.—For a bird does not follow the wind, but flies with it; and especially when wounded; for it is then unable to make use of any muscular exertion, nor is it necessary when it is flying with the wind.

[66]—[66] This I cannot understand, nor could Müller; unless Ion meant to generalize the assertion, which Socrates had confined to the art of the rhapsodist alone.

[11.] *Soc.* According to your own account then, the rhapsodist's art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist himself.

Ion. Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind.

Soc. By things of such a kind you mean such as belong nearly to all the other arts. Now what will (the rhapsodist) know, if (he knows) not all things.

Ion. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what for a freeman; and what for him, who is commanded, and for him, who commands.

Soc. Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a ship, tost in a storm at sea, to say?

Ion. No. This at least the steersman (will know) better.[67]

Soc. But what it is proper for a person governing a sick person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Ion. Not in this case.

Soc. But what is it proper for a slave, you say.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying [68] cows that are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the herdsman?

Ion. Not I indeed.

Soc. But what it is proper for a woman engaged in woolwork to say about working in wool?

Ion. No.

Soc. But he will know what it is proper for an army-leader to say, when exhorting the soldiers?

Ion. Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know.

Soc. What then, is the rhapsodist's art that of an army-leader?

Ion. I should know [69] what it is fitting for an army-leader to say.

[67] The Greek is Οὔκ· ἀλλὰ ὁ—But one MS. has Οὔ· κάλλιον ὁ·—Ficinus, "Non; sed gubernator melius hoc percipiet," whom I have followed.

[68] Nitzsch aptly refers to Politic. p. 268, A. § 11.

[69] Instead of γνοίην γοῦν ἄρ'—Sydenham suggested, γνοίην γοῦν ἂν, and so Bekker from MSS. Ficinus has "Intelligerem equidem, si opus esset."

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage[70] horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you—By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? what answer would you make me?

Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a horseman.

Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies,[71] do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Ion. There seems to me no difference.

Soc. How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two?

Ion. They seem to me at least to be one.

Soc. [72] Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general.[72]

Ion. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too.

Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

[70] As ἱππάζεσθαι is a verb deponent, it is evident that τοὺς has dropt out after ἵππους, similar to τοὺς εὖ ἱππαζομένους ἵππους, in the very next sentence.

[71] Instead of στρατιωτικά, Ficinus evidently found in his MS. στρατηγικά, as shown by his version, "quæ ad imperatorem spectant," adopted by Sydenham.

[72]—[72] Such is the literal version of the Greek. But Sydenham has what is preferable—"Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same must be also a good general"—where "must be" has been obtained from "erit," in Ficinus. Sydenham's tacit alteration is supported by the next remark of Socrates.

Soc. But the other does seem so, [73] [that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.] [73]

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks

Ion. Very much, Socrates.

Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks?

Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt [74] that too from Homer.

[12.] *Soc.* Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general?

Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be competent for that.

Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Ion. Who is he?

Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too [75] of Andros, and Heraclides [76] of Clazomenæ, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice.[77] And will she not choose

[73]—[73] The words within brackets are evidently an interpretation of ἐκεῖνο.

[74] So Sydenham from Ficinus, "hæc enim in Homeri scriptis didici? who doubtless found in his MS. ἔμαθον in lieu of μαθών: which may, however, be united to εἰ in the question of Socrates.

[75] As this Phanosthenes was sent against his countrymen to Andros by the Athenians, according to Xenophon in H. Gr. i. 5, 18, about Ol. 93. 2, Ast conceives that this dialogue was written shortly after that event.

[76] Both Heraclides and Apollodorus are mentioned by Ælian in Var. Hist. xiv. 5, who however drew all his information from this passage, as remarked by Perizonius.

[77] This praise Athenæus, in xi. p. 506, A., considers to be ironical, and hence he infers that Plato was not content to speak ill of poets alone,

Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old?[78] and is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms,[79] turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer. If then you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display relating to Homer, you deceive me, you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are, by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine.

Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine.

Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to obtain) at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.

but of the Athenian people for the conduct they adopted to the persons here mentioned.

[78] Ephesus was colonized by some Athenian emigrants under the command of a son of Codrus. See Ruhnken on Velleius Paterc. i. 4.

[79] On the changes of form, which Proteus could assume, it will be sufficient to refer to Hom. Od. iv. 455, Virgil, G. iv., and the commentators on Plato, Euthyph. p. 15, D., ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς—στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ALCIBIADES.

Singular, says Stalbaum, has been the fate of the dialogue that passes under the name of the First Alcibiades. For after it had been held in the highest honour by a long line of admirers, amongst the Neo-Platonists of the olden time, attempts have been made during the last half-century by Schleiermacher and Ast to displace it from its former pedestal. So many and such gross faults, relating to the matter and manner, say those two scholars, are to be found in the dialogue, as to lead to the conclusion of its being quite unworthy of its reputed author. On the other hand, Socher and Stalbaum are of opinion that not a single substantial reason can be assigned for doubting its genuineness; and with the latter I confess I am disposed to agree; and shall continue to do so, until some definite rules are laid down to enable us to assert that the men, who passed their whole lives in the study of the philosophers of antiquity, were cheated by a shadow, and unable, like the people of Cuma, in the Æsopo-Socratic fable, to discover the long ears of an asinine imitator, peeping out of the lion's hide of the original genius.

Be however the author who he may, the dialogue itself is well worth the perusal of those, who, like Alcibiades, pride themselves on the union of natural and artificial advantages; and of others too, under less favourable circumstances, who fancy themselves fit to appear in public life, and competent to direct the affairs of a state, without having previously undergone that mental training, which alone enables a person to govern first himself, and then his fellow-men. And happy would it have been for his native Athens, and indeed for the whole of Greece, and other countries, had Alcibiades

been as ready to practise the precepts of philosophy, as he was to listen to them. For we learn from Xenophon, that, so long as he was a follower of Socrates, his conduct was as praiseworthy, as it was the reverse when, after leaving the pacific ocean of philosophy, he embarked on the stormy sea of politics, in which he eventually lost his character, his fortune, and his life.

THE

FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

[1.] You feel some wonder, I think, son of Clinias, that I, who was the first of your admirers, am now, when all the rest have ceased to be so, the only one who has not withdrawn himself; and that, while the others were plaguing you with their conversation, I did for so many years never speak a word to you. For this behaviour of mine the reason is to be found not in any obstacle arising from man, but from a dæmon, of whose power you shall hear hereafter. But as it no longer offers any opposition, I have come to you now; and I am in good hopes that for the future likewise it will be no impediment. By reflecting, however, during the interval, I nearly thoroughly understand what is your position with respect to your admirers. For though they were many, and men who thought highly of themselves, yet there is not one, who has not gone away from you, through their being surpassed by you in self-conceit.[1] Now the reason for your thinking so highly of yourself I am desirous of detailing. You assert then, that you are in nothing inferior to any man. For what is your own, beginning from the body and ending in the mind, is so great, as to stand in need of nothing. [2.] In the first place, you fancy yourself to be

[1] According to Plutarch, the strongest of the passions in Alcibiades, although all were strong, was a love of pre-eminence in every thing Ælian too, Var. Hist. iv. 16, represents him in a similar light. S.

very handsome,[2] and of a great size. And in this it is evident to every one, who can see, that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you are of a family the most youth-like[3] in your own city, which is the greatest of any in Greece; and that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready, if need be, to assist you; and those too on your mother's side are neither inferior nor fewer. But greater than all I have mentioned taken together, is the influence you possess through Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left as guardian to yourself and brother; (that Pericles) who is able to do what he pleases, not only in this city, but through all Greece, and with many and mighty clans of Barbarians. And I will add too, that you are one of the wealthy; although, on this point, you seem to me to value yourself the least. Boasting yourself then highly on all these advantages, you have acted the lord over your admirers; and they, feeling their inferiority, have become your slaves. And of this you are very sensible; and hence I know full well, that you feel a wonder at what I have in my thoughts, in that I do not withdraw myself, and what is the hope I entertain in remaining, when all the rest have gone away.

[3.] *Alc.* Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that you have anticipated me a little. For I really had it in my mind to come to you previously, and to ask you these very questions—What can you possibly mean, and looking to what hope are you plaguing me, and, wherever I am, are perpetually present yourself? For I do in truth wonder what your business can be with me; and I should very gladly hear.

Soc. You will hear me then, as is likely, very readily, if, as you say, you are really desirous of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak then as to one [4]who will hear, and stay.[4]

[2] That Alcibiades, says Proclus, was of large size and of great beauty is evident from his being called the general object of love in the whole of Greece; and from the saying of Antisthenes, that, if Achilles were not such as Alcibiades is, he was not in reality beautiful; and from the fact of Hermæ being modelled after him. T.

[3] By *νεανικωτάτου* Stalbaum understands "the most brave," or "most manly." Ficinus has "nobilissimo"—what the sense requires. Plato wrote, I suspect, *μεγακλεεστάτου*—in allusion to Megaclees, whose daughter, Deinomache, was the mother of Alcibiades.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has avoided the *ὕστερον πρότερον* by translating, as Plato probably wrote, "expectanti et auscultaturo."

Alc. Entirely so. Speak then.

Soc. But mark, for it will be a thing not of wonder, if, as I begin with difficulty, I should with difficulty likewise make an end.

Alc. Speak, my good man, for I will listen.

Soc. Speak then I must; and though it is a hard task for an admirer to address himself to him, who is not inferior to his admirers, yet I must dare to speak my mind. [4.] If, Alcibiades, I had seen you satisfied with the advantages which I have just now detailed, and that you conceived you ought to pass your life amongst them, I should long since have withdrawn myself from all the love I bear; at least so I persuade myself. But I will now convict you of having other thoughts relating to yourself; and by so doing you will know, how I have continued keeping my attention directed towards you. For you appear to me such that, if any god were to say to you, "Are you willing, Alcibiades, to live possessing what you now do, or to die instantly, unless you are permitted to possess things still greater?" you would prefer to die. But in what kind of hope are you now living? I will unfold. (For[5]) you conceive that, if you were to come rather quickly before a meeting of the Athenian people—and this will take place within a few days—you will be able to show that you are worthy of being honoured in a way that neither Pericles nor any one else of those, who have ever existed, (was worthy); and after you have shown this, that you will possess the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the man of the greatest influence here, you will be so amongst the rest of the Greeks; and not only amongst the Greeks, but amongst the Barbarians likewise, as many as inhabit the same continent with us.[6] And further, if the very same god were to say to you that—It is necessary[7] for you to be the master here in Europe, but that it will not be allowed you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with affairs there—it appears to me that you would not even on these terms be willing to live, unless you could fill the mouths, so to say, of all men with your name and

[5] Ficinus—"Putas enim," which leads to ἡγεῖ γὰρ—

[6] By these are meant the Macedonians, Thracians, and others. For otherwise οἱ βάρβαροι would mean the Asiatics.

[7] Since Ficinus has—"si deus—concesserit," it is probable that he found in his MS. not δεῖ, but διδοῖ, or δώῃ.

power; and you would deem, I fancy, that no man ever lived, except Cyrus and Xerxes, worth mentioning. Now, that you do entertain such hopes I know full well, and speak not from conjecture merely. [5.] Perhaps, you will say, as being convinced that I am speaking the truth—What has all this to do with the reason, which you said you would tell, why you have not withdrawn yourself from me? I will tell you then, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. That to all these thoughts of yours a finish should be put, is impossible without my help; so great power do, I think, I possess with regard to your affairs and to yourself to boot. Hence I have long ago thought that the god[8] did not permit me to converse with you; for whom I have waited, until he should permit. For as you have a hope of [9]being able to show before the state that you are worth every thing to it, and after having shown it, that there is nothing that you will not be able to do forthwith,[9] so do I have a hope that I shall possess the greatest power over you, after having shown that I am worth every thing to you;[10] and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any one else, is able to procure you the power you desire, except myself, with the assistance, however, of the god. While therefore you were rather young, and before you were filled with these hopes, the god, it seems to me, would not permit me to discourse with you, lest I should converse in vain; but now he has permitted; for now you will hearken to me.

[6.] *Alc.* Much more unreasonable, Socrates, do you appear to me now, since you have begun to speak, than when you followed me in silence: and yet you were at that time very much a person of such kind to [11]look upon. Whether I have such thoughts, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty; so that were I to deny it, the denial would not avail me to persuade you an atom the more. Let it then be so. But if I have such thoughts ever so much, can you tell me

[8] That is, the dæmon of Socrates. T.

[9]—[9] Since all the words between the numerals are wanting in the three oldest MSS., Buttmann was the first to reject them as an interpolation from § 4, and his idea is adopted by Schleiermacher and Stalbaum.

[10] Sydenham was the first to remark that σοὶ, requisite to preserve the balance of the sentences, had dropt out; which the three oldest MSS. have subsequently supplied.

[11] By "such a kind," is meant "unreasonable."

how they will be accomplished through you; but without your help they never can be?

Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to make a long harangue, such as you are accustomed to hear? For if so, such is not my ability. But yet I should be able, I think, to show you, that such is the case, if you are willing to do me only one small piece of service.

Alc. If you mean some service not difficult, I am willing.

Soc. Does it seem to you difficult to give answers to questions?

Alc. Not difficult at all.

Soc. Answer then.

Alc. Ask.

Soc. Shall I ask you then as having the thoughts, which I say you are thinking of?

Alc. Be it so, if you will; in order that I may know what you will say.

[7.] *Soc.* Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to go and consult with the Athenians within not a long time. If then, when you were just about to mount the platform, I were to lay hold of you, and to say—"Since the Athenians are thinking, Alcibiades, about deliberating upon some matter, are you rising up to give them advice? Is it, since[12] about what you know better than they do?" What answer would you make?

Alc. I would assuredly answer—About what I know better than they do.

Soc. On those subjects, then, which you happen to know, you are a good counsellor?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Do you know those things only, which you have learnt from others, or found out yourself?

Alc. What other things are there?

Soc. Is it then possible that you should ever have learnt, or found out, any thing, which you were not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself?

Alc. It is not.

Soc. What then, have you ever been willing to search out or learn what you thought you knew?

[12] Ficinus, unable, it would seem, to understand ἄρ' ἐπειδή, has omitted ἐπειδή entirely. Stephens, too, was equally in the dark. Plato wrote, I suspect, ἄρα σπεύδεις—i. e. Do you hasten (to advise)?—

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What you now happen to know, was there a time, when you did not think you knew?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. Now, what you have learnt, I know pretty nearly. But if any thing has escaped me, do you mention it. To the best of my memory, you have learnt assuredly grammar, and to play on the harp, and to wrestle: for to play on the hautboy, you were not willing to learn.[13] These things are what you know; unless peradventure you have learnt something else secretly. And yet I think that you neither by day or night [14]went out from within.[14]

Alc. I have never gone to the school of other masters than of these.

[8.] *Soc.* When therefore the Athenians are deliberating about grammar, and how they are to write correctly, at that time will you rise up to give them advice?

Alc. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. But when (they are debating) about striking (the strings of) the lyre?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. But on the subject of wrestling they are not wont to deliberate in a public assembly.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. When then they are deliberating about what? For assuredly it cannot be, when the subject is about house-building.

Alc. No, certainly.

Soc. For a house-builder would advise them better than you could.

Alc. True.

Soc. Nor yet is it, when they are deliberating about divination.

[13] According to Plutarch, Alcibiades considered the playing on the hautboy to be very ungraceful, as it distorted the muscles of the face; and could not, like playing on the lyre, be accompanied by the voice. See, too, A. Gellius, xv. 17. So Sydenham: who did not see that Plutarch has probably preserved the words *ὡς δῆθεν ἀνελευθέρου ἔργον ὄν*, which he found in his MS. of Plato.

[14]—[14] Ficinus has, what the sense requires and is adopted by Sydenham, "exisse te domo nos latentem," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐξιών· μ' ἔλαθες ἄν*, instead of *ἐξιὼν ἔνδοθεν*.

Alc. No.

Soc. For a diviner would do so better than you.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And that too, whether he be a short man or a tall one; whether handsome or ugly; and whether of a noble or ignoble family.

Alc. How not?

Soc. For advice upon each subject belongs, I conceive, to a person who knows it, and not to a man of wealth.

Alc. How not?

Soc. And whether the man, who gives advice, be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are deliberating about the health of those in the city; but they will seek for a physician to be their counsellor.

Alc. And reasonably so.

[9.] *Soc.* When they are inquiring into what subject, will you rise up, and after rising up, give them advice?

Alc. When they are inquiring, Socrates, into the state of their affairs.

Soc. Do you mean about building a fleet? and what kind of vessels it is requisite should be built?

Alc. No such thing, Socrates.

Soc. Because you are ignorant, I think, in the art of shipbuilding. Is this or any thing else the reason?

Alc. There is no other than this.[15]

Soc. But when they are consulting about what affairs of their own do you mean?

Alc. When they are deliberating, Socrates, about war or peace; or any other affairs of state.

Soc. Do you mean when they are deliberating with whom it is requisite to make peace, and against whom to engage in war, and in what way?

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Now is it not requisite (to do so) with whom it is better (to do so)?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And at that time, when it is better?

Alc. By all means.

Soc. And for so long a time, as it is better?

[15] I have translated, as if the Greek were Οὐκ ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦτο, instead of Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. See at § 29.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. If then the Athenians were deliberating with whom it was requisite to wrestle and with whom to come to close quarters, and in what way, would you give better advice than the exercise-master?

Alc. The exercise-master assuredly.

Soc. Can you tell me now, by looking to what would the exercise-master give advice, with whom it is meet to wrestle closely, and with whom it is not? and at what time, and in what manner? I mean something of this kind. Is it meet to wrestle closely with those persons, with whom it is better (to do so)? or is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Whether to such an extent as it is better?

Alc. To such an extent.

Soc. And at the time too when it is better?

Alc. By all means.

[10.] *Soc.* Moreover, a singer ought sometimes to play the harp, and to move (his feet) according to the tune.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Ought he not (to do so) at the time when it is better (to do so)?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And to such an extent as it is better?

Alc. So I say.

Soc. Well then, since you make use of the term better in both cases, namely in playing the harp according to the tune, and in close wrestling, what do you call "the better" in playing the harp, as I call the better in wrestling by the term gymnastical? what do you call that?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. Try then to imitate me. For I have assuredly answered[16] you, (it is that) which, under all circumstances, is correct. Now that is correct, which is done according to art. Is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Now is not the art gymnastic?

Alc. How not?

[16] Instead of ἀπεκρινάμην, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀποκριναίμην ἂν, as shown by his version, "responderem." Ast, however, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, all are content with ἀπεκρινάμην: which I confess I do not understand.

Soc. And I said, that the better in wrestling is gymnastical.

Alc. You said so.

Soc. And was it not well (said)?

Alc. It seems so to me at least.

Soc. Come then, and say—for it would surely become you too to discourse correctly—in the first place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving (the feet) correctly. By what name is the whole of this art called? Are you not able to tell?

Alc. Indeed I am not.

[11.] *Soc.* Try in this way then. Who are the goddesses to whom the art belongs?

Alc. Mean you, Socrates, the Muses?

Soc. I do. Consider now, what appellation has the art derived from their name?

Alc. You appear to me to mean musical.

Soc. Yes, I meant so. What then is that, which is performed rightly according to this art? Just as I told you, that what was performed rightly according to art, was gymnastical. So what do you say is similarly in this case? How is it to be performed?

Alc. Musically, I think.

Soc. You say well. Come then—What do you term the better in the expressions, "the warring better," and "in enjoying peace (better)?" just as there[17] you made use in each case of the term better,[18] (in one)[19] as being more musical, in the other as more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to state what is "the better."

Alc. I cannot tell at all.

Soc. But surely it is a disgraceful thing, should any one, [20]while you were giving advice respecting the kinds of food, and saying,[20] that this is better than that, both as regards the

[17] Instead of ἐκεῖ, which seems to have been interpolated from the preceding ἐκεῖ, one MS. has καὶ, which leads to ὥσπερ γε καὶ—Ficinus avoids the difficulty by his version, "in superioribus—"

[18] In lieu of τῷ ἀμείνονι, three MSS. and Proclus offer τὸ ἄμεινον, and thus confirm the conjecture of Cornarius.

[19] Ficinus has "in uno quidem, quod magis musicum," as if he had found in his MS., before ὅτι, ἐπὶ τῷ μὲν, to answer to ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ. Ast, however, Buttmann, and Stalbaum, are content with the ellipse of ἐπὶ τῷ μὲν in the first clause of the two balanced sentences.

[20]—[20] I have translated as if the Greek were συμβουλεύοντα περὶ

present time and quantity, inquire of you, "What do you mean, Alcibiades, by 'the better?'" that you should, on these subjects, be able to tell him that it was the more wholesome—and this, too, although you do not profess to be a physician—but that on a subject, of which you profess to have a knowledge, and, after rising up, you will give advice, as if you knew it, you are not, when questioned, ashamed, as you seem to be, if you are unable to say any thing? Or does this appear to be not disgraceful?

Alc. Very much so.

[12.] *Soc.* Consider now, and be ready to state—To what point tends "the better" in enjoying peace, and in warring with those with whom it is meet?

Alc. But though I do consider, I am unable to imagine (what it is).

Soc. Know you not, when we make war, that[21] after accusing each other of some suffering, we proceed to hostilities, and [22]by what calling it we proceed?[22]

Alc. I do. (It is) by our being deceived, or treated with violence, or deprived of something.

Soc. Hold. How are they suffering in each of these points? Endeavour to state what is the difference, this way or that.

Alc. By the expression "this way," do you mean, Socrates, "justly" or "unjustly?"

Soc. This very thing.

Alc. And yet this is a difference wholly and entirely.

Soc. Well then, with whom shall you advise the Athenians to war? with those, who do what is unjust, or with those, who do what is just?

Alc. You are asking a hard question. For even if any man conceives that it is needful to war with such, as do what is right, he would not confess it.

Soc. For this, it seems, is not lawful.

σιτίων καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι, instead of *λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλεύοντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι*—

[21] I have translated as if the Greek were *ὅτι τι—πάθημα*, instead of *ὅ, τι—πάθημα*.

[22]—[22] The words between the numerals I cannot understand; to say nothing of the repetition of *ἐρχόμεθα*. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "et quomodo nuncupamus illud, quo ad bellum incitamur."

Alc. By no means is it so; nor does it seem to be honourable.

[13.] *Soc.* [23]With a view then to these points, and to what is just,[23] you will make your speeches.

Alc. It is necessary (to do so).

Soc. Does then the term "better," [24]about which I asked you just now, relating to the going to war or not, and with whom it is meet (to do so), and with whom not, and at what time, and when not, happen to be any thing else than[25] the term "more just?" or does it not?

Alc. It appears (to be nothing else).

Soc. How then, my dear Alcibiades, does it lie hid from yourself, that you are ignorant of this? or have you lain hid from me, while learning, and frequenting the school of a master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the more just, and what is the less just? Now who is he? Tell me, in order that you may introduce me too, as a frequenter (of his school).

Alc. You are bantering, Socrates.

Soc. Not so, by the guardian-god of friendship[26] to both myself and you, whom I would the least of all invoke[27] as witness to a falsehood? If then you have (any master), tell me who he is.

Alc. But what if I have not? Think you that I could by no other means have a knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust?

Soc. I think (you would), if you had discovered it yourself.

Alc. Do you conceive then I could not have discovered it?

Soc. You (would have done so) perfectly, had you sought for it.

Alc. Think you, then, that I have not sought for it?

[23]—[23] The Greek is Πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ τὸ δίκαιον—where Sydenham has suggested the simple correction, which I have adopted, σὺ καὶ—for by ταῦτα are meant, he says, the lawful and the honourable.

[24, 25] I have translated as if the Greek were τὸ βέλτιον and καὶ μὴ, ἢ not βέλτιον—καὶ μὴ, although I am quite aware that ἄλλο τι is said by some to be merely the formula of an interrogation. In the present case ἢ is properly found in two MSS.

[26] On the name of φίλιος applied to Ζεὺς, who presided over friendship, see the learned on Euthyphr. p. 6, B., and on Suid. Φίλιος.

[27] This is an allusion to Homer, Ιλ. Ο. 39, whom Euripides has likewise imitated in Orest 1531, as remarked by Porson.

Soc. I (think you would), if you had thought you did not know it.

Alc. Was there not a time, when I was[28] in that state?

[14.] *Soc.* You speak correctly. Can you then mention the time when you did not think you knew what is just, and what is unjust? Come, (tell me,) were you making the search last year, and did you think then, or did you not, that you knew them? Answer truly now, that our conversation may not be in vain.

Alc. Nay, I did at that time think I knew.

Soc. And did you not (think) so during the third, fourth, and fifth year (preceding)?

Alc. I did.

Soc. But previously you were a boy.

Alc. True.

Soc. And even then, I know full well, that you thought you knew.

Alc. How do you know it well?

Soc. Often have I heard you, when you were a boy at school, and in other places, when you were playing at marbles, or any other game, speaking, as if you had no doubt respecting what is just and unjust, but proclaiming loudly and boldly about any of the boys who happened to be there, that he was a knave, and not just. Say I not what is true?

Alc. But, Socrates, what else was I to do, when any one did me an act of injustice?

Soc. Right. But if you happened at that time to be ignorant whether you were injured or not, would you have said,[29] What were you to do?

Alc. But, by Zeus, I was not ignorant; but I clearly knew that I was injured.

[15.] *Soc.* You thought then, it seems, when you were a mere boy, that you knew what is just and unjust?

Alc. I (did think) so; and knew it too.

Soc. At what time did you discover it? for certainly it was not when you merely thought you knew.

[28] From the version of Ficinus, "cum sic me haberem," Sydenham was the first to reject *οὐκ* between *ὅτε* and *εἶχον*. And so Ast and others, with nearly all the MSS.

[29] The Greek is *τότε, λέγεις, τί σε χρὴ ποιεῖν*. But one MS. offers *λέγειν*: which evidently leads to *τότ', ἔλεγες ἂν—χρῆν ποιεῖν*; and so I have translated.

Alc Certainly not then.

Soc. At what time then did you think you did not know? Reflect; for [30]that time you will never find.[30]

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, I am not able to tell.

Soc. You did not then know by finding it yourself.

Alc. It seems I did not.

Soc. But you stated however just now, that you knew, even without learning. But if you neither discovered it nor learnt it, how or whence did you know it?

Alc. But perhaps I did not answer you correctly by saying that I knew by discovering it myself. [31] But the case is this. I learnt it, I presume, as others do.[31]

Soc. We are now come again to the same point. From whom (did you learn it)? Tell me.

Alc. From the people.

Soc. In referring it to the people, you fly to no good instructors.

Alc. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

Soc. Not even the game of back-gammon (correctly) or not. [16.] And yet I think that these subjects are of less importance than those relating to what is just. Do not you think so too?

Alc. I do.

Soc. Are they then unable to teach some things of less importance, and some things of more?

Alc. I think so; at least they are able to teach many things of more importance than playing at back-gammon.

Soc. What things are these?

Alc. I learnt, for instance, from them to speak the Greek language; nor could I name my teacher on that subject, but I refer to those very persons, who you say are not good teachers.

Soc. But, my noble sir, on this subject, indeed, the people are good teachers, and may be justly praised for their power of instructing.

[30]—[30] This seems a rather strange assertion. For if Alcibiades could never find the time, there was no need of Socrates telling him to reflect. Instead of *οὐ* Plato probably wrote *ποῦ*—On the interchange of those two words, see Porson on Eurip. Hec. 300.

[31]—[31] This arrangement of the speeches was first suggested by Buttmann, and has been adopted by Stalbaum.

Alc. Why so?

Soc. Because on those subjects they possess what it is necessary for good teachers to possess.

Alc. What mean you by this?

Soc. Know you not, that it is necessary for those who are to teach any thing, in the first place to know it themselves? Must they not?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And (must) not they, who know it, agree together and not differ?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But would you say that they know the subjects in which they differ?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

Alc. By no means.

[17.] *Soc.* Well then, do the people appear to you to differ as to what is stone and wood? And should you inquire of any one, do they not (all)[32] agree in the same opinion? and when they wish to take up a stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all rush to the same kind of things? and similarly (understand) all things of such kind? For I very nearly learn that you mean by this the knowing how to use the Greek language? Is it not so?

Alc. It is.

Soc. On these subjects, then, as we have said, do not persons individually agree with each other and themselves? and publicly the states (of Greece) do not have a difference with each other, by some of them meaning one thing, and others a different thing (by the same words).

Alc. They do not.

Soc. On these subjects, then, they would reasonably be good teachers.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. If then we wished to cause a person to have a knowledge on these points, we should do right in sending him for such instruction to the people?

Alc. Perfectly so.

Soc. But what if we wished that person to know not only

[32] Ficinus has alone preserved this word, so necessary for the sense.

of what kind are men and of what are horses, but what kind of horses are fit for the race, and what are not, are the people competent to teach this?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And is this for you a sufficient proof that they do not know and are not correct[33] teachers on these points, because they do not agree with each other on these points?

Alc. To me at least it is.

Soc. And what, if we wished that person to know not only of what kind men are, but what are healthy and unhealthy, would the many be competent teachers for us?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. And it would be a proof to you that they are bad teachers on these points, if you saw them disagreeing.

Alc. It would.

[18.] *Soc.* What then, do the many seem to you to agree, themselves with themselves, or with each other, respecting persons and acts, just and unjust?

Alc. By Zeus, Socrates, the least of all.

Soc. What then, that they differ the most on these points?

Alc. Very much indeed.

Soc. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, differing so violently, about things wholesome and not, as on that account to fight and kill one another?

Alc. Never.

Soc. But upon questions of justice and injustice, [34](how bitterly they differ)[34] I know well; and if you have not seen it, you have at least heard from many others, and from Homer; for you have heard of both the Odyssey and the Iliad.

Alc. Entirely, Socrates.

Soc. Are not then those poems concerning a difference as to what is just and unjust?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And did not the battles and the deaths take place amongst the Greeks and the other[35] Trojans, and amongst the wooers of Penelope, and Ulysses, on account of this very difference?

[33] As the word *κρήγυον* is found only once even in Homer, and never elsewhere in Attic poetry, much less in prose, it is probably a corruption; which it would not be difficult to correct.

[34]—[34] The words between the numerals are due to the version of Ficinus alone, "quam acriter dissentiant—"

[35] According to some scholars, *ἄλλος* is used pleonastically, without

Alc. You speak what is true.

Soc. And I conceive that to the Athenians, Lacedæmonians, and Bœotians who perished at Tanagra,[36] and to those, who afterwards [37]met in arms at Coronea, when[37] Clinias your father ended his career, a difference upon no other question than what relates to justice and injustice, caused [38]the deaths and battles.[38] Is it not so?

Alc. You are in the right.

Soc. Shall we say then that those persons had a knowledge on the question about which they differed with such vehemence, as by their contending with each other to inflict upon themselves the extreme (of mischief)?[39]

Alc. It appears not.

[19.] *Soc.* Do you not then refer to teachers of such a kind, as you confess yourself to know nothing?

Alc. I seem (to do so).

Soc. How then is it likely that you should know what is just and unjust on questions, about which so vague are your ideas, and which you appear to have neither learnt from another, nor to have discovered yourself?

Alc. From what you say, it is not likely.

Soc. See you again this, that you have not spoken, Alcibiades, correctly?

Alc. What is it?

Soc. In that you stated that I said so.

Alc. What, did not you say that I know nothing of what is just and unjust?

Soc. Not I, indeed.

Alc. But did I (say it)?

Soc. Yes.

Alc. How so?

any definite meaning. But here, instead of ἄλλοις, Plato wrote, I suspect, Ἰλιεῦσι, of which Τρῳσὶ was the explanation. Respecting the loss or corruption of Ἰλιεὺς, see my note on Crito, § 14, n. 18.

[36] On this battle see Thucyd. i. 108, Diodor. Sic. xi. 81.

[37]—[37] I have adopted the reading preserved by Proclus alone, ἐν Κορωνείᾳ συμβᾶσιν ὅτε, in lieu of ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, ἐν οἷς— On the battle of Coronæa, see Thucyd. i. 113.

[38]—[38] As the deaths would follow, not precede, the battles, Plato adopted perhaps this ὕστερον πρότερον to avoid the repetition of the collocation αἱ μάχαι καὶ οἱ θάνατοι, found just above.

[39] Here again Proclus has alone preserved the words τῶν κακῶν, wanting in all the MSS. of Plato.

Soc. You will see it in this way, should I ask you about one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

Alc. I shall.

Soc. By how much.

Alc. By one.

Soc. Which of us then is the person who says that two is more than one by one?

Alc. It is I.

Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you answer it?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. On these points, then, who appears to assert? Is it I who ask, or thou who answerest?

Alc. I.

Soc. What then, were I to ask how many (and what)[40] are the letters in "Socrates," and you were to state, which of us (would be) the teller?

Alc. Myself.

Soc. Come then, tell me in one word, whenever a question and answer take place, who is it that asserts? he who asks, or he who answers?

Alc. He who answers, Socrates, as it seems to me.

Soc. Now through the whole of the conversation[41] was not I the party asking?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you the party answering?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, which of us two said what was asserted?

Alc. From what has been admitted, Socrates, I appear to be the party.

[20.] *Soc.* Has it not been said that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, knew nothing about what is just and unjust, but thought (he knew); and that he was about to go to a public meeting to give the Athenians advice upon questions of which he knew nothing? Is it not so?

[40] I have adopted Schleiermacher's *πόσα καὶ ποῖα*, supported by the parallel passage in Xenoph. M. S. iv. 4, 7, *οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων, ἐάν τις ἔρηταί σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἐστίν*: and so Buttmann in ed. 2, although he had rejected it in ed. 1.

[41] Although the three oldest MSS. offer *τοῦ λόγου* after *διὰ παντὸς*, yet Buttmann, with whom Stalbaum agrees, would supply *χρόνου*, similar to "semper" in Ficinus.

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. The saying then of Euripides has come to pass, Alcibiades. You seem very nearly to have heard this [42] from yourself, and not from me.[42] For it is not I, who say this, but yourself; and vainly do you lay the blame on me. [43] And indeed you speak correctly. For mad is the endeavour, O best of men, which you have in your thoughts of attempting to teach what you do not know and have neglected to learn.[43]

Alc. I conceive, Socrates, that the Athenians, and the other Greeks, seldom deliberate whether things are more just or unjust; for these things they think are plain enough. Dismissing then (the consideration) of such points, they look to what will be most conducive to those who act. For I imagine that justice and interest are not the same things; since to many it has conduced to their interest to have done things very unjust, while to others there has been no advantage in having acted with justice.

[21.] *Soc.* Then if justice happens to be a thing ever so much of one kind, and interest of another, do you not surely think you know what is a man's interest, and why it is so?

Alc. What prevents me, Socrates? unless you ask me again from whom I learnt it, or how I discovered it myself.

Soc. What is this you are doing? If you say any thing not correctly, and it happens to be possible to prove it so by the same arguments as before, you fancy forsooth that you ought to hear something fresh, and other arguments; as if the former had been worn out like dresses, and you could no longer put them on, unless one should bring you a proof[44]

[42]—[42] Muretus, in Var. Lect. v. 20, was the first to remark that Plato alluded to *σοῦ τάδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις*, in Hippol. 352.

[43]—[43] I have adopted with Stalbaum the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Buttmann; to which he was led by the version of Ficinus, and a remark of Proclus.

[44] In lieu of *τεκμήριον*, Cornarius suggested *σκευάριον*; while Ast, with whom Buttmann agrees, would expel the word as an interpolation, especially as it is not acknowledged by Ficinus. On the other hand, Nurnberger and Stalbaum conceive that there is a kind of mixed metaphor, partly correct, and partly incorrect. Unless I am greatly mistaken, in *τεκμήριον* lies hid *τὸ τεκμηρίου μηρυόμενον*, by which was meant what we call the staple of flax or wool drawn out, as shown by Hesych., *Μηρυόμενον· ἐκτεινόμενον*: while, as regards the metaphor, it may be compared with the passage quoted by Porson in his Letters to Travis, "To draw out the thread of verbosity finer than the staple of the argument."

clear and without a stain. But bidding farewell to the quick sallies of your speech, I will nevertheless ask you from whence have you learnt, and how do you know, what is to a person's interest, and who was your teacher? and all the former points I now put in a single question. For it is evident that you will come to the same point; nor will you be able to show either that, by having discovered it, you know what is to a person's interest, or that you have learnt it. [22.] But since you give yourself airs, and would not pleasantly have a taste of the same argument again, I bid farewell to the question, whether you do or do not know what is for the interest of the Athenians. But whether justice and interest are the same, or different, why have you not shown, by putting, if you wish it, questions to me, as I did to you? or, if (you had rather) go through the subject in a speech at your discretion.

Alc. But I know not, Socrates, if I should be able to go through it before you.

Soc. But, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and people. For there it will be necessary for you to persuade every individual. Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does it not belong, then, to the same person to be able to persuade each individual, and many met together, about what he knows? just as a teacher of grammar is wont[45] to persuade one and many on the question of letters.

Alc. True.

Soc. And will not on the question of numbers the same person persuade both one and many?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And will not he, who knows, be an arithmetician?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And are not you likewise able to persuade many on those points, on which you (persuade) one?

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. But these subjects it is plain are what you know.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does then the person in a meeting like this differ from the orator before the people in any thing else, than that the

[45] I have adopted ἔπειθε from many MSS. in lieu of πείθει. For the imperfect is sometimes used to convey the idea of a custom.

one endeavours to persuade persons collected together, but the other persons taken singly.

Alc. It appears nearly so.

23.] *Soc.* Come then, since it appears that it belongs to the same person to persuade many and one, practise your skill on myself, and endeavour to prove that what is just is sometimes not to a person's interest.

Alc. You are very saucy, Socrates.

Soc. And I am now from my sauciness about to persuade you the very contrary to what you are unwilling (to persuade me.

Alc. Say on.

Soc. Do you only answer the questions asked.

Alc. Not so; but do you say yourself.

Soc. Why so? Do you not wish to be persuaded as much as possible?

Alc. By all means.

Soc. Would you not, if you said that such was the case, be entirely persuaded of it?

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. Answer then; and if you do not hear from yourself that what is just is to a person's interest, do not believe any one else who says so.

Alc. Not at all. But I must answer. For I do not think I shall come to any hurt.

Soc. For you are like a diviner.[46] Tell me then. Say you that of things, that are just, some are to a person's interest, and some not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What then, that some of them are beautiful, and some not?

Alc. Why ask you this?

Soc. Whether[47] has any one seemed to you to act basely indeed, but justly?

Alc. Not to me at least.

Soc. But (you think) that all actions that are just are honourable?

[46] To indicate a sneer Dobree, in Adversar. i. p. 153, suggested *μαντικός γ' ἄρ'*—in lieu of *μαντικὸς γὰρ*—

[47] Since *εἰ* is never used in a direct interrogation, we must, says Stalbaum, supply *ἐρωτῶ*.

Alc Yes.

Soc. But what, as to actions, that are honourable? Whether are all good, or some are so and some not?

Alc. I indeed, Socrates, conceive that some honourable actions are evil.

Soc. And that some base actions are good?

Alc. Yes.

[24.] *Soc.* Do you mean such actions as these? For instance, many men by aiding in battle a friend or relation have received wounds and died; whilst others, by not aiding when they ought, have come off safe and sound.

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. Such aid[48] then you call honourable with respect to their endeavour to save those whom they ought. Now this is fortitude, is it not?

Alc. It is.

Soc. But (you call it) evil with respect to the death and wounds.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is not fortitude one thing, and death another?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. To aid a friend then is not honourable and evil in the same respect?

Alc. It appears it is not.

Soc. Consider now, whether it be not good so far as it is honourable, as in the present case. For, with respect to fortitude, you acknowledged that such aid is an honourable act. Consider then this very thing, namely fortitude, whether it be a good or an evil; and consider it in this way. Which would you choose to have, good things or evil?

Alc. Good things.

Soc. And would not (you choose) the best things the most?

Alc. (Yes).[49]

Soc. And would you not choose to be deprived of them the least?

Alc. How not?

[48] Stalbaum here refers the reader to Xenoph. M. S. iii. 8. 5—7, as exhibiting sentiments of Socrates very similar to those put into his mouth by Plato.

[49] Between *μάλιστα* and *καὶ* Dobree, in Adversar. i. p. 155, proposed to insert ΑΛ. *καὶ*: which Stalbaum has approved of, and I have adopted.

Soc. How say you then of fortitude? at what price would you choose to be deprived of it?

Alc. I would not accept even of life to be a coward.

Soc. To you, then, it seems that cowardice is the extreme of evil.

Alc. It does, at least to me.

Soc. On a par, as it seems, with death.

Alc. So I say.

[25.] *Soc.* Are not life and fortitude the most opposite to death and cowardice?

Alc. They are.

Soc. And would you choose to have those the most, and these the least?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it because you deem those the best of things, and these the worst?

Alc. For this very reason.[50]

Soc. To aid, then, our friends in war, in so far as it is honourable, with regard to the working out a good action, namely, that of fortitude, you call an honourable thing.

Alc. Yes, I appear (to do so).

Soc. But with regard to the working out an evil action, namely, that of death, (you call it) an evil thing.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it not then just to denominate every action thus? If, in so far as it works out an evil, you call it evil, ought it not to be called good, in so far as it works out a good?

Alc. It seems so to me.

Soc. In so far, then, as it is good, is it not honourable? but in so far as it is evil, (is it not) base?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In saying then that the aiding our friends in a war is honourable indeed, but yet evil, you speak in not a different way than if you called[51] it good indeed, but yet evil.

[50] Stobæus, in ix. p. 123, reads *πάνυ γε*: and adds, ΣΩΚ. *ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγεῖ ἀνδρίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.* ΑΛ. *ἔγωγε*: which Buttmann considers to be genuine; but Stalbaum an interpolation.

[51] Instead of *προεῖπες*, Etwall and Sydenham suggested *προσεῖπες*, similar to "dixisses" in Ficinus; and so three MSS. collated subsequently. The restoration is attributed to Wolf by Buttmann and Stalbaum.

Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak the truth.

Soc. Nothing then which is honourable, so far as it is honourable, is an evil; nor is any thing which is base, so far as it is base, a good.

Alc. Evidently it is not.

[26.] *Soc.* Consider now further in this way. Whoever acts honourably does he not act well too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And are not they, who act well, fortunate?[52]

Alc. How not?

Soc. And are they not happy through the possession of good things?

Alc. Most certainly.

Soc. And they possess these good things by acting well.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. To do well then is a good?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is the doing well an honourable thing also?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Therefore the same thing has again been shown to us to be both honourable and good?

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. Whatever then we shall find to be an honourable thing, we shall find it to be a good thing likewise,[53] according to this reasoning at least.

Alc. It must be so.

Soc. What then, do good things conduce to one's interest, or not?

Alc. They do.

Soc. Do you remember now how we agreed about things that are just?

Alc. I suppose (you mean) that they, who do what is just, must of necessity do what is honourable.

[52] The whole of the argument following turns, as remarked by Stalbaum, upon the ambiguity of the expression *εὖ πράττειν*, which means either "to act well towards another," or "to do well oneself." There is a similar ambiguity in Charmid. p. 17. 2, A. § 42, where see Heindorf. Nurnberger refers to Aristot. Eth. iv. *τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.*

[53] Instead of *καλόν τε καὶ*—Sydenham was the first to propose *καλὸν, καὶ*—suggested by "idem quoque bonum" in Ficinus. The restoration, confirmed by MSS. and Olympiodorus, is attributed to Schneider by Stalbaum

Soc. And that they, (who do) what is honourable, (do) what is good?

Alc. We did.

Soc. And that good things conduce to one's interest?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Things then that are just, Alcibiades, conduce to one's interest.

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. Well then, are not you the asserter of this, and I the questioner?

Alc. I appear so, as it seems.

Soc. If then a person rises up to give advice to the people either of Athens or Peparethus,[54] conceiving that he knows what is just and unjust, and should say that what is just is sometimes an evil, would you not laugh at him? since you too happen yourself to be the person asserting, that the same things are both just and conducive to one's interest.

[27.] *Alc.* Now, by the gods, Socrates, I know not what to say; but I am really like a man in an absurd position. For while you are asking questions, at one time I am of one opinion, and at another time of another.

Soc. Are you then ignorant, my friend, what condition you are in?

Alc. Entirely.

Soc. Think you, then, that if a person were to ask you, Have you two eyes or three? and two hands or four? or put any other question of such a kind, you would give one answer at one time, and another at another time? or always the same?

Alc. I have indeed some fear for myself; but I think I should give the same answer.

Soc. Is not the reason, because you know?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Of matters then, where you give contrary answers unwillingly, it is evident that you know nothing.

[54] Of this island, now called Piperi, one of the Cyclades, and near to Scyrus, the earliest notice is found in Soph. Phil. 551, where it is described as εὔβοτρυς, and εὔοινος by Heraclides of Pontus. Its wine was however of an inferior quality, as we learn from Athenæus, i. p. 29, F. The place is here mentioned as being of little note, and therefore properly opposed to the better-known Athens.

Alc. Probably so.

Soc. Do you not say that about things just and unjust, honourable and base, good and evil, to one's interest and not, you waver in your answer? Is it not then evident, that through your not knowing these subjects, you waver respecting them?

Alc. (It is plain) to myself at least.

[28.] *Soc.* Is not then this the case? When a man does not know a thing, must not his mind waver respecting it?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Well then, do you know by what means you can mount up to heaven?

Alc. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. Does your opinion waver on this subject?

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. Do you know the reason? Or shall I tell it?

Alc. Tell it.

Soc. It is, my friend, because, not knowing, you do not think you know.

Alc. How say you this?

Soc. Do you, in common (with me), look (at the matter). About the questions, which you do not know, and are convinced you do not know, do you waver? For instance, in preparing sauces, you surely know that you know nothing.

Alc. Perfectly.

Soc. Do you then form any opinion respecting them, how it is necessary to prepare them, and then waver (in your opinions)? or do you commit them to the person who does know?

Alc. In this way (I act).

Soc. And what, if you were sailing in a vessel, would you form any opinion, whether it was necessary to bring the rudder inwards or outwards, and waver as a person knowing nothing? Or would you commit it to the pilot, and keep yourself quiet?

Alc. (I should commit it) to the pilot.

Soc. In matters then of which you are ignorant, you do not waver, at least if you know that you know nothing.

Alc. I do not seem (to do so).

[29.] *Soc.* Do you perceive then, that errors in acting arise through this very ignorance, namely, in a person thinking he knows, when he does not know.

Alc. How say you this again?

Soc. Whenever we think we know what we are doing, then we surely endeavour to do it.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But when persons think they do not know, then they hand over the matters to others.

Alc. How not?

Soc. Such then of those, who do not know, live free from mistakes through their committing the management of such matters to others.

Alc. True.

Soc. Who then are they, who make mistakes? for certainly they are not the knowing.

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant, who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than those who are ignorant, but fancy that they are knowing?

Alc. None other than these.[54]

Soc. This very ignorance, then, is the cause of their evils, [55] and an absence of learning worthy of reproach.[55]

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. When therefore it relates to things of greatest moment, is it not then the most mischievous and disgraceful?

Alc. Yes, the most so.

Soc. Well then, can you mention things of greater moment than the just, and honourable, and good, and conducing to one's interest?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Do you not say that upon these subjects you waver?

Alc. I do.

Soc. But if you are wavering, is it not evident from the previous (reasoning), that not only you are ignorant of subjects of the greatest moment, but that you think that, although not knowing, you do know them?

Alc. I seem to be nearly so.

[54] So Sydenham; as if he wished to read Οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οὗτοι, instead of Οὐκ ἀλλ' οὗτοι. Ficinus has, "Non alii, sed isti," i. e. Οὐκ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' οὗτοι.

[55]—[55] The words between the numerals are scarcely suited to the train of argument.

[30.] *Soc.* Ho, ho! Alcibiades! In what a state are you suffering! such as I am loth to name; but however, since we are alone, it must be mentioned. You are dwelling, O best of men, in a state of ignorance, the most disgraceful; since the reasoning brings a charge [56]against you, and you are bearing witness against yourself,[56] in that you are rushing to affairs of state, before you have been taught (at all).[57] But this not you alone have suffered, but the majority likewise of those, who manage the affairs of the state, except a few, and perhaps your guardian Pericles.

Alc. He, however, is reported, Socrates, to have become wise, not from himself, but through his intercourse with many wise men, and Pythocleides [58] and Anaxagoras;[59] and even at his time of life he is, on this very account, intimate with Damon.

Soc. What then, have you ever seen a person wise in any thing, and yet unable to make another person wise in the same things as himself; for instance, he, who taught you grammar, was clever himself, and he has made you so, and whomsoever he wished of other persons likewise. Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And will not you too, who have learnt from him, be able (to teach) another?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And as a harp-master, and a teacher of gymnastic exercises, in like manner?

Alc. Perfectly.

[31.] *Soc.* This then is assuredly a fair proof that they, who know any thing whatever, do really know it, when they

[56]—[56] I have adopted *καταμαρτυρεῖ*, preserved here by Olympiodorus, as a various reading for *κατηγορεῖ*. Plato wrote, I suspect, *ὁ λόγος σοῦ κατηγορεῖ, καὶ καταμαρτυρεῖ σὺ σαυτοῦ.*

[57] I have translated, as if *τι* had dropt out before *παιδευθῆναι.*

[58] According to the Scholiast, Pythocleides was a Pythagorean, whose disciple was Agathocles, the teacher of Lamprocles, of whom Damon was the pupil. He is called a Cean in Protagor. p. 316, E. § 20. The object of the sect was to teach moral and political truths under the mask of musical science. Of the nature of their political tenets some idea may be formed by knowing, as related by Plutarch in Pericles, § 4, that Damon was expelled from Athens as a meddler in state affairs, and a friend to arbitrary power. S.

[59] On Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles in astronomy and natural philosophy, see Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 34.

are able to produce [60]another person knowing it likewise.[60]

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. Well then, can you mention any one whom Pericles has made clever, beginning with his own sons?

Alc. But what, if the sons[61] of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

Soc. Clinias, then, your brother?

Alc. Why should you mention Clinias,[62] a man out of his senses?

Soc. Since then Clinias is a madman, and the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, what reason shall we assign in the case of yourself, for his overlooking you, when you are in such a state?

Alc. I am, I fancy, myself the cause, by not giving my mind (to him).

Soc. But of the other Athenians or foreigners, mention either a slave or a freeman, who can show a reason for his having become wiser through his intercourse with Pericles; as I can mention Pythodorus[63] the son of Isolochus, and Callias[64] the son of Calliades through Zeno; to whom each of them paid a hundred minæ,[65] and thus became clever and in high repute.

Alc. By Zeus, I cannot.

[32.] *Soc.* Be it so. What then do you intend respecting yourself? whether to leave yourself as you now are, or to pay some regard to yourself?

Alc. [66]Let the consultation, Socrates, be common to both.[66]

[60]—[60] Such is the literal version of the Greek ἄλλον—ἐπιστάμενον. But Ficinus has more correctly "alium quoque doctum ab ipsis," i. e. "another person taught by them."

[61] These were Paralus and Xanthippus; see Meno, § 33; both of whom were carried off by the plague, during the life-time of their father, as we learn from Xenophon, M. S. iii. 5.

[62] On this Clinias see Protagor. p. 320, A. § 29.

[63] This is the party at whose house Plato lays the scene of the Parmenides.—S.

[64] This Callias commanded the army sent by the Athenians for the recovery of Potidæa; but was slain in the first battle before that city. See Thucydides, i. 61—63. S.

[65] In English money, £322 18*s.* 4*d.*, the same sum that Protagoras and Gorgias demanded for their instructions in sophistry. S.

[66] In lieu of κοινῇ βουλῇ ὦ Σώκρατες, where the dative is without

For [67] I have something [67] in my mind, while you are speaking, and agree to it. For they who manage the affairs of the state, seem, except a few, to be uneducated.

Soc. And what then?

Alc. If they had been educated, it would have been requisite for the person attempting to be their antagonist, to go against them, as if they were prize-fighters, after having learnt and practised (the science). But now, since they proceed to state affairs raw and undisciplined, what need is there for a person to exercise himself, and by learning to give himself any trouble? For I well know, that by my natural abilities, I shall be very much their superior.

Soc. Ho! ho! thou best of men, what a mighty speech is this thou hast spoken. How unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages belonging to you!

Alc. What especially (do you mean), Socrates, and why do you say this?

Soc. I feel greatly hurt in behalf of yourself, and of the love I bear you.

Alc. How so?

Soc. In that you think there is a fitting contest for yourself against the men here.

Alc. Against whom then?

Soc. This forsooth is a question for him to ask, who fancies himself to be a high-minded man!

Alc. How say you? Is not my contest with these very persons?

[33.] *Soc.* If you had any thought of steering a trireme about to engage in a sea-fight, would it be sufficient for you to be superior to your fellow-sailors in the art of steering? or would you think that this ought to be at hand, and you would look to those in reality your antagonists, but not as you now do to your fellow-combatants? to whom it is assuredly [68] meet

regimen; I have translated as if the Greek were *κοινὴ βουλὴ ἔστω, Σώκρατες*, similar to *ἔστι κοινὴ βουλὴ* in Crito, p. 49, D. § 10, and *κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις* in Lach. § 27.

[67]—[67] The Greek is *καίτοι ἐννοῶ*, where Stephens proposed to read *καί τι ἐννοῶ*. He might have suggested *καὶ γάρ τι*—similar to "etenim" in Ficinus. Stalbaum indeed says that *ἐννοῶ* is united to the genitive *εἱπόντος σοῦ*, in Rep. ii. p. 370. But there, as here, it is the genitive absolute.

[68] Instead of *δεῖ* in Ald. and Steph. the two Basil edd. have *δὴ*, adopted

for you to be so much the superior, that they ought never to deem themselves fit to contend against (you),[69] but, through their being held in little esteem, to contend merely with you against the enemy; if indeed you are thinking of exhibiting any exploit in reality honourable, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Alc. Of such an act I am indeed thinking.

Soc. Is it then very worthy of you to rest contented, if you are a better man than your fellow-soldiers merely,[70] and not to look to the leaders of your opponents, [71] considering if perchance you shall become somewhat better than they, and exercising yourself in reflecting upon the things relating to them.[71]

Alc. Who are the persons, of whom you are speaking, Socrates?

Soc. Know you not, that the state is constantly at war with the Lacedæmonians, and the great king?[72]

Alc. True.

Soc. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this state, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have to contend against the kings of Lacedæmon and Persia?

Alc. You are very near to speaking the truth?

[34.] *Soc.* Nay, but, my good man, must you not look to Midias, the quail-feeder,[73] and others of that kind, who attempt

by Sydenham, suggested by Heusde, and subsequently found in nearly all the MSS.

[69] In *συναναγωνίζεσθαι*, found in three MSS., lies hid *σοὶ ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι*, required by the balance of the sentence, as Schleiermacher was the first to perceive.

[70] Instead of *στρατιωτῶν*, Sydenham suggested *συστρατιωτῶν*, to answer to *συναγωνιστὰς* just before.

[71]—[71] The Greek is *ὁπότε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους*: where Sydenham was the first to suggest *ὅπως* for *ὁπότε*. Stalbaum also would read *ὅπως ἂν*, and adopt *γένοιο*, found in three MSS. But *ὅπως ἂν* could not be united to an optative. Heindorf proposed *ὅπῃ τε—γένοιο*. But the optative could have reference only to a past act. Plato wrote, I suspect, *εἴ ποτε, ἐκείνων βελτίων τι γενήσει, σκοποῦντα καὶ ἀσκοῦντα τὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους*, as I have translated.

[72] Such was the title of the king of Persia. See at Meno, § 11.

[73] What cock-fighting was once in England, quail-fighting was at Athens; for small as the bird is, it is, like the male partridge and robin, very pugnacious. According to Pollux, the birds were placed in a circular pit, and the one that drove his opponent out of the circle was considered

to manage the affairs of the state, and still wear, as the women would say, the slave-like cut of hair[74] in their souls, through their want of a liberal education; nor having as yet thrown it off, but acting still the part of barbarians,[75] they have come to the city, to fawn upon, and not to rule it. [76]Ought you then to look to these men, of whom I am speaking, and to disregard yourself,[76] and neither to learn what is closely connected with learning, when you are about to enter into a contest so great, nor to practise what requires practice; and, after being furnished with every kind of preparation, to proceed thus to the affairs of state?

Alc. Indeed, Socrates, you seem to me to say what is true. I fancy, however, that the Lacedæmonian generals and the king of Persia differ in nothing from other persons.

Soc. But consider, thou best of men, of what kind is this fancy of yours.

Alc. With respect to what?

Soc. In the first place, whether you fancy you would take the more care of yourself, when feeling a fear, and fancying them to be formidable, or not?

Alc. It is evident, if I fancied them formidable.

the conqueror; this was called *ὀρτυγομαχία*: but the *ὀρτυγοκοπία* consisted in striking with the finger the head of the bird, or plucking from it a feather; and the one that endured the torture without flinching, won the sum staked by their respective owners. To this kind of sport Midias was so addicted as to be called by the name of the bird, as we learn from Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 1297.

[74] According to Olympiodorus, whose Scholium was first published by Casaubon on Persius, v. 116, *Παροιμία ἐστι γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθερουμένων δούλων καὶ ἐπιμενόντων ἐν τῇ δουλοπρεπείᾳ*, (not *δουλείᾳ*, as it is absurdly printed,) *ὅτι ἔχεις τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη τρίχα ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ἔτι τὴν δουλικὴν ἕξιν* (printed *τρίχα*, which is explaining *idem per idem*) *ἔχεις*. "The women had a saying, which they used to slaves made free, but still retaining the manners which belonged to slaves —You wear your slavish hair on your head still—that is, You still retain your slavish habits." It was applied, it seems, by the Athenian ladies, to men whom they saw ill-bred and illiterate. So Sydenham; who might have quoted Aristoph. *Ὀρν.* 911, *ἔπειτα τηδὶ* (vulg. *δῆτα*) *δοῦλος ὢν κόμην ἔχεις*, to prove that slaves were not permitted to wear their hair hanging down.

[75] It would seem from hence that the family of Midias was of foreign extraction.

[76]—[76] By taking, with Sydenham, the sentence interrogatively, we get rid of the necessity of expelling *δὲ*, with Stephens and Bekker, or of changing it into *δῆ*, as suggested by Etwall and Buttmann.

Soc. Do you fancy then that you would sustain any injury by taking care of yourself?

Alc. Not at all; but be benefited even greatly.

Soc. This fancy then of yours has this one evil of so great a kind.

Alc. You say the truth.

[35.] *Soc.* Consider then if there be not probably a second namely, that it is false.

Alc. How so?

Soc. Whether is it probable that the better natures[77] are produced from noble races, or not?[78]

Alc. It is evident, from the noble.

Soc. And (is it not probable that) the well-born, if they are brought up well, will thus become perfect in virtue?

Alc. Necessarily so.

Soc. Let us consider then in comparing our condition with theirs, whether the kings of Lacedæmon and of Persia appear to be sprung from inferior races. Now know we not that the former are descendants of Hercules, and the latter of Achæmenes?[79] and that both the family of Hercules, and that of Achæmenes, are carried up to Perseus the son of Jupiter?[80]

Alc. And my family, Socrates, (is carried up) to Eurysaces; and that of Eurysaces[81] to Zeus.

Soc. And mine, my noble Alcibiades, is to Dædalus, and his to Vulcan, the son of Zeus.[82] But in the families of the

[77] Instead of *φήσεις*, found in only one MS., the rest have *φύσεις*: which Sydenham elicited before Heusde from "naturas" in Ficinus.

[78] So Aristotle in Polit. iii. 8, *Βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων· εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους.* "It is reasonable for the better persons to come from the better. For to be well-born is the virtue of a race." So Horace too says, "Fortes creantur fortibus." S. See Menexen. § 5, and Cratyl. § 24.

[79] On this Achæmenes, see Herodot. vii. 11, and 150, and the Commentators on Horace, Od. iii. 1, 44; Epod. xiii. 12.

[80] As Hercules, says Sydenham, was never supposed to be descended from Perseus, it is evident that the passage is corrupt. He would therefore insert *εἰς τὸν Δία* after *τὸ δὲ Ἡρακλέους τε γένος*—a suggestion which, strange to say, has been overlooked by every subsequent scholar.

[81] This Eurysaces was the son of Ajax, by whom he was so called, from being the heir to the broad shield of the hero of Salamis.

[82] With this ridicule of the folly of tracing back a long line of ancestors, may be compared something similar in a mediæval Latin jeu d'esprit, under the title of "Solyman and Marcolfus:" which it were easy to prove was written originally by Socrates in Greek.

other parties, beginning from themselves, are kings sprung from kings carried up to Zeus; some of Argos and Lacedæmon, and the others of Persia for ever, and often of all Asia, as they are at present: whereas we and our fathers are only private individuals. If then it were requisite to exhibit your ancestors in the person of Eurysaces, and Salamis as your country, or Ægina as that of the still more remote Æacus, of what ridicule do you fancy you would not have to pay the debt in the presence of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes? [36.] Consider besides, whether we are not inferior both in the pride of birth, and in the rest of our bringing up. Know you not how great are the advantages attendant upon the kings of Lacedæmon? whose wives are watched in public by the Ephori,[83] in order that as far as possible,[84] no king may be secretly begotten except by one of the family of the Heracleidæ; while the Persian king is so greatly our superior, that not a single person has the least suspicion that a king can be born from any other than a king.[85] The consort, therefore, of the king is under no guard but that imposed by her own fears. Further, when the eldest son is born to him, who is then the ruler, all those in the (palace) of the king over whom he rules, have a feast, and subsequently at another period the whole of Asia makes a sacrifice and feast, on the birth-day of the king. But when we were born, Alcibiades, "our very neighbours even little knew it," as the comic poet[86] says. After this the child is brought up, not by some nurse at a little price, but by the eunuchs,[87] who are considered the best about the

[83] These were five in number, and formed the privy council of the state at home; while the kings had little power, except at the head of an army on foreign service.

[84] This limitation is designedly introduced in a conversation with Alcibiades; who was reported, despite the watch kept by the Ephori, to have prevailed, by the present of 4000 gold Darics, over the virtue of Timæa, the wife of Agis, and to have had a son by her, called Leotychidas, as we learn from Plutarch.

[85] Such is what the sense requires; but it can hardly be obtained from the Greek *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*.

[86] According to the Scholiast and Olympiodorus, the comic poet was the namesake of the philosopher; and the verse was, *Ἐμοῦ γαμοῦντος δ', οὐδὲ γείτων ᾔσθετο*, as Dacier elicited from Plutarch in Phocion, § 30, with which has been compared the expression in Cicero, Cat. ii. 10, "corruant; sed ita, ut non modo civitas, sed ne vicini quidem proximi sentiant."

[87] We learn from Herodotus, that eunuchs were highly valued at the

king's person; on whom the duty is imposed of taking care of the royal infant in other matters, and of contriving how he may become as handsome as possible in his person, by moulding his limbs,[88] and making them straight; and they who do this (well[89]) are held in great honour. [37.] When the young princes are seven years old, they are placed upon horseback, and frequent the schools of the riding-masters, and commence going a hunting. At fourteen years of age they, who are called the royal preceptors, take the boy under their care. Now these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men in the prime of life, four in number, excelling (severally) in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. The first of these instructs the youth in the learning of the Magi[90] according to Zoroaster,[91] the son of Oromazes,[92]—now by this learning is meant the worship of the gods,[93]—and likewise in the art of kingly government. The person, excelling in justice, (teaches him) to be true in words and deeds through the whole of life. He who excels in temperance, to be governed by not a single pleasure of any kind, in order that he may acquire the habits of a freeman, and be really a king, by governing first his own appetites, instead of being their slave. But the person who excels in fortitude, makes him fearless and intrepid, since he, who fears, is a slave. But over you,

court of Persia, and purchased at a great price, on account of their reputation for fidelity in all things committed to their trust. S.

[88] According to Olympiodorus, the nose was made aquiline, as being the mark of a kingly mind.

[89] So Sydenham; as if he wished to read *ταῦτ' εὖ δρῶντες* in lieu of *ταῦτα δρῶντες*.

[90] On the learning of the Magi, see Hemsterhuis on Lucian. Necyom. § 6. It was perhaps from this passage of Plato that Cicero asserted in Divinat. i., that no person could be a king in Persia, "qui non ante Magorum disciplinam scientiamque perceperit."

[91] Who Zoroaster was, and when he lived, is unknown. According to Oriental scholars, the word means "star-gazer." Hence one might be led to conjecture that Z is "the," *ὡρο*, "see," and *αστρ*, "star." In Memoires de l' Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, t. xxxix. p. 689 and foll., there is an elaborate account of the religion introduced into Persia by Zoroaster.

[92] According to Plutarch, in Isis and Osiris, p. 369, *Ὡρο-μάζης* was the name given by the Persians to the author of all good.

[93] See Porphyry *Περὶ Αποχῆς*, iv. p. 165, and Apuleius in Apolog. p. 290, ed. Elmenh., quoted by Stalbaum.

Alcibiades, Pericles appointed as a preceptor, Zopyrus of Thrace, who was, through old age, the most useless of his domestics. I could recount to you the rest of the bringing up and instruction of your antagonists, if it were not a work of time; and moreover, these are sufficient to show all the rest that follow after them. But of your birth, Alcibiades, and nurture, and instruction, or any thing else whatever, there is a care to not one, so to say, of the Athenians; unless there happens to be some admirer of you. But if on the other hand you would turn your eyes to the wealth of the Persian kings, and their luxurious living and apparel, and the trailing of the trains of their dresses,[94] and the anointing of themselves with perfumes, and the multitude of their retinue and servants, and the rest of their delicate living, you would be ashamed of yourself, on perceiving how greatly you fall short of them. [38.] And if, on the other hand, you would turn your eyes to the temperance and orderly conduct of the Lacedæmonians, their easy deportment and mildness of disposition, and high-mindedness, and regularity, and manly bearing, and endurance under suffering, and their love of labour, and of contending, and of honour, you would deem yourself a child in all these points. But if you turn your thoughts at all to your wealth, and fancy that on this point you are something, let not this be left unsaid by us, if perchance you are sensible in what rank you stand. If you are willing then to look to the wealth of the Lacedæmonians, you will know that the lands here fall far short of those there. For the land which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, is such, that not one of those here would contend (to be inferior),[95] either in quantity or quality, or in the possession of slaves of other kinds,[96] and of those called Helotes,[97] and of

[94] This was considered a mark of pride or effeminacy, in which not only Alcibiades indulged himself, but his son likewise. See Wyttenbach on Plutarch, S. N. V. p. 28.

[95] Buttmann was the first to remark, that something had dropt out here; for he found in the version of Ficinus, "nemo utique dubitaret, quin—nostros exsuperet." But he did not see that ἐλαττοῦσθαι had probably dropt out between τῇδε and πλήθει.

[96] By these were meant such as were acquired by purchase. S.

[97] The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the ancient inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the river Eurotas. On the town being taken by the Heraclidæ, the Helotes were compelled to till the lands of their Dorian conquerors, as their vas-

horses, and such other cattle as pasture in Messenia. [39.] But to all this I bid a farewell. But as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Greeks, as there is at Lacedæmon in private hands. For already during many generations the metals have been coming thither from all the Greeks, and often too from the Barbarians;[98] but there is no going out to any place;[99] but really, according to the fable of Æsop, where[100] the fox speaks to the lion, the impressions of coined money at Lacedæmon, as it enters thither, one may see plainly marked,[1] but no where of its going out; so that it is easy

sals; and, in lieu of the produce, to pay a fixed rent to their masters, not unlike the tenants in villainage under the feudal laws in after times. To the like hard conditions did the Lacedæmonians subsequently subject the conquered Messenians, who were often comprehended under the same name, as appears from Pausanias, iii. 21, and Thucydides, i. 101, where the Scholiast states, that the Lacedæmonians *διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ διαφόρους εἶναι Εἰλώταις*, (for so we ought to read, in lieu of the absurd *ἀλλήλοις*,) were wont to call their other slaves by the same name. S.

[98] Instead of *ἐκ τῶν*, one would prefer *ἔκ τινων*, to balance *ἀπάντων*—

[99] As the Lacedæmonians were prohibited by law from using any coined money, of gold, silver, or copper, they adopted as the circulating medium pieces of iron of a conical shape, and so peculiarly tempered as to be of no other use. But as such money had no real value elsewhere, and only a nominal one in Laconia, it would not pass elsewhere in exchange for merchandise. On the other hand, all the corn produced and cattle bred in the fertile fields and fine pastures of Messenia, all the copper and iron dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the Helotes, and which was not wanted at home, was sent abroad and paid for in gold and silver; which money was either deposited in the temple at Delphi, or intrusted to the custody of their neighbours, the Arcadians, as shown by Athenæus, vi. p. 233; or much of it buried, (as silver is said to be at Pekin,) or concealed in secret places, an instance of which is recorded by Plutarch in his life of Lysander. So Sydenham. Ast refers to Xenoph. Rep. Laced. vii. 6, xiv. 3; and Stalbaum to Cragius de Rep. Laced. iii. 10, and Boeckh. Œconom. Athen. i. p. 32, ii. p. 138.

[100] Instead of *ὃν*, for which Buttmann suggested *ὅπερ*, similar to "quemadmodum" in Ficinus, Boissonade on Babr. Fab. 103, where the whole fable has, with the exception of a single line, been luckily preserved in the Athos MS., proposes *οὗ*, which has led me to *ἵν'*; while from the passage in Plato it is easy to see that Socrates, who was the author of the fable, closed it with these verses spoken by the fox. *Σῶς ζῆθι, φησιν· εἰ δ' ἄπειμι, συγγνώσει. Πολλῶν γὰρ ἴχνη θηρίων ἔμ' ᾤκαλλ' οὔ. Ὧν εἰσιόντων τά γε γεγραμμέν' ἦν δῆλα. Τῶν δ' ἐξιόντων οὐκ ἔχεις, ὅ μοι δείξεις.* The omission of the verse was owing to the similarity in *Ὧν εἰσιόντων* and *Τῶν ἐξιόντων*.

[1] In lieu of *τετραμμένα*, which is superfluous after *εἰσιόντος*, I have adopted *γεγραμμένα*, found in the three oldest MSS., unless it be said that both lead to *τετριμμένα*, similar to "trita in pulvere" in Ficinus.

to know well that of (all)[2] the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the people there, and of them (the richest[3] is) their king. For from sources of that kind the largest and most frequent receipts go to the kings; and still further, the royal tribute, which the Lacedæmonians pay to their kings, is not a trifle. But though the wealth of the Lacedæmonians is great, as compared with that of the Greeks, yet as compared with that of the Persians, and their king, it is nothing. [40.] For I once heard a person[4] worthy of credit, one of those who went up to the king, who stated that he passed along a large and fertile territory for nearly a day's journey, which the inhabitants called the Queen's Girdle;[5] that there was another called the (Queen's) Veil; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the Queen's apparel; and that each of those countries had its name from the part of the apparel (it furnished). So that I think, if any person were to tell Amastris, the mother of the (reigning) king, and the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had in mind to array himself against her son, and that (Dinomache's) whole attire was worth perhaps fifty minæ,[6] supposing it to be of the most costly kind,[7] and that her son possessed in Ercheia[8] not even three hundred plethra[9]

To the same fable there is an allusion in Horace, Epist. i. 1. 73, "Olim quod vulpes ægroto cauta leoni Respondit, referam; quia me vestigia terrent Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum."

[2, 3] Sydenham has thus adopted "omnium," found in Ficinus, and "the richest," from his "pecuniosissimus."

[4] This is supposed by Olympiodorus and the Scholiast to be Xenophon; who says in Anab. i. Δ. 9, that the villages, in which they encamped, had been appropriated for the girdle of Parysatis (the queen). A similar account is given by Diodor. Sic. i. p. 62, where Wesseling refers to Cicero in Verr. iii. 33.

[5] There was the same custom in ancient Egypt, as stated by Herodotus, ii. 98, where the city of Anthylla was assigned to supply the queen-consort with shoes and slippers. S.

[6] Equal to £161 9*s.* 2*d.* English money. S.

[7] Meaning the most costly among such as were worn by Grecian women. S. But the Greek words *εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ*, omitted by Ficinus, mean rather, "if taken at the very highest value."

[8] Ercheia was a ward of the tribe of Ægeus. See Harpocration in *Ἐρχείαθεν*.

[9] A Greek *πλέθρον* contained 10,000 square feet; an English acre contains 4840 square feet. Hence the estate of Alcibiades contained about 619 English acres. S.

of land, she would wonder to what could Alcibiades be trusting, so as to have in mind to contend with Artaxerxes; and she would, I think, say, it is impossible for this man to make the attempt through trusting to nothing else than his carefulness and wisdom; for these are the only things worth mention amongst the Greeks. [41.] Since if she heard, that this same Alcibiades is making so great an attempt,[10] being in the first place, not yet twenty years of age, and in the next place, that he is utterly uninstructed; and besides this, (that)[11] when his admirer told him he ought first to acquire knowledge, and to pay attention to himself, and after some practice to go in this way, when he was about to contend with the king, he would not do so, but said that he was all-sufficient as he was, then, she would, I think, be astonished, and ask, What is the thing in which the youth puts his trust? If then we were to say that (he trusts) to his beauty and size and family and wealth, and to the natural faculties of his mind, she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected upon the advantages of such a kind on their side. And I think too that Lampido,[12] the daughter of Leotychidas, and the wife of Archidamus, and the mother of Agis, all of whom became kings, would wonder, when she reflected upon the advantages on their side, that you should have a mind to contend with her son, while you have been brought up so ill. And now do you not think it a shameful thing, that the wives of our enemies should consider more prudently for us, than we do for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be to attack them. But do you, O blessed one, be persuaded by me and the inscription at Delphi, "Know thyself;" since such are your antagonists, and not those whom you fancy, and to whom you would never be superior by any thing else except application and skill; in which, if you are deficient, you will fail in that renown amongst the Greeks and Barbarians, of which you appear to me to have such a desire as no other person has of any thing else.

[42.] *Alc.* To what then, Socrates, must I apply myself?

[10] Ficinus has "certamen tantum inire," which leads to τοσοῦτον ἐπιχειρεῖν instead of νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

[11] So Sydenham; as if he wished to insert ὅτι between τούτοις and τοῦ—

[12] The word in Herodot. vi. 71 is Lampito.

Can you inform me? for you seem to me to say what is especially correct.

Soc. Yes, I can. But [13]let there be a joint consultation[13] respecting the means of our becoming the best. For I do not say that, as regards you, there is a necessity for instruction, but not as regards myself; for there is no difference between you and me, except in one thing.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

Alc. And who is yours, O Socrates?

Soc. A deity, Alcibiades, who did not suffer me to converse with you before to-day; and trusting to whom I assert that your favourable appearance[14] (in life) will arise through no one else than myself.

Alc. You are in jest, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps so. I am speaking, however, the truth, (in saying) that we are in need of application, [15]if not more than all men,[15] yet very much so.

Alc. (In saying) that I (am in need of it), you do not say what is false.

Soc. Nor that I myself am so.

Alc. What then must we do?

Soc. We must not hesitate, my friend, nor act a soft part.

Alc. It is by no means, Socrates, becoming to do so.

[43.] *Soc.* Indeed it does not; but we must consider in common. Now tell me. We say that we wish to become as excellent as possible. Do we not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In what quality?

Alc. Plainly in what men are good.

Soc. Good in what?

Alc. Evidently in performing acts.

[13]—[13] I have translated as if the Greek were *κοινὴ βουλὴ ἔστω, Σώκρατες*, not *κοινῇ βουλῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες*, to avoid the juxta-position of two datives, *βουλῇ, ᾧ*— See above, § 32, and at Laches, § 27.

[14] Schleiermacher remarks that the present is the only passage in Plato where *ἐπιφάνεια* is found in this sense.

[15]—[15] I have translated, as if the Greek were *εἰ μὴ μᾶλλον ἢ πάντες ἄνθρωποι*, and not *μᾶλλον μὲν* (one MS. *δὲ*) *πάντες ἄνθρωποι*: which Buttmann could not understand, nor can I.

Soc. What acts? Of horsemanship?[16]

Alc. Surely not.

Soc. For then we should go to jockies.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Do you then mean naval affairs?

Alc. No.

Soc. For then we should go to nautical men.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What affairs then? and who are the doers?

Alc. Such as the Athenians do, who are men of honour and goodness.

Soc. By men of honour and goodness, do you mean those with mind or without it?

Alc. With mind.

Soc. In whatever, then, each is a man of mind, in that is he good likewise?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But in whatever he is without a mind, in that is he bad likewise?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Is not a shoemaker a man of mind, as regards the making of shoes?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. In this respect then is he good?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But as regards the making of garments, is not the shoemaker without mind?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In this respect then he is bad.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. By this reasoning then the same man is both bad and good.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Would you say then that the good men are also bad?

Alc. Surely not.

[44.] *Soc.* Whom then do you mean by the good?

Alc. I mean such as are able to rule in the state.

Soc. Not the horses, surely?

[16] This allusion to horsemanship is made advisedly. For Alcibiades was fond of that amusement, as may be inferred from Aristophanes, who as drawn his character in the Clouds, under the name of Pheidippides.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. But men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Men, who are sick?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those on a voyage?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those harvesting?

Alc. No.

Soc. Those who are doing nothing? or those who are doing something?

Alc. I mean, who are doing something?

Soc. What? Endeavour to show to me clearly.

Alc. Those (I mean) who [17] come in contact with, and make use of each other,[17] as we do, who are living in cities.

Soc. You mean then of persons using each other, (so as)[18] to rule.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you mean of boatswains,[19] who make use of rowers?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. For this ability to do so belongs to the steersman.

Alc. True.

Soc. Do you then mean of men (able) to rule hautboy-players, and by leading the song [to men],[20] and making use of ballet-dancers?

[17]—[17] The Greek is *τῶν καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις*: where Sydenham was the first to object to *ἑαυτοῖς*, for which he proposed to read *ἀλλήλοις*, similar to *συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, a little below. But *ἀλλήλοις* could not be thus repeated. We must therefore retain *ἑαυτοῖς* in the sense of *ἀλλήλοις*, as in Hesych. and Suid., *Ἑαυτούς· ἀλλήλους*: and read *ἀλλήλοις* for *ἀνοῖς* in the next speech of Socrates; and so I have translated.

[18] As *ἄρχειν* has nothing to govern it, Stephens proposed to supply *δυναμένους* from the preceding *τοὺς δυναμένους—ἄρχειν*. But the reference would be too remote. Ast and Stalbaum however have adopted the idea; the latter of whom thus renders the whole speech: "Do you mean those, who are able to rule men, by using the labour of men." Ficinus has "Nunquid imperare eos dicis hominibus, qui hominibus utuntur," i. e. "Say you then that those rule men, who make use of them?" which is perfectly intelligible indeed, but not a translation of the Greek.

[19] This is the correct nautical word in English for *κελευστὴς* in Greek, and "hortator" in Latin.

[20] Sydenham, unable to understand *ἀνθρώποις* by itself, translated, "to other men." But the train of argument requires its rejection entirely.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For this (ability) belongs to the ballet-master

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. [21] But of persons making use of what, do you say it is possible for men to rule men? [21]

Alc. Of those, I mean, who partake in a polity, and come in contact with each other, (and are able) [22] to rule those in the city.

[45.] *Soc.* What then is this art? As if I were to ask you again, what I did just now—What is the art, which enables (a person) to know how to rule those partaking in a sailing?

Alc. The art of steering.

Soc. And what is the science, that enables (a person) to rule those, who, as was just now said, partake in a song?

Alc. The teaching, as you just now said, of ballet-dancing.

Soc. Well then, and what do you call the science (enabling one to rule) those, who partake in a polity?

Alc. I call it, Socrates, good counsel.

Soc. What, then, does the science of steersman seem to you to be a want of counsel?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. But good counsel.

Alc. So it seems to me, at least.

Soc. For the preservation of those who are sailing.

Alc. You speak correctly.

Soc. But [23] what you call good counsel, for what is it (good)?

Alc. For the better administering [23] the commonwealth, and its being saved. [24]

Soc. By the presence or absence of what, is it the better administered to and preserved? As, if you had asked me—By the presence or absence of what is the body the better ad-

[21]—[21] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which Stephens, Ast, and Stalbaum all translate differently; but all are as wide of the Greek, as is that of Ficinus, "Quid denique vocas imperare posse hominibus, qui ututur hominibus."

[22] I have translated, as if the Greek were *οἴων τ ὄντων*, not *τούτων*.

[23]—[23] I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches found in Ficinus; of which Schleiermacher partially approved.

[24] To balance the subsequent *διοικεῖται καὶ σώζεται*, one would prefer here *διοικεῖσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι*.

ministered and preserved? I would have said—When health is present, and disease absent. Do not you think thus?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you had asked me again—By (the presence or absence) of what, (are administered the better and preserved) the eyes? I would have answered in like manner—By sight being present, and blindness absent. So likewise the ears, when deafness is absent, and hearing present, are the better, and better taken care of.

Alc. Certainly.

[46.] *Soc.* What then is the state? By the presence and absence of what does it become better, and is better [25][attended to and][25] administered.

Alc. It seems to me, Socrates, when friendship exists to them[26] with each other, and hate and dissension are absent.

Soc. By friendship do you mean the thinking alike, or not alike?

Alc. The thinking alike.[27]

Soc. Now by what science do states think alike respecting numbers?

Alc. Through the science of arithmetic.

Soc. Well then, and do not individuals too through the same (science)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does not each person (think alike) with himself too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now, through what science does each person think alike with himself about a span and a cubit, which of the two is the greater? Is it not through the science of mensuration?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And do not individuals with each other, and states likewise?

Alc. Yes.

[25]—[25] The words within brackets are omitted by Ficinus.

[26] According to Stephens, whom Buttmann and Stalbaum follow, αὐτοῖς agrees with πολίταις, which is to be got out of πόλις. But Ficinus found, no doubt, in his MS. ἀστοῖς, as shown by his version, "inter cives." On the confusion of ἀστοῖς and αὐτοῖς, see Markland on Eurip. Suppl. 365.

[27] So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum firma amicitia est."

Soc. And about weights? Is it not in like manner?

Alc. I say so.

Soc. But the thinking alike, of which you are speaking, what is it, and about what? and what is the science that furnishes it? And is it the same in the case of a state, and an individual, as regards both himself and another person?

Alc. Probably it is.

Soc. What is it then? Do not be faint-hearted in giving an answer, but be ready to speak out.

Alc. [28]I suppose I may say that friendship and thinking alike is[28] that, by which a father and a mother think alike, in loving their son, and a brother with his brother, and a man with his wife.

[47.] *Soc.* Do you then, Alcibiades, suppose that a man can think alike with his wife on the subject of weaving, he, who does not know, with her, who does?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor ought he either. For this knowledge belongs to women.[29]

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. What then, can a woman think alike with a man on the subject of shield-warfare, when she has never learnt it?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. For this you would perhaps say belongs to men.[30]

Alc. I would.

Soc. Some kinds of knowledge then belong to women, and some to men, according to your account.

Alc. How not?

Soc. On these subjects then there is no thinking alike amongst women and men.

Alc. There is not.

[28]—[28] The Greek is *Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλιαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν.* But as Socrates had asked about *ὁμόνοια*, and not *φιλία*, it is evident that *φιλίαν τε* is out of place here. On the other hand, as he had told Alcibiades not to be faint-hearted, but to speak out, it is probable that Plato wrote—*οἶμαι ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ γε—λέγειν*, i. e. "I think I may safely—assert." Moreover as *οἶμαι* - *λέγειν*, cannot mean, as Buttman explains it, the same as *λέγω*, we may adopt *εἶναι λέγειν*, found in one MS., and similar to "reor—esse—" in Ficinus, or rather *λέγειν εἶναι*, for thus *καὶ* would be a remnant of *εἶναι*.

[29] Compare Hom. Ιλ. Ζ. 490, where Hector tells Andromache to go into the house, and to attend to her business of the loom and distaff.

[30] Compare Hom. Ιλ. Ζ. 492, *πόλεμος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει.*

Soc. Neither then is there any friendship, if friendship be a thinking alike.

Alc. It appears not.

Soc. So far then as wives attend to their own business, they are not beloved by their husbands.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. Neither are husbands (beloved) by their wives, so far as (they attend to) their own business.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Neither are states (well)[31] administered in this way,[32] when every one attends to his own business.

Alc. I think so, Socrates.

Soc. How say you, when friendship is not present, through the existence of which we said that states were well administered, but otherwise not?

Alc. But friendship seems to me to exist to them on this very account, because every one attends to his own business.

[48.] *Soc.* It did not (seem so to you) just now. How then do you now state the reverse? Does friendship exist, while a thinking alike does not exist? Or is it possible for a thinking alike to exist on subjects, which some do know and others do not?

Alc. It is not possible.

Soc. Do persons act justly or unjustly, when each attends to his own business?

Alc. Justly. How not?

Soc. When the citizens in a state act justly, is not friendship produced amongst each other?

Alc. It appears to me necessary, Socrates.

Soc. What kind of friendship then, or thinking alike, do you mean, respecting which it is meet for us to be wise and of good counsel, in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn what it is, or in what things it exists. For at one time it seems to exist in the same things, and at another time not, according to your account of it.

Alc. Now by the gods, Socrates, I do not know myself

[31] From "optime" in Ficinus, Sydenham was the first to suggest εὖ in lieu of αὖ, confirmed by Olympiodorus. So too Heusde, Schleiermacher, and Ast.

[32] Instead of ταύτῃ, omitted in one MS., Ficinus found in his τότε, as shown by his version, "tunc."

what I mean; but I am in danger of having been unconsciously for a long time in a shameful state.

Soc. But now you ought to take courage. For if you had perceived you were so suffering at the age of fifty, it would have been difficult for you to take care of yourself. But you are now at the very time of life, in which it is meet for you to perceive it.

Alc. What then must I do, Socrates, now that I perceive it?

Soc. Answer to what I ask, Alcibiades. And if you do so, you and I, god willing, will be in a better state, if one may trust to my prophetic powers.

Alc. Such will be the result, as far as it depends on my answering.

[49.] *Soc.* Come then, (say,)—What is it to take care of oneself?—in order that we may not be unconsciously, as we often[33] are, not taking care of ourselves, although fancying we are—and when does a man do so? When he is taking care of what belongs to him, is he then taking care of himself?

Alc. To me, at least, it appears so.

Soc. What then, when does a man take care of his feet? Is it when he is taking care of the things belonging to his feet?

Alc. I do not understand.

Soc. [34]Do you call by a name something belonging to the hand? as, for instance, a ring? Would you say that it belongs to any other (part) of a man than his finger?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. And (does) not a shoe (belong) to the foot in like manner?

Alc. Yes.[34]

Soc. When we are taking care of shoes, are we then taking care of feet?

Alc. I do not, Socrates, very well understand.

[33] Here, as elsewhere, Buttmann would render πολλάκις "perchance," on the authority of the passages quoted by Heindorf on Phædo, § 11. And so too Stalbaum.

[34]—[34] After Ναί, Stobæus supplies, in p. 178, as remarked by Gottleber, ΣΩΚ. Καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος; ΑΛΚ Ναί: which Buttmann considers to be genuine; and so did T. Taylor in the Cl. Jl. No. 41, p. 141, but Stalbaum an interpolation.

Soc. Well then, Alcibiades, do you call by any name the taking a correct care of any thing whatever?

Alc. I do.

Soc. When then a person makes any thing better, call you that a correct care?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. What then is the art, that makes shoes better?

Alc. The shoemaker's.

Soc. By the shoemaker's art then we take care of shoes.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And (do we take care) of a foot by the shoemaker's art, or by that by which we make the feet better?

Alc. By this last art.

Soc. And (we make) better the feet not by the art, by which (we do) the rest of the body?

Alc. So it seems, at least to me.

Soc. And is not this the gymnastic art?

Alc. Especially so.

Soc. By the gymnastic art then we take care of the foot, but by the shoemaker's art that, which belongs to the foot.

Alc. Exactly so.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the hands, but by the art of engraving rings, of what belongs to the hand.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. And by the gymnastic art (we take care) of the body, but by the art of the weaver and other arts, what belongs to the body.

Alc. Entirely so.

[50.] *Soc.* By one art then we take care of each thing, but by another what belongs to it.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. You are not then taking care of yourself, when you are taking care of what belongs to yourself.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. For the art, it seems, is not the same, by which one takes care of himself, and of what belongs to himself.

Alc. So it appears.

Soc. Now then, by what kind of art can we take care of ourselves?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. So much, however, has been agreed upon, that it is not the art, by which we render better any thing whatever belonging to us, but that, by which (we render so) ourselves.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. Could we have ever known what art would make a shoe better, if we knew not what a shoe was?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Neither what art makes better finger-rings, if ignorant, (could we have known) what a finger-ring was.

Alc. True.

Soc. Well then, can we ever know what art makes a man[35] better, if we are ignorant what we are ourselves?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. Does it then happen to be an easy thing to know oneself? and was he a person of mean abilities, who put up that inscription in the temple at Pytho?[36] or is it a difficult thing, and not for every one (to discover)?

Alc. To me indeed, Socrates, it has often seemed to be (an easy thing[37]), for every one (to discover), and often too, a thing very difficult.

Soc. But, Alcibiades, whether it be easy or not, with respect to us, the case is this. Had we known it, we should perhaps have known to take care of ourselves; but not knowing, we can never (do so).

Alc. Such is the case.

[51.] *Soc.* Come then, by what means can a thing be discovered what it is by itself? For so we might thus perhaps find what we are ourselves; but being in ignorance on that point, we are unable (to know ourselves).

Alc. You speak correctly.

Soc. Attend now, by Zeus. With whom are you conversing now? Is it not[38] with myself?

[35] Instead of *αὐτὸν* Ficinus found *ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς* in his MS., as shown by his version, "nos ipsos."

[36] Pytho was another name for Delphi. The Scholiast here quotes a distich, which Meineke on Menander, p. 576, ed. 1, attributes to Ion the tragic writer: "To know thyself is in word nothing great; And a god only knows it well in deed."

[37] Ficinus alone has—"facile hoc," as the balance of the sentence requires.

[38] Instead of *ἄλλῳ τινι ἢ ἐμοί*, Sydenham suggested *ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοὶ* on account of the affirmative answer *Ναί*: and so all the MSS. but one

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And am I not conversing with you?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is conversing and arguing?

Alc. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades who is listening?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is it not by a discourse that Socrates is conversing?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is not the same thing to converse and to use a discourse?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the person, who uses a thing, different from the thing, which he uses?

Alc. How do you mean?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts leather with (a semicircular) knife, and (a straight) knife, and other tools.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts and uses (tools), one, but the tools, which he uses, another?

Alc. How not?

Soc. Would not in like manner the instruments on which a harp-player plays, and the harp-player himself, be different?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. This, then, I was lately asking, whether the person, who uses a thing, seems to you always to be different from the thing, which he uses.

Alc. He seems so.

Soc. What then shall we say of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his tools only, or with his hands likewise?

Alc. With his hands likewise.

Soc. He uses them too.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And does he not use his eyes too, when he is cutting leather?

Alc. He does.

Soc. Now we are agreed, that the person, who uses, is different from what he uses.

Bekker omits ἢ, because when ἄλλο τι is used interrogatively, the ἢ is not expressed. Buttmann however, and Stalbaum, prefer ἄλλῳ τῳ ἢ, furnished by Stobæus, despite the objection of Sydenham.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. The shoemaker, then, and the harp-player, are different from the hands and eyes with which they work.

Alc. It is apparent.

Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Now the thing using is different from what it uses.

Alc. True.

Soc. A man therefore is a being different from his body.

Alc. It seems so.

[52.] *Soc.* What sort of being then is a man?

Alc. I cannot tell.

Soc. But you can (tell) that it is some being making a use of its body.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Does any other being make use of its body but the soul?

Alc. None other.

Soc. And does it not so do by ruling (the body)?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. I suppose moreover that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

Alc. Than what?

Soc. That the man was one of three things.

Alc. What things?

Soc. Soul, or body, [39]or a whole, itself formed of both.[39]

Alc. How not?

Soc. Now have we agreed that the being, which rules the body, is a man.

Alc. We have agreed.

Soc. [40][What being then is a man?][40] Does the body itself govern itself?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. For we said that it was ruled.

Alc. True.

Soc. This then cannot be that, of which we are in search.

[39]—[39] Instead of ἢ ξυναμφότερον τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο, Schleiermacher, whom I have followed, elicited ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ὅλον οὐτὸ, by the aid of Ficinus—"aut totum ipsum ex utrisque compostum."

[40]—[40] The words within brackets are wanting in the three oldest MSS. and omitted by Bekker and Stalbaum.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. But does the compound being rule the body? and is this a man?

Alc. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Least of all so. For (of two parties), one not being a joint-ruler, there are no means for both to rule jointly.

Alc. Right.

Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of both, is a man, it remains, I think, either that the being (man) is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it results that the man is nothing else than soul.

Alc. It is just so.

[53.] *Soc.* Needs it then be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul is man?

Alc. It needs not, by Zeus: for it seems to me (to be shown) sufficiently.

Soc. If it be proved not accurately, yet moderately so, it is sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps know accurately, when we shall have discovered, what we just now passed by, through its being a matter of much consideration.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. That which was just now spoken of in some such way as this; that we must first consider the self by itself; but now [41] instead of "the self by itself," we have been considering the "each" [41] what it is; and this perhaps will suffice. For we could surely never say that any thing is more the master of ourselves, than the soul.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Is it not then well to think thus; that we are having an intercourse with each, by making use of discourses, [42] soul with soul? [42]

[41]—[41] The Greek is *ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον*: of which Schleiermacher has offered one correction, and Stalbaum two others. I have translated as if the Greek were, *ἀντὶ τοῦ*—"*αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ*," *τὸ* "*ἕκαστον*"—to which I have been led by the version of Ficinus, "nunc vero pro eo, quod est ipsum quod ipsum, consideravimus ipsum unumquodque."

[42]—[42] The Greek is *τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν*. But as the dative has nothing to govern it, Dobree in Adversar. i. p. 156, suggested *τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς ψυχήν*: with which Stalbaum is dissatisfied; for he saw, no doubt, that the accusative is in a similar predicament. Perhaps Dobree intended *τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῆς ψυχῆς*, remembering Pope's expression, "the intercourse of soul with soul," and the passages quoted on Hippias, § 37, where the soul is said to speak. Add Plato Epist. 2, p. 313, A.

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. This then was what we were saying a little before that Socrates is conversing with Alcibiades, by using speech, not, as it seems, to your person, but by putting reasons to Alcibiades; now this is his soul.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

[54.] *Soc.* He then who enjoins a person to know himself, orders us to recognise a soul.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. [43] Whoever then knows only the things belonging to his body, knows the things belonging to himself, but not himself.[43]

Alc. Just so.

Soc. Not one therefore of the physicians, so far as he is a physician, knows himself; neither does any master of exercises, so far as he is such a master.

Alc. It is probable.

Soc. Husbandmen then, and other workmen, are far from knowing themselves. For these it seems do not (consider)[44] even what belongs to themselves, but what are still more remote from themselves, according to the arts which they possess. For they know the things belonging to the body, (and) by which it is taken care of.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. If therefore it is temperance[45] to know oneself, none of these is temperate according to their (respective) arts.

[43]—[43] The Greek is ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτὸν, ἔγνωκεν. To restore the syntax, Stephens would insert τι before τῶν, or change τῶν into τὰ—But this is at variance with the reasoning; which requires the mention of the body itself, and not τὰ (or τι τῶν) τοῦ σώματος, i. e. the things belonging to the body. Le Fevre and Dacier seem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly translated "*son corps*," similar to "corpus" in Ficinus. Perhaps he found in his MS. ὅστις ἄρα τὸ αὐτοῦ σῶμα γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν, ἔγνωκεν—similar to his version, "Quicunque igitur corpus agnoscit, sua quidem non se ipsum novit." So Sydenham; and so too Schleiermacher proposed to expel τῶν, or to read ὅστις ἄρα τὸ σῶμα ἤ τῶν τοῦ σωματός τι, where σώματός τι is due to Stobæus.

[44] Ficinus has inserted "considerant," but whether from his MS. or not, is uncertain.

[45] According to a Scholiast, σωφροσύνη is here used in the sense of φρόνησις, and hence Ficinus rendered it "prudentia;" whom Sydenham followed; as do Nurnberger and Stalbaum; who refer respectively to Xenophon M. S. iii. 9. 4, and Plato Charmid. p. 164, D.

Alc. I think they are not.

Soc. On this account then these arts seem to be those of handicrafts, and not the learning fit for a good man.

Alc. Entirely so.

Soc. Again, whoever takes care of his body, takes care of what belongs to him, but not of himself.

Alc. It is nearly so.

Soc. And whoever takes care of his property, (takes care) neither of himself nor of what belongs to him, but of what are still more remote from what belongs to himself.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

Soc. The money-making man [46]does then not do his own business.[46]

Alc. Rightly (said).

[55.] *Soc.* If then a person has become an admirer of the body of Alcibiades, he is not in love with Alcibiades, but with something which belongs to Alcibiades.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. But whoever is in love with you, is (in love with your) soul.

Alc. This appears necessary from the reasoning.

Soc. And hence he, who admires your body, when it ceases to bloom, goes away.

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. But the admirer of the soul does not go away, so long as it goes on to what is better.

Alc. Probably so.

Soc. Am I not then the person not going away, but remaining, when, the body ceasing (to bloom),[47] the rest have departed?

Alc. And well have you done so, Socrates; and never may you depart.

Soc. Be ready then to be the best possible.

Alc. I will be ready.

Soc. For the case is this. There never has been, it seems, an admirer of Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, nor is there

[46]—[46] Ficinus, apparently unable to understand *τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει*, has "suis indulget." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἄρ' ἄριστα πράττει*, not *ἄρ' ἔτι πράττει*.

[47] Sydenham wished to insert *ἀνθῶν*, as just before *λήγει ἀνθοῦν*—Ficinus has "senescente corpore—"

now, but [48]one alone, and he worthy to be loved.[48] Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

Alc. It is true.

Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you were about to address me first, being desirous to ask me, why I alone do not go away?

Alc. It was so.

Soc. This then is the reason; for I alone am the admirer of you; but the others of what belong to you. Now what belong to you are ceasing to bloom; but you are beginning to be in flower. [56.] If then you are not now spoilt by the Athenian mob, and become ugly, I shall never forsake you. For of this I am most afraid, that you may become a mob-lover, and be spoilt by them. Since many, even virtuous Athenians, have already suffered this fate. For [49]the mob of the magnanimous Erectheus[49] has a fair exterior. [50]But you ought to see it undressed.[50] Make use therefore of the caution, which I give you.

Alc. What caution?

Soc. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself,[51] and learn what a person ought to learn, who is proceeding to state affairs; but previously not; in order that you may go to them possessing an antidote, and suffer no grievous harm.

Alc. You seem to me, Socrates, to speak correctly. But endeavour to explain in what way we may take care of ourselves.

Soc. Has not so much been gone through by us already? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed upon. Indeed we feared lest, if mistaken on that point, we should be unconsciously taking care of something else, and not of ourselves.

Alc. It is so.

[48]—[48] Buttmann acutely saw here an allusion to Μοῦνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητὸς in Hom. Ιλ. Β. 305.

[49]—[49] Here, as Gottleber remarked, is an allusion to Δῆμος Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος in Hom. Ιλ. Β. 547.

[50]—[50] For it would then appear, to use the words of Horace, "Introrsus turpis, speciosa pelle decorus."

[51] Ficinus has "exue illum—" as if he had found in his MS. γύμνασον—and referred the verb to the people.

Soc. And after this we ought to take care of the soul, and look to it.

Alc. Plainly so.

Soc. And that to others should be handed over the care of our bodies and our property.

Alc. How not?

[57.] *Soc.* In what way then can we know these things the most clearly? For, after we know this, it seems, we shall know ourselves. Now, by the gods, do we not understand the Delphic inscription we just now mentioned, as saying correctly?

Alc. What? What are you thinking of, and what do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect this inscription means, and what it advises us (to do). For it nearly seems that its resemblance does not exist every where, but only with reference to the sight.

Alc. How say you thus?

Soc. Do you likewise consider it. If it had said to our eye, as to a man, by way of advice—"Behold yourself—" how and what should we suppose it was advising? Would it not be to look to that, by looking to which the eye might see itself?

Alc. It is evident.

Soc. Let us then consider, by looking to what of things existing we can see both it and ourselves?

Alc. It is evident, Socrates, (by looking at) mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You say rightly. And in the eye itself, with which we see, [52]is there not something[52] of such a kind?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. You have observed then, that the face of him, who looks at the eye of another, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror, which we call the pupil,[53] being the image[54] of the person, who looks in it.

[52]—[52] Instead of ἔν εστὶ τῶν τοιούτων, Ficinus found in his MS. ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων, as is evident from his version, "inest hujusmodi quiddam," which Sydenham adopted, and F. A. Wolf subsequently suggested in Miscell. Analect. p. 104.

[53] In lieu of κορυφὴν, Dacier was the first to adopt κόρην, from "pupillam" in Ficinus; and so the three oldest MSS. and Stobæus. So too Bernard Martin, in Varr. Lect. iv. 3, and Viger on Euseb. p. 54.

[54] As the pupil is not the image itself, but only gives the image, it

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking at that, which is the best part of itself, with which it sees, may thus see itself?

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. But if it look at any other part of the man, or at any of things existing, except at that, to which it happens to be like, it will not see itself.

Alc. You say what is true.

Soc. If then an eye would see itself, it must look at an eye, and to that place of the eye where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; now this is surely the sight.

Alc. Just so.

[58.] *Soc.* Is it not true then, my dear Alcibiades, that the soul likewise, if it would know itself, must look at soul, and especially at that place of the soul where wisdom,[55] the virtue of the soul, is inherent, and to that other thing, to which it happens to be like?

Alc. To me at least, Socrates, it seems so.

Soc. Can we mention any property of the soul more divine[56] than that, about which knowledge and intelligence are conversant?

Alc. We cannot.

Soc. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a person looking at this, and recognising all that is divine, both god[57] and intelligence, would thus know himself the most.[58]

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.[59]

Alc. By all means.

is probable that Plato wrote *εἴδωλον διδοῦν τι*, in lieu of *εἴδωλοι ὄν τι*—

[55] Heusde first proposed to expel *σοφία*, as an interpolation; with whom Ast and Stalbaum feel disposed to agree.

[56] In lieu of *θειότερον*, the three oldest MSS. offer *νοερώτερον*, which Buttmann would receive, but Stalbaum reject.

[57] Instead of *θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, Heusde suggested *σοφίαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, similar to the preceding *τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν*. But Ast, *νοῦν τε καὶ φρόνησιν*, referring to Julian, Or. ii. p. 68, D., *νῷ καὶ φρονήσει, φησὶ* (*ὁ Πλάτων*) *καὶ, τὸ ὅλον, τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῷ*.

[58] I should prefer *κάλλιστα* to *μάλιστα*.

[59] Here again *σωφροσύνη* is used in the sense of *φρόνησις*, and so is *σώφρονες* a little below for *φρόνιμοι*.

[60] [*Soc.* As mirrors then are more clear, and more pure, and more brilliant, than the mirror in the eye, so the deity is more pure and more brilliant than that, which is the best in our soul.

Alc. It is likely, Socrates.

Soc. Looking therefore at the deity, we should make use of him, as the most beautiful mirror; but (of) things belonging to man, to the virtue of the soul; and shall we not thus especially see and know our very selves?

Alc. Yes.] [60]

Soc. By not knowing ourselves, and not being wise, can we know what of things belonging to us are good and evil?

Alc. How could it be, Socrates?

Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for him who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know that what belongs to Alcibiades does so belong to Alcibiades.

Alc. It is, by Zeus, impossible.

Soc. Nor that what are our own, are really our own, [61] unless (he knows) us.[61]

Alc. For how should he?

Soc. And if not what are ours, then not what belongs to ours.

Alc. It appears he cannot.

Soc. We did not then rightly admit, as we did just now, that there were some, who know not themselves, and yet (know) what belonged to them, but that others[62] (do not know) even

[60]—[60] "The words within the brackets are quoted by Stobæus, xxi. p. 181, although the omission has not been noticed by any editor of Plato. The original is, Ἆρ', ὥσπερ κάτοπτρα σαφέστερά ἐστι τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερά τε καὶ λαμπρότερα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; Ἔοικέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρώμεθ' ἄν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετήν: καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα οὐχ ὁρῴμεν καὶ γιγνώσκοιμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; Ναί. The intelligent reader need not, I trust, be told, that, without this beautiful passage, the dialogue is defective in its most essential part." So Taylor. Gesner had, however, already noticed the Supplement, which is likewise found in Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. xi. 27, p. 551. It is rejected by Nurnberger, Schleiermacher, Ast, and Stalbaum; but considered genuine by Gottleber, Wernsdorf, and Buttmann.

[61]—[61] In lieu of εἰ μὴ δι' ἡμᾶς, Faber suggested εἰ μηδ' ἡμᾶς, which he got from Ficinus: "nisi prius nos ipsos." The conjecture is confirmed by nearly all the MSS.

[62] I have adopted with Buttmann the reading ἄλλους δὲ found in Sto-

what belongs to them. For it seems, that it is the province of one person, and of one art, to know himself, (and) the things which are his, and what belongs to the things that are his.

Alc. The fact is nearly so.

[59.] *Soc.* And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself, would surely be ignorant likewise of what belongs to other men.

Alc. How not?

Soc. And if (he is ignorant) of what belongs to other men will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to states?

Alc. Necessarily.

Soc. Such a man therefore cannot be a statesman.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor fit even to manage a family.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor will he know what he is doing.

Alc. He will not.

Soc. And will not he, who knows not (what he is doing), act amiss?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. And acting amiss, will he not do ill, both in private and public capacity?

Alc. How not?

Soc. And is not he, who does ill, miserable?

Alc. Yes, very.

Soc. And what are those, for whom he is acting?

Alc. And they too are (miserable).

Soc. It is not possible then for a person to be happy, unless he be prudent and good.

Alc. It is not possible.

Soc. Bad men then are in a miserable state.

Alc. Very.

Soc. Not even the rich man then is free from a miserable state, but only the prudent one.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. States then are not in want of walls, or ships, or docks, if they would be happy, nor even of a multitude (of people), or of extent (of country), without the possession of virtue.

bæus, in lieu of ἀλλ' οὐδὲ—for thus τινας and ἄλλους are properly opposed to each other.

Alc. Not at all.

Soc. If then you would manage the affairs of a state rightly and well, you must impart to the citizens virtue.

Alc. How not?

Soc. But how can a person impart what he has not himself?

Alc. How indeed?

Soc. You must therefore, in the first place, acquire virtue yourself, and so must another, who would rule, take care not only of himself and his own private affairs, but of the state, and the affairs of the state.

Alc. You say true.

[60.] *Soc.* You must not therefore procure for yourself or the state the power and dominion to do what you please, but justice and prudence.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. For by acting justly and prudently both you and the state will act in a manner pleasing to the deity.

Alc. It is likely.

Soc. And by looking, as we said before, at what is divine and bright, ye will do so.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. And, moreover, by looking there,[63] ye will behold and know what is your own good.

Alc. True.

Soc. And will ye not then act both rightly and well?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And acting thus I will guarantee that you will be happy.

Alc. For you are a sure guarantee.

Soc. But by acting unjustly and looking to that which is godless and dark, ye will, it is likely, commit acts similar to those things, through your being ignorant of yourselves.

Alc. It is likely.

Soc. For to the party, my dear Alcibiades, who has the power of doing what he pleases, and does not possess a mind, what is there likely to happen, either as a private person, or in the case of a state?[64] as in the case of a sick person,

[63] The expression ἐνταῦθα βλέποντες is hardly correct Greek, for it ought to be ἐκεῖσε; and if it were otherwise, yet here it could be scarcely admitted, where the train of thought requires, εἰς τὰ θεῖα, as opposed to the subsequent εἰς τὸ ἄθεον—βλέποντες.

[64] Sydenham, perceiving that πόλει could hardly be thus opposed to

having the power to do what he pleased, but not possessing a medical mind, and acting the tyrant, so that nobody would chide him, what would be the consequence? Would it not be in all probability that his body would be destroyed?

Alc. You say the truth.

Soc. And do you see, in the case of a ship, if a person devoid of mind and the talent of a steersman had the power of doing as he thought proper, what would happen both to himself and to his shipmates?

Alc. I do; that they would all be lost.

Soc. Does not, in like manner, in the case of a state, the doing ill follow upon all offices and power deficient in virtue?

Alc. Necessarily.

[61.] *Soc.* It is not meet then, O best (of men) Alcibiades, to procure a tyrant's power either for yourself, or for the state, if ye would be happy, but virtue.

Alc. You say true.

Soc. And before possessing virtue, it is better for a man, and not a child alone, to be ruled by his better, than to rule.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Is not the better more beautiful likewise?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And is not the more beautiful more becoming?[65]

Alc. How not?

Soc. It is becoming then for a bad man to be a slave; for it is better.

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Now vice is a thing becoming only to a slave.

Alc. It seems so.

Soc. But virtue is a thing becoming to a freeman.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Ought we not, friend, to fly from what is becoming to a slave?

Alc. Most especially, Socrates!

Soc. Perceive you then in what state you are? Is it such as becomes a freeman, or not?

Alc. I think I perceive it very strongly.

Soc. Know you then, how you may escape from that, which

ἰδιώτῃ, translated "to the state, if he governs it:" which has led me to suggest that in πόλει οἷον lie hid πόλεως προστατεύοντι. οἷον— For thus προστατεύοντι would answer to τυραννεύοντι in the very next sentence.

[65] This doctrine is more fully developed in the Hippias Major.

is now around you? (I say this) that we may not apply that name[66] to a man of honour?

Alc. I do.

Soc. How?

Alc. If you, Socrates, are willing.

Soc. You say not well, Alcibiades!

Alc. But what ought I to say?

Soc. This, "if a god is willing."

Alc. So I say then. And I will add to those words this too; that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing characters, I (assuming) yours, and you mine. For it is not possible for me from this day forward not to follow you, as if I were your tutor, and you were my pupil.

Soc. My love then for you, my noble Alcibiades, differs in nothing from that of the stork;[67] if after having hatched for you a winged love, it shall be administered to in return by this love of yours.

Alc. And such is the case; and I will begin henceforth to pay all attention to what is just.

Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I have a great fear, not indeed through distrusting your natural disposition, but through perceiving the strength[68] of the city, lest it overcome both me and you.

[66] i. e. *δουλοπρεπής*. To this passage Cicero is supposed to allude in Tuscul. iii. 32, where he states that—"quum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nec quidquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis bajulum interesse, quum se Alcibiades afflictaret lacrymansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret—" But as Plato says nothing about Alcibiades shedding tears, Cicero must have got the anecdote from some other source; unless it be said that he found here *Δακρύων δοκῶ μοι*—not simply *Δοκῶ μοι*—

[67] This alludes to the story, that the young stork is wont, during the periodical migrations of the birds, to carry on its back its parent, when unable to fly. The earliest reference to this fable is in Soph. El. 1047, and in Pseudo-Babr. fab. 13, where the Stork says of itself, *εὐσεβέστατον ζώων Τὸν ἐμὸν τιθηνῶ πατέρα καὶ νοσηλεύω*. For other passages see the note of Ast

[68] Sydenham translates *ῥώμην*, "torrent," as if he wished to read *ῥύμην*, literally, "dragging along," which would be a more vivid expression.

I will state here, what I forgot to do in the Introduction, that Winckelmann agrees with Schleiermacher and Ast, in considering the First Alcibiades not to be a genuine production of Plato; for in p. 126, C. § 46, the word *σπιθαμὴ* is found, which according to Mœris was an Hellenic word, but *δόχμη* the Attic one.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND ALCIBIADES,

ON PRAYING.

Although different scholars have arrived at different conclusions respecting the author of the First Alcibiades, yet nearly all appear to admit that the Second was not written by Plato. Clinton indeed, in Fast. Hellenic. p. 225, seems to consider it genuine. For he probably did not so much forget, as designedly disregard, the statement made by Athenæus in xi. p. 506, C., that the dialogue had been attributed to Xenophon. It is however quoted as Plato's by Ælian V. H. viii. 9, Priscian, p. 1148, Olympiodorus on Phileb. p. 265, and Thom. Mag. Εὔχομαι. But in the last passage some MSS. rightly read ὡς ὁ Πλατωνικὸς λόγος Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπιγραφόμενος ἢ περὶ Προσευχῆς. It seems moreover to be alluded to by Juvenal in x. 346, and Persius ii. 61. But Stalbaum denies the existence of any such allusion, and conceives that the author was some philosopher of Alexandria, who lived in the second or third century before the Christian æra, and who was not only ignorant of Plato's manner of carrying on a dialogue, but of the purity and peculiarities of the language spoken at Athens, which neither the philosopher himself, nor any of his contemporaries, would have failed to adopt. But as the dialogue has come down to us in rather a corrupt state, as remarked by Dobree, and that there is, according to Stalbaum himself, scarcely a sentence where something does not occur to offend, it seems hardly fair to lay upon the author all the faults to be found in the dialogue, instead of attributing some to the carelessness of

transcribers, and others to the accidents of time. My own opinion is, that as Antisthenes wrote, or rather dressed up, a dialogue under the title of Alcibiades, as we learn by Diogenes Laertius ii. 61, and that the same person spoke ill of the son of Clinias, as stated by Athenæus v. 20; and as we find in this dialogue more frequent allusions to the Æsopo-Socratic fables, than are furnished by any dialogue of Plato, or separate work of Xenophon; and that Julian, in Orat. vii. p. 390, testifies to the fact that Antisthenes was accustomed, like Xenophon, to have recourse to fables in his philosophical discourses, one may fairly assign to him the authorship of the Second Alcibiades; where he has not only represented his master as acting the part of a sensible philosopher, but Alcibiades in that of a mere ordinary man, instead of being, what he fancied he was, the then living sun of Athens and the cynosure of Greece.

With regard to the matter of the dialogue, the folly or inutility of prayer, as practised by the generality of mankind, Gottleber refers to Xenophon's M. S. i. 3, where Socrates is said to have prayed the gods simply to give what was good, leaving them to decide, as knowing better than himself, what was or was not for his good. The doctrine was adopted by Marcus Antoninus in v. 7, who says that we must either pray in general terms, or not at all; while the latter alternative was chosen by the philosophers of Cyrene, who, as we learn from Clemens Alexandrinus in Stromat. vii. p. 722, asserted the inutility of prayer.

THE

SECOND ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES.

[1.] ARE you going, Alcibiades, to pray to the god?[1]

Alc. Just so, Socrates.

Soc. You appear to have a serious look, and to be directing your eyes to the ground, as if thinking upon something.

Alc. Of what should a person be thinking, Socrates?

Soc. Of things, Alcibiades, of the greatest moment, as it seems to myself at least. For come, by Zeus, do you not think, when we happen to pray, either in private or in public, that the gods themselves[2] sometimes grant some of those prayers, and some not, and to some persons they (nod assent),[3] but to some not?

Alc. Very much so.

Soc. Does it not seem then to you that there is need of much forethought, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for great evils for himself, while thinking (he is praying) for good; and that the gods may not happen to be in such a disposition, as to grant whatever he happens to be praying for? just as they say Œdipus did, in praying that his

[1] As the deity is not mentioned, Sydenham and Koeppen suppose it was Zeus, but Gottleber Apollo.

[2] Buttmann would reject *αὐτοὶ*, as being perfectly unnecessary. It is however defended by Reinhold Klotz in Quæst. Crit. p. 24. I long ago suggested *ἀνταῖοι*, to answer to "malignis" in Juvenal x. 3, "Magnaque numinibus vota exaudita malignis."

[3] In lieu of *αὐτῶν* Ficinus seems to have found *κατανεύειν*, as shown by his version, "annuere."

sons might divide their patrimony by the sword;[3] (and)[4] when he might have prayed for his then present evils to be averted, he uttered a curse that others might be superadded; and thereupon both these were brought to pass, and after these others too, many and terrible,[5] of which what need is there to speak singly?

Alc. But, Socrates, you have spoken of a man who was mad; for who, think you, of sound mind would venture to make such a prayer?

[2.] *Soc.* Does it seem to you, that to be mad is at all the contrary to being in one's senses?

Alc. Perfectly so.

Soc. Do not men seem to you to be senseless and sensible?

Alc. Yes, to be so.

Soc. Come then, let us consider who these are. For that there are men senseless and sensible you have admitted, and others who are mad.

Alc. It has been admitted.

Soc. Moreover, there are some men in a sound state of health?

Alc. There are.

Soc. And are there not others in a bad state of health?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. These are not the same with those?

Alc. They are not.

Soc. Are there not others, who are in neither of those states?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. For every man must of necessity be either in a diseased state or not.

Alc. It seems so to myself at least.

Soc. What then with respect to intellect and non-intellect, have you the same opinion?

Alc. How say you?

[3] The curse is described by Euripides in Phœn. 70, *Ἀρὰς ἀρᾶται παισὶν ἀνοσιωτάτας Θηκτῷ σιδήρῳ δῶμα διαλαχεῖν τόδε*: where see Valckenaer.

[4] Stephens suggested the insertion of *καὶ* from "cumque," in Ficinus. Buttmann, however, and Hommel on Sympos. p. 186, B., and Stalbaum consider it unnecessary.

[5] For the whole family was destroyed. And hence Juvenal says in x. 7, "Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles."

Soc. Does it seem to you to be necessary[6] for a man to be sensible or senseless? Or is there some third and middle state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alc. There certainly is not.

Soc. It is necessary then for him to be in the one or in the other[7] of those states.

Alc. So it seems to me at least.

[3.] *Soc.* Do you not remember that you admitted this, that insanity is contrary to being in one's senses?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And that there is no middle or third state, which causes a man to be neither sensible nor senseless?

Alc. I admitted this too.

Soc. But how can two different things be contrary to one thing?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. [8]To be senseless then, and to be mad, seem to be nearly the same thing.[8]

Alc. They seem so.

Soc. If then we should pronounce that all fools were madmen, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades. For example, if some of your equals in age, happen to be senseless, as indeed they are, and some of your elders likewise, [9]come, by

[6] The Greek is *Δοκεῖ σοῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι*, "Do you think it possible," &c. But Ficinus has "Opinaris hominem—esse oportere"—as if he had read in his MS. *Δοκεῖ σοὶ δεῖν εἶναι*. "Do you think that a man ought to be." Both readings interfere equally with the argument, which requires us to read, *Δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι*, as we have translated in English, and Dacier has done similarly in French. S. From whence Buttmann was led to *Δοκεῖ σοι ἀνάγκη εἶναι*. But Wex, in Commentat. de Menon, p. 43, has suggested—*δοκεῖς ἀνοῦ* (i. e. *ἄνθρωπον*) *ὄντα εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα*: Stalbaum, *Εἰ δοκεῖ σοὶ μόνον τίν' εἶναι*: and Sauppe, *Εἰ δοκεῖς οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ εἶναι*. The reader is therefore left to take his choice.

[7] Although *ἕτερον* is acknowledged by "alterum" in Ficinus, yet correct Greek requires *ἑκάτερον*, "alterutrum," as I have translated after Sydenham.

[8]—[8] That the Stoics derived from Socrates their celebrated paradox *πάντας τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι*, "all fools are mad," is justly observed by Cicero in Tuscul. iii. 5; where Davis refers to this passage in Plato. S. But on the other hand Boeckh was led to believe that this dialogue was written subsequent to the time of Socrates, when the doctrines of the Stoics were more in vogue.

[9]—[9] Ficinus omits the words *φέρε πρὸς Διός*—

Jove,[9] do you not think that in this city there are few sensible men, but the majority senseless, whom you call madmen?

Alc. Yes, I do.

Soc. Think you then, that, living under the same state with so many madmen, we should be delighted,[10] or that we should not be buffeted, and pelted, and have long since suffered punishment for such acts as madmen are wont to commit? But consider, thou blessed man, whether this be the case.

Alc. What then could it be, Socrates? For it appears nearly to be not what I just now fancied.

Soc. Neither does it appear so to myself. But let us look at the matter in some such way as this.

Alc. In what way do you mean?

Soc. I will tell you. [4.] We understand that some men are in bad health; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. Does it seem to you necessary for every man in bad health to have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia?[11] Or does it not seem to you that a man, without suffering at all in this way, may be ill in some other disorder? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not these alone.

Alc. I suppose there are.

Soc. Does not every ophthalmia seem to be a disease?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But is every disease ophthalmia?

Alc. Certainly not, it seems to me. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Soc. If, however, you will give me your attention,[12] by considering the matter, both of us together[12] will peradventure discover it.

Alc. I am giving you, Socrates, all attention, to the best of my power.

Soc. Was it not agreed upon by us, that every ophthalmia was a disease; but every disease was not an ophthalmia?

[10] Stalbaum translates *χαίροντας* "impune"—But that use of the verb *χαίρειν* is found only in a threat.

[11] Although "ophthalmia" is a Greek word written merely in English letters, it has now becom naturalized to express a peculiar disorder in the eyes.

[12]—[12] Here is an allusion to Hom. Ιλ. Κ. 224, *Σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω*—from whence *τε* has crept in, where the author wrote *γε*—The same allusion is found likewise in the Banquet, p. 174, D. § 2.

Alc. It was agreed so.

Soc. And it seems to me to have been correctly agreed. For all persons in a fever have a disease; but not all, however, who have a disease, are in a fever; neither have they all I think the gout, nor ophthalmia. Every thing indeed of this kind is a disease; and they, whom we call physicians, say that diseases produce different effects. For all diseases are not alike, nor do they all act similarly, but each according to its own peculiar power; and yet they are all diseases, just as we understand there are in the case of workmen; do we not?

Alc. Certainly.

[5.] *Soc.* Such as shoemakers, carpenters, statuaries, and very many others, whom why need one mention in detail? All these have divided amongst them portions of handicraftship, and yet all are handicraftsmen. They are not, however, carpenters, nor shoemakers, nor statuaries, taken altogether.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Just so have men divided folly amongst them. And those, who have the largest share, we call madmen; but those, who have a less, silly, and thunder-struck.[13] But if we choose to speak of such in good-omened language, some call them high-spirited, but others simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced, and speechless.[14] You will also find, upon inquiry, many other names. But they all mean non-intellect; although they differ, just as one art has been shown by us (to differ) from another; and one disease from another. Or how does it seem to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. [15] To the point then (from whence we digressed)[15] let us return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the

[13] In Greek, ἐμβροντήτους: for the effect of lightning when attended by thunder, and indeed of all electrical fire, is to stupify, at least for a time, whatever animal it strikes. S.

[14] The Greek is ἐνεοὺς, a word properly applied to infants. Of these three epithets, the first alludes to the wholly useless in any affair; the next to the easy to be imposed on; and the last to those who, from the want of ideas, have nothing to say. S. But ἐνεὸς is rather said of a person struck dumb, as shown by Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 102.

[15]—[15] I have followed Ficinus, "Sed ut redeamus unde digressi sumus," rather than the Greek Οὐκοῦν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν, where ἐκείνου has nothing to which it can be referred.

beginning of our conversation to consider who are the senseless, and sensible. For it was agreed that some such existed. Was it not?

Alc. Yes, it was so agreed.

Soc. Whether then do you understand by the sensible, those who know how to do and say what they ought?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And whom (do you understand) by the senseless? Are they not such as know neither of those things?

Alc. Those very persons.

Soc. Will not those persons then, who know neither of those things, unconsciously say and do what they ought?

Alc. It appears so.

[6.] *Soc.* Now of these very persons, Alcibiades, Œdipus, I said, was one. And you will find many of those living even now, who, though not influenced by anger, as he was, pray for things hurtful to themselves; not fancying them to be so, but good (rather).[16] He indeed, as he did not pray for (good), so neither did he fancy (he was doing so). But some others there are, who have suffered the very contrary to this. For I think that you, if the god to whom you happen to be going should appear to you, and, before you had uttered a prayer, first ask you—"Will it suffice for you to become a despotic king[17] of Athens;" and, if you thought this a trifle, [18][and no great thing,][18] should add "and over all the Greeks;" and, if he should see that you fancied you would still have[19] too little, unless he were [20]to appoint you king[20] of the whole of Europe; and should undertake not this alone, (but) that on this very day, according to your wish, all should perceive that Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, is their autocrat—I think you would walk away exceedingly delighted, as if you had met with the greatest good.

[16] Ficinus has "sed bona potius," as if he had found in his MS. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀγαθά.

[17] The word τύραννος every where in Plato signifies a despotic monarch. S.

[18]—[18] The words μὴ μέγα τι are evidently an explanation of φαῦλον.

[19] Instead of ἔχειν, the sense requires either ἔχειν ἂν or ἕξειν, as I have translated.

[20]—[20] Since in lieu of ὑποσταίη σοὶ, one MS. has καταστήσοι, from the two united I elicited, many years ago. ἄνακτα καταστήσειε σὲ, similar to δεσπόται κατέστησαν in Isocrates, p. 478, Bekk., and ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι in Thucyd. iv. 132.

Alc. I fancy, Socrates, that any one else whatever would do so likewise, if such things were to happen to him.

Soc. You would not, however, be willing that the country of, and absolute dominion over, all the Greeks and Barbarians should be yours in exchange for your life.[21]

Alc. I suppose not; (for why should I?) when I was about to make no use of them.

Soc. What then, if you were about to make a bad and detrimental use of them, you would not (be willing) even in such a case?

Alc. Certainly not.

[7.] *Soc.* You see then that it is not safe to accept at random gifts when offered; nor for a person to pray that things may take place, if he is about to be injured through them, or be totally released from life. Many, too, we could mention, who after having longed for absolute power, and laboured to obtain it, as if about to enjoy some mighty good, have, on account of their tyranny, been plotted against and lost their lives.[22] I think, too, that some events, which happened as it were but yesterday,[23] have come to your ears, how that a favourite[24] of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia, murdered his admirer, through his being as fond of absolute power, as the tyrant was of him, and with the view of becoming the tyrant himself, and a happy man; but that, possessing the power for three or four days, he was in turn plotted against by some of his friends and destroyed. You see, too, of our own fellow-citizens—for this we have not heard from others, but know by being present ourselves—that such as have longed for, and obtained, the command of an army, some are even now exiles from the city, and others have ended their lives; and such, as seemed to have fared the best, have passed

[21] In Alcibiad. i. p. 105, A. § 4, there is a very similar train of argument. But there the son of Clinias is represented as preferring power to life. From the change in his feelings it is fair to infer that this dialogue relates to a period, when he had become somewhat cooled down by age.

[22] The author had probably in view the fate of Peisistratus and Hipparchus.

[23] The phrase Χθιζά τε καὶ πρωϊζὰ is taken from Homer in Ιλ. Β. 303. In Attic prose Greek it is χθὲς καὶ πρώην, found in Gorg. p. 470. Buttm.

[24] The name of the favourite is Κρατεύας, in Ælian V. H. viii. 9, Κράτερος in Diodorus, lxiv. p. 761, but Κραταῖος in Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 11.

through many trying dangers and terrors[25] during the campaign itself;[26] and when they have returned to their own country, have suffered from informers a siege not at all inferior to that, which they have endured from foreign foes; so that some of them prayed they had never been at the head of an army, rather than to have borne a command. [8.] Now, if the dangers and toils had tended to their benefit, [27]it would have had some reason;[27] but now it is quite the reverse. And with respect to children, you will find in the very same manner, how that some persons, after having prayed for them to be born, have, when they are born,[28] come into the greatest calamities and sorrows. For some, whose children have been thoroughly wicked, have passed the whole of their lives in sorrow; and some, whose children were well-behaved, have met with the misfortune to be deprived of them, and have come into calamities in no respect less than the others, and, like them, have wished rather that their children had been never born.[29] And yet, although these, and many other instances of the like kind, are so very evident to persons, it is rare to find a man who would refuse what is offered, or who, if he is about to obtain it by prayer, would cease to pray for it. Nor would the majority refrain from absolute power, if offered them, or the command of an army, or many other things, which, when present, do more harm than good; but they would, on the contrary,[30] pray for their possession, should such things happen not to be present to any one. And yet, after waiting a little time, they sometimes recant,[31] and pray the reverse of what they prayed before. I have therefore my

[25] Instead of *φόβων*, Sydenham would prefer *πόνων*, as better suited to *κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι*, just afterwards.

[26] I have adopted *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στρατίᾳ*, which Ficinus found in his MS. as shown by his version—"in ipso exercitu."

[27 – 27] The Greek is *εἶχεν ἂν*— But as there is nothing to which the verb can be referred, Ficinus introduced "hoc studium." The author wrote, I suspect, *εὐχὴ εἶχεν ἂν*— "a prayer would have had—"

[28] The word *ἤδη*, which now precedes *γενέσθαι*, should be united to *γενομένων*. S.

[29] I have omitted here *ἢ γενέσθαι* with Ficinus; whose version is, "ac prorsus eligerent nunquam se filios genuisse."

[30] Instead of *ἀλλὰ*, the sense requires *ἀλλ' αὖ*—

[31] Gottleber quotes opportunely Maxim. Tyr. xxx. p. 313, **Μίδας— ποιεῖται παλινῳδίαν τῆς εὐχῆς.**

doubts, that men do in reality accuse the gods unjustly, in saying that their evils come from them; for either by their own crimes or follies, we should say,

They griefs endure beyond their fated share.[32]

[9.] And that poet, Alcibiades, was near to being a sensible person, who, when connected with some friends void of understanding, and observing them to do and pray for things which it were better for them (not to have), but which appeared to them (to be good), thought proper to use in common a prayer, which he expresses somehow to this effect—

[33] Oh, Zeus, our king, whate'er is good vouchsafe
To us, if prayers we offer or do not;
But evil, when we pray thee to avert,[33]
Do thou ordain.[34]

To me indeed the poet appears to speak correctly and safely. But if you have aught in your mind against this sentiment, do not hold your tongue.

Alc. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against any thing which is said correctly. But I am thinking on that point, of how many evils to man is ignorance the cause; since, as it seems, through it we are unconsciously doing to ourselves the greatest mischiefs, and, what is the worst, even praying for them; a fact which no one would fancy; but every one would conceive this rather, that he is competent to pray for things the best for himself, and not the worst; for this would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Soc. But perhaps, O best of men, some one who happens to be wiser than you or I, would say, that we do not speak correctly in blaming thus at random ignorance, unless we add that of some things and to some persons and under certain circumstances, ignorance is a good, as it is to them an evil.

Alc. How say you? Is there any thing whatever, of

[32] Here, as Sydenham remarks, is an allusion to Od. I. 32.

[33]—[33] The Greek couplet is found with some slight variations in Anthol. Epigr. Ἀδέσποτ. 466, ed. Br. The same verses have been lately found likewise in Orion Antholog. Gnomic. and published by Schneidewinn in Conject. Crit. p. 48, as remarked by Sauppe, who refers to Proclus in Platon. Rep. 402, 26, ed. Bas.

[34] Instead of κελεύει, which is unintelligible, Ficinus found in his MS. κίλευε, as shown by his version, "abesse jube—"

which it is better for any person whatever, under any circumstances whatever, to be ignorant than to know?

Soc. So it seems to me at least; and does it not to you?

Alc. No, by Zeus.

[10.] *Soc.* I will not bring a verdict against you on the point of your being willing to do[35] to your own mother, what they say Orestes and Alcmæon did, or whoever else may have happened to act in the same manner as they did.

Alc. Speak, by Zeus, words of good omen, Socrates.

Soc. There is no need, Alcibiades, of your bidding that person to speak words of good omen, who says that you would not be willing to do such a deed, but much rather him, who says the contrary. (But)[36] since the deed appears to you to be so dreadful, that it ought not to be mentioned so easily, do you think that Orestes, if he had been a sensible person, and known what it was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any such act?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Nor would, I think, any other man.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. [37] The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil; and to be ignorant of the best.[37]

Alc. So it appears, at least to me.

Soc. And to him, and to all other men.

Alc. So I say.

Soc. Let us consider further this too. If it occurred to you on this very instant to think it were a better thing for you to take a dagger, and, going to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend, to ask—Is he within—with the intention of killing only him, and no other person, and that the servants should say—He is within.—[11.] I do not assert that

[35] Respecting the murder of his mother Clytemnestra by Orestes, it will be sufficient to refer to the Choephori of Æschylus, and the Electra of Sophocles, and Euripides; and for that of Alcmæon, to the Scholia on Hom. Od. xi. 326; Servius on Virgil's Æn. vi. 445; and Apollodorus iii. 6. S. Who might have added the fragments of the Alcmæon of Euripides, some of which are to be found translated into Latin in Cicero's Academics.

[36] I have adopted Buttmann's conjecture, that δὲ has dropt out after δῆ. Hommel however, on Sympos. p. 189, D., defends the want of connexion; while Stalbaum would read ἔπειτα—

[37]—[37] In the words between the numerals there is a tautology which Gottleber was the first to notice; but it was found in the MS. used by Priscian, who quotes the whole passage in p. 1148

you have an inclination to do any of these things; [38] but if, as I think, it shall seem good to you, what surely nothing prevents, that to him, who is ignorant of what is the best, an opinion has at some time occurred, so that what is even the worst, has been thought at some time to be the best.[38] Or does it not seem to you it would be?

Alc. Certainly so.

Soc. If then, upon going within, you should see himself there, but not knowing him, should think he was some other person, would you still venture to kill him?

Alc. No, by Zeus; I do not think I should.

Soc. For you would not (kill) any person, who happened to meet you, but only that very person, whom you wished (to kill). Is it not so?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if you made frequent attempts, but were always ignorant of his being Pericles, [39] [whenever you were about to do the deed,] [39] you never would make an attack upon him.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What then, do you think that Orestes would ever have made an attack upon his mother, if in like manner he had not known her?

Alc. I think he would not.

Soc. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman, who might meet him, nor the mother of any person whatever, but his own mother.

Alc. Such is the fact.

Soc. To persons then so situated, and having such fancies, it is better not to know such things.

Alc. It appears so.

Soc. Do you then perceive, that of some things, and to some persons, and under some circumstances, ignorance is a good, and not, as it seemed to you just now, an evil?

Alc. It is probable.

[38]—[38] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, out of which neither Sydenham nor any one else have been able to make the least sense, except by alterations more or less violent. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "Sed an videatur tibi, quod quidem nihil prohibet, ignoranti tibi, quid sit optimum, adesse posse interdum opinionem, ut judices, quod est pessimum, nonnunquam optimum esse."

[39]—[39] The words within brackets are properly omitted by Ficinus.

[12.] *Soc.* Further still, if you are willing to consider what is after this, it would perhaps appear to you to be absurd—[40]

Alc. What especially, Socrates?

Soc. That the possession of (all)[41] other sciences, so to speak, is, unless a person possesses the science[42] of what is best, very near to being seldom a benefit, but generally hurtful to the person possessing it.[43] And consider in this way. Does it not seem to you necessary that, when we are about to do or say any thing, we ought to know, or previously fancy we know, or know in reality, what we are about to say or do rather readily?

Alc. To me at least it seems so.

Soc. Do not then our public speakers, either knowing how to counsel, or fancying they know, give us their counsel on the instant on every occasion, some about war and peace, others, about the building of walls, or furnishing harbours; and, in one word, whatever one state does to another state, or itself by itself, all takes place from the advice of the orators.

Alc. You speak the truth.

Soc. See then what is after this.

[45] *Alc.* If I am able.

Soc.[45] You surely call persons sensible and senseless.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you not (call) the many senseless, but the few sensible?

[40] Ficinus has "Præterea si volueris——mirabile dictu discutere forte probabile videbitur," which Sydenham adopted; and from whence Buttmann elicited *ἄτοπον ὂν, ἴσως ἂν σοὶ εἰκὸς δόξειεν εἶναι.* Stalbaum once proposed *ἴσως ἂν σοί τι δόξειεν εἶναι*: and so Sydenham before him.

[41] I have adopted the "omnium" of Ficinus. For without that word the limitation of the universality in *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* would be unintelligible. Otherwise we must omit *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, as Ficinus has done.

[42] Sydenham was the first to perceive that *τῆς* was required here between *ἄνευ* and *τοῦ*, as is evident from § 15, where the assertion is repeated. The correction is attributed to Schleiermacher by Buttmann.

[43] Instead of *αὐτὰ* in all the MSS. but two, which read *ἀυτὸν*, Schneider suggested *αὐτὸ*, whom Bekker and Stalbaum have followed. The credit of the correction is due to Sydenham, who was led to it by comparing § 15. He likewise anticipated *αὐτὰς*, formerly proposed by Stalbaum.

[44] Instead of *πρῶτον*, Ficinus seems to have read in his MS. *πρότερον*, answering to his "prius." But *πρῶτον* is found again in § 14.

[45]—[45] I have adopted the arrangement of the speeches suggested by Heusde.

Alc. Just so.

Soc. And (you call) both so, with an eye to something.

Alc. Yes.

[13.] *Soc.* Would you call that man sensible, who knows how to give advice, but without (knowing) whether a thing is better, and in what it is better?

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor him, I think, who knows war abstractedly, but without (knowing) when it is better, or for how long a time it is better. Is it not so?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Nor if a person knows how to murder another, or to take away his property, or to cause him to be an exile from his country, without (knowing) when it is better, or to whom it is better (to do so).

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, unless the knowledge also of what is best follows at his side—now this is surely the same as the knowledge of what is beneficial—[46] Is it not so?

Alc. Certainly it is.

Soc. Shall we say that he is a sensible[46] and a competent counsellor both for the state and himself; but that the man [47] who does not do so, is the contrary of these?[47] Or how seems it to you?

Alc. To me in this way.

Soc. What then, should a person who knows how to ride, or shoot with a bow, or wrestle, or box, or engage in any other kind of combat, or in any thing else which we know by art, by what name will you call him, who knows what takes place the better

[46]—[46] The whole passage between the numerals Ficinus thus translates—"hunc forte prudentem vocabis. *Alc.* Hunc ipsum. *Soc.* Prudentemque ipsum dicemus"—

[47]—[47] The Greek is *τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα τἀναντία τούτων.* In lieu of *ποιοῦντα*, Sydenham suggested *ὠφελοῦντα*, that is, *ὠφελεῖν ἐπιστάμενον*, or else *τοιοῦτον*: which last conjecture Stalbaum attributes to Schneider, and once called it "an egregious" one; but he afterwards proposed to omit *ποιοῦντα* entirely. I suggested many years ago—*τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπαΐοντα τούτων, τἀναντία*—but I should have corrected rather *τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐπαΐοντά τι τούτων*, similar to *τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν*, in Theætet. p. 145, D., i. e. "but the person knowing none of these things, the reverse." Sauppe would read *τὸν δὲ μὴ νοοῦντα*—

according to each art?[48] (Will you not call him, who knows) according to the equestrian art, an equestrian?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And him (who knows) according to the boxing art, a boxer? but him, according to the hautboy-playing art, a hautboy-player; and in the rest of cases surely analogously to these? Or how otherwise?

Alc. Not otherwise than in this way.

Soc. Does it then seem to you necessary that the person knowing any of these, is a sensible man? Or shall we say that he wants much of being so?

Alc. Much indeed, by Zeus.

[14.] *Soc.* What kind of a commonwealth do you think there would be, composed of good bow-men and hautboy-players, and still more of athletes[49] and other artists, and of those mixed with such as we have just now mentioned, who know how to war [50]in the abstract, and to murder in the abstract;[50] and, moreover, of orators puffed up with the statesman's swell,[51] but all devoid of the knowledge of what is best, and of that, which knows when it is better to make use of each one of those things, and against whom?

Alc. A bad one, Socrates, I think.

Soc. And you would say, I think, when you saw each one of these men full of ambition, and giving the greatest share he has in the commonwealth to that point,

Where he may happen to be best himself,[52]

[48] In lieu of *κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην*, Ficinus found in his MS. *κατὰ τέχνην*, as shown by his version—"in arte." Buttmann suggested *καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν τέχνην*, which I have adopted.

[49] We have no word in English to answer to *ἀθλητὴς*, by which was meant a person contending in all kinds of bodily exercises.

[50] Ficinus twice omits *αὐτὸ*—

[51] The cant English word "swell" answers exactly to the Greek *φύσημα*. Stalbaum has given here a facetious anecdote, preserved by Eustathius on Ιλ. Σ. p. 1151 = 1205, who states that when Demeas, the son of Diomedes by a female hautboy-player, was acting the swell as an orator, Hyperides stopped him by saying, Will you not be silent, nor swell your cheeks more than your mother did?

[52] The author alludes to a passage quoted by Plato in Gorg. p. 481, E., from the Antiope of Euripides; where instead of *τῆς πολιτείας*, is found *ἡμέρας*: and hence in lieu of *πολιτείας* I should prefer *πραγματειας*, especially as Cicero has in Rep. i. 22, "Cum in suo quemque opere artificem, qui quidem excellat, nihil aliud cogitare, meditari, curare videam, nisi quo sit in illo genere melior."

I mean that which becomes best according to his own art,[53] [54]but of that which is the best for the state, and himself for himself having missed for the most part, as having I think trusted without intellect to opinion.[54] Since then such is the case, should we not speak correctly in saying that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawlessness?

Alc. Right indeed, by Zeus.

Soc. Did it not seem to us to be necessary that we ought previously to fancy we know, or to know in reality, what we are about to say or do readily?[55]

Alc. It seems so.

[15.] *Soc.* [56]Should then a person do what he knows, or thinks he knows, and there follow that we have ourselves beneficially and profitably both to the state and himself to himself, is not—[56]

Alc. How not?

[53] So Sydenham, as if he wished to read *κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην*, instead of *κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*, "according to art in the abstract," which I cannot understand.

[54]—[54] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, where I am now, as I was many years ago, quite in the dark. For I cannot see, nor could Stephens, how *αὐτὸν* can be united to *πόλει* by a copulative conjunction; nor how *αὐτὸν* can be said of the thing meant by *βελτίστου*, nor on what the accusative *διημαρτηκότα* depends; nor, lastly, why there should be any mention made of a person trusting to opinion without intellect; although it is true that there is a reference to this passage in § 15, but there all is as clear as it is here the reverse.

[55] In § 12, the word is *προχειροτέρως*, where Sauppe prefers *προχείρως*, as read here.

[56]—[56] Here again a literal version will best show that it was not without reason that Sydenham wrote a very long note, and closed it with proposing to read *Οὐκοῦν, κἂν μὲν πράττῃ τις, ἃ οἶδεν, παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη, ἐδόκει ἡμῖν λυσιτελούντως ἕξειν τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ*, i. e. Should then a person do what he knows, and should the knowledge of what is the best accompany (the act), did it not seem to us that he would be in a condition advantageous to the state and to himself? To these emendations Sydenham was led by finding in Ficinus, "Nonne, si quis agit quidem, quod novit, aut nosse existimat, addit autem scientiam optimi, sequitur ut utiliter agat, et ad se ipsum et ad rem publicam." From whence Buttmann too wished to elicit *παρέπηται δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἐπιστήμη*, referring to § 13, *ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δὲ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου.* With regard to my own refiction of the passage, to which I still adhere, I will refer the reader to my edition of this dialogue.

Soc. [57]But if (he does) I think the contrary of these,[57] there (will be a benefit) neither to the public nor himself.

Alc. Certainly not.

Soc. What then does it seem to you now? In the like manner,[58] or somehow otherwise?

Alc. Not otherwise than this.

Soc. Did you not say that you called the many senseless, but the few sensible?

Alc. I did.

Soc. And do we not say again that the many have missed of what is the best, by having generally, I think, trusted to opinion without intellect?

Alc. We say it.

Soc. It is for the interest then of the many neither to know any thing, nor to fancy they know, if they shall be more ready to do what they know, or fancy they know, and by doing so are about[59] to be still more injured than benefited.

Alc. You say what is most true.

Soc. [60]Do you see then[60] that when I said, that the possession of the other sciences is, unless a person possesses the science of what is best, very near to being seldom beneficial, and generally hurtful to the person possessing it, did I not appear to be speaking in reality correctly?

Alc. If not then, yet now it seems so, Socrates.

[16.] *Soc.* It is requisite then for [61]a state, and a soul that

[57]—[57] The Greek is *Ἐὰν δέ γ', οἶμαι, τἀναντία τούτων*— But as the sentence has reference to the preceding remark of Socrates, to express the required sense, we ought to read *Ἐὰν δ' ἄγνοια* (sc. *τοῦ ὠφελίμου παρέπηται*), *τἀναντία τούτων*—i. e. "But if the ignorance of what is useful follows, the contrary of this will happen." So Sydenham; who did not perceive that the ellipse was to be thus supplied—*Ἐὰν δέ γε* (*πράττῃ*) *τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ* (*λυσιτελούντως ἕξειν*) —and hence we can see the necessity of either omitting *οἶμαι* with Ficinus, or altering it into *ἐνῆν*, and placing it after *αὐτῷ*.

[58] Instead of *ὡσαύτως*, the *οὕτως* in the reply requires here likewise *οὕτως*, answering to "ita" in Ficinus.

[59] The Greek is *βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ*—But as there is nothing to govern *βλάπτεσθαι*, Schneider suggested *μέλλουσι* for *μᾶλλον*. But, says Stalbaum, *ἢ* cannot follow *τὰ πλείω*. We may, therefore, read *ἔτι πλείω*—and so I have translated, answering to Ficinus, "nocebunt crebrius quam conterent."

[60]—[60] The words *ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι* are properly omitted by Ficinus; for they cannot precede the interrogation at the end of the speech—*ἆρ' οὐχὶ*—

[61]—[61] This union of a state and a soul is a rather strange combina-

is about to live correctly,[61] to cling to this science; just as a person in sickness does to a physician, or a person about to sail in safety does to a steersman, [62] by so much as the soul may not previously have a favourable wind, either respecting the possession of property or the strength of body, or any thing else of such a kind,[62] by so much the greater errors is it necessary, it seems, to arise from them; and he who possesses what is called much learning and much art, but is destitute of this very science, and is carried along by each of the others, will he not in reality justly [63] encounter a violent storm, inasmuch as he is, I think, continuing at sea without a steersman, a time not long life of gods;[63] so that it seems to me that here too suits the sentiment of the poet, which he expresses, while he is bringing a charge against some one that

Trades many knew he; but knew badly all.[64]

tion of ideas; and no less so is the syntax, where the singular *τὴν μέλλουσαν* follows *πόλιν* and *ψυχὴν*: while neither the state nor soul can be fairly said "to live correctly." What the author probably wrote may be seen in my edition, together with the reasons for the alterations proposed.

[62]—[62] Such is the literal version of a passage, which Dacier said was one of the most difficult in Plato. The first person who appears to have had a glimpse of the right reading, was Sydenham; who saw that two sentences had been transposed; and so after him did Schneider, to whom the credit of the discovery is given by Buttmann, whose conjecture of *λαβρότερον* for *μὴ πρότερον* Sydenham had already anticipated; while Stalbaum would prefer either Wex's *μὴ πρᾳότερον*, or his own *μὴ λειότερον*. In my own edition I stated that the sense was perhaps something to this effect—"For without this knowledge, by how much the more does fortune with a favouring wind urge on a headlong disposition;" and that the whole passage concealed a fragment of tragedy. Sauppe suggests *ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν λαβρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἄνευ ταύτης ἢ περὶ*—where *τύχης* for *ψυχῆς* is due to Dacier.

[63]—[63] Here too is another corrupt passage, which has hitherto defied the sagacity of scholars to restore it satisfactorily. And perhaps the same remark will be applied to my own attempt in the edition already referred to. Ficinus has in the concluding clause, "quippe cum absque gubernatore oberret in pelago brevi tempore periturus," to which he was led, I suspect, rather by the sense, than what he found in the MS. before him.

[64] This verse is taken from a mock-heroic poem, called the "Margites," to which Aristotle refers in Poet. c. 4 and Nichomach. Eth. vi. 7. Other references are to be found in Fabricius Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. 2, § 24. S. The poem seems to have been a parody of the Odyssey, where Ulysses is represented as the model of wisdom; while the matter of it was, like the Batrachomyomachia, an imitation of, and cento from, Homer. Thus the line, *Πόλλ' ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ' ἠπίστατο πάντα.* is not unlike *πολλά τε ἤδη Μάψ* in Il. B. 213, and it would be still more like, if the

Alc. But how, Socrates, does the verse of this poet suit here? For to me it seems to say nothing to the purpose.

Soc. Nay, it is very much to the purpose. But this poet writes enigmatically, and so do nearly all the others. [17.] For the whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical; and it is not for a person who is to be met with any where, to understand it; and in addition to its being such naturally, when it seizes upon a man of a grudging disposition and unwilling to make himself known, but desirous to conceal, as much as possible, his wisdom, it seems to be difficult beyond measure to understand what each of those poets mean. For you cannot, surely, think that Homer, a poet most divine and clever, was ignorant how impossible it is for a person to know a thing badly; for he it is, who says that Margites knew many things, but knew all badly; but he speaks enigmatically, I suppose, by introducing the word "badly" instead of the word "bad,"[65] and "he knew" instead of "to know." There is then a sentence composed, unshackled by the metre, and it expresses what he meant, that "He knew many trades; but that to know all was to him an evil."[66] It is evident then, that if to know many things was to him an evil, he himself was some worthless fellow; at least if we must give any credit to the reasonings previously produced.

Alc. And so it seems, Socrates, to me; for I should hardly give credit to other reasonings, if not to these.

Soc. And correctly does it seem so.

[67] *Alc.* Again it seems to me.[67]

Soc. But come, by Zeus, for you surely see, how great

reading were, as quoted by a Scholiast, Πολλὰ μὲν ᾔδεα ἔργαν, κακῶς δὲ μάλ' ᾔδεε πάντα.

[65] The Greek is, ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ; but we suspect the right reading to be ἀντὶ τοῦ "κακὸν," that is, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος "κακόν," instead of the noun "evil:" as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι, just after, means ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπαρέμφατον 'ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, instead of the infinitive "to know." S.

[66] The whole of this argument is evidently a ridicule of some of the sophists, who were accustomed to draw inferences from isolated passages in Homer, but not without giving them a forced meaning, and one better suited, than the common interpretation, to their own views.

[67]—[67] The words between the numerals, found in Ficinus, and all the MSS. but one, Stalbaum says are excessively silly, whether they are assigned to Alcibiades, or, as in Ficinus, to Socrates. What the author wrote, may be seen in my edition, together with the reasons requisite to support my views.

and of what kind is the difficulty and doubt, in which you too appear to me to have a share; as you never rest at all in changing your place up and down; [68] but what may have seemed especially to you, this to have gone secretly away again, and so seems no longer in a similar manner.[68] [18.] Should the god then, to whom you happen to be going, appear to you even now, and ask you, before you had prayed for any thing whatever, whether it would be sufficient for you, if any of those things, mentioned at the beginning, were to take place; or should he leave it to yourself to make a request, how, think you, could you avail yourself of the opportunity? either by accepting any of the things offered, or by praying yourself for something to happen?

Alc. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say in such a case. But it seems to me to be a violent[69] thing, and in good truth one of caution, in order that a person may not unconsciously pray for things evil, while fancying them to be good; and then after waiting, as you said, a little time, recant, and pray the reverse to what he did at first.

Soc. Did not then the poet, whom I mentioned at the beginning of the argument, know somewhat more than we do, when he begged[70] (of Zeus) to avert terrible things from (us) when praying?

Alc. So it seems to me.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, Alcibiades, having admired this very poet, or having so considered themselves the matter, put up on every occasion in private and in public

[66]—[68] The Greek is *ἀλλ ὅπερ ἂν μάλιστα σοί δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ καὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν.* But as there is nothing to govern *ἐκδεδυκέναι* and *δοκεῖν*, Buttmann suggested *ἐκδέδυκεν αὖ*, and *δοκεῖ*, found in a single MS. And as there is some uncertainty about the meaning of *ἐκδύνειν*, Stalbaum says the author fancied it meant the same as *ἀναδύεσθαι*, "to retract," in Theætet. p. 135, C., and *ἀνάδυσις*, in Euthyd. p. 302, E. There is some error here corrected in my edition.

[69] The Greek is *μάργον*, which Buttmann renders "insanum," i. e. "a mad wish." Ficinus has more fully—"insanum quiddam mihi videtur, temere deum precari ac diligenter considerandum—" Dobree, in Adversar. T. ii. p. 393, suggests *μέγα ἔργον* or *μοὖργόν* (i. e. *μοι ἔργον*) *τε δοκεῖ*—I have proposed *οὐ Μαργείτου μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι*, in allusion to § 17. Ast—*μὴν ἔργον*—Heindorf *μέρμερον*, a word found in Hipp. Maj. § 24.

[70] The verb *κελεύειν* is used here and elsewhere in this dialogue in the sense of requesting. See too Thucyd. ii. 81, 85; iii. 7; iv. 108.

[71] a similar prayer, by requesting the gods to grant them ever[72] things honourable in addition to what are good;[71] and no one has ever heard them pray for any thing more. Accordingly, up to the passing time, they have been fortunate less than none. And even if it has happened to them to be not fortunate in every thing, it was not on account of this prayer of theirs; but it is for the gods, I presume, to grant what a person happens to pray for, and the reverse. [19.] And I am desirous of telling you something else, which I once heard from certain elderly persons, how that, when differences arose between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it so happened to our city, that whenever there was a battle, by land or sea, it was unsuccessful, and never able to gain a victory. Thereupon the Athenians, brooking ill their doings, and at a loss for some contrivance to find an escape from their present evils, held a council; and it seemed to them that it would be best to send to Ammon,[73] and inquire of him, [74]and in addition, this too likewise,[74] on what account do the gods always give the victory to the Lacedæmonians, rather than to us; who, of (all) the Greeks,[75] bring them sacrifices the most numerous and the most beautiful; and have decorated their temples with offerings such as none else have done; and are wont to make to the gods processions the most costly and the most solemn, each year; and to expend money, such as all the rest of the Greeks never did together; whereas the Lacedæmonians have never paid the least regard to any of these things; but conduct themselves in so slighting a manner towards the gods, as to sacrifice on each occasion animals, maimed even; and in all other matters fall far short of us not a little in honouring the gods, although possessing property not less than our state.

[71]—[71] On the prayer *τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*, Lobeck, in Aglaophamus, p. 12, refers to Plutarch in Laconic. T. 8, p. 253.

[72] I have adopted Buttmann's *ἀεὶ* in lieu of *αὖ*, although I still adhere to the emendation proposed in my edition for the reasons assigned there.

[73] This allusion to the oracle of Ammon, situated in Africa, is peculiarly appropriate; for we learn from Plutarch i. p. 531, E., that when Alcibiades was exciting the Athenians to engage in the Sicilian expedition, some persons, who had been sent on a holy embassy to Ammon, returned with an oracle, stating that the Athenians would get all the people of Syracuse into their power.

[74]—[74] The words within the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[75] So Sydenham; as if he wished to read *πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων*—

[20.] When the messenger had thus spoken, and had inquired of the oracle what they ought to do to find a deliverance from their present evils, the prophet made no other answer;[76]—for it is evident the god did not permit him—but calling (the messengers),[77] said,—To the Athenians thus saith Ammon.[78] He saith, that he prefers the good-omened address of the Lacedæmonians before all the sacrifices of (the rest of)[79] the Greeks.—These words he said, and nothing more. Now it seems to me, that by a good-omened address the god means only that prayer of theirs; for it is in reality much superior to the prayers of others. For the rest of the Greeks are wont, some of them, after placing (by the altar) oxen with gilded horns,[80] and others presenting the gods with offerings to be hung up (in temples), to pray for whatever they happen (to desire), whether it be good or evil. The gods therefore, on hearing their impious addresses, accept not their costly processions and sacrifices; so that there is need of much caution and consideration as to what is to be spoken and not. And you will find in Homer likewise other expressions similar to these. [21.] For he says, that the Trojans, on taken up their night quarters,

> The perfect hecatombs to th' Immortals gave,[81]

and that the winds carried the savour of the fat to heaven

> Sweet-smelling; but the blessed gods refused
> To taste it; for by them was hated much
> The holy Ilion, and Priam too,
> And of the careful Priam subjects all:

so that it was of no use for them to sacrifice, or to expend presents in vain,[82] when they where thus hated by the gods.

[76] Ficinus, perceiving that ἄλλο οὐδὲν would be scarcely intelligible by itself, has given "non multa."

[77] Instead of αὐτὸν I have translated as if the Greek were τὸν ἄγγελον.

[78] On the formula, τάδε λέγει Ἄμμων, Gottleber refers to Diodor. xvii. 51, and Buttmann to Arrian vii. p. 305.

[79] Ficinus has "reliquorum—Græcorum," as if he had found in his MS. τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, not simply τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

[80] Gottleber refers to Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 3, "Deorum honori—auratis cornibus hostiæ—immolabantur." Add from Virgil, "aurata fronte juvencum;" and Callimachus, ἐλάφους—κεράων δ' ἀπελάμπετο χρυσός.

[81] The passage, as here quoted, has been found in none of the MSS. of Homer. Barnes was the first to insert the supplement in its proper place, Ιλ. Θ. 458.

[82] Compare Eurip. Tro. 1241. Οὐκ ἤρεσεν θεοῖς τι, πλὴν οὐμοὶ πόνοι, Τροία τε πόλεων ἔκκριτον μισουμένη· Μάτην δ' ἐβουθυτοῦμεν.

For the divine nature, I conceive, is not such, as to be seduced by presents,[83] like a knavish judge.[84] But we are giving a silly reason, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians in this way. For it would be a dreadful thing indeed, if the gods looked to gifts and sacrifices, and not the soul, should a person happen to be holy and just. Nay, (they look) much more, I think, (to this), than to expensive processions and sacrifices; for which there is nothing to prevent those from having the power to pay each year, either individuals or states, who have sinned greatly against the gods, and greatly too against men. But they, as not receiving bribes, disdain all such things as these, as says the god, and the prophet of the gods. [22.] It seems, then, that justice and prudence are near to being honoured above all things by the gods, and by men too, that have any sense. Now the sensible and the just are none other than such as know what it is meet to do and say both towards gods and men. But I should be glad to hear from you, what are your thoughts upon this subject.

Alc. To myself, Socrates, the matter seems to be in no other way, than it does to you and the god. For it would not be reasonable for me to vote contrary to the god.

Soc. Do you not remember, then, saying that you were much at a loss, lest you should unconsciously be praying for evil things, fancying them to be good?

Alc. I do.

Soc. You see then, that it is not safe for you to go to the god with the view of praying, in order that, should it so happen, he may not hear you speaking impiously, and receive no part of your sacrifice, and you perchance meet with something different. It seems to me, therefore, that it is best to keep quiet. For through your high spirit—for that is the

[83] Stalbaum refers to Persius ii. 48, to which he might have added Plato, Legg. iv. p. 601, x. p. 885, D., and Cicero de Legg. ii. 16, "Donis impii ne placare audeant deos."

[84] I have adopted Gedike's reading, *δικαστὴν*, "judge," for *τοκιστὴν*, "usurer." The allusion is to an Æsopo-Socratic fable in Latin, which I have given at length in my edition from a MS. in the British Museum. That it was found likewise in Greek is shown by an allusion to it in Plutarch de Solert. Animal. ii. p. 973. B., where lies hid the commencement of a Choliambic fable—*Κουρεὺς ποτ' ἔτρεφε θαῦμ' ὅσον τι πολυφώνου Κίττης, τά τ' ἀνδρῶν ἥτις εἶχε καὶ θηρῶν Φωνήματ' ἀνταποδιδόναι.*

fairest of names for folly—I think you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary, therefore, for a man to wait, until he has learnt how he ought to conduct himself towards gods and men.

[23.] *Alc.* But when, Socrates, will that time be? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, I think, to see who the man is.

Soc. It is he, of whose care you are the object.[85] But it seems to me, as Homer (Il. v. 127) says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede,

> That he might clearly see both gods and men;

so must he in the first place remove from your soul the mist, that now happens to be present there, and then apply those things, through which you will be about to know both good and evil. For now you seem to be unable (to do so).

Alc. Let him then remove the mist, or any thing else that he pleases; as I am prepared not to fly from any thing ordered by him, whoever he may be, if I am about to become a better man.

Soc. And yet he has a very wonderful eagerness in your behalf.

Alc. Till that time then it seems to me to be best to put off my sacrifice.

Soc. And rightly it seems so to you. For it is safer than to run so great a risk.

[24.] *Alc.* But how,[86] Socrates? However, since you seem to me to have given good advice, I will put this garland[87]

[85] This is usually applied to Socrates, as in Alcibiad. i. p. 122, B. § 37, *τῆς δὲ σῆς παιδείας—οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ἐραστὴς σοῦ τυγχάνει ὤν.* But there, as here, the indefinite *τις* could not be said of a person known positively. To meet this objection, Bekker was led perhaps to adopt here *Οὗτός ἐστιν* from some MSS., in lieu of *Οὗτος τίς ἐστιν* in others. From which I elicited long ago *Οὔτίς τις ἐστιν*, "There is one No-man," in allusion to the Homeric *Οὖτις*, which I have restored to Hippias Major, § 24. For Socrates in both places is speaking covertly. And hence too in the first Alcibiades I should have suggested *εἰ μὴ Οὖτις, ὃς*—

[86] Buttmann justly considers this a strange way of passing from one subject to another. What I suspect the author wrote may be found in my edition.

[87] Amongst the Greeks, they who went to a temple to pray to a god, carried a garland, which they wore while praying; and hence Socrates knew, on meeting Alcibiades, whither he was going. S.; who might have referred to Eurip. Hippol. 72.

round your (brows);[88] and to the gods we will then present crowns,[89] and all the other customary offerings, when I behold that day arrive; and it will in no long time arrive, if they are willing.

Soc. Well, I accept both this, and [90]I would see myself readily accepting[90] any thing else given by you. And as Creon, when he sees Tiresias wearing garlands, and hears that he had obtained them as the first-fruits of spoils taken from the enemy, is made by Euripides (in Phœn. 865) to say,

> This crown, as a happy omen, have I worn;
> For well you know how tempest-tost we lie—

so do I place on myself this opinion[91] on your part as an omen of good. For I seem to myself to be in no less a storm than Creon; and I would gladly be a victor over your admirers.

[88] So in the Banquet, p. 213, § 37, Alcibiades is represented as putting a chaplet on the head of Socrates. The rite is ridiculed by Aristophanes in Ἱππ. 1262, where Demus decks the Sausage-maker, after his victory over Cleon, with a crown of sausages, saying, as I corrected on Æsch. Suppl. i. Ἀλλάντιε Ζεῦ, σὸν τὸ νικητήριον; i. e. "Thine is the victor's chaplet, Sausage-Zeus."

[89] Potter, in Archæolog. Græc. ii. 4, infers from this passage that the garlands worn by suppliants during their prayers were, on their leaving the temple, put on the head of the deity who had been addressed; and hence Alcibiades is represented as giving to Socrates the honour he had designed for the image of Jupiter. S.

[90]—[90] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, to whom Stalbaum might have referred; for he says that nothing can be more absurd than the whole clause, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ—ἐμαυτὸν— Perhaps the author wrote ἴδοις ἄν, "you would see."

[91] In lieu of δόξαν, Buttmann suggested δόσιν, and myself λέξιν, comparing Iph. A. 607, Ὄρνιθα μὲν τόνδ' αἴσιον ποιούμεθα Τὸ σόν τε χρηστὲν καὶ λόγων εὐφημίαν. But perhaps δόξαν means here "glory" or, "reputation."

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAGES.

In placing in a consecutive order the Theages, Rivals, and Hipparchus, I have followed the arrangement adopted by Stalbaum. For he conceives that they were written, if not by the same hand, at least by a kindred mind, and are all equally unworthy of Plato, despite the attempt made by Socher and Knebel to reverse the judgment of Boeckh, Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Ast. For though some of the arguments brought forward by the impugners of the dialogue have been refuted, says Stalbaum, by its defenders, yet there still remains evidence enough to prove its spuriousness. For not only is it in matter and manner at variance with the subject and style adopted by Plato, but it contains likewise such remarkable instances of plagiarisms rather than imitation, as to leave little doubt of the writer being only a Plato in disguise; to say nothing of some peculiarities in language, not to be found in the writings of the philosopher and his contemporaries. The dialogue is, however, reckoned amongst the genuine works of Plato by Diogenes Laertius, iii. 57, on the authority of Thrasyllus, a Platonist of the time of Tiberius, as we learn from Suetonius in Tiberius, § 14, and the Scholiast on Juvenal, vi. 576; and it is quoted as such by Ælian, V. H. viii. 1. While Lamprias, in the list of the works of Plutarch, n. 68, mentions one, "On the Theages of Plato."

According to Stalbaum, Wympensee, in Diatrib. de Xenocrate, p. 96, conceived that the author of the dialogue was perhaps the philosopher of Chalcedon. But Stalbaum himself feels disposed to refer it to Antipater, who flourished about A. C. 150, and who was the teacher of Panætius, and the disciple of Diogenes of Babylon,

and who wrote, as appears from Cicero de Divinat. i. 3, a work on the wonderful divinations made by Socrates, of which there are some curious instances given in this dialogue; and as both Cicero, and Plutarch in his treatise, On the Dæmon of Socrates, seem to have made use of the work of Antipater, so probably did the author of this dialogue.

THE THEAGES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

[1.] I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private[1] about some matters, if you are at leisure; and if your want of leisure be not very great, for my sake however make leisure.

Soc. Nay, I am at leisure in other respects, and on your account very much so. If then you wish to say any thing, it is in your power (to do so).

Dem. Are you willing then for us to retire out of the way, to the portico of Zeus Eleutherius[2] hard by?

Soc. If it seems good to you.

Dem. Let us go then, Socrates. All natural productions, growing out of the earth, and other animals as well as man, appear to subsist in nearly the same manner. For to such of us as cultivate the ground it is a thing the most easy in the case of plants, to prepare every thing prior to planting, and even the planting itself. But when what has been planted is in a living state, the care of it becomes great and painful, and difficult. The same thing appears to take place with respect to human beings likewise. I form this conjecture as regards other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, whether one must call it the planting, or the procreating, it is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and I am continually

[1] The word ἰδιολογεῖσθαι, says Stalbaum, is not found elsewhere in pure Greek; and he refers to Suicer in Thesaur. Eccles. i. p. 1434.

[2] This portico was in the Ceramicus, as shown by Meursius de Ceramic. § 4, quoted by Stalb.

in fear about him. On other points much might be said; but the desire which now possesses him alarms me very much It is not indeed an ignoble one, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. I suspect that certain youths of his own age, and of the same ward, have been going down to the city, and repeating certain discourses, and disturbed his mind very much. Of these he is emulous; and for a long time is giving me great trouble, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and pay money to some of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. For the money indeed I care [1] less than nothing,[1] but think that, in going whither he is hastening, he is running into no small danger. Hitherto I have by soothing restrained him; but as I am no longer able (to do so) I think it best to yield to him, lest by frequently associating (with others)[2] without me, he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those, who are considered to be sophists. Opportunely then for us have you appeared, with whom, as I am about to engage in affairs of this kind, I wished very much to consult. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and needful (to do so).

[2.] *Soc.* Counsel, Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing.[3] If then any other consultation is sacred, this is so, about which you are now considering. For there is not a thing, about which a person may consult, more divine, than about the instruction of himself and of those related to him. In the first place then, let you and I agree together as to what we think that thing is, about which we are consulting; lest I may not perchance[4] take it to be one thing, and you another; and we afterwards perceive,

[1]—[1] I have translated as if the Greek were not καὶ ἔλαττον, but ἔλαττο ἢ μηδέν, as in Theætet. § 92, ἧττον—ἢ μηδέν. Æsch. Prom. 974, Ἐμοὶ δ' ἔλασσον Ζηνὸς ἢ μηδὲν μέλει.

[2] Taylor has adopted "with others," from "cum aliis," found in Ficinus. But συγγενόμενός τῳ, "associating with some one," found in all the MSS., is more correct.

[3] The Scholiast, who vainly attempts to give a satisfactory account of this proverb, says it was found in the Amphiaraus of Aristophanes; while Zenobius, Proverb. Cent. iv. 40, attributes it to Epicharmus. It is found likewise in Plato Epist. 5. It was probably a saying, addressed to those who came to consult an oracle.

[4] On this sense of πολλάκις, see at Alcib. i. p. 127, E. § 49.

[1] when the conference has proceeded far,[1] that we are an object of ridicule, both I who give, and you who request, advice, in not thinking the same upon any thing.

Dem. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak correctly; and it is meet so to do.

Soc. And speak I do correctly, but not entirely so; since I make a trifling alteration. For I am thinking, that perhaps this youth may not desire that, which we think he desires, but something else; and in that case we shall be still more absurd in consulting about something different. It appears, therefore, to me to be the most correct to begin by inquiring of him what the thing is, which he desires.

Dem. It appears very nearly to be the best to do as you say.

[3.] *Soc.* Tell me then what is the name of this handsome[2] youth? what must we call him?

Dem. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

Soc. You have given your son, Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred-like name. Tell us, Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wise man? and do you think it fit for this your father to find out the acquaintance of such a person as may make you wise?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Do you call those men wise, who are skilled in that, respecting which they have a knowledge, or those, who have not?

Thea. Those, who have a knowledge.

Soc. What then, has not your father caused you to be instructed, or taught you (himself),[3] what others are taught, who are the sons of fathers good and honourable;[4] for instance, letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

Thea. Yes, myself.

Soc. Do you think then there is still a want of some knowledge, to which it is proper for your father to pay attention for your sake?

[1]—[1] Such is Stalbaum's version of *πόρρω τῆς συνουσίας*, who quotes opportunely Sympos. p. 217, D., *διελεγόμην πόρρω τῶν νύκτων*.

[2] So Taylor, as if he wished to read, what the sense requires, *καλῷ* in lieu of *καλὸν*—

[3] To preserve the difference between *διδάσκεσθαι* and *παιδεύειν*, I have inserted "himself." Ficinus has simply "edocuit," omitting *καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν*, which he probably considered superfluous.

[4] By *καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ* are meant what we should call persons both handsome and of polished manners.

Thea. I do.

Soc. What is it? Tell us it, that we may gratify you.

Thea. My father knows it, Socrates; for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says this to you, as if truly he did not know what I desire; for in this and other matters likewise he opposes me, and is unwilling to place me with any one.

[4.] *Soc.* But all that you have hitherto said to him, has been said, as it were, without witnesses. Now therefore make me a witness and state before me what is the wisdom you desire. For come now, if you should desire that wisdom, by which men steer ships, and I should happen to ask you—What is the wisdom, Theages, of which being in want you blame your father, because he is unwilling to place you with a man, through whom you might become wise? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not the pilot's art?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And if you desired to be wise in that wisdom, by which persons direct[1] chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteer's art?[2]

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But is the wisdom, of which you have now a desire, nameless, or has it a name?

Thea. I think it has (a name).

Soc. Whether then do you know it, but not its name? Or its name likewise?

Thea. Its name likewise.

Soc. Say then what it is.

Thea. What other name, Socrates, can one say it has, than that of wisdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteer's art wisdom likewise? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

Thea. It does not.

[1] Schleiermacher objects to the expression *κυβερνᾶν τὰ ἅρματα*. But though the phrase is not elsewhere found in Plato, the metaphor might fairly be adopted here, just as Æschylus has *ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως Οἴακα νωμῶν* in S. Th. 2.

[2] With the whole of this passage compare Alcibiad. i. p. 125, § 44.

Soc. But wisdom?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. For what do we use it? Is it not for that, by which we know how to manage horses when yoked?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Is not then the pilot's art wisdom likewise?

Thea. To me at least it appears so.

Soc. Is it not that, by which we know how to manage ships?

Thea. It is.

Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? What by it do we know how to govern?

Thea. By it we know, it seems to me, how to govern men.

Soc. What, sick men?

Thea. No.

Soc. For that wisdom is the physician's art. Is it not?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Is it that then, by which we know how to regulate singers in choirs?

Thea. It is not.

Soc. For this is the musician's art.

Thea. Certainly.

Soc. But is it that, by which we know how to regulate those, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises?

Thea. No.

Soc. For this is the gymnast's art.

Thea. It is.

Soc. Is it that of those, who do what? Be ready to state it to myself, as I have the preceding to you.

Thea. It is that, by which persons (do something) in the city.

Soc. Are there not then in a city persons who are sick?

Thea. Yes. But I am not speaking of these only, but also of the others in the city.

Soc. Do I then understand the art of which you are speaking? For you appear to me to say it is not that, by which we know how to govern mowers, and grape-gatherers, and planters, and sowers, and threshers; for it is the husbandman's art, by which we govern these. Is it not?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Nor are you speaking of that, by which (we govern,

sawyers, and planers, and turners; for does not this belong to the carpenter's art?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you are speaking of that wisdom, by which we govern all these, and husbandmen, and carpenters, and all artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women.

Thea. Of this wisdom, Socrates, I have for a long while ago been wishing to speak.

[5.] *Soc.* Can you say, that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon at Argos, had dominion over what you have mentioned, artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women, all taken together, or over some other things?

Thea. No; but over these.

Soc. What then, did not Peleus, the son of Æacus, have dominion over those very kind of persons in Phthia?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And you have heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, was a ruler in Corinth.

Thea. Yes.

Soc. And did he not rule over the very kind of persons in his city?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. What then, do you not think that Archelaus,[1] the son of Perdiccas, who was lately[2] the ruler in Macedonia, had dominion over the same kind of persons?

Thea. I do.

Soc. And over whom do you think that Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, ruled in this city? was it not over these kind of persons?

Thea. How not?

Soc. Can you tell me then, what appellation Bacis,[3] and the Sibyl,[4] and our countryman Amphilytus,[5] bore?

[1] Of this Archelaus mention is made in Gorg. p. 471, D.

[2] This "lately" refers to about five years previously.

[3] Bacis was a prophet, who, long before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, predicted what would happen. Some of his prophecies are given by Herodotus in viii. 20. He is likewise frequently mentioned by Aristophanes, and in company with Σίβυλλα in Εἰρ. 1119, and 1116. DACIER.

[4] From the fact of finding the same three oracle-chaunters similarly united by Themistius Or. iii. p. 46, A., where the Sibyl is called "the Erythrean," it has been inferred that the writer had read this dialogue amongst those ascribed to Plato.

[5] Respecting Amphilytus see Wesseling and Valckenaer on Herod. i. 62

Thea. What else, Socrates, than oracle-chaunters?

Soc. You speak correctly. But endeavour to give me an answer as to what appellation Hippias and Periander bore through the same kind of dominion?

Thea. Tyrants, I think; for what else (could it be)?

Soc. Whoever then desires to have dominion over all the men together in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

Thea. So it appears.

Soc. Do you then say that you desire this dominion?

Thea. It seems so from what I have said.

Soc. O you wicked (youth)! Do you desire to tyrannize over us? And have you for a long time blamed your father, because he did not send you to the school of some tyrant-teacher?[1] And are not you, Demodocus, ashamed of yourself? who, having known a long time ago what this youth desired, and having likewise the power of sending him, where you might have made him that skilful artist in wisdom, of which he is desirous, have, notwithstanding, begrudged him this, and are unwilling to send him? But now, you see—since he has spoken against you before me—let us consult in common, you and I, to whose school we may send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

Dem. Let us, by Zeus, then, Socrates, consult; for it appears to me that there is need of no despicable counsel in this affair.

Soc. Permit us first, thou good man, to interrogate him sufficiently.

Dem. Interrogate him.

[6.] *Soc.* What then, Theages, if we should make use of Euripides?[2] For he some where says,

> Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise.

If then some one should ask Euripides—In what say you, Euripides, do tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

[1] In defence of *διδασκάλου*, which Schleiermacher, with whom Beck agreed, wished to expunge, Stalbaum refers to Lobeck's "Disputat. iii. de Nominibus Adjectivis et Substantivis Ambiguis," p. 12.

[2] This verse is elsewhere attributed to Sophocles in Ajac. Locr. Fr. but given to Euripides by Plato in Rep. viii. p. 568, A.

Farmers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would he (reply that they are wise) in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

Thea. In nothing else but those.

Soc. But what, if he had said,

Cooks become wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would it not have been—In things pertaining to cooking?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? Would he not have said—In things pertaining to wrestling?

Thea. Yes.

Soc. But since he says,

Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise—

upon our asking him—In what say you, Euripides, are they wise? What would be his answer?

Thea. By Zeus, I do not know.

Soc. Are you willing then for me to tell you?

Thea. If you are willing.

Soc. It is that, which Anacreon says Callicréte[1] knew Or do you not know the song?

Thea. I do.

Soc. What then, do you also desire the conversation of a

[1] This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses of Anacreon alluded to are lost. DACIER. Ficinus has, "Callicratem." But that was the name of a man. Bergk in Anacreont. Relliq. p. 264, would read Καλλικρίτην and Καλλικρίτη, found in one MS. I should prefer Χαλικρήτην. For the word χαλικρήτη would mean "wine-mixed," an epithet better suited to the lady by whom Anacreon, the wine-drinker, was instructed. The epithet is applied to σπονδαὶ, "libations," in Æsch. Fragm. 158. On the other hand, Egeria, the Nymph by whom Numa was instructed, was a water-drinker, as may be inferred from Juvenal, who speaks of a fountain dedicated to her

man, who happens to be a fellow-artist with Callicrété the daughter of Cyané, and who knows the art of a tyrant, as th poet says she did, in order that you may become a tyrant over us and the city?

Thea. You have for some time, Socrates, been laughing at and playing with me.

Soc. What then, do you say that you do not desire this wisdom, by which you may rule over all the citizens? And doing this, would you be any thing else but a tyrant?

Thea. I would pray, indeed, I fancy, to be a tyrant over all men, or, if not of all, of the greatest part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same, and perhaps still more, to be a god.[1] But I did not say that I desired this.

[7.] *Soc.* But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to rule over the citizens?

Thea. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire tc rule over the willing, in the same manner as other men of note in the city.

Soc. Do you mean, as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilled in state affairs?

Thea. By Zeus, I mean those.

Soc. What then, if you happened to be desirous of becoming wise in horsemanship, by going to whom do you think you would become a skilful horseman? would it be (by going) to others than those skilled in horses?

Thea. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. But (you would go) to those very men, who are skilled in these matters, and who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

Thea. It is evident I should.

Soc. What then, if you wished to become wise in the throwing of darts, think you not that you would become skilled by going to those engaged in the art of dart-throwing, and who possess darts, and continually use many darts, both their own and those belonging to others?

Thea. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in state

[1] Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to the deity.

affairs, think you that you will become wise by going to any others than those statesmen, who are skilled in state affairs themselves, and who continually make use of their own state and many others, and have an intercourse both with the Greek and Barbarian states? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons, but not with these, you will become wise in those things, in which they are wise?

Thea. I have heard the discourses, Socrates, which persons say you have spoken,[1] how that the sons of those very statesmen were in no respect better than the sons of shoemakers: and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be senseless then, if I thought that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he could not in any respect benefit his own son; if indeed he were able on these points to benefit any person whatever.

Soc. What then, O best of men, would you do, if you had a son, who should give you trouble of this kind, and say that he desired to become a good painter, and blame you, his father, because you were not willing to expend money for the sake of these things, while he was despising painters, the artists in this very matter, and unwilling to learn from them; or if, being desirous to become a piper or harper, he should act in this manner towards pipers or harpers? In what way would you treat him, and whither would you send him, when thus unwilling to learn from those persons?

Thea. By Zeus, I (do not know).[2]

Soc. Now then, as you are doing these very things to your father, do you wonder at and blame him, if he is in doubt how he shall treat you, and whither send you? For we will place you with whomever of the Athenians you wish, the most skilled[3] in state affairs, and who will be with you gratuitously;[4] and at the same time you will not lose your money, and

[1] Stalbaum here refers to Protag. p. 319, Gorg. p. 518, C., Meno, p. 93, D., and Alcibiad. I. p. 118, C.

[2] So Taylor, for the sake of the sense, in lieu of "By Zeus, not I."

[3] Instead of καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, which are never, I suspect, thus united to an accusative, as δεινὸς and σοφὸς are, Ficinus has simply "præstantissimorum," adopted by Taylor; and though the expression in the text is repeated just below, yet there Ficinus has correctly merely "ex bonis." For Socrates could not be numbered amongst the καλοὶ, although he might be amongst the ἀγαθοί.

[4] Stalbaum refers to Apolog. p. 19, E., § 4.

likewise be in greater repute with the many than by associating with any one else.

[8.] *Thea.* What then, Socrates, are not you one of the excellent men? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I seek no other.[1]

Soc. Why say you this, Theages?

Dem. He does not, Socrates, speak badly; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. Since there is nothing I should consider a greater piece of good luck than for my son to be pleased with your society, and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish it. I entreat both of you, therefore, you, Socrates, to be willing to associate with him, and you, my son, not to seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus release me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear for him, lest he should meet with some other person able to corrupt him.

Thea. Do not, father, feel any longer any fear for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

Dem. You speak very well. And after this, the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, so to say in few words, to give up to you both me and mine, and the nearest related, whatever, in short, you may require, if you will take this youth to your bosom, and benefit him as far as you can.

[9.] *Soc.* O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he, who is endued with intellect, ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But from whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to benefit your son towards his becoming a good citizen, than you are yourself, and from whence he has thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For, in the first place, you are older than I am; and in the next place, you have held many offices, and those the greatest among the Athenians; and you are honoured by the people of the Anagyrusian ward,[2]

[1] A similar compliment is paid to Socrates in Lach. p. 200, C. § 33.

[2] According to the Scholiast, this was a ward of the tribe of Æantis; but according to Harpocration and Stephen. Byz., of Erectheus

by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. [1]But neither of you can see any one of these things in me; and next, if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate gratuitously with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and to associate with them, and to put down moreover a considerable sum[2] of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them thanks besides.[1] Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son and yourself to select some one; but (to select) me it is not reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful learning, although I wish I did; but I am always somehow asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere trifle relating to matters of love.[3] But in that kind of learning I lay claim[4] to being more skilled than any one man of the past or present time.

[10.] *Thea.* See you, father, how Socrates does not appear to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as tc myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and (others) a little older, who, before they associated with him, were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom they were previously inferior.

Soc. Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is?

Thea. Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I too shall be able to become such as they are.

Soc. Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not con-

Stalbaum refers to Boeckh Inscript. Græc. No. 210, and Grotefend De Demis Attic. p. 18.

[1]—[1] The whole of this, says Stalbaum, has been taken almost verbatim from Apolog. p. 19, E. § 4.

[2] Instead of πολὺν, Beck suggested πολὺ, obtained from "multum," in Ficinus.

[3] Stalbaum refers to Sympos. p. 177, D. § 5, and Lys. p. 204, B. § 2.

[4] Here ποιοῦμαι is improperly used for προσποιοῦμαι, as remarked by Stalbaum.

scious how this occurs; and I will tell you.[1] There is, by a divine allotment, a certain dæmon that has followed me, beginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it exists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was about to contend for the stadium[2] at Nemea; and immediately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend, there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the dæmon; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him, what happened to him after this very act of contending. And if you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus,[3] what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to die, [4]he went right against the dæmon,[4] both he and Euathlus, the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he was an exile, will tell you what he then said.

Thea. What did he say?

Soc. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates.

[1] Here is another passage transcribed, says Stalbaum correctly, from Apolog. p. 31, D. § 19.

[2] The stadium was the course appointed for those who contended in the foot-race, as shown by an Æsopo-Socratic fable, quoted by Galen in Protrept. § 13.

[3] I suppose this is Timarchus of Chæronēa, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who had died a little before. I could never find any vestige of this history elsewhere. DACIER. Nor has any one since his day been more fortunate.

[4]—[4] The Greek is εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου: which Ficinus has omitted, either from his not understanding those words, or not finding them in his MS. Serranus—"adversus dæmonii mandatum"—of which Ruhnken approves on Timæus, p. 127. But εὐθὺ is never said of a single person; only of a place, or many persons. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, correctly observes, that there is some error here.

But why Timarchus said this, I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son of Heroscomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot; and Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say,[1] Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up (and go) some where. I will, however, return shortly, if I am successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him, By no means, said I, rise up; for there has been to me the usual dæmon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates, I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying any thing to me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpetrated the acts, through which he went away about to die. Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he was going to die, through his not believing in me. Further still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army.[2] And the things that are past, you may hear from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmon signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For on the departure of Sannio the beautiful[3] for the army, there came to me the signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus,[4] to carry on the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think

[1] As no mention is made of a previous conversation, it is not easy to understand Τί λέγεις.

[2] By comparing this account with that in Thucyd. viii. 1, it would seem that Socrates proved his dæmon to be a truer prophet than were the oracle-chaunters, who predicted that the Athenians would gain possession of the whole of Sicily.

[3] I have adopted Stalbaum's notion, that τοῦ καλοῦ means the "beautiful," not, as others, from the time of Ficinus, have rendered—"the son of Kalus." For that adjective is never found as a proper name. Besides, we can now better understand why Socrates, who admired handsome young persons, took an interest in his fate.

[4] The expedition against Ephesus under Thrasyllus, described by Xenophon in Hellen. i. 2. 1, took place in Ol. 92. 4, = 409, A. C., when, as we learn from Plutarch in Alcibiad. t. i. p. 39, § 29, the Athenians were defeated under the walls of the town and a trophy of brass was erected by the conquerors. S.

that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end[1] something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. [12.] All these things have I said to you, because this power of this dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, however, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom the power of the dæmon assists to the intercourse, are those whom you have noticed; for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have the benefit firm and lasting; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner; but when they separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while passing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short period; but afterwards an expedition took place, and he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thucydides,[2] the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation. Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so, said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave[3] he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I, it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ridiculous situation, Socrates. What is it? said I. It is, said

[1] In lieu of ἐλᾷν, which is never found in prose Greek, the two oldest MSS. offer γελαν, from which it is easy to elicit τελεῖν, the Attic future for τελέσειν.

[2] Both Aristides and Thucydides are alluded to in Lach. p. 179, A. § 2, as being the unworthy scions of a virtuous stock.

[3] By comparing Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2. 39, quoted by Stalbaum, it would seem that Euthydemus and Aristides had been shown by Socrates to be no better than slaves, as Alcibiades is in Alcib. i. p. 135, D. § 61; but that, instead of lamenting the fact, they took umbrage at the truth of the language applied to them by their teacher.

he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any man whatever, and not to appear inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one, whom I perceive to be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true. I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the same room; but more so when I was in the same room with you; and I seemed to myself (to improve) much more when, being in the same room, I looked at you, when you were speaking, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched you.[1] Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely oozed away. [13.] Of such kind then is, Theages, the intercourse with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See, then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which they benefit men, than by me, who (have the power) to do only whatever may happen.

Thea. It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, namely, to make a trial of this dæmon by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, this will be the best; but if not, then let us immediately consult what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other person, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method that the diviners may explain.[2]

Dem. Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these points; for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.

[1] Stalbaum aptly refers to Sympos. p. 175, F. § 4.

[2] On the technical word ἐξηγεῖσθαι, "to explain a religious rite," see Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 111.

INTRODUCTION TO THE RIVALS.

This is another of the dialogues considered to be spurious by the generality of modern scholars; and even with Thrasyllus, who lived in the time of Augustus, its genuineness was a matter of doubt, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius ix. 37. Sydenham, however, was so impressed with the conviction of its being really the production of its reputed author, as to remark, that although the dialogue is short, it is nevertheless of considerable value, and exhibits "a fair sample of the rich and plentiful repast provided by Plato in his longer productions; and it has this singular beauty, that the figures of the persons brought forwards are sketched in so exact and lively a manner, that painting itself could scarcely surpass it." On the other hand Stalbaum asserts, while confessing that it exhibits a style of writing at once so pure, chaste, and elegant, as to put it on a par with the writings of Plato and Xenophon, that its matter is such as fully to justify its repudiation by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Ast, and others; while as regards the notion that Democritus was perhaps one of the anonymous persons alluded to in the dialogue, Stalbaum says it is too absurd to be entertained for a single moment. For he doubtless remembered, although he says nothing to that effect, that, according to Diogenes Laertius, Demetrius Phalereus had denied that Democritus ever visited Athens.

The title of the dialogue is generally Ἐρασταί, "the Lovers:" and so it is quoted by Olympiodorus. But Proclus calls it Ἀντερασταί, "the Rival Lovers;" and this is the name it ought to bear, as shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, produced by Menage on Diog. L. iii. 5, and his decision has been adopted by all subsequent scholars.

The object of the dialogue is to show, that they, who profess to know just so much of difficult arts and sciences as is suited to a person of liberal education, possess that very kind of knowledge, which to all practical purposes is perfectly useless.

The most recent English translation of this dialogue, as far as I know, is to be found in an anonymous work, published at London in 1827, under the title of "A Narrative of an Excursion from Corfu to Smyrna." Like Shelley, in the case of the Banquet and the Ion, the author has been more anxious to give an elegant than a close translation.

THE RIVALS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, AND TWO ANONYMOUS RIVALS.

SOCRATES.

[1.] I ENTERED the school of Dionysius,[1] the teacher of grammar,[2] and I saw there those of the young men, who were deemed to be the most remarkable for their personal appearance and the good repute of their fathers, and their admirers likewise. Two of the youths happened to be disputing, but about what I did not very well hear. They appeared however to be disputing about Anaxagoras,[3] or Œnopides;[4] as

[1] This person, according to Diog. L. iii. 5, had been Plato's grammar-master.

[2] The reading γραμματιστοῦ in lieu of γραμματικοῦ, first adopted by Forster from a single MS., has been subsequently found in all. By γραμματικὸς was meant "a critical grammarian," not merely "a teacher of the elements of grammar," in Greek γραμματιστής, respecting whose office Knebel refers to Protag. p. 325, E.

[3] Respecting Anaxagoras, the reader may consult Diogenes Laertius, Stanley's History of Philosophy, and similar classical works.

[4] Of this Œnopides, Proclus, on Euclid. ii. p. 19. 78 and 87, has made mention, when giving a brief sketch of the rise and progress of geometry. He says that Anaxagoras touched on many questions relating to geometry, and so did Œnopides of Chios; both of whom Plato has mentioned in the Rivals, as having obtained a reputation for learning. After them Hippocrates of Chios, who discovered the squaring of the meniscus, and Theodorus of Cyréné, who was somewhat junior to Anaxagoras, became

they were describing[5] circles, and imitating by their hands certain inclinations,[6] with great earnestness. And I, for I was sitting near an admirer of one of the young persons, nudged him with my elbow, and asked—On what were the two youths so earnestly engaged? and I said, Surely it is a subject important and beautiful, on which they have bestowed so serious an attention.—What call you[7] important and beautiful? said he. They are prating[8] about things above in the sky, and trifling away their time in philosophizing.—And I, in wonder at such an answer, said—Do you think it, young man, to be a disgraceful thing to philosophize? or why do you speak so harshly?—But another person,[9] who was a rival admirer (of the youths), and happened to be sitting near, on hearing me asking the question, and the answer, said—It is not for you,[10] Socrates, to ask this man, whether he thinks it disgraceful to philosophize. Know you not that he has spent all his time in being throstled,[11] and cramming

conspicuous for their knowledge of the same science; for the squaring of the meniscus is attributed to Hippocrates of Chios, by Simplicius, (on Aristot. Phys. fol. 12,) who has shown how it is to be done geometrically. But as no mention is made of Theodorus by name in this dialogue, Proclus (according to Sydenham) imagined that Theodorus was one of the nameless Rivals.

[5] To avoid the repetition of *ἐφαινέσθην*, Heusde proposed to read *κύκλους γοῦν γράφοντες σφαίρας*, similar to "circulos describentes et inflexiones" in Ficinus, who omits *ἐφαινέσθην*.

[6] Forster shows, from Diodorus i. § 98, that Œnopides had learnt in Egypt that *τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον λοξὴν ἔχειν τὴν πορείαν*; and that Anaxagoras knew of the inclination of the poles of the earth.

[7] To avoid the pleonasm in *εἶπε* and *ἔφη*, Sydenham suggested *φῂς*; but where *ποῖον* is thus used to express surprise, a verb is rarely found, as shown by the mass of passages quoted by Reisig in Conjectan. p. 74; and though *ἔφη* is thus inserted after *ποῖον* in Euthyd. p. 304, E., yet there *εἶπε* is not added likewise.

[8] On *ἀδολεσχεῖν* and *μετεώρων*, see the commentators on Aristoph. Νεφ. 188, Plato Phædon. p. 70, C., Phædr. p. 270, A., Cratyl. p. 401, B., Rep. vi. p. 488, C., and Xenoph. M. S. i. 2, 31.

[9] According to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, Thrasyllus fancied this person to be Democritus, the philosopher of Abdera. See in § 2, n. 21 and 29.

[10] In the formula *πρὸς σοῦ*, the verb *ποιεῖς* is not elsewhere found. I have therefore omitted it. Ficinus has correctly "Non expedit tibi."

[11] On the verb *τραχηλίζεσθαι*, as applied to wrestlers, Sydenham refers to Lucian's Anacharsis; Stutzmann adds Plutarch in Anton. i. p. 97, B. § 33, *διαλαμβάνων τοὺς νεανίσκους ἐτραχήλιζε*: and Diog. Laert., *ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος κορασίου τραχηλίζεται*, quoted by Stephens in Thes. L. Gr.

himself, and sleeping?[12] so that what other answer think you he would give, but that it is disgraceful to philosophize?—Now this person had employed his whole time in mental cultivation,[13] but the other, whom he abused, in bodily exercises. It seemed then to me that I ought to dismiss the one, who had been interrogated,[14] for he did not pretend even to be skilled in words, but in deeds; and to interrogate thoroughly the other, who pretended to be rather clever, in order that I might, if I could, be benefited by him[15] in knowledge. I said therefore to him, that I had proposed my question in common for all; but if you think[16] you will give a better answer, I put the same question to you as I did to him, Whether you think it honourable to philosophize or not?—Just as we were conversing thus, the two youths, overhearing us, became silent; and ceasing from the dispute, became listeners. Now, what their admirers suffered, I know not; but I was struck with astonishment. For I am always struck so in the case of the young and handsome. One of them, however, seemed to me in no less an agony than myself; and he answered with the air of a person eager for honour.—Should I ever,[17] Socrates, said he, consider it disgraceful to philosophize, I should no longer deem myself a human being; nor, indeed, any one else, so disposed, pointing to his Rival, and speaking with a loud[18] voice, so that the objects of their admiration might hear.—To you, then, said I, it seems honourable to philosophize.—Most highly, replied he.—[2.] What then, said

[12] Plutarch, in Philopœmenes, i. p. 375, C. § 3, and Galen to Thrasybul. c. 37, quoted respectively by Sydenham and Forster, give a similar account of the life of prize-fighters.

[13] According to Plato, in Rep. ii. p. 246, and Legg. x. p. 795, education was divided into two parts, bodily, *γυμναστικὴ*, and mental, *μουσική*. FORSTER.

[14] In lieu of *ἐρόμενον* or *ἐρώμενον*, found subsequently in many MSS., Mudge suggested *ἐρρωμένον*, but Schleiermacher *ἐρωτώμενον*, from "quem prius interrogaveram," in Ficinus.

[15] Compare Hipp. Minor, § 12.

[16] Here is a transition from the narrative to the dramatic style. S. There is a remarkable instance of a similar transition in Xenophon in Anab. i. 9. 25.

[17] Instead of *ὁπότε*, Ficinus found in his MS. *εἴποτε*, answering to his version, "si quando."

[18] Stutzmann was the first to suggest *μεγάλῃ*, subsequently found in the four best MSS. Stalbaum, however, is content with *μέγα*, supported by *τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων*, in Protag. p. 310, B.

I; does it seem to you possible for a man to know any thing whatever, whether it is disgraceful or honourable, who does not know at all what that thing is?—No, said he.—Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—Perfectly, said he. —What is it then? said I.—What else, (said he,) than according to the sentiment of Solon? For Solon says some where,[19]

Even as I grow old, still much I learn.

And it appears to me that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always learning some one thing at least, when he is either young or old, in order that he may during life learn the greatest number of things.—At first it seemed to me that he had said something to the purpose; but afterwards, on thinking thrice,[20] I asked him, whether he considered philosophy to be much learning?—Completely so,[21] said he.—And do you consider, said I, that philosophy is only honourable? or good likewise?—It is likewise very good, said he.—Do you perceive this to be something peculiar to philosophy? or does it seem to you to be the case in other things likewise? For instance, do you consider a love of gymnastic exercises to be not only honourable but good likewise, or not?—To this [22]he said very ironically two things.[22] To this man let it be said, that it is neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honourable and good.—(I then asked him), Do you think that in these exercises the undergoing much toil is a love of exercise?—By all means, said he; just as in philosophizing, I consider that much learning is philosophy.—Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises desire any thing else than that, which will cause the body to be in a good state? —That very thing, he replied.—Do then, said I, many la-

[19] The same verse is quoted in Lach. p. 188, B., and Rep. vii. p. 536, B.

[20] Instead of πως, one MS. has περ. The two seem to lead to τρὶς: for thus "tris" is used by Virgil in Æn. i. 109, "Tris Notus—torquet —tris Eurus—urget:" and τρὶς in Æsch. S. Th. 727.

[21] From this answer Sydenham was led to believe that Democritus was the speaker. For, according to Clemens Alexandr. in Strom. i. p. 357, ed. Potter, he prided himself upon his extensive learning.

[22]—[22] Such is the literal version of the Greek, μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δύο, which I cannot understand. For the reply, so far from being ironical, is perfectly straightforward. There is evidently some error here; which it were not difficult perhaps to correct by the aid of ἔφη, read in the three oldest MSS. in lieu of εἶπε. Sydenham renders εἰρωνικῶς "facetiously;" Knebel, "suam magnopere dissimulans sententiam."

bours, cause the body to be in a good state?—Certainly, said he; for how should a person have, from little labour, his body in a good state?—Here I thought it best to call[23] upon the lover of gymnastics, in order that he might assist me through his knowledge of the gymnastic art. And I asked him, Why are you silent, O best of men, while this person is talking thus? Or to you likewise do persons seem to have their bodies in a good state from much labour or little?—[24] For my part, Socrates, said he, I thought he had known[25] the saying,[24] that moderate labour is best for the body.[26]—[27] How so? (said I).—(I speak) not of a man[27] sleepless, and foodless, and having his neck not worn down[28] and attenuated by care.[29] On his saying this the youths were delighted, and burst into a laugh; but the other party blushed.—I then said, What then,

[23] So Sydenham. Ficinus has—"provocandus"—as if he found in his MS. *κλητέος*, in lieu of *κινητέος*: on which see Heind. at Lys. p. 225, A.

[24]—[24] Ficinus has merely "Equidem, O Socrates, asserere ausim—" For his MS. was either deficient; or else he saw that there was nothing in the shape of a proverb, to which the phrase *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ* could be referred. Accordingly Knebel would supply *τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν*, to which Plato alludes in Menex. p. 247, E. § 20, and Protag. p. 343, B. 82.

[25] After *τοῦτο* Schleiermacher would insert *τουτονὶ*—But the disease is seated somewhat deeper.

[26] Cornarius quotes opportunely Hippocrates on Epidem. vi. 6, *πόνοι, σιτία, ποτά, ὕπνος, ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια.*

[27]—[27] The Greek is, *πόθεν δὴ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε*—Ficinus has, "Unde? inquam; non virum vigilantem dico—" as if he had found in his MS. *πόθεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ; οὐχὶ ἄνδρα λέγω ἄγρυπνον*— Forster, whom Sydenham follows, would insert *ὁρᾷς* after *οὐχὶ*— Heusde however, who says that the whole passage is wretchedly corrupt, would read—*πόθεν δὲ οὐχί; ἄνδρα—εὐστραβῆ.* But *εὐστραβὴς* is found no where else in Greek; nor in the formula *πόθεν*, used either by itself or with *οὐ* in a negative sense, do we meet with *οὐχί*. Schleiermacher prefers, ΣΩΚ. *πόθεν δ' οὐχ οἱ πολλοί; Ἄνδρα γε*—whom Beck follows in part. But the whole passage still requires correction.

[28] All the MSS. but one offer *ἀτριβῆ* in lieu of *ἀστραβῆ*. Ficinus has —"insuetam spinam habentem"—from which it is difficult to discover what he found in his MS. Stalbaum translates *ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα* by "collum nullis pugnis committentem."

[29] To give additional support to the notion that Democritus is here alluded to, Sydenham refers to the Epistle of Hippocrates, where the philosopher is described as being very pale and wasted in flesh; that he was found with a book which lay [open] on his knees; and that other books lay by him, some on each side; that by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earnest attention; and by turns rested, pondering very much within himself.

do you now concede that neither much nor little labour causes human beings to have their bodies in a good state, but only what is moderate? or will you contest with us two?—Against him, said he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, and I know well that I should be competent to support the proposition I have laid down, if I had laid down one weaker than this; for he is nothing. But against you I beg not to contend in favour of a paradox; and I admit, that not many, but moderate exercises[30] procure for men a good habit of body.—And what in the case of food? said I. Is it the moderate, or much?—He admitted it in the case of food.[31] And thus I compelled him to confess that, in the case of all the other things relating to the body, the moderate is the most beneficial, and not the much or little. [32][And he confessed the moderate][32] and all this he granted me.—What then, said I, as regards the soul? Of the things applied to it do the moderate or the immoderate benefit it?—The moderate, said he.—Is not learning one of the things applied to the soul?—He admitted it.—Of learning then, the moderate quantity benefits, but not the great.—He assented.—[3.] Of whom then, making an inquiry, should we justly inquire what kind of exercise and of food are moderate for the body? We all three agreed that it is a physician or a master of exercise.[33] And

[30] A similar sentiment is attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in M. S. i. 2. 4, as remarked by Sydenham.

[31] The Greek is Καὶ τὰ σιτία ὡμολόγει. But we must either insert ὡσαύτως, or some other word of like import, or else in lieu of τὰ σιτία read τὰ μέτρια—that the concession here may tally with the two subsequent concessions. S. Schleiermacher, with whom Knebel agrees, considers the whole clause to be superfluous.

[32]—[32] The words within the brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[33] "Although Παιδοτρίβης properly signifies the person who teaches youth their exercises, yet Plato here, and elsewhere, uses the word to signify the γυμναστής, 'gymnastic physician;' i. e. the person, who knows what exercise is suited for each disease. Such a person was Herodicus; who, says Plato, in Rep. iii. p. 406, A., παιδοτρίβης ὢν ἔμιξε γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῇ. But the παιδοτρίβης and γυμναστὴς afterwards became the same; although in process of time they were different professions. But in the time of Aristotle the knowledge of what sort of exercise was suited to each particular habit of body was attributed to the παιδοτρίβης, as well as to the γυμναστής; which last word we beg leave to read in Aristot. Politic. iv., instead of γυμναστικός." So Sydenham; who refers to Mercurialis De Arte Gymnastica i. 12, and to Faber in Agonist. ii. 6; and he might have added Perizonius on Ælian V. H. ii. 6.

of whom (shall we inquire) about the sowing of seeds? About this, we confessed the husbandman. But inquiring of whom, should we justly inquire respecting the planting and sowing of learning in the soul, how many, and of what kinds of it are moderate? We were here all full of difficulty. Upon which I said, by way of a joke, Since we are all at a loss, are you willing for us to ask these youths here? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer (Od. xxi. 285) says the suitors were, who deemed that no one else was fit to stretch the bow.

Since then they now seemed to be dispirited on the question, I endeavoured to view it in another light, and I said —What kinds of learning do we best conjecture those are, which a philosopher ought to learn? since they are not all or many. Whereupon the wiser person, taking up the discourse, observed that the most beautiful kinds of learning, and (the most) becoming, are those by which a person would obtain the highest reputation for philosophy; and that he would obtain the highest, if he seemed to be skilled in all arts;[34] and, if not all, at least in as many as possible, and especially those of the greatest account, after having learnt such of them as are fitting for freemen to learn, and are connected with intellect, and not with a handicraft merely.—Do you mean in the same way, said I, as in carpentry? For there you may purchase a tip-top carpenter for five or six minæ;[35] but you could not (buy) an architect even for ten thousand drachmas;[36] so few of these are to be found amongst all the Greeks. Are you speaking of some such thing?—And he, on hearing, admitted that he was speaking of such a thing.—[4.] I then asked him, if it was not impossible for one person to learn thus[37] only two arts, much less, many and great.—Do not understand me, Socrates, said he, as if I were saying that a philosopher ought to know each of the arts accurately, as he does, who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes

[34] Here is another trait, which Forster and Sydenham apply to Democritus, who had, according to Diogenes Laert. ix. 37, a skill in all kinds of arts; where Sydenham would read *πασῶν* for *πᾶσαν*, to suit better with the words here.

[35] Less than £20. For the Attic *μνᾶ* was equal to £3 4*s.* 7*d.* English. S.

[36] Equal to £322 18*s.* 4*d.* For the *μνᾶ* was worth 100 *δράχμαι*. S. It differed from the Roman "libra" by only four drachmæ, as remarked by Stutzmann.

[37] After *οὕτω* has dropt *καλῶς*, or something similar.

a person of a liberal education, to follow better than the persons present, what is said by the handicraftsman; and to give his opinion so as to appear, in what is said and done relating to the arts, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than those who happen to be present.—Then I—for I was still doubtful what he meant by his speech—said to him, Do I conceive rightly what kind of person you call a philosopher? For you seem to me to speak of a person, such as are the competitors in five kinds of contest, compared with the runner, or the wrestlers.[38] For the former fall short of the latter, as regards the contests of the latter, and are second to them; but of all the other competitors, they are the first, and are the victors.[39] Some such thing you mean perhaps that the study of philosophy effects in those, who pursue it, in that they fall short of the first prize,[40] in the intellect relating to the arts, but in attaining the second, they are superior to all the rest; so that he, who has studied philosophy, becomes in every thing a person under the tip-top[41] man. Some such person you seem to me to point out.—You appear to me, Socrates, said he, to understand correctly what relates to a philosopher, in likening him to a competitor in five contests.[42] For he is really such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing; nor has he laboured upon any one thing with such accuracy, as,

[38] Clericus, in Silv. Philolog. c. 10. 4. was the first to substitute παλαιστὰς for πελταστὰς; and so three MSS. subsequently collated.

[39] Forster quotes Longinus, § 34, where Hyperides is stated, from the variety of his talents, to hold the second place amongst the first-rate orators, but the first amongst the second-rate.

[40] In lieu of πρώτων, the antithesis in δευτερεῖα requires πρωτείων, as I have translated.

[41] According to Stalbaum, ὕπακρος is not found elsewhere in Plato. But as Longinus makes use of it in the passage just quoted, it is evident he found it here, and considered it a good Greek word.

[42] Sydenham gives here in a corrected form a translation of what Diogenes Laertius has, in xi. 37, quoted from Thrasyllus. "If the Rivals be a dialogue of Plato, says Thrasyllus, the anonymous person there introduced as the friend of those, who were disputing about Œnopides and Anaxagoras, must be this Democritus; who, in the conversation he had with Socrates concerning philosophy, there related, says, that a philosopher is like a competitor in five contests. Now he was himself a five-contest competitor in philosophy. For he had cultivated physics, and ethics, and mathematics, and all the common learning of those times, and had some experience in all the arts."

through his attention to that one thing, to be deficient in all the rest, as are handicraftsmen, but he has touched moderately upon all.

[5.] After this reply, I was anxious to know clearly what he meant, and I inquired of him, whether he considered good persons to be useful or useless.—Useful, surely, Socrates, said he.—If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?—He agreed.—Well then, said I, do you deem philosophers to be useful, or not?—He acknowledged they were useful; and moreover he said, that he deemed them the most useful (of all persons).[43]—Come now, (said I,) let us see whether you say what is true. How can these second-rate men be of any use to us? For it is plain that the philosopher is inferior to each of those who possess their respective arts.—He acknowledged it.—Come then, said I, if either yourself were unwell, or any of your friends, for whom you have a great regard, would you, being desirous to recover health, introduce that second-rate person, the philosopher, to your family; or take a physician.—Both of them, said he.—Do not say both, I replied; but which in preference, and the first?—No man, said he, would hesitate about this, that (I would take) the physician in preference and first.—What then, in a vessel tost in a storm? To whom would you rather intrust yourself and your property? To a pilot, or to a philosopher?—To a pilot, for my part, said he.—And so, too, in all other affairs; so long as there is a person of skill in a profession, the philosopher is of no use.—It appears so, said he.—The philosopher, therefore, said I, is some useless person; for there are surely persons of skill in (all) professions. But we have agreed that the good are useful, and the wicked useless.—He was forced to own it.—[6.] [44] What then, said I, shall I ask you about what comes[44] after this? or is it not rather rude to put a question?—Ask what you please, said he.—I desire nothing else, said I, than to repeat the concessions already made. Now the matter stands thus. We have conceded that philosophy is an honourable thing, and that we are ourselves philosophers; and that philosophers are good; and that the good are useful,

[43] Ficinus alone has "omnium."

[44]—[44] The Greek is, *τί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωμαι*; Stephens suggested, *Τί οὖν; τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωμαι*—which Stalbaum approves of, and I have translated.

and the wicked useless. Again, on the other hand, we have conceded that philosophers are useless, as long as there are persons of skill in any particular profession; and that such persons are existing at all times. For was not all this conceded? —Certainly, said he.—We concede, therefore, agreeably to your own reasoning, that if it be philosophy to be skilled in arts in the manner you state, such[45] persons are wicked and useless as long as there are artists.[46] But see, my friend, if the case be so, and that to philosophize is not to attend to arts, nor to busy oneself about many things, nor to be living like a workman, bending over his work,[47] nor to be learning many things, but something else? Since I thought, it was a reproach for persons, much occupied in arts, to be called operatives.[48] [7.] But we shall know more clearly by this means, whether I am speaking truly, if you will answer me this. Who know how to punish horses correctly? Whether they, who make them better, or others?—They who (make them) better.—Well then, do not they, who know how to make dogs better, know how to chastise dogs properly?—Yes.—The same art then makes better, and chastises properly.—I agree, said he.—Well then, is the art, which makes better and chastises properly, the same as that which knows the good and the vicious, or is it a different one?—It is, said he, the same.—Are you then willing, said I, to concede this, in the case of human beings likewise, that the art, which makes men better, is that, which chastises properly, and knows the good and the bad?—By all means, said he.—Does not then the art which (applies)

[45] Instead of *αὐτοὺς*, Heusde would read *αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους*—I have translated as if the Greek were *τοιούτους*—Knebel says that *αὐτοὺς* agrees with *φιλοσόφους*, to be got out of *φιλοσοφεῖν*.

[46] I have followed Heusde, who correctly suggested *τεχνῖται* in lieu of *τέχναι*.

[47] Such is the literal meaning of *κυπτάζειν*.

[48] In Greek, *βάναυσος* is one who works by means of a furnace. For so Hesychius: *Βαναυσία, πᾶσα τέχνη διὰ πυρὸς, κυρίως δὲ ἡ περὶ τὰς καμίνους.* Plato seems to allude to the metallurgic and the chemical experiments of Democritus; whose treatise, *Περὶ τῆς λίθου*, related perhaps to the magnet, or loadstone, which, for its peculiar virtues, was called "the stone;" and it was no doubt through fusion by fire that he converted common stones into precious, and carried on his other chemical experiments. The word, however, seems to comprise all those arts we call mechanical; and the chain of reasoning requires it to be used here with the same latitude. S.

to one (apply) to many too, and that which (applies) to many (apply) to one likewise? And so too as regards horses and all other things?—I confess it, (said he.)—What then is the science, which chastises properly the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science?—Yes. —Do you mean by justice[49] any other science than this? —No other.—Do not then men know the good and the bad by that science, by which they chastise properly?—By that. —And he, who knows one, will know many?—Yes.—And whoever does not know many, (will not know one.)—I confess it.—If then a horse, as being but a horse, knows not good and bad horses, he would not know of which kind he is himself?—I admit it.—And if an ox, being but an ox, knows not good and bad oxen,[50] he would not know of which kind he is himself?—True, said he.—And so too, in the case of a dog?—He admitted it.—What then, if a man knows not the good men and the bad, would he not be ignorant whether he is good or bad, inasmuch as he too is a man?—He agreed.—Now to be ignorant of oneself, is it to be of sound mind,[51] or not sound?—Not sound.—To know then oneself, is to be of sound mind.—I admit it, said he.—To this then, as it seems, the Delphic inscription exhorts, namely, to exercise a sound mind, and justice.[52]—It seems so.—And by the very same science we know too how to chastise properly.—I admit it, (said he.)—Is not then justice that, by which we know how to chastise properly? but soundness of mind that, by which we have the skill to know our-

[49] Stalbaum says that the writer has confounded legal justice with justice in the abstract; or, as we should say in England, law with equity.

[50] Ficinus has "qui sint boni aut mali boves." From which Bekker wished to insert *βοῦς*, wanting in all the MS.

[51] No words are more puzzling to translate than *σώφρων* and its derivatives. For they are employed in different places in different senses; and there is no word in English answering to them every where. Hence to express their precise meaning, different words must be used in different places. In Homer, *σωφροσύνη* means prudence, or discretion, as in Od. xxiii. 30. Its true etymology is *σῶα φρὴν*, "a sound mind;" and so Porphyry says in Stobæus xxi. p. 185, Gesn., *καὶ γὰρ σωφροσύνη σαοφροσύνη τις*. And so too Plato, in Charmid. p. 164, D., by *σωφροσύνη* understands "soundness of mind;" and both Xenophon, in M. S. i. 16, and Plato, in Rep., oppose it to *μανία*, "madness." Most commonly, however, Plato applies it to one of the cardinal virtues. S.

[52] The same interpretation is given in Charmid. p. 164, D. § 27, and Alcibiad. I. p. 124, A. § 41.

selves and others?—It seems so, said he.—Justice then, said I, and soundness of mind are the same thing.[53]—It appears so. —[8.] In this way, said I, states are well governed, when they, who do wrong, suffer punishment.—You speak the truth.—The same science too, said I, is that of the statesman.—He assented.—What then, when a single man administers correctly the affairs of a state, he is not a tyrant, and a king?[54]—I admit it.—Does he not administer affairs by the art of the king? or the tyrant?—Just so.—These arts then are the same with those.—They appear so.—Well then, when one man administers the affairs of a household correctly, what is his name? Is it not steward, or master?—Yes.—Whether by justice would he administer the affairs of a household correctly? or by any other art?—By justice.—The same kind of person then, it seems, is a king, a tyrant, a statesman, a steward, a master, a man of sound mind, and a just man; and one is the art of the king, of the tyrant, of the statesman, of the master, of the steward, of the just man, and the man of sound mind.—So it appears, said he. [9.] Is it not then disgraceful for a philosopher, when the physician is speaking about persons who are ill, not to be able to follow what is said, nor to give an opinion on what is said or done, and similarly, when any one skilled operative (is speaking)? and when a judge, or a king, or any one else of those whom we have just now enumerated, (is speaking of things belonging to his office,) is it not disgraceful for a philosopher not (to follow what they say or do,) nor to be able to give an opinion respecting them?—How, Socrates, said he, is it not disgraceful for him, to be able to give no opinion on subjects so important?—Shall we assert then, said I, that on these points the philosopher must be a competitor in five contests, and be second-rate, having

[53] According to Polus the Pythagorean, quoted by Stobæus, ix. p. 105, justice is the mother and nurse of the other virtues; for without it no one can possess temperance, fortitude, or prudence. S.

[54] Although the Greek, *τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεὺς*, is "both a tyrant and a king," yet Plato does not mean, that "tyrant" and "king" are synonymous; so far from it, he says in the Statesman, p. 276, E. § 18, that "a tyrant and a king are *ἀνομοιότατοι*, i. e. most unlike one another;" and, Rep. ix. p. 580, C. § 6, that "the best of all governments is the kingly, and the worst the tyrannic." By *τύραννος*, "a tyrant," he meant, an arbitrary monarch, governing not according to established laws, but his own will; by *βασιλεὺς*, "a king," governing according to law written or customary. S.

the second prize after all, and be useless, so long as there exists any of the first-rate? Or must he in the first place not commit his household to another person, nor have the second place in that business; but ought himself to chastise after being the judge, if his household is about to be administered correctly.—In this he agreed with me.—[55] And then, said I,[55] should his friends submit an award to him, or the state order him to decide upon any thing, or to act the judge, would it not, my friend, be disgraceful for him to appear in such cases to be second or third, and not to take the lead?—So it seems to me. To philosophize therefore, thou best of men, wants much of being great in learning, or the busying oneself about arts.—On my saying this, the wise man, ashamed of what he had before asserted, was silent; but the illiterate person said, it was in that way,[56] and the rest approved of what had been stated.

[55]—[55] In lieu of *ἔπειτά γε δήπου*, a combination of particles not to be found, I suspect, elsewhere, Stutzmann suggested *ἔπειτα δέ γ' εἶπον*, similar to—"Atque ego addidi" in Ficinus.

[56] In *ἐκείνως* there is, I suspect, some error. For many MSS. read *ἐκεῖνος*. Perhaps the author wrote *ἔφη, εἰ καὶ ἄνους, εἰδέναι*, i. e. "said he knew, although he was a simpleton."

INTRODUCTION TO THE HIPPARCHUS.

Although this dialogue is found in the list given by Diogenes Laertius, iii. 50, of the genuine productions of Plato, yet even before the time of Ælian, there was some idea of its being spurious. For after quoting it in V. H. viii. 2, the writer adds, "if it be in reality Plato's." Carrying out this hint, Valckenaer was the first to prove, on Herodotus v. 55, that it was not written by its previously-supposed author; and his decision has been admitted by Wolf in Prolegom. Homer. p. cliv., and all the subsequent scholars who have written upon Plato, with the exception of Taylor; who says he "cannot find any thing in its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in question." Boeckh indeed attributes it to Simon the shoemaker, who was a Socratic philosopher, ridiculed probably by Aristophanes, in the Clouds; but Stalbaum would bring it down to the time, when schools of rhetoric were in vogue towards the decline of Greek literature, and he considers it inferior to even the Theages and Rivals, despite the preservation of the anecdote relating to Hipparchus in § 4, who has given the name to the dialogue, and was once thought to have been introduced as a speaker, until, to avoid the anachronism, an unknown friend was substituted in his place.

THE HIPPARCHUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, AND A FRIEND.

SOCRATES.

[1.] WHAT is the love of gain, and who are its lovers?

Fr. They seem to me to be those, who think it worth while to make a gain from what is nothing worth.[1]

Soc. Whether then do they seem to you (to do so), while knowing that the things are of no worth, or not knowing? For if (they do so) not knowing, you call the lovers of gain senseless.

Fr. Nay, I do not call them senseless, but thorough knaves and villains, the slaves of gain, and who know indeed that the things are worthless, from which they dare to make a gain, but yet through their shamelessness they dare to have a love of gain.

Soc. Do you then call a person of this kind a lover of gain? For instance, should a husbandman, while planting, and knowing the plant to be worthless, nevertheless think to make a gain from it when grown up, do you call such a person a lover of gain?

Fr. The lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to make a gain from every thing.

Soc. Do not thus answer me at random, like a person in-

[1] To such persons Horace alludes in his "Rem, si possis, recte; si non, quocunque modo, rem;" so well translated by Coleman—"Get money, if you can with honesty; if not, get money." With regard to the play on the words *ἀξιῶσιν—ἀξίων*, see at Phileb. § 57, n. 56; § 65, n. 74; Charm. § 49; Hip. Maj § 41, 45.

jured[1] by some one, but, giving your mind, answer me, as if I were questioning you again from the beginning. Do you not agree with me, that a lover of gain knows the value of that, from which he thinks it worth while to make a gain?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Who then is he, that knows the value of plants, and in what time and place it is worth while to plant them? that we also may introduce something[2] from the words of the wise, which the clever in law-suits employ for the sake of elegance.

Fr. A husbandman, I think.

Soc. Do you then mean by the expression—It is worth while to make a gain—any thing else than to think that one ought to make a gain?

Fr. I mean this.

Soc. Now do not you, who are so young, endeavour to deceive me, your elder, by answering as you do at present, what you do not think; but tell me truly, do you think that a husbandman exists, who knows it is not worth while to plant a certain plant, and yet fancies he will make a gain[3] by such a plant?

Fr. By Zeus, not I.

Soc. What then, think you that a horsedealer, who knows that the food which he gives a horse, is of no worth, does not know that it destroys the horse?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. He does not think then that from such worthless food he will make a gain.

Fr. He does not.

Soc. What then, do you think that a pilot, who has furnished his ship with sails and a rudder of no worth, does not know that he will sustain a damage, and be in danger of perishing himself, and of losing the ship and all it carries?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. He will not think then that he will make a gain by worthless articles.

[1] Stalbaum justly objects to *ἠδικημένος*. For most assuredly an injured person would give an answer not at random, but with bitterness, or in an unseemly manner. Hence in lieu of *εἰκῇ* one would prefer *ἀεικῇ*—

[2] This alludes to the play on the words *ὥρα* and *χώρα*, which it is impossible to preserve in a translation.

[3] Ficinus has "lucraturum," which leads to *κερδανεῖν*, or *κερδαίνειν ἄν*, and similarly all through afterwards.

Fr. He will not.

Soc. But does the general, who knows that his army carries worthless arms, [1] think he will make a gain, or that he is worthy to make a gain by them? [1]

Fr. By no means.

Soc. But if a hautboy-player possesses a worthless hautboy, or a lyre-player a lyre, or a bowman a bow, or, in short, any other artist or skilled person possesses instruments or any other apparatus of no value, does he think he will make a gain by these?

Fr. It appears he will not.

[2.] *Soc.* Whom then do you call lovers of gain? For surely they are not those, whom we have already mentioned, who, knowing what are things of no value, think they must [2] make a gain by them. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

Fr. But, Socrates, I mean to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, are perpetually and beyond all measure, greedy after things that are small and worth little or [3] nothing, and thus have a love of gain.

Soc. But surely, thou best of men, they do not know this, that they are worthless; for we have proved against ourselves, that this is impossible.

Fr. So it seems to me.

Soc. If then (they do so) not knowing it, it is evident that, not knowing it, they fancy things of no worth to be of great value.

Fr. It appears so.

Soc. Do not the lovers of gain love gain?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Is it therefore a good to any one to suffer a loss?

Fr. To no one.

[1]—[1] The Greek is οἴεται ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαινειν καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν. But the phrase is here constantly οἴεται κερδαίνειν, not ἀξιοῖ κεραίνειν, which was interpolated from § 1.

[2] One MS. omits δεῖν, as in the preceding passages, where the same formula is repeated.

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were, ὀλίγου ἄξια ἢ καὶ οὐδενὸς, not merely ἄξια καὶ—

Soc. But it is an evil?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Are men then injured by a damage?

Fr. They are injured.

Soc. Is then damage an evil?

Fr. It is.

Soc. But gain is contrary to damage?

Fr. Contrary.

Soc. Gain is therefore a good?

Fr. It is.

Soc. Do you then call those, who love a good, lovers of gain?

Fr. It seems so.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain mad-men. But do you yourself love what is a good, or not love it?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Is there a good which you do not love, but an evil (which you do)?

Fr. By Zeus, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love good things. But besides I and you, do not all the rest of men appear to you to love good things, and to hate evil?

Fr. To me it appears so.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is a good?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. In this way then,[1] all appear (to be) lovers of gain; but that, in which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing then which assertion, would a person not err?

Fr. Should, Socrates, one rightly apprehend what a lover of gain is, [2] I think it is right to consider him a lover of gain [2] who earnestly applies himself to, and thinks it worth

[1] Instead of *αὖ* one MS. has *οὖν*, similar to "igitur" in Ficinus. One would prefer *οὖν εἶναι—φαίνονται.*

[2]—[2] So Taylor with Ficinus, "eum, ut puto, lucri cupidum arbitrabitur." The Greek is, *ὀρθῶς δ' ἔστι τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι φιλοκερδῆ.* But after *εἴ τις—ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι*, the particle *δὲ* could not thus follow the repeated *ὀρθῶς.* The author wrote perhaps *ὀρθῶς δὴ ἐστ'*.—

while to make a gain from those things, from which the good do not dare to make a gain.

[3.] *Soc.* But do you not see, O sweetest[1] of men, that we just now acknowledged that to make a gain is to be benefited?

Fr. What then?

Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always wished for good things.

Fr. We did.

Soc. Do not, then, good men wish to possess every thing gainful, since such things are good?

Fr. But not the things, Socrates, by which they are about to be hurt.

Soc. By "to be hurt" do you mean "to be damaged"? or something else?

Fr. No, but I mean "to be damaged."

Soc. Are persons damaged by gain, or by damage?

Fr. Through both. For they are damaged by damage, and through iniquitous gain.

Soc. Does it then appear to you that any thing useful and good is iniquitous?

Fr. To me it does not.

Soc. Did we not then a little before acknowledge that gain is contrary to damage, which is an evil?

Fr. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is a good?

Fr. We granted this.

[4.] *Soc.* You endeavour then, you see, to deceive me, by designedly asserting the contrary to what we just now granted.

Fr. By Zeus, I do not, Socrates; but you, on the contrary, are deceiving me; and I know not how, in your reasonings you turn things topsy-turvy.

Soc. Speak fair words. For I should not act correctly, if I were not persuaded by a man good and wise.

Fr. Who is he? and why particularly (say you) this?

Soc. My fellow-citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus,

[1] Although Plato uses γλυκύς, in Hipp. Maj. p. 288, B. § 9, in an ironical sense, for "a simpleton," as remarked by Ruhnken on Tim. p. 131, yet this, says Stalbaum, is the only place where the superlative is found.

the son of Pisistratus, one of the Philaïdæ,[1] and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus; who exhibited many other illustrious acts of wisdom, and was the first who introduced[3] into this land the poems of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists during the Panathenæa to go through them successively[4] and in order, just as you know they do at present; and having sent for Anacreon, the Teïan, a ship of fifty oars, brought him to this city, and always had about him Simonides of Ceos, having induced him (to stay) by great rewards and gifts. And this he did, wishing to instruct[5] the citizens, in order that he might rule over them being the best of men; nor thinking, that he ought to begrudge wisdom to any man, as being himself a highly educated person. And when such of the citizens as were living around the town had been educated well, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise laid down a plan to instruct those in the country; and he set up for them statues of Hermes[6] along the roads, in the middle of the city and of each of the wards; and afterwards selecting from his wisdom, on points he had partly [7]learned, and partly discovered himself,[7] what he deemed to be the cleverest idea, he put them into elegiac verses, and engraved them (on the Hermæ) as his poems, and specimens of wisdom; in order that in the first place the citizens might not wonder at those wise inscriptions (on the temple) at Delphi, "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much," and the rest of that kind, but that they

[1] So Meursius in Peisistratus, § 1, in lieu of Φιλαίδωνος. For the Philaïdæ was a ward of the tribe of Ægeus, as stated by the Schol. here and Step. Byz. in Φιλαΐδαι. See likewise Corsini Fast. Attic. i. p. 246; Heringa Observat. p. 236; Spon. p. 38. 9, quoted by Porson in Miscell. Crit. p. 264.

[2] According to Thucydides in vi. 54, Hippias was the eldest son.

[3] This is attributed by other authors to Solon or Peisistratus. See Perizonius on Ælian V. H. viii. 2; Heyne Excurs. ad Il. T. viii. p. 809; Wolf Prolegom. Homer. p. xcix.—cxl.

[4] On the expression ἐξ ὑποβολῆς or ἐξ ὑπολήψεως, see Wolf Prolegom. Homer. p. cxl., and Hermann Opuscul. T. v. p. 300.

[5] Instead of πείθειν, four MSS. read παιδεύειν, similar to "instruere" in Ficinus.

[6] In lieu of "Hermas" Ficinus has, apparently from a Scholium, "columnas sive quadratos lapides," as in Thucyd. vi. 27.

[7]—[7] So Taylor, following Ficinus, "quam partem didicerat, partim ipse invenerat," who perhaps found in his MS. ἣν ἅμα τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἅμ' αὐτὸς ἐξεῦρε, not ἥν τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς ἐξεῦρε.

might deem the words of Hipparchus still wiser; and, in the next place, that passing by them, up and down, they might read them, and have a taste of his wisdom, and come from the fields[1] and be instructed in the remaining branches of learning. And there are two epigrams. In some upon the left-hand sides of each of the Hermæ there is sculptured a [2]Hermes, saying that he was standing midway between the city and the ward;[2] and in others upon the right-hand sides he says:—"This is the memorial[3] of Hipparchus. Go on, having just thoughts." There are also many other beautiful poetical descriptions on other Hermæ; and there is this in the Steiriac[4] road, in which he says—"This is the memorial of Hipparchus. Do not deceive your friend." I would not then have dared to deceive you, being my friend, and disobey so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were tyrannized over by his brother Hippias; and you have heard from all the old men, that only during those years did there exist a tyranny at Athens, and that during all the other period, the Athenians lived nearly as when Saturn reigned.[5] But it is said by rather clever persons, that he did not die in the way which the multitude have thought, through the [6]dishonour done to the sister (of Harmodius) respecting the carrying the sacred basket[6]—for that is a silly reason—but that Harmodius was the bosom friend and pupil of Aristogeiton, who valued himself highly upon [7]instructing a man,[7] and fancied that Hipparchus would be his rival. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of one of the handsome and nobly-born youths—whose name persons have mentioned, but I do not remember—and that this young

[1] Ficinus has "ex agris et silvis," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ὑλῶν*.

[2]—[2] According to Stalbaum, both Boeckh in Indic. Lect. Berolin. 1824, and Osann in Syllog. Inscript. p. 241, conceived there was an Hexameter likewise, answering to the words given here in prose—*λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἕστηκεν*—from which it is easy to elicit *Δήμου τ' ἐν μέσῳ εἴμ' Ἑρμᾶς καὶ Ϝάστεος ἐστώς*. To these Hermæ placed by Hipparchus Hesychius alludes in *Ἱππάρχειος Ἑρμῆς*.

[3] In lieu of *μνῆμα* one would expect here *ῥῆμα*—

[4] According to the Scholiast and Steph. Byz., Steiria was a ward of the tribe of Pandion.

[5] So Ovid, "Quam bene vivebant, Saturno rege—"

[6]—[6] The dishonour alluded to is explained by Thucydides vi. 56.

[7]—[7] In the Greek, *παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον*, is an error, which it were perhaps not difficult to correct.

person did for a time admire Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as wise men; but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and that they, being very much annoyed at the dishonour, slew Hipparchus.

[5.] *Fr.* You run the risk, Socrates, of either not considering me a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, of not being persuaded by Hipparchus: for I cannot be persuaded that you have not deceived me [1]in I know not what manner,[1] during the discourse.

Soc. But indeed, just as in the game of backgammon,[2] I am willing to put back whatever part you please of the assertions already made, in order that you may not think you have been deceived. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

Fr. Not for me.

Soc. But that to be damaged, and damage itself, is not an evil?

Fr. Not for me.

Soc. But that gain, and to make a gain, are not contrary to damage, and to be damaged?

Fr. Nor this neither.

Soc. But that to make a gain, as being contrary to evil, is not a good?

Fr. Retract nothing of this kind at all for me.

Soc. It appears to you then, as it seems, that of gain one part is a good, and another an evil.

Fr. Yes, to me.

Soc. I retract therefore this for you. For let it be, that one kind of gain is a good, and another kind an evil; but that gain itself [3] is not more good than evil. Is it not so?

Fr. Why do you ask me?

Soc. I will tell you. Is there food good, and bad?

Fr. Yes.

[1]—[1] The Greek is *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅν τινα μέντοι τρόπον.* But Stalbaum has omitted *μέντοι*, not remarking that the author of the dialogue had probably in mind a similar introduction of *μέντοι* in the passages quoted by Boissonade on Aristænetus, Epist. ii. 2, and the commentators on Phædr. p. 236, E.

[2] On the metaphor in *πεττεύων* see the mass of passages quoted by Valckenaer in a MS. note printed by myself on Æsch. Suppl. 14.

[3] I have adopted with Taylor *αὐτὸ* in Stephens in lieu of *αὐτῶν*—Ficinus has—"nihil tamen magis hoc quam illud lucrum est—" The *αὐτῶν* came from the next question of Socrates. But there the syntax is different.

Soc. Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one differ in no respect from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

Fr. Just so.[1]

Soc. And is it not as regards drink, and all other things which are parts of things existing, that some at least are so circumstanced as to be bad, and others, good; and that they differ not at all from each other, in that they are the same; just as one man is good, and another bad?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But one man is, I suppose, neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

Fr. You speak the truth.

Soc. Shall we not then think in like manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

Fr. It is necessary.

Soc. He, therefore, who has a good gain, does not in any respect make a gain more than he, who (has a) bad gain: for neither of these, as we have granted, appears to be more a gain than the other.

Fr. True.

Soc. For to neither of them is the more or the less present.

Fr. It is not.

Soc. But in a thing of this kind, to which neither of these accidents is present, how can any one do, or suffer, more or less?

Fr. It is impossible.

[6.] *Soc.* Since, then, both are similarly gain and gainful, it is requisite that we should still further[2] consider this—why do you call both of them gain? and what do you see to be in both the same? [3]Just as if you had asked me about the recent question,[3] why I called both good and bad food similarly

[1] Ficinus has "Est, ut dicis;" for he saw that a single answer, Ναί, could not be given to a bipartite question.

[2] Ficinus has "hoc deinceps,"—in Greek τοῦτ' ἔτι, as in Stephens, more correctly than τουτὶ in Bekker, from four MSS.

[3]—[3] The Greek is ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἃ σύ με ἠρώτας, where Stalbaum rejects ἃ with Ficinus; whose version is "veluti si ipse modo me rogavisses.' But perhaps the author wrote, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, ἃ ἐγὼ σὲ τὰ νῦν δή, σὺ ἐμὲ ἠρώτας. Compare Alcibiad. I. p. 114, B. § 22, ἐρωτῶν ἐμε, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ For the reference is to p. 230, A. § 5, as remarked by Stalbaum.

food, I would have said—Because each is a dry aliment of the body, on this account I (called them so). For that this is food, you would surely acknowledge; would you not?

Fr. I would.

Soc. And there will be the same manner of answering respecting drink; that for the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad, the name is drink; and for the rest of things, in like manner. Do you therefore endeavour to imitate me, by answering thus. [1] When you speak of good gain and bad gain, as being both of them gain, what same thing do you perceive in them, that this too is gain?[1] But if you are not able to answer me in this way,[2] reflect, while I am speaking. Do you call a gain every acquisition that a person obtains, when he either spends nothing, or when, after spending less, he receives more?

Fr. I seem to myself to call the latter gain.

Soc. Are you therefore speaking of such things as these? If a person after having been feasted and spending nothing, and indulging in good living, should become diseased?

Fr. Not I, by Zeus.

Soc. But if he should obtain health after feasting, would he obtain a gain or damage?

Fr. Gain.

Soc. This then is not a gain, to obtain any acquisition whatever.

Fr. It is not.

Soc. [3] Whether will he, who obtains what is an evil, or at least what is not a good, not obtain a gain?[3]

Fr. [4] It appears so, at least if it be a good.[4]

[1]—[1] Ficinus has what is far more intelligible, "Quidnam idem in lucro bono et malo cernis, propter cujus præsentiam, utrumque lucrum nominas?" But whether he found in his MS. the Greek answering to his Latin, is another question.

[2] Instead of *αὐτὸς* one MS. has *οὕτως*, which I have adopted to answer to the preceding *οὕτως*.

[3]—[3] I have translated into English the Latin version of Stalbaum. The Greek is, *ἐὰν κακὸν ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν*, for which Cornarius would read *ἐάν τε κακὸν, ἐάν τε ἀγαθὸν*, founded on "sive bonum seu malum" in Ficinus.

[4]—[4] Stalbaum observes that the answer ought to have been, "It appears not; but if it be a good." I cannot however understand the limiting clause, "at least, if it be a good;" nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it.

Soc. But if (he obtains) an evil, will he not obtain a damage?

Fr. To me it appears so.

Soc. See then how you are again running round to the same point? For gain appears to be a good, but damage an evil.

Fr. I really am at a loss what to say.

Soc. Nor unjustly are you at a loss. But, answer me still further this. If any one after having spent less, obtains more, do you say this is a gain?

Fr. [1] I do not say it is an evil,[1] but if after having spent less of gold or silver money, he receives more.

Soc. I too am about to ask you this. For come, (tell me,) should a person spending half a pound[2] of gold, receive double this weight of silver, would he obtain a gain or a damage?

Fr. A damage surely, Socrates; for, instead of a value twelve times as much, the silver is only twice as much.

Soc. But yet he has received more. Or is not double more than half?

Fr. But silver is not of (the same)[3] value as gold.

Soc. It is requisite then, as it seems, that this, namely, value, be added to gain; for in this case do you not say that the silver, although being more than the gold, is not of equal value? [4] the gold, although being less, you say, is of equal value.[4]

Fr. Very much so: for such is the fact.

Soc. Value, therefore, is gainful, whether it is small or great; but that which is valueless is gainless.

Fr. Yes.

[1]—[1] I confess I cannot perceive the relevancy of this answer; nor the reason of the subsequent limitation, thus introduced by the words ἀλλ' ἐὰν—

[2] So Taylor translates σταθμόν. But whether σταθμὸς in Greek, "libra" in Latin, and "pound" in English, are all of the same weight, I am unable to state. Stalbaum refers to Boeckh in Œconom. Athen. i. 30, and to Letronne's "Considerations Generales sur l' Evaluation des Monnaies Grecques et Romaines," Paris, 1817.

[3] Instead of Οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ, Ficinus found in his MS. Οὔτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀξίᾳ, as shown by his version, "Non ejusdem dignitatis ac pretii—"

[4]—[4] The Greek is ἄξιον—ἄξιον. But two MSS. offer ἀνάξιον—ἄξιον, which evidently leads to ἀντάξιον—ἀντάξιον, where the first ἀντάξιον answers to "æque æstimandum et dignum" in Ficinus; who properly omits the repeated φῂς εἶναι.

Soc. By "value," do you mean any thing else than what it is worthy to acquire?

Fr. I do not.

Soc. But by the expression "it is worthy to acquire," do you mean the useless, or the useful?

Fr. The useful, certainly.

Soc. The useful, therefore, is a good.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Hence, thou most manly of all men, has not the lucrative come to us again a third or a fourth time, as being an acknowledged good?

Fr. So it seems.

[7.] *Soc.* Do you remember, then, from whence this discourse of ours originated?

Fr. I think I do.

Soc. If you do not, I will remind you. You contended that good men are not willing to make every kind of gain, but of gains the good (alone)[1] but not the iniquitous.

Fr. It did originate from this.

Soc. But has not reason forced us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good?

Fr. It has forced me, Socrates, rather than persuaded.

Soc. But perhaps after this it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, you agree at least with us, that all kinds of gain are good, both small and great?

Fr. I do agree.

Soc. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men wish for all things that are good?

Fr. I do.

Soc. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

Fr. I did say so.

Soc. According to your assertion, then, all men, both good and bad, would be lovers of gain.

Fr. It appears so.

Soc. If then any person reproaches another with being a lover of gain, he does not correctly reproach him; for the very person so reproaching happens to be such a character himself.

[1] I have introduced "alone" from "duntaxat," in Ficinus

INTRODUCTION TO THE MINOS.

In placing the Minos in juxta-position with the Hipparchus, I have followed the example of Boeckh; who published in 1810 those two dialogues, together with four others of the Pseudo-Platonic list, under the title of "Simonis Socratici, ut videtur, Dialogi," &c., after he had proved in a preceding work, printed in 1806, that the Minos was not written by Plato; although it had been considered genuine by Bentley, and had been quoted as such by him on Phalaris, t. i. p. 327, ed. Dyce. Nor had Fr. Patricius any suspicion of its spuriousness, who, in his Discussion. Peripatet. p. 338, speaks of it as having come down to us in an imperfect state. But according to Stalbaum, so numerous and glaring are the proofs of its being not Plato's, that he is only astonished at the fraud having lain undetected so long; and similar it would seem are the sentiments of Schleiermacher.

The dialogue is however, says Boeckh, alluded to by Plutarch in Theseus, i. p. 7, A., and by Clemens of Alexandria in Strom. i. p. 151. 33; and ii. p. 158. 13; to say nothing of the references made to it by Maximus Tyrius, Servius, Proclus, Stobæus, and Alexander Aphrodisiensis in Aristot. Elench. Sophist. fol. 51, b.

According to Boeckh, the author was the shoemaker Simon. For we learn from Diogenes Laertius, that he wrote some short dialogues comprised in one volume, Περὶ Δικαίου, and Περὶ Ἀρετῆς, and Περὶ Νόμου, and Περὶ Φιλοκέρδους. Now as amongst the confessedly spurious dialogues there are two on the two subjects first mentioned, Boeckh conceived that those two, together with the two others, the subjects respectively of the Minos and Hipparchus, made up the four alluded to.

But specious as this induction is, it failed to satisfy Stalbaum, who has contested at considerable length the theory of Boeckh, and eventually arrives at the conclusion, that the author of this dialogue was some Alexandrian writer, who lived in the time of the Ptolemies, a period rife with such forgeries; and that, although he might have drawn something from the work of Simon, yet his great storehouse was the acknowledged writings of Plato, which, unable to imitate, he has been content to travesty.

With regard to the divine origin of law, Taylor observes that Zoroaster ascribed the laws he gave the Persians to Oromazes; Hermes Trismegistus, the Egyptian, to Mercury; Minos, the Cretan, to Jupiter; Charondas, of Catana, to Saturn; Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian, to Apollo; Draco and Solon, of Athens, to Minerva; Numa, the Roman, to Egeria; Zamolxis, the Thracian, to Vesta; and Plato, when he gave laws to the Magnesians and Sicilians, to Jupiter and Apollo.

With respect to the title of the dialogue, it has, like the Hipparchus, obtained its name, not from any of the speakers, but from the person whose doings form the chief subject of it; a fact not known to Boyle, who fancied, as remarked by Bentley, that Minos, the lawgiver of Crete, was one of the Interlocutors.

THE MINOS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

SOCRATES AND A FRIEND.

SOCRATES.

[1.] WHAT thing is law with us?

Fr. Of what kind is the law are you asking about?

Soc. What, is it that law differs from law, according to this very thing, in being law? For consider what I happen to be asking you. For I am asking, as if I should inquire what is gold? and if you should in a similar manner ask me, about what kind of gold am I speaking, I should think you would not rightly ask. For neither does gold differ in any thing from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in any thing from law; but all laws are (as laws) the same. For each of them exists similarly (as law); nor is one more, and another less so. I ask you, therefore, this very thing as a whole, what is law? and if you have an answer at hand, state it.

Fr. What else, Socrates, can law be, than the things established by law?

Soc. Does speech too appear to you to be the things which are spoken? or sight, the things which are seen? or hearing, the things which are heard? Or is [1] (not) speech one thing, and

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were ἢ οὐκ, and not ἢ simply; so that one negative may refer to all the following questions.

the things spoken another? Is (not) sight one thing, and the things seen another? Is (not) hearing one thing, and the things heard another? And is (not) law one thing, and the things established by law another? Does it appear to you in this way? Or how?

Fr. It now appears to be another thing.[1]

[2.] *Soc.* Law therefore is not the things established by law.

Fr. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. What then can law be? Let us consider it thus. If some one had asked us respecting the things just now spoken of—Since you say that things seen are seen by the sight, by the sight being what, are they seen? we should have answered —by that sense, which through the eyes manifests colours to us. And if he had asked us again—Since things heard are heard by hearing, by the hearing being what, (are they heard)? we should have answered—by a sense, which through the ears manifests sounds to us. In like manner, if he had asked us, —Since things are established by law, by the law being what. are they thus established? Is it by a certain sense, or manifestation, in the same manner as things learnt are learnt by some art rendering them manifest through some discovery? just as things discovered are discovered; as, for instance, things salubrious and noxious are discovered through the medical art; and what the gods have in their thoughts, as the diviners say, through the divining art. [2]For art is with us the discovery of things:[2] or is it not?

Fr. Entirely so.

[3.] *Soc.* Which of these then may we especially understand law to be?

Fr. Decrees and votes, as it seems to me. For what else

[1] Such is the version of the Greek, Ἄλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη, suggested by Stephens, in lieu of Ἀλλ' ὅμοιον νῦν ἐφάνη, and confirmed by two MSS. Ficinus has, "Sicne an aliter videtur? Min. Sic utique,"—as if he had found in his MS. οὕτως ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ; Οὕτως.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has, "vaticinium namque rerum talium inventio est," as if he had found in his MS. μαντικὴ γάρ που ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστι τοιούτων τῶν πραγμάτων. But as μαντικῇ has just preceded, perhaps the author wrote αὕτη γάρ που ἡ τέχνη, not ἡ γάρ που τέχνη, as found in MSS. Leid. and Tub., which is however adopted by Boeckh and Stalbaum, who retain τῶν, and consider the remark as applicable universally.

can any one say law is? So that it nearly appears that law, about which you were asking, is, taken as a whole, the decree of a state.

Soc. You call, as it seems, law, a state-opinion.

Fr. I do.

Soc. And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we shall know better in the following manner. You call some persons wise?

Fr. I do.

Soc. Are not then the wise, wise by wisdom?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But what, are the just, just by justice?

Fr. Entirely so.

Soc. Are not then the lawful, lawful by law?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And the lawless, lawless by an absence of law?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And the lawful are just?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But the lawless unjust?

Fr. Unjust.

Soc. Are not justice and law therefore things most beautiful?

Fr. They are.

Soc. And are not injustice and lawlessness the least beautiful?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And does not the former preserve cities and every thing else, but the latter destroy and overturn them?[1]

Fr. Yes.

Soc. It is necessary then to consider the law as something beautiful, and to seek it as a good.

Fr. How not?

Soc. Now have we not said that law is a decree of the city?

Fr. We have said so.

Soc. What then, are not some decrees good, and some evil?

Fr. They are.

Soc. Law however is not evil.

Fr. It is not.

Stalbaum compares Euthyph. p. 14, B. § 16. Add Soph. Antig. 669.

Soc. It is not correct then to answer thus simply, that law is a decree of the city.

Fr. It appears to me it is not.

Soc. Nor is it suited to reason[1] for an evil decree to be law.

Fr. Certainly not.

[4.] *Soc.* Law however appears to me too[2] to be a certain opinion. And since an opinion is not evil, is not this evident, that it is a good one, if law is opinion?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But what is a good opinion? Is it not a true one?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Is then a true opinion the discovery of that which is?[3]

Fr. It is.

Soc. Law therefore would be[4] the discovery of that which is.

Fr. How then, Socrates, if law is the discovery of that which is, do we not always use the same laws about the same things? since things that are have been discovered by us.

Soc. The law nevertheless would be the discovery of that which is. But if men do not always, as we think,[5] use the same laws, they are not always able to discover that which law wishes, namely, that which is. But come, let us see if it will hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same laws, or some at one time, and others at another; and if all (use) the same laws, or different persons different laws.

[5.] *Fr.* But this, Socrates, it is not difficult to know, that neither do the same persons always use the same laws, [6]nor different persons always different laws.[6] Thus, for example,

[1] On this use of *ἁρμόττειν*, Stalbaum refers to Plato's Epistol. viii. p. 356, D.

[2] In lieu of *αὐτό μοι*, Stephens proposed *αὐτῷ μοι*, suggested by "mihi quoque" in Ficinus; and so six MSS. subsequently collated.

[3] Here, as elsewhere, Ficinus translates *τὸ ὄν* by "veritas."

[4] Ficinus has "inventio esse vult." He therefore found in his MS. *βούλεται εἶναι*, as read in twelve MSS., in lieu of *ἔστιν*. On this use of *βούλεται* in the sense of *μέλλει* Boeckh refers to various passages, and compares it with a similar usage in *ἐθέλει*.

[5] Instead of *δοκοῦμεν* one MS. has *δοκῶ*, which would meet the objection started by Stalbaum.

[6]—[6] Ficinus, whom Taylor properly follows, has, what the sense requires, "nec alii semper aliis;" for he doubtless found in his MS. *οὔτε ἄλλοι ἀεὶ ἄλλοις*, in lieu of *οὔτε ἄλλοι γε* in two MSS. And though *γε* is read in all the MSS. after *ἄλλοι*, I confess I do not understand it; nor

it is not a law with us to sacrifice human beings, but it is an unholy act; but the Carthaginians sacrifice them, as being a holy and a lawful act with them; so that some of them sacrifice their sons to Kronos,[1] as perhaps you too have heard; and not only do Barbarians use laws different from ours, but also those fellows in Lycæa,[2] and the progeny of Athamas,[3] what sacrifices do they perform, although they are Greeks! In like manner you surely know by hearsay yourself what laws we formerly used concerning the dead, by cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and sending for the women who collect the bones[4] of the dead in jars; and those, who still, antecedent to them, buried the dead at home; but we do none of these things. Ten thousand instances of this kind one might mention; for wide is the field of demonstration, that neither do we always have customs in the same manner amongst ourselves, nor do men amongst each other.

Soc. It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you are speaking correctly, this has lain hid from me. But as long as you by yourself declare what appears to you in a long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I think, come to an agreement. But if the inquiry be laid down in common, we shall perhaps think alike. If then you are willing, ask me some question, and consider with me in common. Or, if you wish it, give an answer.

Fr. Nay, I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you choose (to ask).

[6.] *Soc.* Come then, do you think that what is just is unjust, and what is unjust is just? Or that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust?

did Boeckh, who suggested ἄλλοι τε, adopted by Bekker and Stalbaum; for οὔτε in one clause is followed sometimes by τε simply, not οὔτε, in another.

[1] On this practice see Wesseling on Diodor. Sic. xx. 14.

[2] This was a town of Arcadia, as shown by Steph. Byz., and probably situated near the mountain Lycæus, where the tutelary deity was worshipped with human sacrifices; to which Plato alludes in Rep. viii. p. 565, D.

[3] On the story of Athamas, see Ovid. Met. iv. 467; Fast. vi. 489; and Pausan. ix. 34.

[4] So Boeckh understands the word ἐγχυτριαστρίας, applied by the Schol. on Aristoph. Σφηκ. 288, to the women who poured libations on the dead from jars.

Fr. I indeed think that what is just is just, and what is unjust is unjust.

Soc. Is it not so held by all persons as it is here?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Among the Persians also?

Fr. And among the Persians too.

Soc. But is it really always so?

Fr. Always.

Soc. Whether are things, that draw the greater weight, thought by us here to be the heavier, but those that draw the less, lighter? or the contrary?

Fr. No; but those that draw the greater weight, are the heavier, and those that draw the less, are lighter.

Soc. Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Things beautiful, as it seems, are every where held to be beautiful, and things ugly to be ugly; but things ugly are not (thought to be) beautiful, nor things beautiful to be ugly.

Fr. It is so.

Soc. In the case of all things, so to say, the things, that exist, are held to be, not the things that do not exist, both with us and with all others.

Fr. It appears so to me.

Soc. He, therefore, who errs in that which is, errs in that which is lawful.

[7.] *Fr.* Thus, Socrates, as you say, the same things always appear lawful both to us and to others. But when I consider, that we never cease altering the laws up and down, I cannot be persuaded.

Soc. For perhaps you do not bear in mind that these things, being put into a changed place,[1] are the same. But look at them thus with me. Have you ever met with any[2] book relating to the health of the sick?

Fr. I have.

Soc. Do you know then to what art that book belongs?

Fr. I know (it belongs to) the medical art.

Soc. Do you then not call those skilled in these matters physicians?

[1] On the metaphorical use of *πεττεύειν*, see at Æsch. Suppl. 14.

[2] Boeckh has acutely seen that *τινι* has dropt out after *ξυγγράμματι*, as shown by "librum aliquem" in Ficinus.

Fr. I do.

Soc. Do then the skilled think the same about the same, or do some think one thing and others another?

Fr. They seem to me to think the same.

Soc. Do then Greeks alone think the same with Greeks about things of which they know? or do Barbarians likewise (do so) with each other, and with Greeks?

Fr. There is a great necessity for both Greeks and Barbarians, who know, to think the same with [1]themselves and each other.[1]

Soc. You have answered correctly. Do they not then always (do so)?

Fr. Yes, always.

[8.] *Soc.* Do not physicians also write about health what they think to be (true)?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Things relating to medicine and medical laws are the writings of physicians.

Fr. Things relating to medicine, certainly.

Soc. Are not then the writings relating to agriculture agricultural laws?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Of whom then are the writings and institutes relating to gardening?

Fr. Of gardeners.

Soc. These then are the laws about gardening.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. Of those, who know how to manage gardens?

Fr. How not?

Soc. But gardeners possess this knowledge.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And of whom are the writings and institutes relating to the dressing of savoury food?

Fr. Of cooks.

Soc. These, therefore, are the laws of cookery.

Fr. Of cookery.

[1]—[1] I have adopted the emendation of Boeckh, *αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις*, in lieu of *αὑτοῖς* simply; who aptly compares Alcibiad. I. p. 111, C., *ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς*, and E., *ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις*.

Soc. Of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the dressing of savoury food.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But cooks, as they say, know.

Fr. They do know.

Soc. Be it so. And of whom are the writings and institutes concerning the administration of a state? Are they not of those, who know how to govern states?

Fr. It appears so to me.

Soc. But do any others than statesmen and kings know?

Fr. They alone.[1]

[9.] *Soc.* Those writings then relating to a state, which men call laws, are the writings of kings and good men.

Fr. You speak the truth.

Soc. Will then they, who know, write one thing at one time, and another at another, about the same things?

Fr. Certainly not.

Soc. If then we see certain persons doing this at any place whatever, shall we say that those, who do so, are skilled or unskilled?

Fr. Unskilled.

Soc. Shall we then say that what is right is in each case lawful, whether it relate to medicine, or cooking, or gardening?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But that, which is not right, we shall no longer assert to be lawful.

Fr. No longer.

Soc. It therefore becomes lawless.

Fr. Necessarily so.

Soc. Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust, and, in short, concerning the orderly arrangement of a city, and the manner in which one ought to administer it, that, which is right, is a royal law; [2]but that, which is not right, is not a (royal law), because science is wanting: for it is.[2]

[1] So Taylor, after Ficinus—"Isti soli"—as if he had found in his MS. *οὗτοι μόνοι* in lieu of *Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν*.

[2]—[2] Such is Taylor's English translation of the Latin of Ficinus—"Non rectum vero nequaquam lex regia, quia scientia deest, esse videtur, quippe cum illegitimum sit."—But the Greek is *τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἄνομον*: i. e. but that, which is not right, does not seem to be a law to those not knowing; for it is lawless.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. We have rightly therefore acknowledged that the law is the invention of that which is.

Fr. So it appears.

[10.] *Soc.* Let us still further consider it in this way likewise. Who is skilled in distributing the seeds to the earth?

Fr. The husbandman.

Soc. Does he then distribute seeds proper for each soil?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. The husbandman therefore is a good distributer of these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars are right.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And who is a good distributer of pulsations for tunes, and distributes[1] such as are proper? And whose laws are right?

Fr. Those of the piper and the harper.

Soc. He then, who acts most according to law in these things, is, in the greatest degree, a piper.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But who is the best to distribute nutriment to the bodies of men? Is it not he, who (distributes) the proper?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. The distributions therefore and the laws of this man are the best; and he, who acts the most according to law in these things, is the best distributer.

Fr. Entirely so.

Soc. Who is he?

Fr. The training-master.[2]

Soc. Does he know how to feed [3]the flock of the human body[3] in the best manner?

Bekker however has inserted from one MS. ὁ between οὐ and δοκεῖ: which I cannot understand. I could have understood ὄν, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ —i. e. "is not, even though it seems—"

[1] Boeckh has altered νεῖμαι into νέμει on the authority of "impertit" in Ficinus; for νεῖμαι, he says, could hardly depend upon ἀγαθός.

[2] Instead of παιδοτρίβης, the natural train of ideas seems to demand παιδοτρόφος: although it is true, that when young persons were put under the training-master, he did, like the γυμναστής, decide upon the quantity and quality of the food to be given. See The Rivals, § 3.

[3]—[3] Stalbaum has well exposed the impropriety of this expression, which seems to have been got from the Statesman.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And who is the best to tend a flock of sheep? What is his name?

Fr. Shepherd.

Soc. The laws therefore of the shepherd are the best for the sheep.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And those of the herdsman for oxen.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And whose laws are the best for the minds of men? Are they not those of a king? Tell me.

Fr. I say so.

[11.] *Soc.* You speak well. Can you therefore tell me, who among the ancients was a good maker of the laws relating to pipes? Perhaps you have him not in your thoughts. Are you then willing that I should remind you?

Fr. By all means.

Soc. Was not Marsyas said to be so, and his loved Olympus the Phrygian.[1]

Fr. True.

Soc. The pipe-playing of these men is most divine, and alone excites and shows forth those who are in need[2] of the gods; and it alone remains to the present time as being divine.

Fr. Such is the case.

Soc. And who amongst the ancient kings is said to have been a good law-maker, and whose institutions remain even now as being divine?

Fr. I do not recollect.

Soc. Do you not know, which of the Greeks are making use of laws the most ancient?

Fr. Are you speaking of the Lacedæmonians, and of Lycurgus the law-giver?

Soc. These institutions, however, are perhaps not three hundred years old, or a little more. But do you know from whence came the best of their laws?

[1] On this allusion to Marsyas and Olympus, Boeckh refers to Sympos. p. 215, C. § 39, and Schol. on Aristoph. Ἱππ. 9.

[2] In lieu of χρείᾳ, Cornarius suggested χορείᾳ, by which he probably understood the divine dancing, excited by the pipe, called ἐνθουσιασμὸς by Aristotle in Polit. viii. 5.

Fr. They say, from Crete.

Soc. Do not they of all the Greeks make use of laws the most ancient?

Fr. Yes.

[12.] *Soc.* Do you know then who among these were good kings? (Were they not) Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Zeus and Europa, by whom those laws were made?

Fr. They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man, but that Minos was rustic, morose, and unjust.

Soc. You are telling, O best of men, a tale of Attica, and of tragedy.[1]

Fr. What, are not such things told of Minos?

Soc. Not by Homer, at least, and Hesiod; and they are more trust-worthy than all the tragic poets, from whom you have heard what you are saying.

Fr. But what do they say about Minos?

Soc. I will tell you, that you may not, like the many, be guilty of impiety. For there is not any thing more impious than this, nor of what we ought to be more cautious, than of sinning against the gods, either in word or in deed; and next, against divine men. But you ought to take ever a very great care, when you are about to praise or blame any man, that you speak correctly; and for the sake of this, it is meet to learn how to distinguish good and bad men. For the deity feels indignant when any one blames a person similar to himself, or praises one dissimilar; [2]for this is the good man.[2] For think not that stones, and wood, and birds, and serpents are sacred, but that men are not so; for a good man is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled of all things. [13.] Now then, since Homer and Hesiod pass an encomium on Minos, on this account I will speak, in order that you, being a man sprung from a man, may not sin in word against a hero the son of Jupiter. For Homer, (in Od. xix.

[1] Boeckh believes there is an allusion to some plays of Sophocles and Euripides, where Minos and the affairs of Crete were introduced.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ ἀγαθός*; in lieu of which Boeckh would read *ἔστι δ' ὅμοιος ὁ ἀγαθὸς*, similar to "Dei vero similis est vir bonus" in Ficinus. For he says that *οὗτος* would refer, like "hic" in Latin, to the party last mentioned, but *ἐκεῖνος*, like "ille," to the one before. Stalbaum however defends the impropriety of the usage of *οὗτος* by referring to Schæfer on Demosth. i. p. 541, and v. p. 322. Perhaps the author wrote here *ἔστι δὲ θεῷ ὅμοιος ὁ ἀγαθός*.

174,) speaking of Crete, says, there are many men, and ninety cities in it;

> Amongst them Knossus, a great city, where
> Reign'd Minos, who each ninth year converse held
> With mighty Zeus.

This then is Homer's praise of Minos, expressed in few words, such as he has not given to even one of his heroes. For that Zeus is a sophist,[1] and that the art itself is all-beautiful, he shows in many other places, and here likewise. For he says that Minos conversed in the ninth year[2] with Zeus, and went to be instructed by him, as if Zeus were a sophist. That Homer, then, does not bestow the honour of being instructed by Zeus upon any other hero, than Minos, is praise indeed to be wondered at. In the scene of the Odyssey, too, relating to the Dead,[3] Homer has represented Minos as a judge, and holding a golden sceptre; but not Rhadamanthus as judging there, or conversing with Zeus any where. On this account I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For to have been instructed merely by Zeus, when he was the son of Zeus, carries with it no excess of praise. [14.] For the verse—He reigned, and each ninth year conversed with Zeus—means that he was the associate of Zeus; for by ὅαροι is meant "discourses," and by ὁαριστὴς, "an associate in discourse." Hence at each ninth year, Minos went to the cavern of Zeus, to learn some things, and to show forth others; which, during the preceding period of nine years, he had learnt[4] from Zeus. There are, however, some who understand by ὁαριστὴς, "the associate" of Zeus in drinking and sport; although any one may make use of this as a proof to show that they, who thus understand the word, say nothing

[1] The word is here taken in its original sense, of a person endued with wisdom. See Blomfield on Prom. 62.

[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek ἐνάτῳ ἔτει, by which Boeckh understands "during nine years." But according to Valerius Maximus, i. 2, "Minos, Cretensium rex, nono quoque anno in quoddam præaltum et vetusta religione consecratum specus secedere solebat et in eo commoratus, tanquam a Jove, quo se ortum ferebat, traditas sibi leges prærogabat." Hence, as remarked by Stalbaum, the author should have written here δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους, as he has done just afterwards.

[3] By Νεκυία is meant what is now called book xi. To the same passage Plato alludes in Gorg. p. 526, C.

[4] Ficinus has "acceperat," who read therefore in his MS. μεμαθήκει, subsequently found in others likewise.

to the purpose; for although both the Greeks and Barbarians are numerous, there are none, who abstain from banquets, and the sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans, and next the Lacedæmonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. But in Crete this is one of the other[1] laws, which Minos laid down, "not to drink with each other to intoxication." And it is evident, that what he deemed to be beautiful institutions, these he laid down for his own citizens. For Minos did not, like a knave, think one thing, and do another, contrary to what he thought; but his intercourse with Zeus was, as I assert, through discourses for the attainment of virtue. Hence he laid down those laws for his citizens, through which Crete has been for all time prosperous, and Lacedæmon likewise, from the time when it began to make use of those laws, as being divine. [15.] But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it, which ministers to the royal, as far as presiding over courts of justice; from whence he was said to be a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but Talus for those through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preserve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of brass; from whence he was called "brazen." Hesiod too asserts respecting Minos, what is closely related to this. For, having mentioned his name, he says,

> Most regal was he of all mortal kings,
> And o'er the most of neighbouring people ruled,
> Of Zeus the sceptre holding, [2]king like him;[2]

and he too means by the sceptre of Zeus, nothing else than the instruction of Zeus, by which he regulated Crete.

[16.] *Fr.* On what account then, Socrates, was the report spread against Minos, of his being an unlearned and morose man?

[1] In lieu of *ἄλλων* one would prefer *παλαιῶν*, "old."

[2]—[2] The Greek is *τῷ καὶ πόλεων βασίλευε*: where Boeckh, whom Bekker and Stalbaum follow, suggested *πολέων*. But *πολέων* seems scarcely admissible after *πλείστων*. I have translated, as if Hesiod had written—*τοῦ καὶ πέλας ὢν βασίλευε*: while the first line of the fragment, found no where else, has been restored to its original metrical form by Boeckh.

Soc. On that account, through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other person to whom it is a care to be in good repute, will be cautious never to incur the anger of a poet. For poets are able to effect much as regards reputation, in whatever way they may represent acts, by praising men and blaming[1] them. On which ground Minos erred, when he made war upon this city; where there is much of other wisdom, and poets in every other kind of poetry, and in tragedy likewise. Now tragedy here is of an old date, not beginning as persons fancy from Thespis, nor from Phrynichus; but, if you are willing to turn your thoughts to it, you will find it is a very ancient invention of this city. [17.] Now, of poetry (in general),[2] the most pleasing to the vulgar and the most soul-alluring is tragedy; to which we, applying our minds,[3] have revenged ourselves upon Minos, for the tribute he compelled us to pay. In this then Minos erred, by incurring our anger; from whence, in reply to your question, he became in rather bad repute. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest proof, that his laws have been unchanged, in consequence of his having discovered correctly the truth of what is, with reference to the administration of a state.

Fr. You appear to me, Socrates, to have stated a probable reason.

Soc. If then I am speaking the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamanthus, appear to you to have made use of laws the most ancient?

Fr. They appear so.

Soc. These therefore were the best lawgivers of the ancients, and distributors and shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is "a shepherd of the people."

Fr. Entirely so.

[18.] *Soc.* Come then, by Zeus, who presides over friendship, if any one, who is a good lawgiver and shepherd of the

[1] I have adopted *κακηγοροῦντες*, found in two MSS., and similar to "ad vituperandum," in Ficinus.

[2] The Greek is—*ἔστι δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως*—But Ficinus has "ex universa poesi," as if he had found in his MS. *ἔστι δ' ὅλης τῆς ποιήσεως*.

[3] This is Taylor's translation of *ἐντείνοντες*.

body, should ask us—What are those things, which a person by distributing to the body will make it better? we should well and briefly answer, that they are nutriment and labour, by the former increasing, and by the latter exercising and knitting together the body.

Fr. Right.

Soc. If then he should after this ask us—What are those things which a good law-giver and shepherd will, by distributing to the soul, make it better?—by making what answer, should we be not ashamed of ourselves, and of our age?

Fr. This I am no longer able to say.

Soc. It is however disgraceful to the soul of each of us to seem not to know the things pertaining to them, and in which their good and evil consist, but to have considered those pertaining to the body, and to other things.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CLITOPHO.

THIS dialogue, like some others already mentioned, has been considered spurious. But it was reckoned amongst the genuine by Thrasyllus, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 50. It is distinctly alluded to by Arrian on Epictetus iii. 22, and Themistius Or. xxvi. p. 320, D., and covertly by Dio Chrysost. Or. xiii. p. 222, D., and Aristides, T. i. p. 78 ; ii. p. 378, as remarked by Ruhnken on Timæus in Τραγικὴ σκηνή, and Wyttenbach on Julian, p. 42. It contains a summary of the leading doctrines promulgated by Socrates; the greater part of which have formed the subject of separate dialogues by Plato and others. Its commencement alone has been preserved; for the remainder was probably lost by its having been written at the end of the Codex Archetypus, that contained the rest of the existing dialogues of Plato; for it would thus be exposed to the greatest chance of suffering from damp and the other accidents to which books are liable in the lapse of years: I say the Codex Archetypus; because it is evident that all the MSS. that have been hitherto collated, are to be traced to such an original; of which the one used by Ficinus was in a more complete state than any that have been examined by Bekker and others, as may be seen from the notes appended to the dialogue.

CLITOPHO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO.

SOCRATES.

A CERTAIN person has lately told me that Clitopho,[1] the son of Aristonymus, has been conversing with Lysias, and blaming the passing the time with Socrates, but been praising immoderately the intercourse with Thrasymachus.[2]

Clit. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you the conversation I had with Lysias about you. For in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you are evidently blaming me, although you pretend to care nothing about the matter, I will most willingly go through the conversation myself, especially since we happen to be alone, in order that you may the less imagine that I am ill disposed towards you. For now perhaps you have not heard correctly; so that you appear to be more harshly disposed towards me than is fitting. But if you will grant me the liberty of speech I shall most cheerfully accept it, and am willing to speak.

[1] Of this Clitopho, who is not mentioned elsewhere by Plato, the reader will find all that is known in the useful and learned Onomastic. Aristophan. appended by Holden to his recent edition of the dramatist.

[2] Of this Thrasymachus, who was a friend and admirer of Gorgias, see particularly Plato in Rep. p. i. p. 336; where his character is delineated in vivid colours. Other passages are quoted by Groen van Prinsterer in Prosopograph. Platon. p. 107—110.

Soc. Nay it would be[1] disgraceful for myself, when you are willing to benefit me, not to bear with you. For it is evident that, when I know in what respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

Clit. You shall hear then. [2.] For while I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you; and you appear to me, as compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when, reproving men, you exclaim like a god upon a machine[2]—"Whither are ye borne along? And —Are ye ignorant, that ye are doing nothing that ye ought, ye, who make every exertion how ye may get money, but neglect your children, to whom ye are to leave it, and the means whereby they may know how to use it justly; and do not find for them teachers of justice, if indeed it can be taught,[3] and who, if it is to be made the subject of meditation and exercise, may sufficiently exercise them in it. Nor yet do ye previously attend to yourselves; but, seeing that both ye and your children have learnt sufficiently grammar, and music, and the gymnastic arts, which ye have considered as the perfect discipline of virtue, yet afterwards that ye become no less depraved with respect to riches, why do ye not despise the present mode of education, and seek after those, who will cause you to cease from this illiberal line of life? And yet it is through this neglect of what is right, and indolence, and not through the foot being out of time with the lyre, that brother himself arrays himself against brother, and states against states, and, out of all measure and harmony, are stirring up strife and war upon each other, and do and suffer the extreme of ill. But ye say, that they, who are unjust, are unjust not through the want of instruction, nor through ignorance, but voluntarily;[4] and again, ye dare to assert that injustice is disgraceful and hateful to the gods. How then can any one voluntarily choose so great an evil? He (does so) ye say, through being conquered by pleasure. Is not this then an involuntary act, since to conquer is a voluntary one? So

[1] Instead of *μὴν*, Ficinus found in his MS. *ἂν ἦν*, as shown by his—"esset."

[2] Upon the expression "Deus ex machina," see the commentators on Horace, A. P. 191, "Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus;" and Ruhnken on Timæus, *Τραγικὴ σκηνή*.

[3] Compare the Meno, where the question is mooted at length, whether virtue in general, of which justice is a part, can be taught or not.

[4] This doctrine is discussed at length in the Gorgias.

that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary; and that every man privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention than they do at present to their conduct."

[3.] When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually speaking so, I am greatly delighted with you, and pay you in a wonderful manner the tribute of praise. And when you say what follows in order upon this, that they, who cultivate their bodies, but neglect their soul, [1]do something different of this kind,[1] in neglecting that which is to govern, but busily attending to what is to be governed;[2] and when you assert that it is better for him, who does not know how to use a thing, to leave alone the use of it; for[3] if a person does not know how to use his eyes or ears, or his whole body, it is better for him not to hear, nor see, nor to use his body for any need, than to use it in any way; and in a similar manner with respect to art. For it is evident (as you say)[4] that he, who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not (know how to use) that of his neighbour; nor will he, who (knows not how to use) the (lyre) of others, (know how to use) his own, nor any other instrument or chattel whatever; and this your discourse ended beautifully (by inferring),[5] that for him, who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act according to his own caprice; but, if there is any necessity for such a person to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of a freeman. For[6] that this is to deliver

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they were omitted by Ficinus, who probably could not understand them; nor can I. For though ἕτερος is sometimes taken in the sense of κακὸς, as shown by Valckenaer in Diatrib. p. 112, C., yet here such a sense would be out of place. The author wrote perhaps ἀλλότριον, "strange."

[2] The middle voice, ἀρξόμενον, is to be taken passively. For a mass of middle verbs used similarly see Monk on Eurip. Hippol. 1458.

[3] Instead of δὴ, two MSS. have δὲ, i. e. γάρ, as shown by the passages quoted by Schæfer in the Index to Porson's Euripides in Γάρ.

[4] Taylor has introduced "as you say" from "ut ipse ais" in Ficinus, to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek.

[5] Here again Ficinus has "ut inferas;" nothing similar to which is to be found in the Greek.

[6] After δικαιοσύνην in the Greek are two words, ὡς ἔστι, omitted by Ficinus, whom I have followed; although they probably contain some hidden error.

the rudder of the mind, like that of a ship, to another, who has learnt the art of governing men; which, Socrates, you have often called the statesman's art, and said it is the same as that of the judge and justice. [4.] To these, and many other and very beautiful reasonings, in which it is asserted that virtue can be taught,[1] and that a person ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have scarcely at any time said a word in opposition, nor do I think that I shall ever say. For I deem them to be very exhortatory and useful, and really awakening us, as if we were asleep. I have therefore given my mind to them, as one about to hear what is to follow; and I have asked at first, not yourself, Socrates, but your equals in age, or fellow-thinkers, or friends, or in whatever name one must call the (party)[2] thus disposed towards you. For among them, I have first of all asked those, who are thought by you to be something, by inquiring what would be the discourse after this; and laying down a subject[3] after your manner, I have said to them—How are we to receive for the present, O best of men, the exhortation of Socrates to virtue? as being merely a word,[4] but that it is not in our power to follow it up in deed, and to comprehend it thoroughly? And will this be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who have not been exhorted as yet? [5]and for them (to exhort) others?[5] Or is it requisite for us after this to inquire of Socrates and each other, since we confess that this should be done, what is to come next? How, say we,[6] ought we to begin the discipline relating to justice? As if some one had exhorted us to pay attention to the body, on perceiving that we, like boys, had no notion that the care of the body belongs to the gymnastic

[1] This Socrates never asserted; at least if any reliance is to be placed on the Meno.

[2] I have translated as if *γένος* or *φῦλον* had dropt out after *τὸ τοιοῦτον*—

[3] Instead of *τρόπον*, Ficinus seems to have found *τόπον* in his MS. For his version is "quæstionem exposui."

[4] The Greek is *ὡς ὄντος μόνου τούτου*. But though *τούτου* might be referred to *προτροπῆς*, yet the subsequent *πράγματι* plainly shows that the author wrote, as I have translated, *ὡς ὀνόματος ὄντος μόνου γ αὐτοῦ*. For *ὄνομα* and *ἔργον* are thus perpetually opposed to each other. See Porson on Phœn. 512.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor.

[6] Ficinus omits *φάμεν*, which is here quite unnecessary.

and medical arts, and afterwards reproached us by saying, that it was disgraceful to pay every attention to wheat and barley, and vines, and such other things as we labour to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art or device, so that the body may be rendered in the best condition, and this too when there is such an art. If then we inquired of the person so exhorting us—Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say, There are the gymnastic and medical arts. [1]And what now, we said, is the art that relates to the virtue of the soul? Let it be mentioned.[1] [5.] [2]But he, who seemed to be of the greatest strength for giving an answer to these questions, said to myself, that the very art, which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. And on my saying—Tell me not merely the name of the art, [3]but explain it further in this way.[3] There is an art called the medical. By this two things are effected; one, that physicians are always forming other physicians in addition to those already existing; the other, to effect health. Now of these one is no longer an art, but the work of the art, which teaches and is taught, which we call health. And in the case of carpentry, there is the building and the art; one the effect, and the other the teaching. So too of justice, one part is to make persons just, as each (of the arts mentioned) above (makes) artists. But what shall we say is the other work, which a just man is able to do for us? State it. One person[4] has, I think, said in answer to us, that it is "the conducible;" another, that it is "the becoming;" another, that it is "the useful;" and another, that it is "the profitable." But I rejoined by saying, that these very names exist in each of the arts, namely, to act rightly, profitably, usefully, and the like. But that, to which all these tend, each art will state itself. Thus, the art of carpentry will say, that "the right,"

[1]—[1] Ficinus has what is very different from the Greek—"eodem pacto nunc, quam artem circa animæ virtutem versari censeamus, respondeat, quisquis peritissimus horum sibi videtur;" which Taylor has adopted, with the exception of the concluding clause.

[2] Instead of *αὐτῶν*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῶ*, which leads to *αὐτῷ*, as I have translated.

[3]—[3] The Greek is simply *ἀλλ' ὧδε*.—But Ficinus has more fully—"sed ulterius sic exponas;" which I have adopted.

[4] Instead of *οὗτος*, Ficinus found *ἄλλος*, as shown by his "Respondit alius—"

"the beautiful," "the becoming," (tend to this,) that wooden furniture may be (aptly)[1] made; which is not art, (but the work of art).[2] Let in like manner be mentioned the work of justice. [6.] At last one of your friends, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me, that this was the work peculiar to justice, which does not belong to any other science, namely, to cause a friendship amongst states. But he, on the other hand, on being interrogated, said that friendship was a good, and by no means an evil. But on being asked about the friendships[3] of boys and of wild animals, for by that name we call (their attachments), he did not admit that they are friendships; for it happened that such (friendships) of theirs[4] were for the greater part hurtful rather than advantageous; and that those, who call them so, call them falsely; but that friendship existing really and truly was most clearly an union of sentiment.[5] But on being asked whether he meant by an union of sentiment, an agreement in opinion or science, he repudiated the agreement in opinion; for many and hurtful agreements in opinion are compelled to take place amongst men; but he conceded that friendship was entirely a good, and the work of justice; so that he said, an agreement in sentiment was the same as science really existing, but not opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, the parties present being in a state of doubt [6]were competent to find fault with him,[6] and to say, that the reasoning had run round to the point first mooted; and they affirmed that the medical art is a certain agreement in sentiment; and so are all the other arts; and that they are able to state about what they are conversant; but that the art called by you justice, or

[1] Taylor has here followed Ficinus, whose "apte" is not seen in the Greek.

[2] Here again Ficinus supplies what the train of thought requires, but is wanting in the Greek, "sed artis opus."

[3] The word in Æschylus Prom. 501, is *στέργηθρα*. On the feelings felt by animals for each other, see the commentators on Virgil, G. iii. 517, "arator Mærentem abjungens fraterna morte juvencum."

[4] In lieu of *αὐτῷ*, two MSS. offer *αὐτῶν*, which I have adopted.

[5] So Sallust, "Idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum est firma amicitia." Compare Polit. p. 311, B., 351, D., and Alcib. I. p. 127, A., *εἴπερ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν*.

[6]—[6] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, because they are not found in the version of Ficinus; while in lieu of *ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν*, the oldest MS. offers a remarkable various reading in *ἐπεχείρησαν*—

an agreement in sentiment, it had escaped them as to whither it tends, and that it is not manifest what is its work. At last I inquired of yourself, Socrates, upon these points; and you told me that it is the work of justice to injure enemies, and benefit friends; but afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. [7.] Having endured this not once, nor even twice, but for a length of time, and being urgent with you, Socrates, I was tired out; thinking, indeed, that you effected in the best manner of all men, the exhortation to the study of virtue; but that [1] one of two things (must take place),[1] either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further—which might happen in the case of any other art—as, for instance, that he who is not a pilot, may exercise himself in praising the pilot's art, as a thing of great value to man; and similarly in the case of other arts —so a person may perhaps apply the same remark on the subject of justice to yourself, as not having a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. [2] Such however is not my (opinion), but (as I say),[2] one of two things (take place); either that you do not know (what justice is), or that you are unwilling to impart (the knowledge of it) to me. On this account then, I think I shall go to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I can, as being in doubt, [3] (and where I hope I shall be freed from doubts; nor should I betake myself elsewhere,)[3] if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. Now, for instance, if I had been exhorted on the subject of the gymnastic art, that I ought not to neglect the body, you would state to me what comes next after the exhortation-speech, what is the nature of my body, and what attention it requires. And let

[1]—[1] Taylor has adopted what he found in the Latin of Ficinus, "e duobus alterutrum necesse est;" which would be in Greek, *δυοῖν δὲ δεῖν θάτερον εἶναι*, not simply *δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον*—

[2]—[2] I have followed Ficinus, who has supplied what was necessary to unite the unconnected members of the sentence, "Ego autem non sic existimo; e duobus enim alterum inquam."

[3]—[3] All the words within the numerals are to be found only in the Latin of Ficinus, "speraveroque a dubitationibus liberari; neque vero alio me conferrem—" Something similar to which must have been read in his MS., for it is hardly possible to believe that he supplied them himself to complete the sense

this be done at present. Lay it down then that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous to pay attention to other things, but to neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and imagine that I have really[1] spoken upon all other points, next in order to those, which I have just now gone through. I beg of you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not (hereafter),[2] as at present, partly praise you before Lysias and the rest, and blame you likewise in part. For I will say, Socrates, that you are worth every thing to the man, who is not yet exhorted; but to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment to his arriving at the end of virtue, and becoming happy.

[1] I have adopted ὄντως from one MS. in lieu of οὕτως.

[2] Ficinus has "quemadmodum nunc ita et posthac;" what the balance of the sentence evidently requires. He found, I suspect, in his MS., ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὖθις, καθάπερ νῦν—

INTRODUCTION TO THE EPISTLES.

The last portion of the works of Plato, that have been considered by some scholars to be spurious, and genuine by others, are the Epistles. These, according to Diogenes Laertius, iii. 61, were thirteen in number; and just so many have been found in different MSS., and addressed to the parties mentioned by Diogenes, with the exception of the 10th and 11th; which, he says, were written respectively to Aristodemus and Leodamas, instead of Aristodorus and Laodamas, as found at present—a discrepancy evidently arising from a literal variation merely.

Out of the whole number, all but 1, 10, 11, 12, have been quoted distinctly, or covertly alluded to, by different writers, commencing with Cicero, and ending with some of the Greek fathers. One, however, the 12th, addressed to Archytas, is reported in some MSS. to be spurious; although Diogenes, in viii. 79, states it was written in answer to the letter there preserved from Archytas to Plato.

As scarcely any thing has been written upon the Epistles, with the exception of the notes of Stephens, based for the most part on the version of Ficinus, I have been compelled to say more than I should otherwise have done, with the view of directing attention to passages, where, from the corruptions in the text, I have been unable to see my way clearly.

THE

EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.[1]

DION TO DIONYSIUS—PROSPERITY.[2]

WHILE I was passing so long a time with you and administering the affairs of your kingdom the most faithfully[3] of all, who took in hand your interests,[4] I had to endure calumnies really grievous. For I know that nothing of a rather cruel kind you ever thought proper to do with my consent. And of this all, who have taken a part in the state with yourself, are my witnesses, with many of whom I have been engaged in a contest, after I had freed them from no trifling calamities And when in possession of the sole power, I had often preserved for you the state, I have been sent away in a more ignominious manner than it became you to drive out a beggar, and you have ordered me to sail away, after I had resided with you for such a length of time. With regard to my future conduct, I shall consult my interest, somewhat more like a human being:

[1] Although this Epistle appears to have been written by Dion, it is ascribed to Plato in nearly all the MSS. but the one used by Ficinus. The whole of the superscription is however omitted in one MS., and the word Πλάτων alone in another.

[2] On the address εὖ πράττειν, adopted by Plato, see Epist. iii. and the elaborate notes of Menage on Diog. L. iii. 61.

[3] I have adopted πεπιστευμένως, in lieu of πεπιστευμένος, as suggested by the Bipont editor.

[4] Such seems to be the meaning of τὰς ὠφελείας ὑμῶν λαμβανόντων. But λαμβάνειν is not, I suspect, to be found elsewhere in this sense. Ficinus has "utilitates vestras captantibus."

[1] While you,
A tyrant of that kind, shall live alone.[1]

As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my departure, Baccheius, the bearer of this epistle, brings it back; for it was neither sufficient for my travelling expenses, nor useful for the rest of life, and it would bring the greatest disgrace upon you as the giver, and not much less upon me, as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; so that after getting it again, prove by it your attention to some other of your associates, as you did to me. For you have paid sufficiently an attention to me. And now one may mention opportunely the sentiment of Euripides, that

[3] When thy affairs shall otherwise fall out,
Thou'lt pray that such a man were standing by thee.[3]

But I wish to remind you, that the majority of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant, dying at the hands of any one, make him call out,

By friends deserted, do I hapless perish;[4]

but no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. To those too, who possess any mind, that piece of poetry is thought to be not ill said,

Not glittering gold, 'mongst men[5] most rare
During a life of hapless care,
Nor steel[6] nor couch[7] with silver dight,
By mortals[8] valued, strike the sight,

[1]—[1] In the words *σὺ δὲ Τοιοῦτος ὢν τύραννος οἰκήσεις μόνος*, there is evidently a dramatic fragment, as I have translated; and so there is in the preceding words, *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ἀπανθρωπότερον*, which it would require no great talent to elicit.

[2] In *λαμπρὸν* there is a latent irony, and so too in the subsequent *ἱκανῶς*.

[3]—[3] In this distich, as detected by Barnes, I have with Stephens adopted *ἄλλως*, the correction of Cornarius, in lieu of *ἄλλων*.

[4] Compare the sentiment in Gray,

"Deserted at his utmost need,
By friends his former bounty fed,"

when alluding to the death of Richard the Second.

[5] One MS. has *ἐν θνατοῖς*, which seems preferable to *ἐν θνατῷ* or *ἐν θνατῶν* in the other.

[6] Taylor translated *ἀδάμας* by "diamond," an error into which some other scholars have fallen.

[7] I have adopted *κλίνα*, found in one MS., in lieu of *κλῖναι*.

[8] Here too I have adopted *ἀνθρώπων*, from the margin of one MS., instead of *ἄνθρωπον*.

Nor fertile furrows of the earth's wide plain
Such self-sufficient power e'er obtain,
As of good men the mind, that thinks the same.[1]

Fare thee well, and know that thou hast erred thus much as regards us, in order that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

EPISTLE II.

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS PROSPERITY.

I HAVE heard from Archedemus, that you think that not only I ought to keep quiet myself, but my familiar friends likewise, on matters relating to yourself, and neither do or say any thing to your disparagement; but that you make an exception in the case of Dion. Now this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted, signifies that I have no power over my connexions. For if I had a power, as well over others as you and Dion, a greater good would be the result both to all of you and the rest of the Greeks, as I assert. But now I am great through rendering myself a follower of the dictates of my reason. And this I say, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you sound information; for one of them asserted, says common report, that he had heard at Olympia of many of my associates having spoken ill of you. But perhaps he heard more acutely than I did. [2]For such a thing I have not heard.[2] But it is requisite, as it seems to me, for you to act thus for the future, whenever any one says any thing about any one of us, by sending a letter to inquire of myself; for I shall neither be afraid or ashamed to tell the truth. But to you and me such is the state of circumstances with regard to each other that we are neither of us unknown to any one, so to say, of the Greeks; nor is our intercourse passed over in silence; nor let it be concealed from you, that it will not be

[1] From the word ὁμοφράδμων it is fair to infer that φίλων τε have dropt out after ἀγαθῶν, for, as Sallust says, "Idem velle atque idem nolle est —amicitia;" and a similar sentiment is to be found in Pseudo-Plato, Clitoph. § 6, and the passages quoted there.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omited by Taylor.

passed over in silence in the time to come; so many have obtained a knowledge of it, as having been neither little nor quietly carried on. But why do I say this? I will now tell you, beginning from events far back.

Intellect and great power naturally tend to the same; and these two always pursue, and seek after, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted to speak about these subjects themselves, and to hear about them from others in their private conversations, or in the writings of poets. Thus for example, when persons discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, they are delighted in bringing forward the intercourse of Simonides with these men, and what he did and said to them; and they are accustomed to celebrate together Periander of Corinth, and Thales of Miletus; and Pericles, and Anaxagoras; and Crœsus, and Solon, as being men of wisdom, and Cyrus, a person of power. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias, Polydus and Minos, Agamemnon and Nestor, Ulysses and Palamedes; and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men brought together Prometheus and Zeus; and they sing of some of these, as having a difference, and others a friendship with each other; and again, of some as having at one time a difference, and at another friendship; and having similar feelings on some points, and different upon others. Now all these things I mention, as being willing to show that men will not be silent respecting us, when we are dead; so that we ought to pay an attention to them. For we must, as it seems, pay some regard even to the time to come; especially since it happens that the most slave-like persons do by a kind of nature, neglect it entirely; but persons of a more elegant mind do every thing in order that they may be spoken well of hereafter. And this I consider an argument that the dead have a certain perception[1] of things here. For the most excellent minds divine that this is so, but the most depraved deny it. Now the divinations of god-like men are of greater weight than of those who are not so. And I conceive that if it were permitted for those persons of a former age, to whom I am alluding, to correct aught in their intercourse, they would earnestly endeavour that better things be said of them, than

[1] This doctrine is laid down only hesitatingly in Menexen. § 20.

at present. This however it is still permitted us to say, god willing, that if any thing has been done not correctly during our former intercourse, either in word or deed, we may correct it. For on the subject of philosophy I assert that a true opinion will be formed of us; a better one if we are persons of worth, but the contrary, if we are worthless. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we shall not do any thing more pious; nor any thing more impious, if we neglect it. But how this ought to take place, and how it is just, I will explain.

When I came to Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy; and I wished on my arrival at Syracuse to have you a witness in my favour, in order[1] that philosophy might be honoured by the multitude. But this did not turn out prosperously.[2] I do not however assign that as the reason which the many would say, but because you appeared unwilling to put implicit confidence in me; but willing to send me away and to send for others, and to inquire what my business was, by this, as it seems, distrusting me. And they, who were proclaiming loudly these matters, were many, affirming that you had a contempt for myself, and were seriously applying yourself to other things. Such were the reports at that time bruited abroad.

Now hear what after this it is just to do, in order that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought to conduct ourselves to each other. If then you have a contempt for philosophy, bid farewell to it. But if you have heard from another, or discovered [3]yourself any thing more excellent[3] than what you have from me, honour it. But if what (you have heard) from me please you, then must you honour highly myself likewise. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by you, I will honour you (in return); but not being honoured, I shall keep quiet. Further still, if by honouring me, you

[1] I have translated as if the Greek were—*σέ μοι, ἵνα δὴ*—not *σε, ἵνα δή μοι*—where *μοι* has no meaning.

[2] Why *εὐαγὲς* is thus rendered by Ficinus and Ast, I cannot understand. The word is learnedly illustrated by Hemsterhuis in a note printed by Gaisford on Markland's Eurip. Suppl. 662.

[3]—[3] I have adopted, in lieu of *βελτίονα εὕρηκας—ἐκεῖνα* from one MS. *βέλτιον εὕρηκάς τι*, and *ἐκεῖνο*, similar to "Si quid novisti rectius istius" in Horace.

take the lead in this,[1] you will seem to honour philosophy; and that very thing, [2] which you are considering even otherwise,[2] will bring you the reputation of being considered by the multitude a philosopher. But by honouring you, when not honouring me, I should seem to be admiring and pursuing wealth; but this we know has a name dishonourable amongst all men; and, to sum up, by your honouring me, there will be an ornament to both of us; but by my (honouring) you, a disgrace to both. And thus much on these matters.

But the little sphere[3] does not answer; and this Archidemus will show you, when he arrives. Moreover, you must explain to him very distinctly respecting the matter, which is far more honourable and divine than this, and respecting which you sent as being in doubt. For you say, according to his report, that there has not been a sufficient demonstration respecting the nature of the first. I must speak to you by enigmas, [4] in order that, should the tablet meet with any accident in its folds by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand.[4] For such is the case.

"As regards the king of all, all things are his, and all are for his sake, and he is the cause of all that is beautiful. But about a second are the secondary things; and about a third the third. Now the soul of man is eager to learn respecting these things of what kind they are, looking to what is allied to itself, none of which it possesses sufficiently. [6] But respecting the king (himself)[6] and those of which I have spoken, there is nothing of this kind. But of that, which is after this, does the soul speak. But of what kind, son of Dionysius and Doris, is your inquiry

[1] I cannot understand *τούτου*: nor could Ficinus; whose version is—"honorare prius me cæperis." Perhaps Plato wrote, *αὐτὸς* or *οὔπω*—

[2]—[2] Here again I am at a loss, and so was Ficinus. For he has—"quod tu imprimis cupiebas."

[3] What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery. T. See Epist. 13.

[4]—[4] In the Greek words between the numerals lies hid a tragic distich, Ἵν' ἄν τι δέλτος ἐν πτυχαῖς πόντου δία Ἢ γῆς πάθῃ, μὴ γνῷ τὸ γράμμα τις τυχών: as may be inferred from Eurip. Iph. T. 1744, ed. Monk.

[5] I have followed one MS. that reads *πάντ' ἐκείνου ἔστι*, instead of *πάντ' ἔστι καὶ ἐκείνου*—

[6]—[6] Ficinus has—"sed in rege ipso et in his," as if he had found in his MS. *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως αὐτοῦ*—in lieu of *τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως πέρι*—

concerning what is the cause of all things evil.[1] Or rather, is it not a kind of labour-throes on this point, which are produced in the soul, and which if a person does not take away from it, (the soul) will never meet with truth existing in reality.

And you told me that you had thought of this in the garden under the laurel trees, and that it was your discovery. And I said, that if this appeared to you to be the case, you had freed me from a long discussion. I said however that I had never met with any other person, who had discovered it, but that it had been a great source of trouble to myself. But perhaps you have heard this from some one; but accidentally impelled in this direction by a divine allotment,[2] you have not kept firm hold of the demonstrations on this point, and pinned them down;[3] but you are dashing on, at one time in this way, and at another in a different way, to what is the object of fancy; but such it is not. Nor has this occurred to you alone; but be well assured, that no one, when he first hears me, is otherwise affected than thus [4]in the beginning.[4] And one having more trouble, and another less, are with difficulty liberated from it; but nearly all of them have of it not a little. Such then having been, and is still the case, we have in my opinion nearly discovered that, about which you sent to me, namely, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For since you are testing (my doctrines) by associating with other persons, and [5]placing them by the side of those (promulgated) by others, and (considering)[5]

[1] In lieu of *κακῶν*, Proclus, in Theolog. Platon. ii. 4, p. 103, offers *καλῶν*, adopted by Taylor; and so one MS. collated by Bekker. The other however is the preferable reading. Unless it be said that Plato wrote both, *καλῶν τε καὶ κακῶν*. For Dionysius, like many philosophers before and after his time, was puzzled with the origin and continuance of evil, introduced by one or more powers, the authors of all good.

[2] The expression *θεία μοῖρα* would now be applied to what we call "genius," or "gift of nature."

[3] So I have translated *κατέδησας*. Ficinus has "protulisti," which would lead to *κατέδειξας*—

[4]—[4] Ficinus omits *κατ' ἀρχὰς*, probably deeming them superfluous after *πρῶτον ἀκούσαντι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ ταραχάς*, "by some confusion."

[5]—[5] The Greek is *παραθεώμενος*. But there is, I suspect, no such compound in Greek. Ficinus has "cum—comparaveris," from which Faehse was led to *παραθέμενος*, which I have adopted, and translated as if *θεώμενος* had dropped out before *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*.

them by themselves, [1] they will, if the touchstone be true, still stick to you, and you will be at home with them and us.[1] How then shall these things, and all we have spoken of, not take place?

You have therefore done well in having sent Archedemus; and hereafter, when he shall have reached you, and told you my message, other doubts will perhaps lay hold of you. If then you take counsel of yourself properly, you will send Archedemus to me again; and he, like a travelling trader, will return again to you. And if you do this twice or thrice, and test sufficiently what is sent from me, I shall wonder, if your former doubts be not very different from what they are now. Act then thus boldly; for neither will you send, nor Archedemus act the part of a travelling trader, in a manner more beautiful or more acceptable to the deity, than by a trading of this kind. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall peradventure among men devoid of instruction; for, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any doctrines[2] which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than these; nor on the other hand any more wonderful, and producing a greater enthusiasm in those who are well disposed. But when they are often mentioned, and continually heard, and this for many years, they are scarcely at length, and with great labour, purified like gold.

[3] But hear what is wonderful there;[3] for even a good many persons have heard these things, who are able to learn and

[1]—[1] Ficinus, apparently not understanding the meaning of *προσφύσεται*, has thus given the general sense of the passage—"modo rectum examen peregeris, consentientem nobis te et nostris præbebis;" which Taylor was content to translate literally into English. With regard to *οἰκεῖος*, the phrase "at home" keeps closer to the Greek than its usual version, "a familiar friend."

[2] The Greek is *ἀκούσματα*, literally "hearings." For previous to the invention of printing, the philosophers of old promulgated their principles partly by writing, but more frequently by word of mouth, before persons who listened to their intellectual "displays," as they were then called; but which would now be called "lectures," a word that means literally "readings," and is applied sometimes to discourses spoken even extempore.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ὃ δὲ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ἄκουσον*: where I cannot understand *αὐτοῦ*. Ficinus has "Nam, quod in hac re mirabile contingere consuevit, id audi." One MS. omits *αὐτοῦ*. Perhaps Plato wrote *εἴ τι*—

able to remember, and after testing every thing in every way, to come to a decision, being already old men, and who have heard these things for not less than thirty years; and who asserted lately that, what formerly appeared to them to be the least worthy of belief, now appears the most so, and perfectly clear; but what was most worthy of belief then, is the very reverse now. Directing therefore your mind to this, be careful lest it repent you of what has now unworthily fallen from you. Now the greatest guard in this case is in not writing but learning; for what is written, it cannot be but that it will get abroad. On this account, then, I have never at any time written any thing about them; nor is there any composition of Plato (by name), nor will there be; but what has now [1]been said belong to Socrates, who was, even when young, a handsome person.[1] Fare thee well, and be persuaded by me; and, after frequently reading this epistle, burn it. And thus much on these matters.

With respect to Polyxenus, you have wondered that I did not send him to you. But I say now, as of old, respecting Lycophron, and the others who are with you, that, both naturally, and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel them in the art of speaking; nor is any one of them confuted willingly, as some suppose, but unwillingly; and you appear indeed to have treated them with great moderation, and to have bestowed upon them (honourable)[2] presents. So much

[1]—[1] The Greek is *τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστὶ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος*. But Julian in Orat. vi. p. 189, A., quotes *φερόμενα*, which, says Wyttenbach in Epist. Crit. p. 16, answers better to *ἀποφερόμεναι ἐρωτήσεις*, in Theætet. p. 148, E. But how Socrates could be said to be at any period of life "a handsome man," I cannot understand. For he was not only the reverse, but even prided himself on being so. Wyttenbach indeed asserts that the expression *καλὸς καὶ νεός* is well suited to Socrates, as being *ἐρωτικός*. But a person may easily be *ἐρωτικὸς* without being at the same time *καλὸς καὶ νέος*. As however the passage is quoted in its present form by Aristides, T. ii. p. 288, and Stobæus cix. p. 355, it seems hazardous to suggest any alteration; else one would suspect that Plato wrote *τὰ δὲ νῦν φερόμενα διὰ Σωκράτους ἐστ' οὐκ ἄνου, καὶ νέου γεγονότος, λεγόμενα*, i. e. "but what has now been published is spoken through the mouth of Socrates, who was, even when young, no fool." To obviate probably the difficulty in *καλοῦ*, Ficinus translated it "virtute claruit."

[2] Ficinus has "et honestis eos muneribus prosecutus," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ καλῶς δεδωρῆσθαι*.

on these matters, which for such matters is much. But if you make use of Philistion at all, make a great use of him; and, if you can, lend Speusippus (something),[1] and send him away. Speusippus too stands in need of you. And Philistion too promised me, that he would very willingly come to Athens if you would dismiss him. You have likewise done well in dismissing him[2] from the stone quarries. But trifling is the request both respecting his domestics, and Hegesippus, the son of Ariston; for you sent word to me, that if any one injured either him or them, and you knew of it, you would not overlook it. And of Lysiclides it is worth while to speak the truth; for he alone of those, who came from Sicily to Athens, has caused no change as regards our intercourse with each other, but ever continues to say something good, and what is for the best respecting what has occurred.

EPISTLE III.

[3]PLATO TO DIONYSIUS.[3]

HAVING put in a letter "all hail," can I have truly found the best address?[4] or rather [5]by writing, according to my

[1] Ficinus, not aware that χρῆσον comes from χράω, "I lend," translates "Speusippi opere utere," whom Taylor has followed as usual. It is evident however that τι has dropt out after Σπευσίππῳ. For Plato meant to say, that without some assistance in the shape of a loan, Speusippus could not leave Syracuse.

[2] After τὸν Stephens suspected that Φιλόξενον has dropt out, or the name of some other person.

[3]—[3] I have adopted, what Ficinus seems to have found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens.

[4] With the idea contained in these words may be compared the expression in Eurip. Med. 663, Μήδεια, χαῖρε· τοῦδε γὰρ τοῦ φροιμίου Κάλλιον οὐδεὶς οἶδε.

[5]—[5] The Greek is ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφων εὖ πράττειν ὥσπερ εἴωθα ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς τοὺς φίλους προσαγορεύειν. But Ficinus has "an quemadmodum ego solitus sum scribere ad amicos, bene agere," thus omitting the words κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν and ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς. On the other hand Menage, on Diog. L iii. 61, rejects ὥσπερ εἴωθα as an interpretation of κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν. Plato wrote I suspect, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν συνήθειαν γράφοιμ' ἂν, "εὖ

custom, "Prosperity," as I am accustomed to address friends in my letters.[5] For you, as they who went on a sacred embassy[1] related, addressed the god at Delphi, by this very flattering expression, and wrote, as they say,

Hail, and preserve the tyrant's pleasant life.

But I would exhort not even a man, much less a deity, by an invocation, to do this; not a deity, because I should give a command contrary to his nature, since the deity is seated far from pleasure and pain; nor a man, because pleasure frequently begets mischief, [2]and pain produces[2] in the soul indocility, and forgetfulness, and silliness, and insolence. And thus much let it be said by me on the subject of the address; and do you, after having read this, receive it as you are willing to receive it.

Not a few report, that you stated to certain persons sent to you, that, when I heard you saying that you were about to establish Grecian cities in Sicily, and to relieve the people of Syracuse by changing the government from an absolute to a limited monarchy, I prevented you from doing [3]so; although, as you assert, you were very eager on the matter; but that now I have taught Dion to do the very same thing himself; and that, according to your notions, we are depriving you of your power. You indeed know whether you are benefited by such assertions. You are however injuring me by stating the contrary to what really occurred; for I have been sufficiently prejudiced by Philistides and many others in the eyes of the hired troops and the mob of Syracuse, through my remaining in the Acropolis; while they without (I think) [4]would, had any error taken place, have turned it all against myself, by assert-

πράττειν," ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς φίλους προσαγορεύων, i. e. or rather shall I write according to my custom "Prosperity," while addressing friends in my letters.

[1] On the word θεωρεῖν see Blomfield's Prom. 118.

[2]—[2] I have translated as if the Greek were γεννᾷ, καὶ λύπη, not καὶ λύπη γεννᾷ. For thus while pleasure begets mischief (to the body), pain affects the soul in a similar manner.

[3] In lieu of ἄρα, Ficinus found in his MS. δρᾶν, as shown by his "ne faceres."

[4] Stephens was the first to remark that there is nothing to govern τοὺς ἔξωθεν: to preserve therefore the syntax, I have translated as if οἶμαι had dropt out after ἔξωθεν, and ἂν after τρέπειν.

ing (tenaciously) that you were persuaded in all things by me. But you knew yourself most clearly, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, except at first, when I thought I might do something beneficial, and that I was moderately engaged in some other trifling matters, and upon the Proœms of the Laws, with the exception of what you and some one else have written as an addition; for I hear that some persons after you have been tampering with them.[2] Each portion will however be plain to those, who are able to distinguish my manner. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need of calumny before the Syracusans, and certain others, if you can persuade them (by speaking) in this way; but I am much more in want of an apology against the former calumny, and that, which has now been produced after it, both greater and more violent.

Against these two (calumnies) therefore, it is necessary for me to make a two-fold apology (by saying), in the first place, that I properly avoided taking a share with you in the affairs of the city; and in the second place, that [3]I know it was not my advice, as you have asserted, that exhorted you, nor[3] was I an impediment to you, when about to establish the Grecian cities. Hear then first the commencement of those matters, about which I have spoken the first.

I came to Syracuse invited by yourself and Dion, who had already passed an ordeal with me, and had been of old my guest; and who was of the middle and staid period of life—(men) of whom there is altogether a need to such as possess

[1] The Greek is in some MSS. *σὲ φάσκοντας τίνας*, where Stephens would omit *τινας*, not found in Ficinus, nor in three other MSS. One however has *σε τινας φάσκοντας*, which leads to *ἀτενὲς φάσκοντας σὲ*, where *ἀτενὲς* is a Platonic word, found in Rep. vii. p. 547, E., *ἀτενεῖς ἄνδρας*, and explained by Suidas, *συνεχὲς—ἄγαν ἰσχυρῶς*: while Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 53, has given some instances of its loss and corruption.

[2] If after the laws of Plato had been thus tampered with, the author himself never put forth an unadulterated edition, it will be difficult, despite what he says in the next sentence, always to separate the genuine from the spurious matter.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *οὐκ ἐμὴν ταύτην εἴρηκας συμβουλὴν οὐδε διακώλυσιν ἑλλοντι* in some MSS., but in others *διακωλύσειν*, and in one *διδασκαλίαν*. Ficinus has "meum illud consilium non fuisse, quod tu ais, ut suaderem tibi—" From whence I have elicited *οὐκ ἐμὴν ταύτην, ἣν εἴρηκας, συμβουλὴν εἶναι οἶδα διακελεύουσαν οὐδὲ*—where *διακελεύουσαν*, is confirmed by *κελεύων* in p. 319, B.

even a little intellect, when they are about to consult about affairs such as yours were then; while you were very young, and had great inexperience on those points, in which it behoved you to have been skilled, and you were perfectly unknown to me. After this, some man, or god, or fortune, did in conjunction with yourself drive out Dion, and you were left alone. Think you then at that time I would have held any communion with you on affairs of state, when I had lost a sensible partner? and when I saw a senseless person was left with many and wicked men, not ruling in reality, but fancying himself to be a ruler, although he was ruled over by men of such a kind? Under these circumstances, what ought I to have done? [1]Is it not of necessity, from what occurred afterwards,[1] just what I did do? To bid farewell to state affairs, and to be cautious of the calumnies arising from envy, and to endeavour to make all of you, although separated and at variance, friends as much as possible to each other. And of this you are the witness, that in bringing this about I never abated a jot. And though with some difficulty, it was nevertheless agreed that I should sail homewards, since a war detained you; but that, when peace took place, I and Dion should come to Syracuse again, and that you should invite us. Such were the circumstances that occurred, touching my first sojourn at Syracuse, and of my safe return home.

On peace being made, you invited me a second time; not, however, according to the agreement; but you wrote to me to come alone; and said that you would send for Dion afterwards. On this account I did not come, and displeased Dion; for he thought it would be better to come and hearken to you. In a year after this a trireme arrived, and letters from yourself; and the language of the letter began (by saying), that if I would come, the affairs of Dion should be settled according to my mind; but the contrary, if I did not come. I am ashamed to say, how many letters then came both from you and others through you from Italy and Sicily, to myself and to such as were my relations and acquaintances, all of them exhorting me to go, and begging me by all means to yield to your request. It seemed therefore good to all, beginning from Dion, that I should set sail, and not act the coward.[2] And

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[2] Compare Epist. 7, p. 329, B., *καταμαλθακισθεὶς καὶ ἀποδειλιῶν.*

yet I put forward before them my period of life; and I strenuously urged with respect to yourself, that you would be unable to defend me against those calumniating us, and wishing us to become foes. For I saw then, and I see now, that the great and over-swollen property of private persons and almost monarchs, that the greater they are, the more do they nourish calumniators many and mighty, and who associate for the sake of pleasure, together with mischief of a shameful kind; an evil greater than which neither does wealth produce, nor the influence of any other power. Bidding, however, farewell to all these ideas, I came, after thoroughly reflecting, that not one of my friends would have to accuse me, in that through my negligence, their interests had been, when they might have been safe, destroyed. On my arrival—for surely you know all that occurred thereupon—I thought it right, according to the compact made in your letters, that you should in the first place bring back Dion and restore him to your familiar intercourse; such familiar intercourse, I mean, as that, by which,[1] if you had been persuaded by me, something better, than what has taken place, would have happened to yourself, and Syracuse, and the rest of the Greeks, at least as my opinion divines. And then I thought it right that the relations of Dion should have his property, and that those, whom you know[2] did divide it, should not have divided it. Moreover I thought that what was customary should be sent to him each year, and rather more, and not less, be sent on account of my being present. But succeeding in none of these demands, I determined to depart. After this, however, you persuaded me to remain a year, by saying that you would sell[3] all the property of Dion, and send one half to Corinth, and leave the residue to his son. I could relate many other things, not one of which, after promising, you have performed; but, on account of their multitude, I will cut them short. For after you had sold all the property of Dion, without having per-

[1] In lieu of ἦν, which has nothing to govern it, the sense and syntax require ᾗ; and just afterwards, βέλτιόν τι τῶν—ἔσχε, in lieu of βέλτιον τῶν—ἔσχε.

[2] Instead of οἶσθα, Ficinus seems to have found some other word in his MS.; for his version is "præfeceras—"

[3] Ficinus, disregarding the difference in meaning between ἀποδοῦναι and ἀποδόσθαι, renders ἀποδόμενος by "redditurum;" and he is followed, as usual, by Taylor.

suaded him to that step, although you said you would not do so, without first persuading him, you have put, O wonderful man, a most glorious[1] finish[2] to all your promises. For you discovered a plan neither honourable, nor clever, nor just, nor advantageous, to frighten me, as being ignorant of what had taken place at that time, in order that I might not require the money to be sent. For when you were intending to banish Heraclides, an act that did not seem just to the Syracusans, or to myself, and on that I did, together with Theodotus and Euribius, request you not to do so, you laid hold of this as a sufficient pretext, and said that I had evidently been for some time past caring nothing for you, but only for Dion, and his friends and relatives; and that since Theodotus and Heraclides are now calumniated, as being the relatives of Dion, I am devising in every way for them not to suffer punishment. And thus much on the subject of the intercourse between you and myself on state affairs. And if you have seen any estrangement in me towards yourself, think it only reasonable for all this to have happened in this way, and do not wonder at it; for to any one possessing any intellect, I should justly appear to be a knave, if I were induced by the greatness of your power, to betray an old friend and guest, when doing badly through you, and being, so to say, not inferior to yourself, and to prefer you, when committing an act of injustice, and to do whatever you ordered, for the sake, it is evident, of money; for no other reason would any one have assigned for this change in me, if changed I had been. But these events, occurring in this way, have through yourself produced a kind of wolf-friendship,[3] and a want of cordiality between you and me.

[1] Literally, "most youth-like." Compare *νεανικὸς φόβος* in Eurip. Hipp. 1204, which is explained by "vehement." I suspect, however, that *νεανικώτατον* here conceals some corruption, as *νεανικωτάτου* does in Alcib. I. § 2, where I have suggested *μεγακλεεστάτου*, in allusion to the grandfather of Alcibiades on his mother's side.

[2] Literally, "Colophon"—On the meaning of the metaphor, see at Euthyd. § 71.

[3] This is, I suspect, an allusion to an Æsopo-Socratic fable, in which a shepherd forms a friendship with a wolf; who, after being taught to carry off the sheep of other owners, feasts on those of its own friend. Something similar is still extant in MS. Flor., in No. 105. Ficinus, not aware of this circumstance, has translated, "succensendi"—Gataker, however, on Marc. Antonin. xi. 15 says the allu-

The discourse has now come nearly [1]to the point, connected[1] with what has just now occurred, and for which I said I must in the second place apologize. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to tell a falsehood, and not the truth. For I assert that you did, when Archedemus and Aristocritus were present in the garden, about twenty days before my departure homewards from Syracuse, find fault with me on the points you have just now mentioned, how that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and all the rest, than for you. And you likewise asked me in their presence, whether I remembered that on my first coming to Syracuse, I exhorted you to establish the Grecian cities. And I acknowledged that I did remember; and, even now, it appears to me that it is best (to do so). I must likewise relate, Dionysius, what was said at that time after this. For I asked you whether I advised you (to do) this alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me in a very angry and insulting manner, as you thought; and on this account the insult of that period has become [2]a day-dream, instead of a night one.[2] For [3]you said laughing in not a feigned manner, if I remembered, that you had exhorted me, after I had been instructed, to do all these things or not.[3] I replied, that you had very properly reminded me. You then said —Was it after being instructed in geometry? or how? After this I did not say what it came into my mind to say, through

sion is to Æsop. Fab. 237, and would read here *ἀκοινώνησίας*, in lieu of *ἀκοινωνίας*, which he says is not a correct Greek word; while the other is found in Aristotle, Polit. ii. 3, and in the letter of Cornelius, bishop of Rome, preserved by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. vi. 43, *τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ λυκοφιλίαν*. Gataker quotes likewise Menander, Fr. Inc. 203, *Λυκοφίλιοι μέν εἰσιν αἱ διαλλαγαί.*

[1]—[1] The Greek is *εἰς λόγον—λόγος—ξυνεχὴς*. But Ficinus has "opportune sermo," omitting entirely *ξυνεχὴς τῷ νῦν δὴ γενομένῳ*. Hence Stephens supposed that Ficinus found in his MS. *εἰς καλὸν* in lieu of *εἰς λόγον*. I have translated as if the Greek were *εἰς τόπον—λόγος—ξυνεχῆ* —to which I was led by finding *ξυνεχεῖς*, i. e. *ξυνεχῆς*, in one MS. On the loss of *τόπον* I have spoken elsewhere.

[2]—[2] i. e. "a true vision instead of a false one." On the expression *ὕπαρ ἀντ' ὀνείρατος*, see at Phileb. § 75.

[3]—[3] This I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is "Rogasti autem me—si bene quid memini—an ista præcepissem tibi quasi docto an non;" but whether he found the Greek in his MS. corresponding to the Latin may be fairly doubted. There is evidently something wrong here, which better MSS. alone will enable us to correct.

the fear that, on account of a trifling word, the sailing-away, which I expected, [1]would be in a narrow instead of a wide space.[1] This then is for the sake of all what has been said by me.[2] Do not calumniate me by saying that I did not permit you to colonize the Grecian cities, subverted by the Barbarians, and to assist the Syracusans by your changing to a limited monarchy instead of an absolute one. For you cannot state any falsehood against me, which is less suited to myself than this.

If there appeared to be any where a sufficient power of deciding, I could give in addition to these, arguments still clearer, (to prove) that I exhorted you to act in this way, but that you were unwilling to do so. And in truth it is not difficult to show clearly, that had this been done, it would have been the best for yourself, the Syracusans, and all the Siceliotes.[3] If then you deny you have said so, after you had so said, I have a right of action against you. But if you confess you did (say so), consider after this that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitating his recantation,[4] betake yourself from a false assertion to a true one.

EPISTLE IV.

PLATO TO DION OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.

I THINK that my readiness with respect to events as they occur, is apparent at all times, and that I give much of a serious attention to their being brought to pass for the sake of nothing

[1]—[1] The words Μή μοι στενὸς γένοιτ' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας evidently conceal an Iambic verse, Μή μοι γένοιτ' ἀντ' εὐρυχωρίας στενός, which eventually became a proverb amongst the sea-faring Athenians; who knew, as the English do, that there is little danger as long as there is plenty of sea-room; and that it is only in a strait, or in shallow water, that a sailor feels any fear.

[2] Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has "cæterum ad illud jam redeamus, quo tendunt hæc omnia.

[3] The indigenous inhabitants of Sicily were called Σικελοί: the foreigners, who settled there, Σικελιῶται.

[4] To the same recantation of Stesichorus there is an allusion in the Phædrus, § 44. See Blomfield in Stesichor. Fragm. 5, in the Museum Criticum, T. i. p. 263.

else rather than a love of honour in the case of things honourable. For I consider it just, that they, who are in good truth worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain the renown due to them. At present, matters are, to speak with god's will, doing well; but in those that relate to the future there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swiftness, and strength, would seem to be in the power of some others;[1] but to excel all the others in truth, justice, magnificence, and the graceful bearing relating to all these, any one would agree to honour in reason those, who establish their claim to qualities such as these. Now then what I am saying is manifest. But at the same time we ought to remind ourselves, that it is proper [2]to excel the rest of men, whom you know more than boys.[2] Hence we ought to become manifest, as being such as we say; especially since, so to say, with god's will, it will be easy: for to others it has happened that it was necessary for them to have wandered in many a place, [3]if they were about to be known.[3] But that which is now existing about you is such, so that persons from the whole of the inhabited (earth), if one may speak in rather an arrogant style, are looking to one spot, and in that spot to yourself especially. Since then you are beheld by all men, prepare to exhibit yourself, as that celebrated Lycurgus of the olden time, and Cyrus, and if there is any one else, who has ever been thought to excel in moral and political (virtues); especially since many, and indeed nearly all here say, there is a great expectation that, when Dionysius is taken off, affairs will be in a ruinous state, through the ambition of yourself, and Heraclides, and Theodotus, and others of your acquaintances.

Let then, the most of all, such a person not exist. But if he should exist, do you appear as a healer, [4]and ye will proceed

[1] I confess I hardly understand here *ἑτέρων τινων*.

[2]—[2] Such is the literal translation of the Greek, which I cannot understand; nor could, I suspect, Ficinus, whose version is, "oportere nos, ut te non latet, plus ab aliis quam viros a pueros differre—" unless it be said that he found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens, *προσήκει πλέον ἢ παίδων ἄνδρας, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, ὡς οἶσθα δήπου.*

[3]—[3] The Greek is *εἰ μέλλουσι γνωσθῆναι.* Ficinus has "ad id consequendum."

[4]—[4] Such is the translation of the Greek. But Ficinus has "ut res in melius deducantur," as if he had found in his MS. *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἂν ἔλθοι πᾶν*, not *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἔλθοιτ' ἄν.* One MS. subsequently collated reads *βέλτιον.*

on to what is best.[4] It appears perhaps to you ridiculous for me to mention these things, because you are yourself not ignorant of them. But I see that in the theatres the combatants are incited by children, to say nothing of their friends, whom one might suppose would through a kind feeling cheer them on with earnestness. Now then do you enter the contest, and send me word by a letter if you require at all my assistance. Affairs are here very nearly as when you were present. Inform me too what has been done, or what you are now doing; for though we hear many things, we know nothing. And now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides have come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as has been stated, although we hear many things [1] about those here,[1] know nothing. Bear in mind that you seem to some to be less attentive than is fitting. Let it therefore not escape you, that by pleasing men it is possible to do (something); but that austerity has its dwelling in a desert. May good fortune be thine.

EPISTLE V.

DION[2] TO PERDICCAS—PROSPERITY.

I HAVE advised Euphræus, as you enjoined in your letter, to occupy himself about all[3] that is a care to you. And I am justified in giving you advice, suited to a host, and what is

[1]—[1] The words περὶ τῶν τῇδε, which are at variance with the train of ideas, are omitted in five MSS. Ficinus has what is at least intelligible —"audientes multa de rebus vestris nihil aperte percipimus." Perhaps the author of this letter wrote παρὰ τῶν τῇδε—i. e. from persons here.

[2] Taylor has here tacitly followed the earlier editions, where this letter is ascribed to Dion; and in the Classical Journal, No. 60, p. 305, he says that, from the mention of Plato in it, the writer must have been some other person. It is however quoted as Plato's by Cicero in Epistol. ad Divers. i. 9; but that, says Stephens, might have happened, not because Cicero conceived Plato to be the writer, but because it alluded to something said in his person.

[3] Instead of ταῦτα, which I cannot understand, I have translated as if the Greek were πάντα.

called holy,[1] respecting the other things [2]of which you may speak,[2] and how you ought for the present to make use of Euphræus. For the man is useful in many ways, but mostly so in that, where you are through your time of life deficient, and through there not being many counsellors of the young on that point. Now there is a voice from each form of polity, as it were from certain animals; one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Very many persons assert that they understand these voices. But, except a few, they are very far from understanding them. Whichever then of these polities speaks with its own voice, both to gods and men, and produces actions, correspondent to its voice, it flourishes ever, and is preserved; but when it imitates another voice, it is destroyed. For this point then Euphræus will be useful to you in no small degree, although he is possessed of fortitude in other things likewise; for I hope that he will discover the reasons for a monarchy not less than those who are in your employment. If then you make use of him for this purpose, you will be benefited yourself, and greatly benefit him.

But if any one on hearing this, should say, Plato, as it seems, professed indeed to know what is conducive to a democracy; but though he might have spoken amongst the people, and given them the best advice, yet he never got up and addressed them. To this it may be said, that Plato was born late in his paternal land, and that he came amongst a people, already grown rather old,[3] and accustomed by those prior to him do many things contrary to his advice; for he would have consulted most willingly for its good, as for that of his own father, had he not thought he should vainly expose himself to danger. And I think he would do the same thing (with respect to)[4]

[1] On the expression ἱερὰ ξυμβουλὴ, see at Theag. p. 122, A. § 2. From the union of ξενικὴν καὶ ἱερὰν, it would seem as if the advice were called "holy" from its being given and received by persons connected by the sacred bonds of hospitality.

[2]—[2] The words ὧν ἂν φράζῃς are rightly omitted by Ficinus; unless it be said that the author wrote ὧν ἀεὶ ἔφραζες.

[3] If Cicero's quotation is to be depended on—"quum offendisset (Plato) populum Atheniensem prope jam desipientem senectute," it would lead to ὑπὸ γήρως κρονικώτερον in lieu of πρεσβύτερον.

[4] Ficinus alone found in his MS., as remarked by Stephens, the preposition περὶ requisite for the syntax; as shown by his version, "circa meum consilium."

my advice; for if we should appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either me or mine. May good fortune be thine.

EPISTLE VI.

PLATO TO HERMIAS, ERASTUS, AND CORISCUS.—PROSPERITY.

It appears to me, that some god has kindly and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you will only receive it properly. For you live neighbours to each other, and have need to benefit each other in the greatest degree. To Hermias, (I say) that neither a multitude of horses, nor of any other alliance[1] for war, nor of gold present to him, would be of greater power for every emergency, than of friends, who are firm and possess a sound moral conduct. But to Erastus and Coriscus I say, although I am an old man, that besides the beautiful wisdom, relating to species, there is a need of that wisdom, which possesses a guardian and defensive power against the base and unjust; for they are inexperienced through their having passed much of their life with us, who are men of moderation and without guile. On this account I have said, that they stand in need of those two[2] things, in order that they may not be compelled to neglect true wisdom, and pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary[3] wisdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this power[4] from nature, which is not yet cognate,[4] and from art through experience. What then do I say? To you, Hermias, do I, having made a greater trial of Erastus and Coris-

[1] In lieu of *πολέμικῆς συμμαχίας*, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. *πολεμικῆς παρασκευῆς*—for his version is "belli apparatus—"

[2] I have adopted Taylor's "those two;"—the Greek was probably *τούτοιν προσδεῖν δυοῖν*, not simply *τούτων προσδεῖν*—

[3] Coray in a note on Levesque's Thucydides iv. 117, would read *μη ἀναγκαίας*—

[4]—[4] Such is Taylor's translation of *φύσει, ὅσα μήπω ξυγγεγόνοτι*, as if a masculine participle could agree with a noun feminine. Ficinus, unable, as I am, to understand the parenthetical clause, has omitted it by translating "natura usque et arte," neglecting likewise *δι' ἐμπειρίας*.

cus than you have, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will not easily find habits more worthy of confidence than those of your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to hold to yourself by every honest means men of such kind, nor to consider it an act of secondary moment. And on the other hand I advise Erastus and Coriscus to stick close to Hermias, and to endeavour, by such grapplings[1] with each other to arrive at one common bond of friendship. But if any one of you shall determine to dissolve this (union), for human affairs are not altogether stable, send hither to me and my friends [2]an accusing letter of blame.[2] For I think that the reasons sent by those here, (and based) on justice and a feeling of respect, will, unless the rupture happens to have been very great, weld[3] and bind you together better, than any incantation,[4] into your pre-existing friendship and communion; by which,[5] if all. both we and you, philosophize as far as we are able, and it is permitted to each, what has now been oracularly delivered will be ratified. But I will not say the same,[6] should we not act in this manner; for I divine a good omen, and I say, that if a god is willing, you[7] will do all good deeds.

It is requisite for you to read this letter all three together; but if not, two in common, [8]as often as you can, (and) as it is

[1] I have adopted this word, remembering the expression in Shakspeare,

"Grapple him to thine heart with hooks of steel."

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "accusatoriam delinquentis epistolam," translated literally by Taylor, "an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent." Did Ficinus find in his MS. *τοῦ μεμφθέντος κατήγορον ἐπιστολήν*, in lieu of *μομφῆς κατήγορον ἐπιστολήν*?

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *συμφυσῆσαι*, not *συμφῦσαι*, remembering the expression in Sympos. p. 192, D., *συντῆξαι καὶ συμφυσῆσαι*. The Latin word answering to *συμφυσᾶν*, and used similarly in a metaphorical sense, is "conflare." Ficinus omits *συμφῦσαι*, it being probably unintelligible to him.

[4] Compare Hippol. Eurip. 478, *Εἰσὶν δ' ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι*—

[5] Instead of *ἣν*, which is without regimen, two MSS. read *ἢ*—From the two I have elicited *ᾗ*—

[6] In lieu of *τὸ*, one MS. had *τοῦτο*, which evidently leads to *ταὐτὸ* — Ficinus has "nihil equidem præfabor," translated by Taylor, "I will not relate the consequences."

[7] Ficinus found in his MS. *ὑμᾶς*, confirmed by another subsequently collated, instead of *ἡμᾶς*.

[8]—[8] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. They are not only unnecessary, but present an insufferable tautology.

possible,[8] and to make use of a compact, and a decisive law, which is indeed a just thing, and at the same time [taking an oath][1] with attention, not devoid of taste,[2] and amusement,[3] the sister[4] of attention, and swearing by the god, who is the ruler of all things present and future, and by the father (and) lord of the ruler and cause, whom, if we philosophize truly, we shall all clearly know, as far as is possible for men under a good genius.[5]

EPISTLE VII.

PLATO TO THE KINDRED AND FRIENDS OF DION—PROSPERITY.

Ye have written to me, that I ought to think your sentiments[6] are the same as those which Dion held; and, moreover, you exhort me to make a common cause, as far as I can, in word and deed. If ye have the same opinion and desires with him I agree to unite with you; but if not, to take frequent counsel with myself. Now what his sentiments and desires were, I can tell pretty nearly, not by conjecture, but by having known them clearly.

For when I came originally to Syracuse, being then nearly forty years old, Dion was of the age that Hipparinus is now; and the opinion he then held, he has still continued to hold, namely, that the Syracusans ought to be free and live according to the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some god has caused the latter to agree in the same opinion with the former on the subject of a polity. But what was the method of producing this, is a thing not unworthy for the young

[1] I cannot understand *ἐπομνύντας* here. It seems to have come from the end of the sentence, where one MS. omits it.

[2] This is the only version I can give here of *μὴ ἀμούσῳ*.

[3] To this passage Wyttenbach, in Epist. Critic., p. 14, says Lucian alluded in Amor., p. 455, *σπουδὴν—καὶ παιδιὰν εὔμουσον*.

[4] On the metaphorical use of *ἀδελφὸς* see Ruhnken on Tim. p. 2, and Blomfield on Æsch. S. Th. 343.

[5] Such I presume is the meaning here of *εὐδαιμόνων*.

[6] Ficinus has "eandem mentem in republica esse vobis conservandam," as if he had found something in his MS., wanting at present in all the rest.

and not young to hear; and I will endeavour to relate it to you from the beginning; for the present events offer the opportunity.

When I was a young man, I was affected as the many are. I thought, if I became quickly my own master, to betake myself immediately to the public affairs of the state. Now some such circumstances as these fell out relating to state affairs. Of the polity existing at that time, when it was abused by many, a change took place; and over the change one and fifty men presided as governors, eleven in the city, and ten in the Piræus; and each of these had a jurisdiction about the Agora,[1] and whatever else it was necessary to regulate in the cities,[2] while thirty of them were invested with supreme authority. Some of these happened to be my relatives and acquaintances; and they forthwith invited me (to attend) to state-affairs, as being a suitable pursuit. And how I was affected is, on account of my youth, not at all wonderful. For I thought that they would, by leading the city from an unjust mode of living to a just one, [3]administer it in the way it was meet;[3] so that I diligently gave my mind to what they did. But when I saw these men proving in a short time that the previous form of government had been (as it were) gold,[4] [5]and that they committed other acts (unjustly),[5] and sent my friend Socrates, advanced in years, whom I am not ashamed to say was nearly the most righteous man of those then living, together with certain others,[6] against one of the citizens.

[1] This probably alludes to the office called *Ἀγορανόμος*, or "controller of the market," of which there were five for the Piræus, as stated by Harpocration on the authority of Aristotle.

[2] By the cities are meant the towns in Attica, that, like cities and boroughs in England, had previously their own municipal officers.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *διοικήσειν δή*—But Ficinus has "debere convertere," as if he had found in his MS. *διοικήσειν δεῖν*. From the two I have elicited *ᾗ δέον*—

[4] In lieu of *χρυσῆν*, Hemsterhuis on Lucian Necyomant. § 4, would read *χρυσὸν*: and so two MSS. subsequently collated; for that is the perpetual word in this expression. Boissonade however on Eunapius, p. 483, and Stalbaum here, are content with *χρυσῆν*.

[5]—[5] I have followed the version of Ficinus—"et alia multa injuste fecerunt." The Greek is simply *τά τε ἄλλα*—

[6] By these "certain others" are meant the "tipstaffs," or "policemen," as they would be called in England; but whose name at Athens was *τοξόται*, from the bow and arrows they carried, or *Σκύθαι*, from their native country.

and to bring him by force, in order that he might be executed, so that he (Socrates) might have a share in their deeds, whether he wished it or not, and that he did not comply, but ran the risk of suffering every thing, rather than take any part in their impious acts—all this when I saw, and other similar acts of no trifling kind, I felt indignant, and withdrew myself from the evil men of that period.

Not long after this, the power of the thirty fell by a revolution, together with the whole of the then existing form of government. Again, therefore, but somewhat more slowly, did a desire still drag me on to engage in public and political affairs. Now in these, as being in a troubled state, many things took place, at which any one might be indignant; nor was it wonderful, that in revolutions the punishment of hostile factions should have been rather severe in the case of some; although they who returned acted with considerable clemency.[1] But by some chance some of those in power brought before a court of justice our friend Socrates, laying upon him an accusation the most unholy, and belonging the least of all to Socrates. For some brought him to trial, and others gave their vote against him, and destroyed the man, who had been unwilling to share in the unholy act of a removal relating to one of his then exiled[2] friends, [3]when the exiles themselves were unfortunate.[3] On reflecting then upon these matters, and on the persons who managed political affairs, and on the laws and customs, the more I considered them, and I advanced in years, by so much the more difficult did it appear to me to administer correctly state affairs. For it is not possible to do so without friends and faithful associates; whom, existing at that time, it was not easy to find—for our city was then no longer administered according to the manners and institutions of our fathers—and it was impossible to acquire new with any facility; while the written laws and customs were corrupted, [4]and (unholiness) was increasing to a degree how wonderful![4]

[1] According to C. Nepos in Thrasybulus, § 2, only the thirty tyrants themselves suffered.

[2] So Ficinus renders *φευγόντων*. But perhaps the word means here, "put on their trial." For *φεύγων* is thus opposed to *διώκων*, "the pursuer," in Scottish law-phrase.

[3]—[3] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus. For he could not very well understand them; nor can I.

[4]—[4] The words *καὶ ἐπεδίδου θαυμαστὸν ὅσον* are omitted by Ficinus.

So that I, who had been at first full of ardour towards engaging in affairs of state, did, upon looking at these things and seeing them carried along in every way and on every side, become giddy; but not so as to withdraw from considering how at any time something[1] better might take place respecting these very matters, and likewise the whole form of government, but to be wisely[2] waiting continually for opportunities of acting. [3]At last I perceived[3] that all states existing at present were badly governed. For what relates to their laws is nearly in an incurable state, without some wonderful arrangement in conjunction with fortune. I was therefore compelled to say, in praise of true philosophy, that through it we are enabled to perceive all that is just as regards the state and individuals; and [4]hence that the human race will never cease from ills, until the race of those, who philosophize correctly and truthfully, shall come to political power, or persons of power in states shall, by a certain divine allotment, philosophize really.[4]

Holding these sentiments I arrived in Italy and Sicily,[5] when I first came there.[5] But on my arrival, the life, which is there called happy, pleased me at no time or manner; (a life) full of the tables prepared by Italiotes and Syracusans; and where one is filled twice a day; and never lies alone by night, and (has) such other pursuits as follow a life of this kind. For from these habits, no man under heaven, having such pursuits from his youth, would ever become prudent, [6]not even if he were

because, I suspect, he could not understand them; nor could I have done so, had I not seen that *τὸ λυόσιον* was to be restored probably after *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον*. With this use of *ὅσον* after an adjective compare *οὐράνιον ὅσον* in Aristoph. Βατρ. 78.

[1] The Greek is *ἄμεινον ἂν γίγνοιτο*. But Ficinus has "melius quid eveniret." He therefore found in his MS. *ἄμεινον ἄν τι γίγνοιτο*.

[2] I have adopted *εὖ*, found in one MS., in lieu of *αὖ*—

[3]—[3] Ficinus has "tandem vero compertum est mihi," as if he had found in his MS. *τελευτῶν δὲ ἐνόησα* instead of *τελευτῶντα δὲ νοῆσαι*—

[4]—[4] On this celebrated doctrine of Plato, which is repeated in different words in Rep. v. p. 473, D., § 18, it will be sufficient to refer to Ruhnken on Rutilius Lupus, p. 21.

[5]—[5] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[6]—[6] The Greek is *οὐχ οὕτω θαυμαστῇ φύσει κραθήσεται*, where I cannot understand *οὐχ οὕτω*, nor could, I suspect, Ficinus; whose version is "quamvis natura mirabili sit," which has led me to *οὐδ' εἰ ὑπό τε θείᾳ θαυμαστῇ φύσει κραθήσεται*

mixed up with a wondrous nature by some god;[6] [1]but to become temperate it will never be his care.[1] And the same thing may be said respecting the remaining portion of virtue. Nor will any state rest quietly according to any laws whatever, while men conceive that it is proper to waste every thing on excesses, and deem that they ought to be idle in every thing except good living and drinking, and the laboured exertions made for sexual intercourse. But it is necessary for such states never to cease changing their tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and for the powerful in them not to endure even the name of a polity just and with equal laws.

With these and the above-mentioned sentiments I passed over to Syracuse; perhaps through an accident of fortune; at least it seems that by the planning of some superior being a beginning was laid of the doings, that have lately taken place relating to Dion and of those too relating to Syracuse, and, there is a fear, to still more persons, if you do not yield to me, when giving advice a second time. How then do I assert that my journey to Sicily was the beginning of all the then doings? For while associating with Dion, then a young man, and pointing out to him by words that, what seemed good to me would be the best for mankind, and counselling him so to act, I was nearly ignorant that I was unconsciously planning in some manner the dissolution of a tyranny. For Dion being very docile, both with respect to other things, and the reasons urged by me, he heard so quickly and attentively, as not one ever did of the young men whom I had fallen in with; and he was desirous of passing the remainder of his life in a manner superior to the majority of the Italiotes and Siceliotes,[2] by loving virtue [3]rather than pleasure[3] and the rest of luxuries;

[1]—[1] Here again Ficinus has led the way to the truth by his version, "temperatus esse certe nunquam curabit." For the Greek is at present *σώφρων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μελλήσαι ποτὲ γενεσθαι.* But it was originally, I suspect, *σώφρονι δὲ οὐδὲν μελήσει ποτὲ γενέσθαι*: where *μελήσει* is supported by *μελήσαι* in two MSS.

[2] By the "Siceliotes" were meant foreigners settled in Sicily; the name of the natives was "Sicilians," in Greek *Σικελοί.*

[3]—[3] Such is Taylor's version of *περὶ πλείονος* in Greek, and of "potius quam" in Ficinus. But until a parallel passage is produced of *περὶ πλείονος* thus used in the sense of *πλέον* or *μᾶλλον*, I shall continue to believe that Plato wrote *ἀρετὴν περί του λῳονος*—"a virtue relating to something better than pleasure—"

and hence he lived rather odious to those, who passed their lives according to tyrannical institutions, until the death of Dionysius occurred. Subsequently, however, he perceived that the sentiments, which he held under the influence of correct reasoning, did not exist in him alone, but in some others; not numerous indeed, but amongst some, one of whom he thought would be probably Dionysius (the younger),[1] if the gods assisted; and should this take place, that both his own life, and that of the other Syracusans, would turn out to be beyond all measure happy. He thought, moreover, that I ought by all means to come as quickly as possible to Syracuse, to take part in these doings; for he remembered how our mutual intercourse had easily worked him up to the desire of a life the most beautiful and best; which if he could but accomplish, as he was attempting to do, in the case of Dionysius, he had great hopes that he could, without slaughter and death, and the evils which have now taken place, make, in the whole of the country, life to be happy and rational.

With these correct sentiments Dion persuaded Dionysius to send for me; and he himself requested me by all means to come as quickly as possible, before certain other persons, associating with Dionysius, should turn him aside to a life different from the best. [2]But it is necessary to relate what he requested, although[2] it is a rather long story. What opportunity, said he, shall we wait for, greater than that through a certain divine fortune? and giving a statement of their command over Italy and Sicily, and of his own power in it, and of the youth of Dionysius, and of the desire he felt so vehemently for philosophy and instruction, and saying how his cousins and kindred were to be easily exhorted to the reasoning and mode of life ever laid down by myself, and that they were most competent to exhort Dionysius, so that now, if

[1] Taylor has introduced this word from "juniorem" in Ficinus, although wanting in the Greek; while he has omitted "if the gods assisted," duly found in the "Diis bene juvantibus" of Ficinus.

[2]—[2] The Greek is λέγων δὲ τάδε ἐδεῖτο, εἰ, where Stephens suggested ἐδεῖτο, ἃ καὶ, and translated, "His dictis addebat preces, quas longum esset commemorare;" to which he was led by finding in Ficinus "cohortationem insuper precibus longam adjunxit." I have translated as if the Greek were λέγειν δὲ τάδε, ἃ ἐδεῖτο, δεῖ, εἰ, to which Taylor led me by translating, "It is necessary to relate—"

ever, all the hope would be fulfilled of the same persons becoming philosophers and rulers of mighty states. Such then and many others of a like kind were his exhortations. But a fear still possessed my mind, as to how, perchance, the conduct of the young men would turn out; for the passions of such persons are hasty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themselves. I knew, however, that Dion was naturally of a steady disposition and of a moderate age. Hence, while I was considering and doubting [1] whether I ought to go, or how,[1] the balance inclined[2] that I ought (to go). For if perchance any one should attempt to give effect to my ideas upon laws and a form of government, I ought to attempt it now. For by persuading only one person, I should work out every good. With these ideas and confidence, and not from what some imagined, I set sail from home; feeling for myself the greatest shame, lest I should seem to myself to be altogether mere talk,[3] and never willing to lay hold of any thing to be done; and run the risk of betraying first the hospitality and friendship of Dion, exposed in reality to no small dangers; and should he suffer aught,[4] or, being driven out by Dionysius and his other enemies, fly to us, and, making an inquiry,[5] say—"I am come to you, Plato, an exile; but I am neither in want of cavalry nor of heavy-armed soldiers to ward off my enemies, but of words and persuasion; by which I know you are especially able to turn young persons to what is good and just, and to place them on each occasion on terms of friendship and fellowship with each other; through the want of which on your part I have now left Syracuse, and am present here. What relates to myself indeed will bring upon you less disgrace; but the philosophy, which you are always praising, and which you

[1]—[1] Ficinus has "utrum eundum parendumque foret, necne," answering to *πότερον εἴη πορευτέον καὶ ὑπακουστέον ἢ οὔ* in Ald., which, as regards *ἢ οὔ*, is preferable here to *ἢ πῶς*. For the question is not about the manner of going, but of going or not.

[2] The verb *ἔρρεψε* is here used impersonally.

[3] Compare Eurip. Herc. F. 111, where old men are called *ἔπεα μόνον*, "words merely."

[4] In *εἰ πάθοι τι* is the usual euphemism for "should he perish."

[5] I cannot understand *ἀνέροιτο*, nor could Ficinus, who has omitted it; unless it refers to the question feigned to be put subsequently by Dionysius

say is held[1] in dishonour by the rest[2] of mankind, how is it not now betrayed by you together with myself, as far as depends upon you? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would surely have come to me as an assistant for what I had called you, or I should have considered you the meanest of men. But now, excusing yourself by the length of the journey, [3]and the danger of the voyage, and the greatness of the trouble,[3] think you that you shall avoid perchance the charge of cowardice? It will be far from this."

To language like this, what would have been a becoming answer? [4]There is none. But[4] I came with reason and justice, as much as it is possible for a man, having left my own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither suited to my discourses nor myself. But by my coming I liberated myself (from any charge), and exhibited myself to be unreproved by Zeus, who presides over hospitality and the allotment of philosophy, which would have been exposed to reproach, had I acted an effeminate part, and through cowardice shared in disgrace and shame. On my arrival then—for there is no need to be prolix—I found all the affairs of Dionysius full of sedition and calumnies on the part of a tyranny respecting Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmost of my power; but I was able to do but little. But nearly in the fourth month after my arrrival, Dionysius accused Dion of plotting against his power, and putting him on board a small vessel, sent him out with dishonour. Whereupon all of us, who were the friends of Dion, were fearful lest he should accuse and punish some one of us as an accomplice in the plot of Dion. And a report went abroad at Syracuse, that I had been put to death by Dionysius, as being forsooth

[1] In lieu of *φέρεσθαι*, Plato wrote either *φθείρεσθαι*, "wanders," or *στρέφεσθαι*, "tost about."

[2] The phrase in Plato is perpetually *τῶν ἄλλων*. Hence for *λοίπωι* I should prefer *ἀλόγων*, "irrational—"

[3]—[3] The Greek is *καὶ τὸ μέγεθος δὴ τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ τοῦ πόνου*. But Ficinus has "periculumque navigationis atque labores," as if he had found in his MS. *καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ τοὺς πόνους*. The three genitives however require each its own distinctive noun. Compare *κίνδυνοι καὶ πόνοι* in Alcib. II. p. 142, B.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *οὐκ ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ἦλθον*. Plato wrote *οὐκ ἐστιν ἄλλη ἢ ἦλθον*, i. e. There is no other than that I came—

the cause of all that happened at that time. But on perceiving that we were all thus[1] disposed, and dreading lest something of greater consequence should arise from our fear, he received all of us most kindly into his favour, consoled me, and exhorted me to be of good cheer, and requested me by all means to stay; for there would be an advantage to him from my not flying away, but from my remaining; and on this account he pretended to make an urgent request. We know however that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity. By a contrivance, therefore, he prevented my sailing-away. For taking me to the Acropolis, he made me reside there; from whence no ship-master could carry me off, not through Dionysius forbidding it merely, but unless Dionysius himself sent a person with an order, commanding him to lead me out. Nor was there any foreign trader, nor even one of those having jurisdiction over the departures[2] from the country, who would have overlooked my going away alone; but he would immediately have laid hold of me and brought me back again to Dionysius; especially since it had been already bruited abroad contrary to what had been done before, that Dionysius was again holding Plato to his arms in a wonderful manner. And indeed this was the case, for it is necessary to speak the truth. He did indeed hold me to his arms, ever as time went on, more (and more) in respect to the intercourse[3] of my manner and habits. But he wished me to praise him more than Dion, and to hold him as a friend in a far greater degree than the other; and for such an end he made wonderful efforts. But the way by which this might have taken place in the best manner, if it took place at all, [4]he omitted; for he shrunk[4] to become familiar and to associate with me, by [5]hearing and learning[5]

[1] By "thus" is meant "in a state of alarm."

[2] From this it would appear that there was at Syracuse an office, where passports were given to those leaving the country with the permission of the government, who had the power of issuing, what in England would be called a writ "ne exeat regno."

[3] Ficinus has here what is more intelligible, "et gaudebat moribus nostris et consuetudine." Perhaps Plato wrote *κατὰ τὴν—σύνεσιν*, "according to his knowledge—"

[4]—[4] The Greek is in some MSS. *ὥκνει ὡς δὴ*, in others *ὥκνει ἴσως δὴ*. But as Ficinus has "neglexit; hæc enim fuerat—" he probably found in his MS., what the sense requires, *εἴασε· ὥκνει γὰρ—*

[5]—[5] Ficinus has avoided the *ὕστερον πρότερον* in *μανθάνων καὶ*

discourses on philosophy, through the fear lest, (according)[1] to the language of calumniators, he should be shackled, and Dion administer all affairs. However I endured every thing, keeping to the original sentiments, with which I arrived, if by any means he should come to the desire of a philosophic life. But he, by his pulling in a contrary direction, obtained the victory. In this way then happened to turn out the first period of my sojourning and pursuits in Sicily. After this I went away and came back again, through Dionysius having sent for me with all earnestness. But on what account (I came),[2] and what I did, as being reasonable and just, I will, having first advised you what you ought to do, after what has just now taken place, subsequently relate in detail, for the sake of those who are inquiring with what view I came a second time to Sicily; and that deeds of no moment may not happen to be mentioned as deeds of moment.

[3] I say then something what I ought to say.[3] For the party, who gives advice to a sick man and to one who uses a diet improper for good health,[4] it is especially necessary in the first place to change the mode of living, and to recommend to the patient, willing to comply, the other things that are proper;[5] but if he is unwilling, I consider that he, who retires from advising such a person, acts like a man and a physician; but that he, who stays, like a person unmanly and devoid of art. The same is the case of a state, whether its master be one or many. If, while the government is proceeding in a right road according to the constitution, it takes counsel about what is conducive to its interest, it is the part of a man with mind to give to such parties

ἀκούων by translating "in audiendis addiscendisque," whom I have with Taylor followed.

[1] The Greek is φοβούμενος τοὺς—λόγους μή πη— But Ficinus has 'timens ne, quemadmodum asserebant calumniatores"—He therefore found, I suspect, in his MS. φοβούμενος, κατὰ τοὺς—λόγους, μή πη—

[2] Ficinus has alone what the sense requires, "quam vero ob causam rursus accesserim," as if his MS. read ὧν δὲ ἕνεκα ἀνῆλθον.

[3]—[3] The Greek is λέγω δὴ τάδε· ἐγώ. But as there is no verb to which ἐγώ can be referred, I have translated as if the Greek were λέγω δή τι, ὃ δεῖ λέγειν. The verb supplied by Ficinus is "reor."

[4] In lieu of ἄλλο τι, which Ficinus has omitted as unintelligible, and Stephens attempted to correct by reading, what Stalbaum approves of, ἄλλα τε καὶ ὅτι, Plato wrote, I suspect, μάλιστα, as I have translated.

[5] The sense manifestly requires ἃ, or ᾗ, δεῖ in lieu of ἤδη.

advice; but in the case of those, who are proceeding entirely out of a straightforward polity, and not at all willing to walk in its steps, and who proclaim to the adviser to leave alone the form of government, and not to disturb it—since, if he does disturb it, he shall suffer death—and at the same time exhort him to minister to their wishes and passions, and to advise in what way these may for all time to come be gratified,[1] I should consider the person, who endures to give such advice, unmanly; but him, who does not endure, a man.

Holding then such sentiments, whenever any one consults with myself about any thing of the greatest moment relating to his life, such as the acquisition of wealth, or the care[2] of his body or soul, I readily advise with him, if he appears to me to live day by day in an orderly manner, or is willing to be persuaded by me when giving advice, nor do I desist, as if I have gone through merely a formal rite.[3] But if either he does not consult me at all, or is evidently not about to follow my advice, I do not go self-called to such a person to counsel him, nor would I do so by compulsion, even if he were my son. But I would give advice to a slave, and force him, even unwilling, (to follow it.) I should however think it not holy to force my father or mother, unless they were, through disease, afflicted with silliness. But if persons are living an established mode of life, pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I should not, when admonishing them in vain, dislike them, nor yet by flattering, minister to them, and afford them the means of gratifying their desires, which if I were to embrace, I should not wish to live. With the same sentiments respecting a state a prudent man ought to live, and speak out, if it appears to him not to have a good form of government, (and) if he is about not to speak in vain, nor to lose his life by speaking; but never to apply violence [4]to his country on account of[4] a change in the form of government, unless it cannot become the best without

[1] In lieu of *γίγνοιντο* the train of thought leads to *γανύοιντο*—

[2] Ficinus has "corporis vel animi purgationem," as if he had found in his MS. *καθάρσεως*, instead of *ἐπιμέλειαν*, which would lead to *ἢ περὶ σώματος ἐπιμέλειας ἢ ψυχῆς καθάρσεως*.

[3] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows as usual, has "non prius desino, quam initium pro viribus usque ad finem perduxerim." On the use and meaning of *ἀφοσιοῦσθαι*, see Ast on Legg. vi. p. 752, D.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *πατρίδι*. But one MS. has *πατρὶ διὰ*, which evidently leads to *πατρίδι διὰ*—

the banishment and slaughter of persons; but leading a quiet life, to pray for the good both of himself and of the state.

In this very manner I would advise you (to act); and so did I together with Dion advise Dionysius [1]to live day by day, so that in the first place[1] he might be about to become the master of himself, and acquire faithful friends and associates, in order that he might not suffer what his father did; who, after he had got possession of many and great cities in Sicily, which had been laid waste by the Barbarians, was not able to establish and preserve in each of them forms of government, faithful under his associates, or strangers [2]coming from any part whatever,[2] or brothers, whom he himself had brought up as being younger, and had made them rulers, after being merely private persons, and remarkably rich, after being (very) poor. For among these he could not attach to himself a single one as the sharer of his dominion, although working upon them by persuasion, and teaching, and kindnesses, and alliances; and he was sevenfold worse off than Darius; who, placing a trust in persons not his brothers,[3] nor brought up by him, but in those alone associated with himself in their mastery [4]over the eunuch,[4] divided amongst them seven parts of his dominions, each larger than the whole of Sicily, and made use of them as faithful associates, and attacking neither himself, nor each other; and gave likewise an example of what a lawgiver and a king ought to be. For he established laws, by which he has preserved even now the Persian power; and besides this the Athenians, although they had not colonized themselves many Grecian cities, which had been overturned by the Barbarians, but merely got hold of them, when already inhabited, preserved their empire over them for seventy years, through having persons friendly to them in each of the towns.

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ζῆν μέντοι τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν πρῶτον.* But five MSS. omit *τὸ*, and two *πρῶτον.* Ficinus has "ea videlicet ratione quotidie vivere," as if he had found in his MS. *ζῆν καθ' ἡμέραν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.*

[2]—[2] Instead of *ἄλλων δή ποθεν*, correct Greek requires *ἄλλοθεν δή ποθεν.*

[3] I have adopted the idea of Stephens, who unites *οὐκ* with *ἀδελφοῖς*, not, as others do, with *πιστεύσας.*

[4]—[4] The Greek is *τῆς τοῦ Μηδου τε καὶ εὐνούχου.* But *Μήδου τε καὶ*, or *Μίδου τε καὶ*, as Ficinus found in his MS., is evidently an incorrect explanation of *τοῦ εὐνούχου*, whose name was Smerdis, as we learn from Herodotus iii. 61.

But Dionysius having through his wisdom brought together the whole of Sicily into one state, yet, through confiding in no one, was with difficulty saved. For he was poor in persons friendly and faithful; than which there is no greater sign as regards virtue and vice, than in being destitute or not of men of that kind. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius, since what he had received from his father had come to him unacquainted with instruction, and unacquainted too with befitting associates, in the first place to proceed in that direction, to procure for himself friends, different from his relations, but both his equals in age and in accordance with him respecting virtue. But we particularly advised him to be in accord with himself; for that he was wonderfully deficient in this we asserted, not indeed in such clear terms—for this was not safe—but in hints and contending in our discourses, that in this way every man will preserve both himself and those over whom he is the ruler; but that by not turning himself in this direction he will bring to pass every thing the very reverse. But if, after going on, as we said, and rendering himself prudent and temperate, he peopled the cities of Sicily, that had been made desolate, and bound them together with laws and forms of government, so as to be of one family with himself and an assistance to each other against the Barbarians,[1] he would not only double his ancestral dominion, but make it in reality much larger. For if this were done, it would be much more easy to enslave the Carthaginians, than was the slavery effected by them during the reign of Gelon; [2]but not as now on the contrary,[2] his father fixed the tribute he was to carry to the Barbarians.

This is what was said and the advice given to Dionysius by us, who were plotting against him, as the reports were circulated on many sides. Such, that after prevailing with Dionysius, they caused him to drive out Dion, and threw myself into a state of terror. But, that I may bring to a close not a few events [3]which occurred in a short time,[3] Dion, [1]departing from

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were *τὰ*, not *τὰς*, for *βοηθείας* must belong to the cities in Sicily.

[2]—[2] The words *ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὐναντίον* I cannot understand. Ficinus has, what is at least intelligible, "contra quam accidit patri —"

[3]—[3] Such is the translation of *πράγματα τὰ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*. But Ficinus has "non pauca in paucis—" as if his MS. omitted *τὰ ἐν*—Taylor translates the whole phrase "in short—"

Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius indeed.[1] Since then (Dion)[2] had liberated and twice restored the town to the citizens, the Syracusans were affected in the same manner towards him, as Dionysius had been, when he endeavoured by educating and bringing him up to make him thus a worthy partner of his power through the whole of life. But [3](he gave his ear)[3] to those that were calumniating Dion, and saying that he was doing all that he did at that time, while plotting against the absolute power of Dionysius, in order that the one, being lulled in his mind by his attention to instruction, might neglect his kingdom, and commit it to Dion, and the other make it his own by fraud, and cast out Dionysius from his dominions.

These reports being then bruited a second time among the Syracusans prevailed by a victory very absurd and disgraceful to those who were the causes of it. For how it happened it is proper for those to hear, who are calling upon me on the subject of the present affairs.

Being an Athenian, and the associate of Dion, and one who had battled with him against the tyrant, I arrived, that I might produce a peace instead of a war; but while battling against the calumniators I was overcome. But Dionysius, attempting to bribe me by [4] honours and riches,[4] to become on his side a witness and a friend, touching the propriety of his casting out Dion,[5] failed in all of these things happening to him. And Dion afterwards, on returning home from exile, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had become his friends, not through philosophy, but through that acquaintance, which runs through [6]the generality of friends,[6] and which they formed

[1]—[1] Here is evidently something wanting to preserve the connexion of ideas in the narrative.

[2] The Greek is Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν—But two MSS. ἐπεὶ οὖν—Ficinus has "Cum ergo——Dion—" He therefore found in his MS. ἐπεὶ δὴ Δίωνα, and subsequently ἀστοῖς for αὐτοῖς, as shown by his version, "civibus."

[3]—[3] To complete the sense and syntax Cornarius proposed to insert ἐπίστευε after ὁ δὲ—Perhaps Plato wrote ὁ δ' ἔδω τὸ οὗς τοῖς—as I have translated.

[4]—[4] Ficinus has "non verbis solum sed pecuniis etiam et honoribus."

[5] I have translated as if αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι followed διήμαρτεν, not Διώνος, where those words are unintelligible.

[6]—[6] Although πλείστων φίλων might perhaps stand, yet one would prefer πλαστῶς φίλων, as I suggested in Bailey's Hermesianax p. 155, com

from paying the rites of hospitality, and from being [1]Mystæ and Epoptæ.[1] Moreover these two, by having brought Dion back, had become his friends, and, from such causes, and the assisting him in his return from exile, his companions. But when, on their arrival in Sicily, they understood that Dion had been exposed by those Siceliotes, who had become free through him, to the calumny of plotting to become a tyrant, they not only betrayed their associate and guest, but became, as it were, the perpetrators of a murder, in that, with weapons in their hands, they stood by to assist the murderers. However, I neither pass by this base and unholy deed, nor do I detail it; for to many others it (has been)[2] a care to hymn it, and it will be so at some future time.

But the charge, which has been alleged respecting the Athenians, how that it was they, who bound this disgrace around the city, I will take away. For I say that he too was an Athenian, who did not betray this very person, when it was in his power to obtain wealth and many other honours. For he did not become a friend through a shop-mate friendship, but through the communion of a liberal education; to which alone he, who is endued with mind, ought to trust, rather than to the alliance of souls[3] and bodies; so that those two were not fit to bring disgrace on the city through having murdered Dion, as being persons of no account at any time. All this has been said for the sake of the advice given to the friends and kindred of Dion.

I give you besides the same counsel, and for the third time address you three in the same words. Do not place Sicily, or any other city, as a slave under persons with despotic power, but under laws; such[4] at least is my dictum. For this is not the better either for the enslaving or the enslaved, or for their

paring *οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι* in Sophist, p. 216, E., and *ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς* in Legg. i. p. 642. D.

[1]—[1] On the Mystæ and Epoptæ see at the Banquet, § 34, n. 46.

[2] Ficinus has "narraverunt atque narrabunt," as if he had found in his MS. *ἐπιμελὲς ἦν—μελήσει.* But who are the parties alluded to as having hymned these events, is not, I believe, mentioned elsewhere.

[3] This disparagement of a friendship formed by kindred souls seems rather strange in the mouth of Plato. There is an error here, which it would be not difficult to correct by the aid of the proverb in Suidas, *Ζεῖ χύτρα, ζῇ φιλία,* i. e. "Where boils the pot, There friendship's hot." Ficinus has "animorum conjunctioni et corporum consanguinitati."

[4] Instead of *ὅ γ'*—Stephens suggested *ὥς γ'*—similar to "ut—" in Ficinus.

children or their children's descendants; but the experiment is altogether a destructive one. For souls, whose habits are little and illiberal, love to seize upon gain of this kind, as knowing nothing of what is good and just for the future and present time, nor of things human and divine. Of this I endeavoured to persuade Dion first, and secondly Dionysius, and now I do you the third. Be persuaded then by me, for the sake of Zeus the third saviour.[1] In the next place look to the case of Dionysius and Dion; the former of whom by not being persuaded is now living not honourably; whereas the latter, by being persuaded, died honourably. For it is a thing altogether correct and honourable for him, who aspires after things the most honourable both for himself and his country, to suffer whatever he may suffer; for not one of us is naturally immortal; nor, if this should happen to any one, would he become happy, as it seems he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate there is nothing either good or evil worthy of mention; but good or ill will happen to each soul, either existing with the body or separated from it. But it is ever requisite to trust really[2] to the sacred[3] accounts of the olden time, which inform us that the soul is immortal, and has judges of its conduct, and suffers the greatest punishments, when it is liberated from the body. Hence it is requisite to think it is a lesser evil to suffer, than to do, the greatest sins and injuries. This, indeed, the man who is fond of money and poor in soul does not hear; and should he hear, he laughs it down, as he imagines, and impudently snatches from all sides whatever he thinks he can, like a wild beast, eat or drink, or can contribute (aught)[4] to the miscalled pleasure of sexual intercourse, at once servile and graceless. [5](For) being blind, he is not able to see how great an evil, ever united to each act of wrong, follows the never being satisfied with the unholy perpetration of such snatchings;[5] which it is

[1] On the expression Ζεὺς σωτὴρ τρίτος, see at Phileb. § 100.

[2] Ficinus, "revera," answering to ὄντως found subsequently in all the MSS.

[3] Here is probably an allusion to the Orphic hymns, real or pretended, which were in circulation during the time of Plato.

[4] The pronoun τι seems to have dropt out before ποριεῖν, or else before περὶ, for otherwise ποριεῖν will want its object.

[5]—[5] In this most intricate passage Ficinus has been of signal service, by showing that the words αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ πίμπλασθαι were in his MS. found in a different place to where they are commonly read. For his version

necessary for him, who has acted unjustly, to drag along with himself, both while he is moving about upon the earth, and when he takes[1] under the earth a journey without honour, and thoroughly miserable in every way.

By detailing these and other reasons of the like kind, I was enabled to persuade Dion. And I should have felt most justly against those, who murdered him, an anger, in a certain manner, almost as great as against Dionysius; for both had injured myself and all the rest, so to say, in the highest degree. For[2] the former had destroyed a man, who was willing to make use of justice; while the latter (was) unwilling to make use of it through the whole of his dominions, although possessing the greatest power. In which (dominions) had philosophy and power existed really, as it were[3] in the same (dwelling), they would have set up amongst all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, an opinion not vainly[4] shining, (and) in every respect the true one, that neither a state nor a man can ever be happy, unless by leading a life with prudence in subjection to justice, whether possessing those things themselves, or by being brought up in the habits of holy persons their rulers, or instructed in justice.

This injury did Dionysius inflict. But the rest would have been a trifling wrong, as compared to these. But he, who murdered Dion, did not know that he had done the same deed

is, "et quasi cæcus non cernit se frustra contendere inexplebilem explere concupiscentiam; neque rursus cernit, quantum sit impietas malum quibusque insit rebus, semper injustitiæ mixta." In other respects however his translation is too loose to be a safe guide. The Greek was perhaps originally to this effect, *Τυφλὸς ὢν γὰρ οὐχ ἔχει ὁρᾷν ὡς κακὸν ἡλικὸν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀδικήματος ἑκάστου ξυνέπεται αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ πίμπλασθαι τῶν ἁρπαγμάτων ἀνοσιούργιᾳ*: and so I have translated.

[1] On *νόστος* and *νοστεῖν*, taken in the sense of going, not as usual of returning, see my note on Philoct. 43. Here, however, the idea of a return is to be kept in mind. For the dead are said to return to the earth. See at Menexenus, § 6, and compare the language of Walter Scott, who says of the person, who has no love for his father-land, that he

"Living shall forfeit fair renown,
And doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonour'd, and unsung."

[2] To preserve the syntax *ἦν* must be inserted after *οὐδὲν*—

[3] Ficinus has "vere in idem quasi domicilium"—he therefore found in his MS. *ὄντως ὡς ἐν ταὐτῷ οἴκῳ*, not merely *ὄντως ἐν ταὐτῷ*—

[4] The Greek is here *ἱκανῶς*, the sense requires *οὐ κενῶς*—

as Dionysius. For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his power, he would never have changed it to any other form of government than to that, by which he first (caused) Syracuse,[1] his own country, after he had delivered it from slavery, to look joyous, and had put it into the garb of freedom; and after this, he would by every contrivance have adorned the citizens with laws both befitting and the best; and he would have been ready to do what followed in due order after this; and have colonized the whole of Sicily, and have freed it from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subduing others, more easily than Hiero did. But if these things had taken place, through a man just, and brave, and temperate, and who was a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been produced amongst the multitude, as would have been amongst all men, so to say; and have saved[2] Dionysius, had he been persuaded by me. But now some dæmon surely, or some evil spirit, falling upon[3] with iniquity and impiety, and, what is the greatest matter, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they spring up, and afterwards produce fruit the most bitter to those, who have begotten it,[4] this[5] has a second time subverted and destroyed every

[1] By omitting with six MSS. *καὶ* before *φαιδρύνας*, the syntax is indeed completed; but there is still some error in the words *μὲν πρῶτον*, which it is not difficult perhaps to correct.

[2] Such is the literal version of *ἀπέσωσε*. But Ficinus—"quæ et salvare—viguisset," as if he had found in his MS. *ἔτι σέσωστο*, where the pluperfect passive would want, as it often does, its augment; as shown by Matth. Gr. Gr. 165.

[3] The Greek is *ἐμπεσὼν*, which I cannot understand; nor could Taylor, who translates "replete," as if he was thinking of *ἐμπλέως*. Ficinus has "his sese objiciens." But *ἐμπίπτειν* does not mean "se objicere;" and if it did, there is nothing to answer to "his." Perhaps Plato wrote *ἀλιτήριος συμπεσὼν ἀνομίᾳ*. On the corruption of *συν* into *εμ*, see Schæfer on Dionysius Περὶ Συνθεσ. p. 147, and in Index under Σύν.

[4] Instead of *τοῖς γεννήσασι*, Ficinus has "qui producentur;" as if he had either read in his MS., or wished to read, *τοῖς τῆς γέννης οὖσι*—

[5] Stephens justly objected to *αὐτὴ*: which cannot be applied to the preceding *δαίμων* or *ἀλιτήριος*. But he did not perceive that if we read *ἢ θεά τίς ἐλατήριος* in lieu of *ἢ τις ἀλιτήριος*, and place those words before *ἐξ ἧς*, the pronoun will recover the noun to which it belongs, and *θεὰ ἐλατήριος* will be a proper description of the Fury, whose business it is to urge on evil-doers to their ruin. But even thus the passage is not restored to its original state, nor will it be perhaps, till better MSS are discovered.

thing. However, let us, for the sake of a good augury, keep for the third time a well-omened silence.

I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, in the good-will he felt for his country, and in his temperate mode of living, but for the better. But[1] [2]under what auspices you ought to endeavour[2] to fulfil his wishes, and what they are, you have clearly heard from me. But upon the person, who is among you unable to live according to his country's customs in a Dorian fashion, but adopts the life of the murderers of Dion, and what is followed in Sicily, do not call; nor believe that he will in any thing ever act faithfully and sincerely. But call upon the rest to form a settlement of the whole of Sicily, and introduce both from Sicily itself and all Peloponnesus an equality of laws, and do not fear the Athenians; for men are there, who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the daring of guest-murderers.

But if these things be done at a later period, and the differences, produced each day by factions, are many and of all kinds and hasten you on, it is requisite surely for every man, to whom a divine fortune[3] has imparted even a small degree of correct thinking, to know that there will be no cessation of evils to those engaged in revolts, until the victors in battle and in the banishment and slaughter of persons shall cease to have a recollection of wrongs, and to turn themselves to the punishment of their opponents; but, having a mastery over themselves, shall lay down laws common to all, and no less acceptable to themselves than to the vanquished party, and compel them to use these laws, by the two-fold necessity of fear and shame; of fear, through their being superior, by showing their strength; and of shame, on the other hand, through their seeming to be superior in the being both willing and able to be (the masters)[4] over pleasures, and the slaves of

[1] Ficinus has "magis magisque complectentes." For he was not perhaps aware that *μιμεῖσθαι* is united to two accusatives, and that *ἐπὶ τὸ λῷον* follow here *μιμεῖσθαι*, as *ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίω* precede *μιμουμένας* in Politic. p. 297, C., and *ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα* follow *μεμιμημέναι* in Phileb. p. 40, C.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "quibus auspiciis." For his MS. read not *ὡς* but *ὧν*, found subsequently in all the others. It read likewise *πειρᾶσθαι ἀποτελεῖν ἔδει—αἱ δέ*, as shown by his version, "perficere conandum vobis sit."

[3] Ficinus has "sors—divina," which would be in Plato *θεία μοῖρα*—

[4] As *τοῖς νόμοις* depend upon *δουλεύειν*, so to balance the sentence

the laws. For it is not possible otherwise for a state, divided against itself, to cease from ills; but divisions and enmity, and hatred and distrust, are ever wont to arise in states thus arrayed themselves against themselves. It is then ever requisite for those, who have gained the power, when they are desirous of preserving it, to choose from amongst themselves, in preference to the rest, such as they hear are the best; in the first place, old men, who have children and wives at home,[1] and ancestors the most in number and renown, and all possessing a competence. [2] Now for a city of ten thousand persons fifty such will be sufficient.[2] These should be sent for from their home with prayers and the greatest honours possible; and [3] they, who have sent for them, should take an oath, and beg and request them [3] to lay down laws, and give not more to the victors than to the vanquished, but what is equal for, and common to, the whole state; and when the laws have been fixed, [4] all things are in this.[4] For when the victors exhibit themselves more subject to the laws than the vanquished, all things will be full of security and felicity, and there will be an escape from every ill. But if not, call not upon me or any other to take a part for him, who is not persuaded by the precepts now conveyed. For these are the sisters of what I and Dion did with good intentions attempt to do for Syracuse; although they were, on the second occasion; for the first were those, which were first attempted to be done in conjunction

there ought to be a verb united to *περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς*. Hence Ficinus has "tum in voluptatibus superandis tum in legibus observandis," as if he had found in his MS. *ὑπέρ τε ταῖς ἡδοναῖς—δυνάμενοι εἶναι καὶ δουλεύειν*. For thus *εἶναι καὶ* might have been easily lost after *δυνάμενοι*.

[1] Instead of *οἴκοι*, Ficinus found in his MS. *οἶκον*, as shown by his version, "domicilium."

[2—2] Such is the literal translation of this passage; which Taylor has thus misrepresented: "But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be sufficient for a city of this kind."

[3—3] The Greek is *μεταπεμψαμένους ὀμόσαντας δεῖσθαι*, of which I have given a literal translation, that I cannot understand. Nor could Ficinus, as shown by his version, "evocantes autem precari atque jurejurando astringere;" where he has given to *μεταπεμψαμένους* a passive meaning, at variance with the genius of the language, and translated *ὀμόσαντας* as if it were *ὀρκώσαντας*. What Plato wrote can only be guessed at.

[4—4] Here again I am at a loss in the words *ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τὰ πάντα ἐστιν*. I could have understood—*ἐν τῷ αὐτῷν δεῖ τὰ πάντα ἑστάναι*—"all things must needs stand in their own place."

with Dionysius, a common good to all. But a certain fortune, superior to man, scattered them all. Do you then attempt to accomplish all at present more prosperously, with the aid of some kind destiny, and a luck god-sent. And thus much be it said about my advice and letter, and first visit to Dionysius.

But in my second journey and voyage to Sicily, how reasonably and carefully they took place, he, who feels any interest may hear what followed. For the first period of my sojourn in Sicily passed away, as I have stated, before I could advise the relatives and associates of Dion. But subsequently I persuaded Dionysius, as far as I was able, to let me go. But on peace being made—for there had been then a war in Sicily—we both came to an agreement; for Dionysius said that he would send for Dion and myself again, after he had established for himself a state of affairs connected with his government more securely than before; and he thought it proper for Dion to understand that this was not a banishment at that time, but merely a change of residence.[1] And on these conditions I agreed to come.

On peace being made, Dionysius sent for me; but he requested Dion to stop[2] another year; but he thought it proper for myself to come by all means. Dion then exhorted and entreated me to set sail. For a strong report had gone abroad from Sicily, that Dionysius had become again wonderfully eager after philosophy at that moment; and on this account Dion earnestly begged of me not to decline the invitation. But I knew that many such things happen to young men in the case of philosophy. However it seemed to me to be more safe, at least at that time, to bid a long farewell to Dionysius and Dion; and I gave offence to both by answering that I was an old man; and that nothing of what was now being done had taken place according to the agreement. But after this it seems[3] that Archytas[4] had betaken himself to Dionysius; now

[1] Ficinus adds here "certo tempore rediturum," as if his MS. were fuller than the rest.

[2] Instead of ἐπισχεῖν, Ficinus seems to have found in his MS. ἀπουσίαν πάσχειν. For his version is "absentiam tolerare."

[3] Ficinus has "audivi," as if he had found in his MS. ἀκήκοα instead of ἔοικε—

[4] Of this Archytas, who, as appears from the line in Horace, "Te maris et terræ numeroque carentis arenæ," attempted to measure the

before my departure having made a hospitable and friendly acquaintance with Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the guests and friends of Dionysius, I sailed away.[1] There were likewise certain other persons at Syracuse, who had heard some of the doctrines of Dion, and among these some others, filled with wrong notions about philosophy, and who seemed to me to attempt to discourse with Dionysius about things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such matters as I had in my thoughts. But in other respects he was not without natural talent or the power to learn, and had a love of honour in a wonderful degree. Perhaps then the discourse of these men was pleasing to him, and he was manifestly ashamed that he heard nothing from me when I was sojourning there.[2] Hence he came the same time to the longing to hear me more clearly, and at the same time his love of honour urged him on. But on what account he did not hear me during my first sojourn, I have detailed in the account given above.

After I had returned home safe, and refused on his inviting me a second time, as I have just now mentioned, Dionysius appeared to be thoroughly [3]on fire through his love of honour,[3] lest I should seem to some persons to hold him in contempt, and that, as being acquainted with his nature and habits, and mode of living, I was unwilling to be annoyed by going to him. But I am justified in speaking the truth, and in enduring,[4] if any one, on hearing what had occurred, should despise my philosophy, and think that the tyrant possessed a mind. For Dionysius sent to me the third time a trireme for the sake of making easy the voyage. He sent also Archedemus,[5] whom he

quantity of matter contained in the earth, little is known; but of that little the whole is to his credit; especially the fact of his being the means of saving the life of Plato, when he was near losing it by the orders of Dionysius.

[1] Ficinus omits *ἀπέπλεον*, which seems superfluous after *πρὶν ἀπιέναι*. But in that case we must read *ἐποίησα*, in lieu of *ποιήσας*, similar to "adduxeram," in Ficinus.

[2] Ficinus, whom Taylor follows, has "cum ad eum profectus sum." But such is not the meaning of *ἐπιδημεύειν*.

[3]—[3] Out of *φιλοτιμηθῆναι*, which I cannot understand, it is easy to elicit *φιλοτιμίᾳ ἀφθῆναι*, from "honoris sui causa ardere," in Ficinus. Compare a similar metaphor a little below, *ἐξημμένος ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας, ὥσπερ πυρός*.

[4] I cannot understand *ὑπομένειν*, nor "ferre æquo animo," in Ficinus. I could have understood *ἀπαμύνειν*, "to repel."

[5] Stephens tacitly reads here *Ἀρχέδημον*, instead of *Ἀρχίδαμον*, con-

thought I valued the most of all the associates of Archytas, who were then in Sicily, and others of his (own)[1] acquaintances. And all these told to us the same story, that Dionysius had wonderfully increased in[2] philosophy. He sent too a long letter, well knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse. With a view to all these particulars, therefore, the letter was composed, and at the commencement it said somehow to this effect—"Dionysius to Plato." After saying what usually follows, he said nothing previous to this, except that—"should you at my persuasion come now to Sicily, in the first place the matters relating to Dion shall be put into a train in the way you may wish yourself; for I know that you wish what is moderate, and I will accede to them; otherwise [3]nothing that relates to the affairs of Dion,[3] nor upon other points, nor as regards himself, will take place."—This is what he said. But the rest that was said would be here prolix, and foreign to the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas, and others at Tarentum, speaking in high terms of the love of wisdom shown by Dionysius; and that, unless I came now, I should bring into a state of calumny the friendship existing with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no little moment to their political affairs.

Such then being the state at that time of the sending for me, some of those from Sicily and Italy dragging me thither, and others at Athens pushing me away plainly by their entreaties, the same reason returned,[4] that I ought not to betray Dion, nor my guests and friends[5] at Tarentum; and it oc-

ceiving no doubt that the person here alluded to is the same as the one mentioned in Epist. 3, p. 319, A.

[1] I have inserted "own," in allusion to Dionysius. To avoid the tautology in *τῶν ξυγγεγονότων*, and *γνωρίμους*, Ficinus has "nobiles," but that is the meaning of *εὐγενεῖς*, not of *γνωρίμους*. Hence *αὐτοῦ* has probably dropt out before *ἄλλους* or *τῶν*.

[2] Ficinus has "deditum esse." But that would be in correct Greek *δεδωκώς*, or *ἐνδεδωκώς*, not *ἐπιδεδωκώς*.

[3]—[3] Ficinus—"nihil impetrabis quæ pro Dione optas," which is not the Latin for *οὐδὲν σοι τῶν περὶ Δίωνα ἕξει πραγμάτων*. Perhaps he found in his MS. *σὺ τῶν περὶ Δίωνα ἃ εὔξῳ ἕξεις*.

[4] Instead of *ἧκεν*, Stephens proposed *ᾖρει*, suggested by "ratio dictaret" in Ficinus. But one MS. has correctly, *πάλιν ἧκεν*, i. e. "returned."

[5] Bekker has adopted *ἑταίρους* in lieu of *ἑτέρους*, found in only one MS.

curred to me, that it was nothing wonderful that a young man, who had heard incorrectly of things worthy of mention, should come with a docile spirit to the love of the best life; and that I ought to prove clearly, in what state the matter stood, and not by any means to betray it, nor to become myself the cause of a disgrace so truly great, if the case was in reality such as reported. Clothing myself then in this reasoning, I departed, fearing much, and prophesying, as it seems, not altogether well. Arriving then the third time, [1]for the saviour this at least I did in reality.[1] For I was again[2] luckily saved. And for this it is meet for me to give thanks to Dionysius, after the deity, because, when many were wishing to destroy me, he prevented them, and gave up to pity some portion of my affairs.

When therefore I arrived, I thought I ought first to obtain some proof whether Dionysius was in reality touched by philosophy, as by a fire, or whether this great report had come to Athens in vain. Now there is a certain method of making an experiment upon matters of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to such as are full of incorrect notions; which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the case with Dionysius. To such it is requisite to show what (philosophy)[3] is, and of what kind, and through how great deeds how great a labour it demands. For he who hears this, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and related to it, and worthy of it, as being a divine person, thinks he has heard of some wonderful road, and that he ought forthwith to betake himself to it, and that life is not to be endured by him, who acts otherwise. After this he does not, putting both himself and his leader on the stretch, give up the road, until he puts a finish upon all things, or obtains a power so as not to be unable to conduct himself without a person to show the road.

[1]—[1] Such is the literal version of the Greek *τῷ σωτῆρι τοῦτό γε οὖν ἔπραξα ὄντως*: which I cannot understand. For *τῷ σωτῆρι* is without regimen. Ficinus has "Profectus—sub servatore; id enim revera consecutus sum." What Plato said, I think, originally, was, that he made a sacrifice in honour of the deity, who had saved him from the perils of a sea-voyage.

[2] Three MSS. have *πάλιν* for *πάλαι*, agreeing with "rursus" in Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus has alone preserved the word "philosophy," necessary for the sense.

In this way and with these thoughts does such a person live, acting (correctly)[1] in whatever transactions he may be engaged; but before all things perpetually keeping close to philosophy, and (making use of)[2] that food for the day, which may especially render him quick to learn, and of a good memory, and able to reason in himself,[3] by abstaining from wine; and by which he becomes the hater of a practice contrary[4] to this.

But they, who are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but have a coating of colour in their opinions, like those, whose bodies are sun-burnt, when they perceive how many things are to be learnt, and how great is the labour, and what temperance in daily food is requisite for that thing, they deem it too difficult and beyond their powers, and become unable to attend to it at all. But some of them persuade themselves that they have sufficiently heard the whole, and want no further exertions. This kind of experiment is clear and the most safe, when employed in the case of those living luxuriously and unable to endure labour, through the person throwing the blame not upon the guide but on himself, as being unable to attend to all that is requisite for the matter in hand.

In this way was, what has been now stated, mentioned to Dionysius. But neither did I detail them all, nor did Dionysius require it. For many things, and of the greatest moment, he pretended to possess sufficiently himself through the incorrect notions he had heard from others. And I hear that he afterwards wrote about what he had then heard, as if he were composing what was his own art, [5]when there was nothing of his own,[5] as I hear. However, of this I know nothing. But I know that certain others have written about the same things, but who they are [6]not they themselves.[6]

[1] I have inserted the word *εὖ*, which has evidently dropt out before *ἐν*—

[2] Ficinus has "victu quotidiano utitur;" thus supplying the verb requisite for the sense.

[3] I scarcely understand *ἐν αὑτῷ*.

[4] The feminine, *ἐναντίαν*, seems to agree with *πρᾶξιν*, to be got out of *πράξεσι* just before; or else *ὁδόν* has dropt out before *οἱ δὲ*—

[5]—[5] Bekker's text, adopted by Stalbaum, is *οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούοι*: which I cannot understand. Ficinus has "cum nihil tamen horum revera ipsorum inesset, ut equidem audio." For he found, no doubt, in his MS. *ὡς ἀκούω*, as read in three others, and probably *οὐδὲν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ ὄν*—an absolute sentence, in lieu of *οὐδενὸς—ὄντος*, to avoid the accumulation of genitives.

[6]—[6] Here again I am in the dark. Ficinus leaves the difficulty as he

Thus much however I can say about all, who either have written, or shall write, and state that they know about what things I am occupied, whether they have heard from myself or others, or have discovered themselves, that it is not possible for them to know any thing according to my opinions upon the matter; for there is not, and never will be, any composition of mine about them. For a matter of that kind cannot be expressed by words, like other things to be learnt; but by a long intercourse with the subject and living with it a light is kindled on a sudden, as if from a leaping fire,[1] and being engendered in the soul, feeds itself upon itself. Thus much I know, however, that what has been written or said by me, has been said in the best manner; and moreover that what has been written badly, does not pain me in the least.

But if it had appeared to me that such matters could be written or spoken of sufficiently before the masses, what could have been done by us more beautiful in life than to impart a great benefit to mankind, and to bring nature to light before all? I think, however, that the attempt [2]in favour of such being promulgated,[2] would not be beneficial except to a few, who are able with a little showing to make discoveries for themselves. But of the rest, some it will fill not correctly with a contempt by no means in reason, and others with a lofty and vain hope, as if they had learnt something solemn. And it has now come into my mind to say something further still. For perhaps by what I am about to say a portion of what has been said will become more clear. For a certain true account is the antagonist of him, who dares to write any thing whatever about matters of this kind; and which, although it has been stated by me frequently before, seems it must be stated at present likewise.

found it, by his literal version, "quicunque vero hi fuerint, ne ipsi quidem seipsos." Taylor—"but without understanding what they wrote."

[1] By "a leaping fire," Plato meant perhaps "a flash of lightning," or else what is called "ignis fatuus," "a will-o-the-wisp," or "jack-a-lantern," that rises from marsh lands, and is seen to move from place to place. I suspect however that for πηδήσαντος we ought to read πελάσαντος, "being near:" for one MS. has πηλήσαντος.

[2]—[2] The Greek is περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην. But Ficinus has more correctly—"in his edendis," as if he had found in his MS. περὶ τούτων λεγομένων, and so I have translated.

There are three things belonging to each of those, through which it is necessary for science to be produced. But the fourth is science itself. And as to the fifth, it is requisite to establish that which is known and true. Of these one is its name; the second its definition;[1] the third its resemblance; the fourth its science. Now if you are desirous of understanding what has been just now asserted respecting one example, take it, and imagine thus[2] respecting all. A circle is called something, to which there is the name we have just mentioned. Its definition is the second thing, composed of nouns and verbs. For that, which is every where equally distant from the extremes to the middle, would be the definition of that, to which the name is of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is the circle, painted or blotted out, and made by a turner's wheel, or destroyed. By none of which accidents is the circle itself, of which all these properties are predicated, affected, as being of a different nature. But the fourth is science and intellect, and a correct opinion about them. And the whole of this again must be laid down as one thing, which exists neither in voice, nor in a corporeal figure, but is in the soul; by which circumstance it is manifest, that there is something different from the nature itself of the circle, and the three previously mentioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its relation and similitude, approaches the nearest to the fifth; while the rest are more remote. The same is the case with respect to a thing straight, and circular, and with figure, and with colour, and of a thing good, and beautiful, and just, and of every body, both fashioned by the hand, and produced according to nature, and of fire, and water, and all things of that kind, and of every animal, and of the habit in souls, and of all actions and passions. For unless a person does, after a certain manner, understand of these things all the four, he will never perfectly participate in the science relating to the fifth. Moreover these (four) no less endeavour to show forth the quality, as respects each thing, than the being of each, through the want of power in words. On this account, no one possessing a mind will ever dare to [3]place under the same view, and this

[1] So Taylor has translated λόγος by "definition." Ficinus here, as elsewhere, when in doubt, introduces two words, "oratio sive ratio."

[2] Ficinus has "similiter," which leads to ὡσαύτως in lieu of οὕτως.

[3]—[3] The Greek is εἰς αὐτὸ τιθέναι τὰ νενοημένα καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετα-

too never to be changed, the objects, which are perceived by the mind, and those, that are represented by figures, which is the case with those four.[3]

And this again, what has just now been said, it is requisite to learn. Every circle described by its doings,[1] or fashioned by a turner's wheel, is full of that, which is contrary to the fifth; for it every where [2] touches upon the straight line.[2] But we assert that the circle in the abstract has neither more nor less in itself of a contrary nature; and we assert too, that there is no fixed name for any thing; for there is nothing to prevent things, that are now called round, from being called straight, and those straight, round; nor will there be any less stability in them, when they are changed and called[3] by a contrary name. The same assertion is likewise true of a definition, that, since it is composed of nouns and verbs, [4] there is nothing stable in a sufficiently stable manner.[4] And there is an infinity of reasons respecting each of the four, that it is uncertain. But what is of the greatest moment is, that since there are, as I have stated a little before, two things, being and quality, when the soul seeks to know, not the quality of a thing, but

κίνητον, ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, whose version is "in idem atque id immutabile referre, quæ ab ipso intelliguntur, atque quatuor illa; quod utique patiuntur, quæ designantur figuris." From which it is evident that he found in his MS. *εἰς ταὐτὸ, καὶ ταῦτα, ἀμετακίνητον, τὰ νενοημένα καὶ τὰ τέτταρα.* But the words *καὶ τὰ τέτταρα*, by which are meant the four mentioned above, *ὄνομα, λόγος, εἴδωλον*, and *ἐπιστήμη*, all of which are represented by figures in the shape of letters, belong to *πάσχει*, and are opposed to the *νενοημένα*: and so I have translated.

[1] Ficinus, unable it would seem to understand *ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν*, has "inter hominum manus—" Perhaps the expression answers to the English "practically."

[2]—[2] By this Plato meant, I presume, that no circle formed materially is perfectly true; and if so, some part of it touches upon a straight line. So the moderns assert that it is impossible to make materially a straight line; for it touches some where upon a curve.

[3] Instead of *καλοῦσι*, which is here unintelligible, we must read *κληθεῖσι*— Ficinus has "nominibus in contrarium permutatis."

[4]—[4] The Greek is *μηδὲν ἱκανῶς βεβαίως εἶναι βέβαιον*: which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus; whose version is "cum ex nominibus verbisque componatur, nullam omnino habentibus firmitatem:" which is perfectly intelligible indeed, but not to be got from the Greek. The words *ἱκανῶς βέβαιος* ought to follow *μυρίος ὁ λόγος* in the next sentence. For though there might be an infinity of reasons it should be stated that they were sufficiently firm.

what it is, [1] unless each of these four previously sought for by the soul through reason and effect, and at last turns out correctly discussed by the senses, through all things that are said and shown,[1] it fills every man, so to say, with all doubt and uncertainty.

In such cases then as through a depraved education we are not accustomed to seek the truth, but the image of it, which is placed before us, is sufficient (for us to touch upon),[2] we do not become ridiculous to each other, the interrogated to the interrogating; but we are able to bandy about those four, and to examine them. [3] But in such cases as we compel a person to exhibit that fifth, any one of those, who are able to reply, and to overthrow, is the superior,[3] [4] and causes him, who is explaining (this fifth) either by speech, or writing, or answers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things, about which he attempts either to write or speak, persons being sometimes ignorant, that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the four (spoken of),[4] when it is existing improperly. [5] But the procession through all these, while changing its place towards each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length generates the knowledge of a thing existing naturally well in a person existing naturally well.[5] But when it exists naturally

[1]—[1] Such is the literal translation of the Latin version by Ficinus, who could not understand the Greek, nor can I, *τὸ δὲ μὴ ζητούμενον ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων προτεῖνον τῇ ψυχῇ λόγῳ τε καὶ κατ' ἔργα αἴσθησιν εὐέλεγκτον τό τε λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἀεὶ παρεχόμενον ἕκαστον*—where the reading *πρότερον*, found in his MS. for *προτεῖνον*, and *αἰσθήσεσιν* for *αἴσθησιν*, have been confirmed by two others. What Plato wrote, remains still to be discovered.

[2] This was added apparently by Ficinus to fill up the sense.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ἐν οἷς δ' ἂν τὸ πέμπτον ἀποκρινασθαι καὶ δηλοῦν ἀναγκάζωμεν, ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν δυναμένων ἀνατρέπειν κρατεῖ.* Ficinus has "Ubi vero necessitas cogit quintum ostendere, quivis eorum, qui possint subvertere atque retractare, pervincit;" where he has omitted *ἀποκρίνασθαι* in the first clause, and introduced "retractare" in the second, as if his MS. read something wanting at present in the Greek. Taylor translates *ἀποκρίνασθαι* "to separate:" but that is *ἀνακρίνειν*. I have translated as if *ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ* were inserted before *ἀνατρέπειν*.

[4]—[4] Plato appears to give here a description of the method, by which the Sophists seemed to confute their opponents, and as he did themselves.

[5]—[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot understand, nor could Ficinus, as shown by his paraphrase—"Traductio vero

ill, as exists naturally the habit of the soul of the multitude, with respect to learning, and to what are called morals, and these[1] are depraved, not even [2]Lynceus himself can cause such as these to see.[2] And in one word, neither docility in learning nor memory will cause (a person to do so), who is not germane to the matter; for they are not originally inherent in foreign habits; so that neither they, who are not naturally close to, and allied with, what is just, and the other things that are beautiful, but are docile and of a good memory, some with respect to some things, and others to others, nor they, who are allied, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will ever learn, as far as is possible, the truth relating to virtue and vice. For it is necessary to learn these, and at the same time the falsehood and truth of the whole of being, with all exertion and much time, as I stated at the commencement But after each of these have been rubbed together, names and definitions, and the sense of seeing, and (the other) senses, and have been tried by tests in a kindly spirit, and by questions and answers without a feeling of envy, there has with difficulty shone forth[3] an intellectual perception respecting each, and a mind putting itself on the stretch, as far as it is possible for human power to do so.

On this account, let every careful man be very far from writing about things truly[4] worthy of care, lest at some time, by writing amongst men,[5] he throw (himself)[6] into envy and

per omnia illa sursum deorsumque in unumquodque discurrendo perveniens, vix tandem scientiam parit intrinsecus; scientiam inquam ipsius, quod naturaliter bene affectum est in animo, ad ipsum quoque bene naturaliter affecto."

[1] Instead of *τὰ δὲ διέφθαρται*, Plato wrote, I suspect, *τὰ δὲ δ̄* (i. e. *τέτταρα*) *διέφθαρται*.

[2]—[2] Here is some error here. For Lynceus had only the power to see acutely himself, not to cause others to do so.

[3] The metaphor in *τριβόμενα*—*ἐξέλαμψε* will be best understood by comparing Rep. iv. p. 435, A., *τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων, ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*.

[4] From "revera," in Ficinus, Faehse suggested *ὄντως* instead of *ὄντων*.

[5] This mention of "men" seems rather strange; as if a person would write for others than men. In lieu of *ἀνοῖς* we must read *ἄνοις*, i. e. "without mind." In a similar spirit Pindar says that he "wrote for the intelligent what, in the case of the many, would require an interpreter."

[6] After *καταβάλῃ* is required an accusative. Read therefore *αὐτὸν* in lieu of *ποτε*—

difficulties.[1] But, in one word, it is requisite to know from hence, when any one sees the writings of another, either of a legislator upon laws, or of any person whatever[2] upon other subjects, that these are not those, on which he has been the most careful, if he is himself a careful person; but that the objects of his pursuit are situated some where in a country the most beautiful. But if the subjects, on which he has been the most careful, are committed to writing, then not the gods but men themselves have their own intellect destroyed[3]

Now he, who follows this story and digression, will understand correctly whether Dionysius has written any thing of the highest and first kind respecting nature, or any other person inferior or superior to him; since, according to my reasoning, he has neither heard or learnt any thing sound about what he has written; for he would have venerated them equally with myself, nor have dared to cast them forth into a state unfitting and unbecoming; nor has he written about them for the sake of remembering them; since there is no fear that any one will ever forget them, if he has once comprehended them by the soul; for of all things they lie in the smallest compass. But [4] (perhaps he did so)[4] for the sake of base ambition, considering them as his own, or as sharing in a kind of instruction, of which he was unworthy, and loving the renown arising from such a participation.

If however this occurred to Dionysius after one meeting, the fact may be so. But let Zeus,[5] says the Theban, know how it occurred. For I went through these matters, as I have said, only once; and never afterwards at all. In the next

[1] What Plato says of writing, Euripides applies to learning and speaking in Med. 287—296. The doctrine, which evidently emanated from the school of Pythagoras, is touched upon more in detail in Protagor. p. 316, B. § 20.

[2] Instead of *ἄτ' οὖν*, which are never thus united in Greek, correct language requires *ὁτουοῦν*, opposed to *νομοθέτου*.

[3] There is here an allusion, as remarked by Stephens, to a line of Homer, Ἐξ *ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί*: while as regards the clause *θεοὶ μὲν οὐ, βροτοὶ δὲ*, see Dobree on Aristoph. Plut. 555.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *εἴπερ ἕνεκα*, without any apodosis to the sentence, which is not required by the version of Ficinus, "Forte vero—id fecit," which would lead to *ἕνεκα—ἐποίει τι γράμμα*, "he composed some writing."

[5] The allusion to the Theban oath is in the use of *ἴττω* for *ἴστω*, which cannot be expressed in English. To the same form Plato refers in Phædo, p. 62, A. § 16.

place, he, who is interested in discovering what occurred relating to those matters, and how it occurred, ought to consider through what reason it was we did not go through them a second and a third time and oftener; whether it was that Dionysius, having heard them only once, thought he knew them, and did know them, sufficiently? or that he discovered them himself, or had learnt them previously from others, or that what had been said was trifling? or thirdly,[1] that they were not according to his standard, but greater; and that thus[2] he would not be able to live, if he paid any regard to prudence and virtue? For if [3](it be said that he considered)[3] the matters frivolous, he will oppose many witnesses, who assert the contrary, and who are much more competent to judge about things of this kind than Dionysius; but if, that he discovered or learnt them, and that they are worthily suited for the instruction of a liberal soul, [4]how should he, not being a wondrous man himself,[4] have so readily dishonoured the leader and the lord in these matters?

And how he did dishonour him, I will relate. After an interval of no long time, although he had previously permitted Dion to possess and enjoy his property, he did not permit his guardians to send it to Peloponnesus, as if he had entirely forgotten his letter; for (he said) it was not Dion, but Dion's son, of whom, as being his own nephew, he was according to law the guardian. Such were the transactions of that time that took place up to this period. And from these occurrences I clearly saw the desire Dionysius had for philosophy; and it was lawful for me to be indignant, whether I wished it or not. For it was already summer at that time, and ships were sailing out. But it seemed I ought not to be more offended with Dionysius than with myself, and with those, who compelled me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla,

[1] As three alternatives have been stated already, it is evident that for τρίτον we must read τέταρτον.

[2] I have adopted εἶναι, read in one MS. after καθ' αὐτὸν, and οὕτως, found in two MSS., in lieu of οὕτως.

[3]—[3] The words within lunes are found only in the version of Ficinus, "existimasse dicatur."

[4]—[4] Although Stephens had correctly pointed out the error in the translation of Ficinus, "quis non id mirum putet Dionysium sic affectum," Taylor has been content to follow it implicitly.

"And dread Charybdis measure still again."[1]

and to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay with him, while Dion was treated so dirtily. But he soothed me, and begged me to stay, thinking it would not be well for him should I be so swift a messenger of such doings; but unable to persuade me, he said he would prepare the means of sending me away. However, I determined to go on board and sail amongst the vessels outward bound,[2] being enraged, and thinking I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt to stop me, as I had been injured, although I had plainly done no injury. But on seeing that I had no desire at all to stay, he devised a plan of this kind, for delaying my sailing away. On the day after this had taken place, he plausibly addresses me. From myself and you, said he, let Dion, and the affairs of Dion, be removed out of the way, for the sake of our (not[3]) being frequently at variance about them. For I will, said he, thus act on your account, to Dion. I think it right for him to take away his property and to reside in Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as one, who may come hither, when it shall seem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friends; and this shall be, if he forms no plot against myself; and you, and your relations, and his here shall be his sureties; and let him give you a guarantee; and let the property, which he takes away, be deposited in Peloponnesus and at Athens, with those you shall think fit; and let Dion enjoy the use of it, but not the power to take it away without your consent; for I have not any very great trust in him that, if he can use the property, he will be just towards myself; for it will not be trifling. But I have greater confidence in you and yours. See, therefore, if this is agreeable to you, and remain on these terms for this year, and then depart to your well-doing,[4] taking with you the property; and well I know, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for having managed matters in this way on his behalf.

On hearing this speech I felt indignant; but still I said I

[1] Odyssey xii. 428.

[2] This, I conceive, is the exact translation of ἀποστόλοις.

[3] I have inserted μὴ, which can hardly be omitted. See Hermann on Viger, n. 17.

[4] On the phrase εἰς ὥρας ἀπιέναι, see Casaubon on Athenæus, p. 112, and the commentators on Aristoph. Βατρ. 380.

would take counsel of myself until the following day on these points, and communicate my resolves. This was our compact at that time. I hereupon, being all alone, and very confused, took counsel of myself. And this consideration first presented itself as taking the lead in my designs. What, if Dionysius intends to do nothing that he says, but on my departure both he and many others of his friends should write[1] in a plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that Dionysius indeed was willing, but I unwilling, for him to do what he urged me, and that I entirely neglected his (Dion's) concerns; and moreover should Dionysius be unwilling to send me away, and himself give no orders to any master of a vessel (to take me), and easily signify to all men, that I was sailing away without his consent, what sailor would be willing to take me on board, while I was hastening from the dwelling of Dionysius? For in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden[2] which surrounds the dwelling, from whence the porter would not be willing to let me out, unless an order were sent from Dionysius. And should I remain a year, I could indeed send an account of these doings to Dion, and in what state I was, and what I was doing. But should Dionysius do aught of what he says, my conduct would be not entirely ridiculous; for perhaps the property of Dion, if one rightly values it, is not less than a hundred talents.[3] But if what is now looming[4] should, as is likely, take place, I shall be at a loss how to conduct myself. At the same time it is perhaps necessary for me to labour for a year longer, and to endeavour to prove the designs of Dionysius by his deeds.

Having thus determined with myself, I told Dionysius on the following day that I had made up my mind to stay. I hold it right however, said I, for you not to consider me as the master of Dion, and that you should, together with myself, send letters to inform him of the determination, and to ask him whether he was satisfied? and if not, whether he wished for

[1] After *αὐτοῦ* the Greek has *διακελευόμενος*, which I cannot understand; nor could Ficinus, who has omitted the word. I could have understood, *αὐτῷ δὴ κελευόμενοι*, i. e. "being ordered by him," and thus one can account for *αὐτῶν*, found in four MSS.

[2] Elsewhere it is said that Plato was confined in the Acropolis.

[3] i. e. upwards of £13,300.

[4] This is the meaning of *ὑποφαίνειν*, which is applied to the appearance of the morning before the sun has risen above the horizon.

and demanded any thing else? and to send word as soon as possible; but that you should do nothing new in his affairs. This was said (by me), and this agreement did we make nearly in the manner just now detailed.

After this the vessels sailed, and it was no longer possible for me to depart; when Dionysius, [1]while speaking, remembered[1] that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion; and he said he would sell it, and after it had been sold, deliver one half to myself to send to Dion, and leave the other half for his son; for that this would be the most equitable arrangement. Astonished at the statement, I thought it would be very ridiculous to say any thing further. I told him however, that we ought to wait for the letter from Dion, and again send him an account of these matters. But Dionysius immediately after this did, in a very bold[2] manner, sell the whole of Dion's property at what time, and in what manner and to whomsoever he pleased; nor did he say any thing whatever about it to myself; and in like manner I said nothing to him about the affairs of Dion; for I thought I should be able to do nothing more in the matter.

Thus far was assistance given by myself to philosophy and my friends. But after this, I and Dionysius were so living, that I, like a bird, was (always)[3] looking out, and longing to fly away; while he was devising in what manner he might frighten me off,[4] and give up none of the property of Dion. We gave out however through the whole of Sicily, that we were friends forsooth.

Dionysius had attempted to reduce the pay of the veteran mercenaries now to a lower rate than according to the custom of his father; and the soldiers, being enraged, collected together in a body, and declared they would not permit it.

[1]—[1] The Greek is *ἐμνήσθη λέγων*, where Stephens suggested *λέγειν*, to answer in part to the version of Ficinus, "quasi nonnihil prætermissi reminiscens—inquit."

[2] The Greek is *νεανικῶς*: where I should prefer *τυραννικῶς*, as a little below—*μάλα τυραννικῶς—ἔφη.*

[3] Ficinus has "semper," as if he had found here in his MS. *ἀεὶ*—

[4] The verb *ἀνασοβεῖν* is applied to scaring away birds, as in Aristoph. Ὄρν. 34, Ἡμεῖς—*οὐ σοβοῦντος οὐδενὸς Ἀνεπτόμεσθα*, or starting wild game, as in Lysis, p. 206, A. § 7, *εἰ ἀνοσοβοῖ θῆρ' ἰὼν καὶ δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν ποιοῖ.* Ast however, with Ficinus, translates it "to restrain," a meaning it never has.

Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them, by closing the gates of the Acropolis; but the soldiers immediately rushed to the walls, raising a kind of barbarous cry and warlike pæan; at which Dionysius being terrified, conceded all demands, and even more to those of the light-shield-bearers, who had been collected together. But a report was quickly spread, that Heracleides was the cause of this disturbance. On hearing which, Heracleides took himself out of the way and disappeared, while Dionysius endeavoured to lay hold of him; but being in a difficulty, he sent for Theodotes to come to the garden, in which I happened to be then walking. Now of the rest of their discourse I neither knew nor heard; but what Theodotes said in my presence to Dionysius, I both know and remember. For, said he, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius here, that if I am able to bring Heracleides hither to a conference respecting the charges now laid against him, and if it does not seem good (to Dionysius) for him to dwell in Sicily, I think it is proper for him to take his wife and son, and sail to Peloponnesus, and reside there, doing no injury at all to Dionysius, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore sent to him already, and I will now send to him again. But whether he hearkens to my first or second application, I deem it right to request of Dionysius, that [1]if any one falls in[1] with Heracleides, either in the country or here, no ill shall happen to him, but that he shall be removed from the country, until Dionysius shall decide upon something else. To this, said he, do you accede? addressing Dionysius. He answered, I do accede; nor shall he suffer any ill, contrary to what has now been stated, should he make his appearance at your house.

However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully alarmed; and Theodotes said to me, Plato, you were present yesterday at the compact which Dionysius made with me and you respecting Heracleides? To which I replied, How not? But now, says he, the soldiers with light shields are running all round seeking to lay hold of Heracleides; and it appears almost that he is some where here. Follow us then, by all means, to Dionysius. We went therefore and came to him; and they indeed stood silent and in tears, but I said, These persons,

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus, and consequently by Taylor.

Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do something of a novel kind[1] to Heracleides, contrary to the compact made yesterday; for it seems to me, that he has returned and is clearly some where here. And he, on hearing this, burnt with rage, and [2]assumed all kinds of colours[2] such as a person in anger does. But Theodotes falling at his feet, and laying hold of his hand, burst into tears, and implored him not to do any such thing.[3] Then I, taking up the discourse, consoled him and said, Cheer up, Theodotes; for Dionysius will not dare to act contrary to the compact made yesterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he, I made no compact, either great or small. By the gods, said I, you (did agree not to do) what this man now requests you not to do. After saying this, I turned from him and went out.

After this Dionysius endeavoured to hunt down Heracleides. Theodotes, however, sent messengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tisias and the soldiers with light shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heracleides, however, as it is said, anticipated them, and escaped in the small part of a day into the dominions of the Carthaginians. Hereupon the old plot for his not giving up the property of Dion seemed to Dionysius to offer a plausible pretext of enmity against myself. And in the first place he sent me from the Acropolis, framing an excuse, that it was requisite for the women to perform some ten-day sacrifice in the gardens where I resided. He therefore ordered me to remain out during that period with Archidemus. While I was there, Theodotes sent for me, and felt very indignant respecting the transactions of that time, and found fault with Dionysius; who, hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext, and the sister[4] to the former, for enmity against me, and sent a person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theodotes on his sending for me? and I readily replied, I had. The

[1] In *νεώτερον* is an euphemism for *κακόν*. See the commentators on Eurip. Med. 37.

[2]—[2] On this expression Stalbaum refers to Boissonade on Aristænetus, p. 396.

[3] Unless *τοιοῦτον* is to be referred to the preceding *νεώτερον*, one would prefer *τι ἀνίατον*. For *ἀνίατον* would be thus used as an euphemism for *θάνατον*, as *ἀνήκεστον* is in Thucyd. iii. 39, 45.

[4] On the metaphorical use of *ἀδελφὸς*, see Ruhnken on Timæus, p. 3, Porson on Aristoph. Plut. 550, Blomfield on S. Th. 343.

party therefore said, Dionysius has ordered me to tell you, that you are acting by no means correctly in always making much of Dion and the friends of Dion. This is what was said; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his residence; as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heracleides, and his enemy; and he no longer considered me well affected towards him, because the property of Dion had been consumed entirely.

After this I dwelt out of the Acropolis among the mercenary soldiers; but others, Athenians, and some likewise my fellow-citizens, who were in the service of Dionysius, came and told me that I had been calumniated by the light-shield soldiers, and that certain persons had threatened to kill me, if they could lay hold of me. I devised therefore the following plan for my preservation. I sent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, telling them in what state I happened to be; and they, making some pretext of an embassy to the city, sent a ship of thirty oars, and Lamiscus,[1] one of my friends; who, on his arrival, made a request to Dionysius on my behalf, saying that I wished to depart, and begged of him [2]not to act otherwise.[2] And he consented, and sent me away after providing me with means for the voyage. However, I neither asked for the property of Dion, nor did any one give it me.

On reaching Peloponnesus at the Olympic games, I met with Dion, who was a spectator there, and I told him what had happened. And he, calling Jupiter to witness, immediately declared to me and my relations and friends, that he would prepare to revenge himself upon Dionysius, both for his having deceived me, his guest—for thus he spoke and thought—and for his own unjust expulsion and banishment. On hearing this, I advised him to call upon his friends, if they were willing. But as for myself, I said, you together with others had by force caused me in some manner to share in the food, and the hearth, and the sacred rites of Dionysius;[3] who perhaps has thought, in consequence of many calumniat-

[1] Ficinus has "Salmiscum," similar to Σαλαμίσκον in three MSS.

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[3] Ficinus has a supplement here, marked in Italics, not found in the Greek—"suasi ut—me putaret *quasi medium quendam æquumque utrinque esse debere, præsertim* cum—"

ing me, that I was plotting in conjunction with you against him and his tyranny, and yet he did not put me to death, but treated me with respect. Besides I am of an age to take a part with scarcely any one in war; but I would be a common friend to you all, if at any time in want of a friendly feeling towards each other you should wish to do any good; [1] but if you are desirous (of doing) evil,[1] call upon others. This did I say through a feeling of disgust to my wandering about Sicily, and adverse fortune in it.

By [2] not obeying and being not persuaded [2] by the reasonings (urged) by myself, they have been themselves the cause of all the evils that have at present happened to them; of which nothing, humanly speaking, would have occurred, had Dionysius given Dion his own property, or had been perfectly reconciled to him. For I could easily have restrained Dion from both by my will and power.[3] But now they have rushed against each other, and filled all things with evils. And yet Dion had the same wish, which I would say both myself and any other moderate person ought to have, [4] who should consider, touching his own power, and that of his friends, and of his own city, how, by doing a benefit when in power, things of the greatest moment would be in the greatest honour.[4] But this will be,[5] not if a person enrich himself and his friends and city, by laying plots and bringing together conspirators, when he is poor and has no command over himself, through his yielding to cowardice,[6] as

[1] Here again the Latin of Ficinus is more full than the Greek—"quamdiu vero odiis certabitis, ad hæc tanquam propugnatores alios advocabitis—"

[2]—[2] I must leave others to explain the difference between *ἀπειθοῦντες* and *οὐ πειθόμενοι*.

[3] Ficinus has "voluntate mea et consilo et auctoritate," as if he has found in his MS. *τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι*. Perhaps Plato wrote *βουλεύεσθαι* after *δύνασθαι*. At least one MS. reads *βουλεύεσθαι* for *βούλεσθαι*.

[4]—[4] The version of Ficinus is here so different from the Greek, as to render it impossible to ascertain what he found in his MS.

[5] Instead of *ἔστι δὲ*, the sense evidently requires *ἔσται δὲ τάδε*, similar to "neque vero id fit" in Ficinus.

[6] Although *δειλίας* seems to be defended by the expression in Eurip. Phœn. 600, *πλοῦτος ἦν φιλόψυχον κακὸν*, yet one would rather expect here *δουλείας*. For not only would there be an oxymoron in *ἡττημένος ὑπὸ δουλείας*, but a more natural flow of ideas likewise in *δουλείας τῆς πρὸς ἡδονὰς* than in *δειλίας τῆς πρὸς ἡδονάς*. For persons are said to be slaves, rather than cowards, as regards pleasure.

regards pleasures, and subsequently by destroying those, who possess property, and, calling them enemies, scatters the wealth of such persons, and exhorts his fellow-doers and friends (so to act),[1] that no one shall, by saying that he is poor, bring a charge against him. After the same manner, he who benefits his city, will be honoured by it, in consequence of distributing by voting[2] the property of a few among the many; or when any one being the president of a great city, and one ruling over many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the property of the lesser. For in this way, neither Dion, nor any other person, will ever voluntarily proceed to power, pernicious to himself and family for all time, but to a form of government and the establishment of laws, the most just and best, and effected through the fewest deaths and banishments.

This conduct did Dion lately adopt, by choosing to suffer rather than to do unholy deeds, yet taking care lest he should suffer; still, however, did he stumble, after he had arrived at the very point of being superior to his foes. Nor did he suffer any thing to be wondered at. For a man holy, temperate, and prudent, will never be deceived entirely [3]respecting unholy things, respecting the soul of such.[3] But it would perhaps be not wonderful, should he suffer the suffering of a good pilot,[4] from whom a storm about to be has not entirely lain hid; but from whom the violence unusually great and unexpected of tempests may have lain hid, and, having lain hid, have by their force overwhelmed him. The same thing upon a small scale[4] caused Dion to stumble. For they, who tripped

[1] Between *παρακελεύηται* and *ὅπως* there seems to have dropt out *ταὐτὸ ποιῆσαι*, a fact that appears to have escaped Ficinus; who has consequently given here a translation not answering to the Greek.

[2] As this *ὑπὸ ψηφισμάτων* is at variance with the subsequent *μὴ κατὰ δίκην*, and the preceding mention of acts of violence done by the victorious party during a revolution, one would prefer *ὑπ' οὐ ψηφισμάτων*, "by not—voting," i. e. by power.

[3]—[3] The Greek is *ὅσιος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀνοσίων πέρι*, and at the end of the sentence *τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν τοιούτων πέρι*: which I cannot understand. The version of Ficinus is, "Pium enim virum temperatumque et prudentem omnino quidem in rebus ejusmodi impii nunquam fallunt." From which it is easy to see that he found in his MS. not *ἀνοσίων πέρι*, but *παρ' ἀνοσίων*, i. e. "by unholy persons," to whose unholy doings is to be referred the expression *τοιούτων πέρι*.

[4] So I have translated *δι' ὀλιγίστων*, which Bekker has rejected, with one MS., although acknowledged by "aliquantum" in Ficinus

him up, did not lie hid from him, as being wicked men; but what a depth of ignorance, and of the rest of depravity, and of greediness insatiable they possessed, this did lie hid; and stumbling on this point, he lies (dead), and Sicily wraps in sorrow infinite.

What therefore I advise you to do, after the facts just now detailed, has been nearly told, [1]and let them be told.[1] But it appeared to me necessary to show, why I undertook the second journey to Sicily, [2]and, as it were, of somewhat a compulsory[2] kind, on account of the absurdity and irrationality attached to the transactions. If then what has been now said has appeared to any one to be more reasonable, and it seems to any one that the excuses for what have occurred are sufficient, what has been now said will have been (said) moderately and sufficiently (well).[3]

EPISTLE VIII.

PLATO TO THE RELATIONS AND FRIENDS OF DION—PROSPERITY.

By considering what matters (correctly)[4] you will do well in reality, I will endeavour, according to my power, to go through in detail. And I hope I shall advise what is conducive not to you alone, [5]especially at least however to you,[5]

Plato wrote, I suspect, *δι' ἀλογίστων*, "through things not to be calculated upon," similar to the preceding *ἀπροσδόκητον*.

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Ficinus.

[2]—[2] Ficinus has "quasi compulsus," as if he had found in his MS. *ἄφιξιν τὴν δευτέραν καί τι ἀναγκαῖον οἷον*, in lieu of *ἄφιξιν τὴν δευτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι*—where Stephens was the first to object to the pleonasm in *ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι* and the subsequent *δεῖν*.

[3] In lieu of *εἴη*, the sense requires *εὖ εἴη*, as I have translated.

[4] Stephens endeavours to defend "A *δὲ* thus placed at the commencement of a letter, not aware that *δὲ* is a corruption of *εὖ*, for thus *εὖ διανοηθέντες* would be properly balanced by *εὖ πράττοιτε*.

[5]—[5] The Greek is *μάλιστά γε μὴν ὑμῖν*, which I confess I cannot understand. Ficinus has "sed vobis quidem maxime." I could have understood *τὰ ξυμφέροντα μάλιστα, κατά γε νοῦν ἐμον*, i. e. "most conducive according to my mind:" where lies hid a dramatic fragment, *Μάλιστα συμφέροντα κατά γε νοῦν ἐμόν*.

and secondly to all those at Syracuse, and thirdly to your foes (at home) and enemies (abroad), unless some one of them shall have been guilty of an unholy act. For these things are incurable, nor can any one ever wash them out.[1] But bear in mind what I now say.

The tyranny having been dissolved through the whole of Sicily, there is now with you an universal strife about these very things; some wishing to resume the former government; but [2]others to put the finish to the escape from tyranny.[2] Now the counsel relating to such matters appears on each occasion to the multitude to be right, that it is requisite to advise what will effect the greatest evils to foes, and the greatest good to friends. It is however by no means easy for him, who inflicts many evils on others, not to suffer many himself. Nor is it necessary to go far to see this clearly; but what has taken place [3]here and there[3] relating to Sicily would suffice;[4] while some are attempting to do, and others to ward off the doers; and by relating them as a tale to others; ye would become on each occasion competent instructors. In these matters then there is scarcely any difficulty. But what would be conducive to all, both foes and friends, or the least of an evil to both, this it is neither easy to see, nor for a person seeing to accomplish. The consultation of such a kind and the attempt to speak look like a prayer. Let it then be in every respect a prayer. For it is meet to begin from the gods in every thing, both in speaking and thinking; and may it eventually indicate to us some such discourse as this.

[1] Although there appears at first sight little to offend in the words *οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις αὐτὰ ἐκνίψειε*, yet on such an occasion there should be a reference not to a person washing out a stain, but to a river, as in Soph. Œd. T. 1218, *Οἶμαι γὰρ οὔτ' ἂν Ἴστρον οὔτε Φᾶσιν ἂν Νίψαι καθαρμῷ τήνδε τὴν στεγὴν*. Hence Plato wrote, I suspect, *Οὐκ ἄν ποτ' Ἴστρος αὐτά γ' ἐκνίψειεν ἄν*, which was a line probably of Sophocles, imitated by Seneca in Hippol. 715, Quis eluet me Tanais?

[2]—[2] The translation of Ficinus is too remarkable to be omitted, "alii tyrannidis memoriam omnem prorsus extinguere."

[3]—[3] The Greek is *τῇδε αὐτοῦ περὶ*. Ficinus omits the words *τῇδε αὐτοῦ*, which he could not understand, nor can I. Hence I have translated, as if the Greek were *τῇδε τ' αὐτοῦ τε περὶ*—

[4] Ficinus has, what the sense requires, "satis exemplo nobis esse possint,' to which there is nothing to answer in the Greek, unless we read—*ἀρκοίη ἄν, ἃ ἄλλοις*—in lieu of *ἃ κἂν ἄλλοις*—

From the time that the war began, nearly one family has been ruling over both you and your enemies; whom your fathers established firmly, when they came into all kinds of difficulty at the period, when there was to that part of Sicily under Greeks a danger extreme of their becoming Barbarians, through their being entirely overthrown by the Carthaginians. At that time they chose Dionysius, as being a person young and warlike; for the affairs of war suited him; but Hipparinus, his superior in age, as an adviser; and both, for the safety of Sicily, with absolute power, calling them, as they say, tyrants. Now whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the talents of the rulers, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the safety of Sicily, let this be as he conceives. Safety however did take place to the men of that time. As then they were in such a state, it was surely just to return thanks to their preservers. But if the tyranny did in after-times use somewhat improperly the gift of the city, for this it has partly had accusations[1] against it, and let it partly suffer the punishment. But what accusations would have been necessarily correct after what had occurred to them. For if you had been able to escape from them easily and without great danger and trouble, or they to recover easily again their power, it would not have been possible to give the advice about to be spoken. But now it is requisite for both of you to bear and call to mind, how often each of you have been in the hope of fancying yourselves to want only a mere trifle towards the accomplishment of every thing according to your mind. Now, this very trifle happens on each occasion to be the cause of great and numberless mischiefs; nor has yet any end been reached; but the old end [2]seems to be ever combining[2] with a new beginning; and by this circle (of events), the whole of the tyrannic and popular kind (of government) will be near to be destroyed; and the whole of Sicily, should some event probable, but to be deprecated, take place, will come to nearly a desert, as regards

[1] In lieu of *δίκας τὰς*, three MSS. read *δικαστὰς*: and so Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by his "judices," contrary to the genius of the language.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *ξυνάπτει—τελευτὴ δοκοῦσα*. The sense requires, as I have translated, *ξυνάπτειν—τελευτὴ ἣν δοκοῦσα*.

the language of Greece, by being transferred to some Phœnician or Opic[1] dynasty and power. Against this it is requisite for all the Greeks, with all readiness, to prepare[2] a remedy. Now if any one has any thing more correct and better than what will be said by myself, let him bring it forward, and be justly called a lover of Greece.

But what now presents itself to me, I will with all freedom of speech, and making use of a mediatory and just discourse, endeavour to point out. I declare then, speaking in the manner of an arbitrator,[3] to two persons, one ruling over, and the other ruled by, a tyrant, my old advice, as if given to each singly.[3] And now my language of advice would be for every tyrant to fly from the name and the thing itself, and to change his power as a tyrant, if possible, into that of a king. And possible it is, as the wise and good Lycurgus showed by his acts; who, on seeing that the family of his relations in Argos and Messene had proceeded from kings to tyrants, and had been destroying both themselves, and each his own city, felt a fear both for his country and race, and applied as a remedy the government of elderly men, and the bond[4] of the Ephori, as a preservative of kingly rule; so that it has been preserved for so many generations with glory; since law became the lord and[5] authorized king of men, and not men the tyrants over the laws. To this my discourse now exhorts all men, aiming at tyranny, that they turn away themselves, and fly with celerity, from the felicity of men insatiably[6] hungry and without mind, and that they endeavour to come round to a form of kingly government, and to become subservient to laws made by a king, and thus to obtain the greatest honours with the consent both of men and laws.

[1] The Opici were the ancient inhabitants of Campania, in the southern part of Italy.

[2] Literally "to cut." On the phrase *τέμνειν φάρμακον* see Blomfield on Æsch. Agam. 16.

[3]—[3] Ficinus evidently did not find in his MS. what is here read in the other MSS., for his version is, "quemadmodum jamdiu consuevi, tam exercenti quam patienti tyrannidem, consulam—"

[4] I have adopted from a var. lect. in one MS., *δεσμὸν* in lieu of *δασμὸν* which Ficinus has omitted. Taylor translates it "division—"

[5] I have followed Stephens, who proposed to insert *καὶ* before *βασιλεὺς*—

[6] Instead of *ἀπλήστῳ*, Heusde suggested *ἀπλήστως*, found subsequently in two MSS.

But those, who are in the pursuit of free institutions, and are flying from a servile yoke as an evil, I would advise to be cautious lest, through an insatiable desire for unseasonable liberty, they fall at some time into the disease of their ancestors; which the persons of that period suffered through an excessive anarchy, from making a bad use[1] of their measureless love of freedom. For the Siceliotes, who possessed the power[2] before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and ruled over even rulers themselves; for they pelted and stoned to death[3] the ten military chiefs prior to Dionysius, having judged them according to no law, in order that they might not be the slaves of any one either with justice or law as the despot, but be in every way entirely free. From hence arose the tyrannies over them. For slavery and freedom, when excessive, are each an evil; but, when moderate, altogether a good; for moderate is the slavery to a god, but that to a man immoderate; and, to temperate men god is a law, but to the intemperate, pleasure.

Since then such is naturally the case, what I am advising, I exhort the friends of Dion to proclaim to all the Syracusans, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will interpret what, had he been living and able, he would have said[4] to you. What then was the reasoning, some one may say, which the advice of Dion shows forth to us touching the present state of affairs? It was this.

"Receive, O Syracusans, before all things such laws, as appear to you not about to turn your thoughts or desires to money-making and wealth; but as there are three things, soul, body, and moreover wealth, put the worth[5] of the soul in the place of highest honour; that of the body

[1] Ficinus has "abusi," as if his MS. read *καταχρώμενοι*, not *χρώμενοι*.

[2] Bekker has adopted *ἀρξάντων* from two MSS., but Stalbaum has retained *ἄρξαντες*: which Ficinus found in his MS., as shown by "qui—gubernabant—"

[3] Ficinus has "deposuerunt atque pepulerunt," as if he had found in his MS. *κατέλυσαν ἐκβάλλοντες*. But Bekker has edited more correctly from other MSS. *κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες*—

[4] From "diceret," in Ficinus, Stephens suggested *εἶπεν ἂν* in lieu of *εἶπεν*—The correction is attributed to Bekker by Stalbaum.

[5] Taylor's translation is, "it is requisite that that care of the soul should rank:" who has thus followed the text of Stephens, *ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν δεῖ*, in lieu of which six MSS read *ἀρετὴν ἐντιμοτάτην ποιοῦντες*—

in the second, but under the soul; but in the third and last, that of wealth, as being the slave both of the body and soul. Now the institution, that effects this, will be a law rightly laid down by you, and render those, who make use of it, truly happy. But the language, which calls the rich happy, is itself unhappy, as being the senseless language of women and children; and it makes those who are persuaded of it of the same kind.[1] Now that I am exhorting you to what is true, you will know in fact, if you shall try what has now been said by me on the subject of laws, by having received such laws,[2] which appears to be the truest test in all cases. For since danger is keeping down Sicily, and you are neither sufficiently the conquerors nor manifestly the conquered, it will perhaps be just and conducive to all of you to take a middle path, both those who are flying from the severity of power and those who desire to have it again; the ancestors of whom did in their time, what is a thing of the greatest moment, preserve the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it is now lawful to hold discourse about a form of government. For had they perished then, there would have been left no where nor any how either a discourse or hope. Now then, let there be to some a liberty combined with kingly government; but to others a kingly government under control, by the laws having a despotic power not only over the other citizens, but over the kings themselves, should they act contrary to the law. And in addition to all this, do ye together with the gods, in a spirit guileless and sincere, appoint a king; first my own son on account of two-fold favours, from myself and father. For he at that period freed the city from the Barbarians; but I have now done so twice from tyrants, as yourselves are the witnesses; and make him the second king, who has the same name as his own father, I mean the son of Dionysius, for the sake of the assistance which he now affords, and of his pious conduct; who, born from a father who was a tyrant, has voluntarily made the city free, and obtained for himself and his race

similar to "virtutem animi maxime anteponant" in the genuine version of Ficinus.

[1] i. e. "senseless."

[2] I have united the words δεξάμενοι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους νόμους, and changed δὲ into δὴ, to avoid the necessity of an absolute sentence, and to carry out the train of ideas.

ever-living honour, instead of a tyranny lasting for a day, and at the same time unjust. To become the third king of Syracuse it is proper to invite Dionysius the son of Dionysius, if willing, over a willing city, who is now the general of the enemy's army; if he will consent of his own accord to change himself into the form of a king, while fearing his fortunes and commiserating his country and the want of attention shown to sacred rites and sepulchres, and lest through a love of contention he shall destroy every thing in every way, and become an object for Barbarians to rejoice over.

These three kings do ye, whether giving or depriving them of the power they possess at Lacedæmon, by common consent establish after some such manner as this, which has indeed been mentioned to you before; but still do ye hear it now again. If the family of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing for the safety of Sicily to cease from their present ills, and to obtain honour for themselves and family, both for the future and the present time, on this condition, call them as I have said before, (to power,)[1] appointing as ambassadors with full powers for the reconciliation, whomsoever they wish; whether they are from their own country, or strangers, or both; and as many as they shall agree to. And let it be for them on their arrival first to lay down laws, and a form of government, such that in it the kings are to be with full power over things sacred, and whatever else it is fitting for those, who are the benefactors of their country; and to make guardians, thirty-five in number, of the laws; and for these, together with the people and senate, to have the rule on questions of war and peace; and to establish different courts of justice, some for one purpose, and others for others; but for the thirty-five guardians of the laws to be the judges of death and banishment; and that in addition to these for jurymen to be chosen from those, who during the last year have been in office, one from each office, who may have been voted the best and most upright; and that these during the following year are to decide on such points as relate to the death and imprisonment and removal of the citizens; but for the king to be not permitted to be a juryman in such matters, as being a priest, and undefiled by murder, bonds, and banishment. These things I, when living, intended

[1] Ficinus alone has "ad regnum."

to take place for your benefit, and so I intend now;[1] and then indeed, after having with you overcome my enemies, I should, had not foreign[2] furies prevented me, established matters in the way I intended; and subsequently, if deeds had followed upon thoughts, I would have colonized the rest of Sicily, after depriving the Barbarians of the land which they now occupy, with the exception of such as had fought for a common liberty against tyranny; and I would have reinstated the former inhabitants of Grecian places in their ancient and paternal abodes. The very same things do I even now advise you to think upon and to execute, and to invite all to these doings; but to consider the person, who is unwilling to do aught, as a common enemy. Nor is this impossible. For he who judges those things to be impossible, which happen to be in the souls of two persons, and which it is easy to discover from reasoning are the best, does not think correctly. Now by the two, I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and that of my son. For if these two agree together, to the rest of the Syracusans, and all who have any care for their country, I think (the same things)[3] will appear to be correct. But paying to all the gods honours combined with prayers, and to others also, whom it is proper, together with the gods, do ye persuade and exhort both friends and those at variance, gently and altogether,[4] nor stand apart, until what has now been stated by us, like god-sent dreams standing over those awake, you shall work out clearly, and bring to a happy end."

[1] This would seem to be a strange expression in the mouth of a dead person, were it not that the ancients thought as it would appear that the dead had the same feelings and pursuits as they had when living, as shown by Virgil in Æn. vi. 653.

[2] I cannot understand ξενικαὶ ἐριννύες, nor could Ficinus; whose version is "externi furiæque," as if he had found in his MS. ξένοι καὶ ἐριννύες. But the disorder, although seated somewhat deeper, would not, I think, be difficult to cure.

[3] To complete the sense and syntax, I have translated as if ταὐτὰ had dropt out before τοῖς ἄλλοις: where τε in one MS. after τοῖς and τε in another, have unitedly preserved a portion of the missing word, while ἂν has dropt out after πᾶσιν.

[4] In πάντως there is an evident error.

EPISTLE IX.

PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM—PROSPERITY.

ARCHIPPUS and Philonides[1] have come to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the state of your affairs.[2] Such things then, as appertain to the city, they have accomplished without difficulty; for they were not in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself, they said that you bear it ill in not being able to be released from your close attention to public affairs. Now that it is indeed the most pleasant thing in life for a man to attend to his own affairs, especially if he chooses to do what you are doing, is evident nearly to every one; but you ought also to consider this, [3]that each of us is not born for himself alone; but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another, and our friends the remainder.[3] Much too is given to the occasions, that overtake us in life. Since then your country calls[4] you to public affairs, it would perhaps be absurd not to hearken;[5] for at the same time too it happens that (you) leave a place for inferior men, who take the road to politics not for the best. But of these things enough. At present we are taking care of Echecrates,[6] and shall do so for

[1] Although the phrase *οἱ περί τινα* sometimes means the parties attached to any person, yet here it is to be applied to the person himself. See at Hipp. Maj. § 2.

[2] Ficinus has "de rebus tuis." For his MS. read, no doubt, *περὶ* instead of *παρὰ*, and omitted *παρὰ σοῦ* just afterwards, as he does.

[3]—[3] To this saying of Plato Cicero refers, De Offic. i. 7, 22: "Præclare scriptum est a Platone, 'non nobis solum nati sumus, ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici:'" and again, De Finibus, ii. 14. But as in both passages he omits all mention of the parents, it is evident that he quoted from memory; nor did he know that Plato merely put into prose, what he found in the following tristich, probably of Euripides—*Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν γέγονεν οὐχ αὑτῷ μόνον· Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἡ πατρὶς μερίζεται. Τὸ δ' οἱ τεκόντες, τὸ δ' ἔτι λοιπὸν οἱ φίλοι.* Whence we must read *τὸ δ' ἔτι λοιπὸν* in lieu of *τὸ δ' οἱ λοιποὶ φίλοι*, where *οἱ λοιποὶ* is perfectly unintelligible. A similar idea is to be found in Lucan; who says that Cato, "Non sibi sed toti natum se credidit orbi."

[4] On a voice thus given to one's country, see Cicero Catilin. i. 7.

[5] Such is the literal version of the Greek, which I cannot think Plato wrote.

[6] Of this Echecrates mention is made in the Phædo, p. 88, D. § 85.

the remainder of the time both for your sake, and that of his father Phrynion, and of the young man himself.

EPISTLE X.

PLATO TO ARISTODORUS—PROSPERITY

I HEAR that you are now amongst the chief of the friends of Dion, and have been all through exhibiting a conduct the most wise in things relating to philosophy. For I assert that firmness, fidelity, and integrity, is true philosophy. But as to the rest of wisdom and skill. which tend to other things, I conceive that by calling them elegant subtleties, I am giving them a correct appellation. But now farewell; and abide in the conduct in which you are now abiding.

EPISTLE XI.

PLATO TO LAODAMAS—PROSPERITY.

I HAVE written to you before, that your coming to Athens makes a great difference with respect to all you say. But since you assert it is impossible, the second step after this is for myself to come, if possible, or Socrates,[1] as you have said in your letter. Socrates however at present labours under the infirmity of a strangury; and it would be unseemly in me to come and not accomplish that, for which you are inviting me; but that such will take place I have not great hopes; but why (I say so) would require a long letter, were I to go through all the reasons. Moreover I am on account of my age not sufficiently well in body to be wandering about and to risk the dangers, which (a person) meets[2] with by land and sea; and at the present every thing in travelling is full of danger.

[1] This Socrates is supposed to be the one mentioned in the Statesman.
[2] I have translated as if τις had dropt out after ἀπαντᾷ.

I have it however in my power to advise you [1]and the colonists[1] what Hesiod through me, as the relater, says,

To fancy's easy, to think deep is hard.

For if they fancy that a city can be ever well put into order by the mere laying down of any laws whatever, without some person[2] in authority having the care of the daily manner of living in the city, in order that it may be, in the case both of slaves and of free-born, temperate and manly, they do not think correctly. But if there are persons worthy of this very office, this should take place. But if there is a need of some one to instruct them, I think there are not amongst you either a person to teach, or those to be taught; it remains then for you to pray to the gods.[3]. . . . For nearly in this way have cities in former times been put into order, and subsequently well administered,[4] during the concurrence of matters of great moment, which have happened amidst war and other transactions, when a man shall have arisen on such occasions, with bodily and mental qualifications, and in the possession of large powers. But previously it is meet to feel a readiness (to act), and it is necessary to think deeply upon what I am saying, and not to behave sillily through thinking that you can do any thing off-hand. Be good fortune thine.

EPISTLE XII.[5]

PLATO TO ARCHYTAS OF TARENTUM—PROSPERITY.

How wonderfully delighted did we receive the memorials which came from you, and admired in the greatest possible

[1]—[1] The words between the numerals are omitted by Taylor, although found in Ficinus.

[2] Six MSS. read *τινα*, in lieu of *τι*, answering to "aliquis" in Ficinus.

[3] Here is evidently a lacuna. The sense of the missing words was to this effect, "to send some divine teacher, and disciples with minds willing to be taught."

[4] In lieu of *ᾤκησαν*, five MSS. offer *ᾠκίσθησαν*, similar to "excultæ sunt" in Ficinus.

[5] The genuineness of this letter has been contested, as we learn from all the MSS.

manner [1]every thing of the writer's.[1] To us he appeared a man worthy of his celebrated ancestors. For they are said to have been ten thousand[2] in number; and they were, as the story handed down declares, the best of all[3] those Trojans, who during the reign of Laomedon removed themselves from their native land.

With respect to the memorials in my possession, about which you have sent to me, they are not yet in a sufficient state. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. With respect to the safe cure of them, we are of one mind, so that there is no need of exhortation.

EPISTLE XIII.

PLATO TO DIONYSIUS, TYRANT OF SYRACUSE—PROSPERITY.

[4]LET the commencement of the letter and at the same time the symbol, be that it is from me.[4]

When you were once feasting some young men of Locri, and were reclining at table at a distance from myself, you rose up (and came) to me, and courteously addressed to me a kind word, as it seemed to me and to the person reclining by me. Now he was one of the handsome youths, who said at that time—Surely, Dionysius, you are benefited much, with respect to wisdom, by Plato. Whereupon you observed—And with respect to many other things; especially since the time of my

[1]—[1] In lieu of *τοῦ γράψαντος αὐτὰ*, which is hardly intelligible, I have translated as if the Greek were *τὰ τοῦ γράψαντος πάντα*—

[2] Instead of *μύριοι*, Diogen. Laert. viii. 81, offers *Μυραῖοι*, i. e. the people of Myræ, a town in Lycia. One MS. has *μυράϊοι*.

[3] The Greek is *οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν τῶν—ἀγαθοὶ*. But five MSS. *ἁπάντων* for *τῶν*, similar to "omnium" in Ficinus; from whose "præstantissimi" it is easy to see that in *οὗτοι*, which could not be thus repeated, lies hid *μάλιστα*, to be united to *ἀγαθοί*.

[4]—[4] The Greek is *Ἀρχὴ σοὶ——καὶ ἅμα ξύμβολον—ἐστί*. But correct language would require *ἡ ἀρχὴ—καὶ—τὸ ξύμβολον—ἥκει*. Moreover I have some doubts about *ἅμα*: in lieu of which I should prefer *ἡμῖν*—for the *σύμβολον* was known to both Plato and Dionysius—or else *καὶ κοινῇ ξύμβολον*. With regard to the nature of the *σύμβολον*, Bentley conceived it was the superscription *σὺν θεῷ*, mentioned below.

sending for him, through this very thing [1][because I had sent for him][1] I have been benefited forthwith.

This then I must keep in mind, in order that our mutual benefit may be to us ever on the increase. And in preparation for this event I am sending [2]a person of the Pythagorean and the divisions,[2] as it seemed to me then, of whom both you and Archytas, if indeed Archytas has come to you, will be able to make use. His name is Helicon; his family is of Cyzicum; and he is a disciple of Eudoxus; with all of whose doctrines he is elegantly conversant; and still further, he has associated with one of the disciples of Isocrates, and with Polyxenus, one of the friends of Bryson; and, what is moreover a rare thing, he is neither disagreeable to meet with, nor like an ill-mannered person, but would seem rather to be volatile and of an easy temper. I say this however with some fear, as I am expressing an opinion respecting a man, who is no mean an animal, and one easily changed, except in the case of some few persons and on a few points; and with respect to him I am thinking with fear and without confidence, as I have met with him myself, and made inquiry of his fellow-citizens, and not one of them has said a bad word against the man. Do you therefore reflect yourself, and exercise caution. But above all things take lessons from him, and study philosophy upon any other points, if you have any leisure; but if not, set him to teach some one,[3] so that you may, when at leisure, by learning become better, and in good repute,[4] in order that in your being benefited by myself there may be, in your case, no remission.

[1]—[1] The words within brackets are evidently an interpolation.

[2]—[2] The Greek is *τῶν διαιρέσεων*, for which H. Valesius wished to read *τωνδὶ αἱρέσεων* or *τῶνδε αἱρέσεων*. But the deictic pronoun would be here unintelligible. Nor can I understand *καὶ ἄνδρα*. Perhaps Plato wrote *τῶν Ἰταλίᾳ αἱρέσεων ἱκανὸν ἄνδρα*, i. e. "a man sufficiently versed in the Pythagorean doctrines and the sects in Italy." Compare Plutarch De Socratis Genio, ii. p. 579, viii. p. 289, R., *ἄνδρα γενναῖον—μετὰ γενναίας—ἀφιγμένον τῆς προαιρέσεως—ἐξ Ἰταλίας τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν.*

[3] In lieu of *τινα*, which is not sufficiently definite, I should prefer *γύναια*. For amongst the ancients not a few women, such as Aspasia, and Diotima, and others, were given to philosophy; a list of whom has been collected by Menage, and appended to his notes on Diogenes Laertius.

[4] I cannot understand here *εὐδοξῇς*. I could have understood *ἐνδείξῃς*, "you may show—"

With regard to the articles you bade me send you, I have caused to be made the Apollo,[1] which Leptines is bringing, by a young and clever workman. His name is Leochares. There was another work by him, very elegant, as it appeared to me. I therefore purchased it, wishing to present it to your wife; because she had attended me both in health and sickness in a manner worthy of me and you. Present it then to her, unless it seems otherwise good to you. I send you likewise twelve jars of sweet wine for your children, and two of honey. But I came too late for putting up the dried figs; and all the myrtles, that had been put up for you, have rotted. I will however take better care at another time. Leptines will tell you about the plants.

The money in silver for these things[2] and for the contributions of some persons to the state I have received from Leptines; and told him, what appears to me to be the most becoming and true to state, that, what I had expended on the Leucadian vessel, amounting to nearly eleven minæ, was mine. This therefore I have taken; [3]and after taking, I have made use of it myself, and I have sent away these to you.[3] As to what follows with regard to the money, hear how the case stands. I shall make use of your money, as I told you then in the same way as I do that of my other acquaintances; but I use it in as small quantities as possible; (for)[4] such things as seem to be necessary or just or becoming to myself or to the person, from whom I may receive it. Now something of this kind has happened to me. Of my nieces, who died at the period, when I was not crowned, although you had ordered it, there are four daughters living; one is of a marriageable age; another eighteen years old; another a little more than

[1] The statue of Apollo, here alluded to, is, I suspect, the one still existing under the name of the "Apollo Belvidere."

[2] The Greek is *εἰς ταῦτα ἕνεκα τε τούτων καὶ εἰσφορῶν*. But *ἕνεκα τούτων* is superfluous after *εἰς ταῦτα*. Plato, I suspect, wrote, what I have translated, *εἰς ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εἰσφορῶν τινῶν*.

[3]—[3] I confess I cannot understand *καὶ λαβὼν αὐτός τε ἐχρησάμην καὶ ὑμῖν ταῦτ' ἀπέπεμψα*. The sense evidently required is *καὶ τἄλλα λαβὼν οὕτως ἐχρησάμην καὶ ὑμῖν τὰ λοιπ' ἔπεμψα*, i. e. "and having taken the rest of the money, I have employed it in this way, and have sent you the remainder."

[4] In lieu of *ὅσα*, correct Greek requires *εἰς ὅσα*— On this use of *εἰς*, see Aristoph. Plut. 983, *δράχμας—εἴκοσιν Εἰς ἱμάτιον· ὀκτὼ δ' ἂν εἰς ὑποδήματα*.

three years old; and another not yet one year old. All these it will be for myself and friends[1] to give out in marriage, should I survive them; but let those, whom I do not survive, [2]fare as they may;[2] while for those, whose fathers may become richer than myself, I shall not have to provide. At present however my means are greater than theirs. For the marriage of their mothers likewise I have provided with the aid of others and of Dion. One of them is married to Speusippus, of whose sister she is the daughter. For this one there is need of not more than thirty minæ; since the marriage portions given by myself are moderate. Moreover should my mother die, there would be need of not more than ten minæ for erecting her tomb. Such are the sums requisite at present for what are almost necessaries. But should any other expense occur, of a private or public nature, through my coming to you, it will be requisite, as I stated then, for me to labour[3] and to make a vigorous effort for the expenditure to be the least possible; but where I am unable (to do aught), for the expense to be yours. [4]What I mean after this touching the expenditure on the other hand[5] of your money at Athens,[6] is in the first place this;[6] that should it be needful for me to expend any thing on a choregy,[7] or any office of that kind, there is no friend[8] of yours here, who will advance it for you, as I imagine; since even if it made a great difference to you, that a sum would, if expended, be a benefit to you, but an injury, if it were not expended and delayed, until some one should arrive from yourself, such a circumstance would turn out[9] disgraceful in addition to its being detrimental. For of this I have a proof by having sent Erastus to Andromēdes of Ægina; from whom, as being your

[1] Amongst these was probably Dion, who, as we learn from Diogenes Laertius iii. 3, furnished the means to enable Plato to undertake a choregy at Athens.

[2]—[2] In Greek *χαῖρε* is used in a good sense; but *χαιρέτω* in a bad one; just as in Latin "vale," and "valeas."

[3] I have translated as if the Greek were *πονεῖν*, not *ποιεῖν*.

[4]—[5] The Greek is *τὸ δὴ μέτα ταῦτα λέγω—περὶ τῶν σῶν αὖ χρημάτων*—where I cannot understand *μετὰ ταῦτα*, and still less *αὖ*—

[6]—[6] I have translated as if the Greek were *ἔστι τοῦτο πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐὰν*—not *ὅτι πρῶτον*—

[7] On the choregy and all the matters connected with it, see Donaldson's Theatre of the Greeks.

[8] Literally "a friend connected by ties of hospitality."

[9] The sense requires *ἔσται*, what I have translated, not *ἐστὶ*—

friend, you ordered me to get, what I wanted, as you wished him to send even more than you had stated by letter. But he said, what was reasonable and as any person would do, that he had previously laid out money for your father, and had with difficulty got it back again; and that he would now advance a small sum, but nothing more. Thus I received a something from Leptines; and for this it is proper to praise Leptines, not only for having advanced the money, but for doing so readily; and he was in other respects, by speaking of you, and performing what he could, evidently a friend to your interests. For it is meet, respecting such matters and the contrary, for me to tell you in what light each person has appeared to me as regards yourself. On the subject of money, at least, I shall speak with freedom; for it is just; and at the same time I shall be speaking about persons near you, of whom I have some experience; who, after [1] previously stating on each occasion what they think they shall expend for you, do not subsequently mention [1] the subject, as if forsooth they should be disagreeable to you. Do you then accustom them and even compel them to speak upon these points and others too. For you ought to know the whole, as far as you can, and to be a judge, and not to fly from knowing. For this will be the best for your government. For, as regards other things, and the possession itself of money, [2] you too have said, and will say, that it is good to know,[2] that the expenditure is made correctly and correctly accounted for. Let not then those, who profess to care for you, bring a reproach upon yourself in the eyes of mankind. For this appears to be neither good nor fair to your reputation, [3] in the case of your agreements.[3]

[1]—[1] The Greek is οἱ προσαγγέλλοντες——εἰσαγγέλλειν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι προσαγγέλλειν. But προσαγγέλλειν could not be thus repeated; nor, if it could, would εἰσαγγέλλειν be thus introduced between the repeated verb. Stephens' version, for the whole epistle is wanting in Ficinus, is "Qui tibi assidue pollicentur se de iis sumptibus, quos faciendos arbitrantur, te admonituros, admonere tamen nolunt—" which has led me to suggest that εἰσαγγέλλειν is a corruption for εἰς τὰ σὰ ἂν τελεῖν—For τελεῖν is thus perpetually used in the sense "of paying," as shown by Ast in "Lexicon Platonicum;" while to preserve the balance of the sentence, we must read προαγγέλλοντες as opposed to προσαγγέλλειν: and so I have translated.

[2]—[2] Instead of καὶ σὺ δὴ φῂς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φήσεις, which I cannot understand, the sense evidently requires καὶ σύ γ' ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι καὶ φήσεις—

[3]—[3] In lieu of δοκεῖ ξύμβολον, three MSS. read δοκεῖ αἷς ξύμβολον, four

In what follows I shall speak of Dion. Upon other points I am not able to speak, before the letters, which[1] you have mentioned. arrive from yourself. But upon those, which you did not permit me to mention to him, I have mentioned nothing, nor conversed at all. I have merely tried whether he bears ill or easily [2]what is reported; and it seems to me that he will not brook it quietly, if it should turn out a fact.[2] But in other respects Dion appears to me to use moderation both in word and deed.

Let us present to Cratinus, the brother of Timotheus, and my friend, a breastplate of the handsome kind worn by the heavy-armed foot soldiers, and to the daughters of Cebes three outer-dresses, seven cubits long, not, however, of the expensive kind from Amorgus,[3] but of Sicilian linen.[4] With the name of Cebes you are duly acquainted; for he is mentioned in the Socratic dialogues, as holding, together with Simmias, a conversation with Socrates [in the dialogue][5] respecting the soul, and as a man of the same clique with, and well disposed to, all of us.

Of the symbol relating to my letters, I think you have a recollection touching such as I write with care and such as I do not; nevertheless, reflect upon it, and bear it in mind. For many persons insist upon my writing, whom it is not easy to put off. The more important letter a god commences, but the less, gods.[6]

δοκεῖν αἷς ξύμβολον, and two *δοκεῖ ξύμβουλον*. Hence it is easy to elicit *δοκεῖ εἰς ξυμβόλαια*, as I have translated.

[1] The Greek is *ὥσπερ ἔφης*—Stephens' version is, "quas dicis," as if he wished to read *ἅσπερ ἔφης*.

[2]—[2] I cannot understand *οἴσει γιγνομένων—εἰ γίγνοιτο*. I have translated as if the Greek were *οἴσει τὸ λεγόμενον*, which is at least intelligible.

[3] Amorgus, one of the Cyclades, was famous for its fine flax or cotton, as we learn from the Greek Lexicographers quoted by Berkelius on Steph. Byz. *Ἄμοργος*.

[4] This allusion to the flax of Sicily is rather strange. For that island was celebrated rather for its wool; unless it be said that Plato wrote *ληνέων*, not *λινῶν*. For Hesych. has *Λήνει· ἐρίῳ*, from Æsch. Eum. 44.

[5] The Greek is *ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ*. But *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ* could not be thus repeated after *ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατείοις λόγοις*.

[6] Had Plato meant to say, as Bentley supposed, that the more important letters were indicated by the words *σὺν θεῷ*, and the less by *σὺν θεοῖς*, some reason would have been given, I think, for this change of number. Hence in lieu of *θεοὶ*, I would read *θεά*. For by the masculine *θεὸς* was

The ambassadors likewise have requested me to write, as was natural. For they very heartily praise both you and me every where; and not the least Philagrus, who at that time,[1] had something the matter with his hand; and Philaides, who has come from the great king,[2] has spoken about you; and if I had not had matter for a long letter, I would have written down what he said; but at present inquire of Leptines.

Should you send the breastplate or any thing else, about which I have written, intrust them to any you wish; or otherwise to Terillus.[3] He is one of those, who is continually sailing (to and fro), and is attached to myself, and upon other subjects, and those too relating to philosophy, is a person of elegant mind, and is a relation of Tison,[4] who was, at the time when I sailed away, the prefect of the city.[5]

May you increase in health and philosophy, and convert others, who are younger, to it; and embrace for me all our fellow-sphærists,[6] and enjoin the others and Aristocritus,

meant the superior power of mind; but by the feminine θεὰ, the inferior power of matter.

[1] Here, as elsewhere in this letter, by τότε, "at that time," is intended the last sojourn of Plato in Sicily; unless it be said that τότε is sometimes put for ποτε, an idea first promulgated by Markland on Eurip. Suppl. 551, Iph. A. 46, and adopted by Brunck on Aristoph. Thesm. 13, Plut. 1117, Soph. El. 278, and Schæfer in Julian. Præf. p. iv.

[2] By "the great king," is meant the king of Persia.

[3] Although Τηρίλλῳ might perhaps stand here, yet the word was probably Πηριλλῳ, the name of the Sicilian machinist, who invented the brazen bull for Phalaris.

[4] The person here called Τίσων is, I suspect, the same as Τισίας, mentioned in Epist. 7.

[5] Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 681, refers to Mazochi Tabul. Heracleens. p. 205, where the verb πολιανομεῖν is found. It would seem that at Syracuse there was an officer called Πολιανόμος, similar probably to the "Prætor Urbanus" at Rome, the "Mayor" in borough towns in England, the "Préfet" in France, and the "Burgomaster" in Holland.

[6] So I have translated συσφαιριστὰς, in allusion to the little sphere mentioned in Epist. 2, about which there had probably been a meeting of Syracusan "Savans," forming an astronomical and geographical society; for it appears that Eudoxus, whose disciple was the Helicon, mentioned above, was the first to introduce the knowledge of the sphere, which he had acquired in Egypt, to the Greeks. But as the latitude of Syracuse was not the same as of Alexandria, one can easily understand, why the sphere did not answer so well its purpose at one place, as it did at the other. For this idea I am partly indebted to Scaliger's note on Manilius, p. 155. 6, ed. 1579. Ast, with Stephens, translates "in pilæ ludo collusores."

should any message or letter arrive, relating[1] to you, that they take care you know of it as quickly as possible, and that they put you in mind of it, in order that you may attend to the matter mentioned in the letters. And for the present do you not neglect the repayment of the money to Leptines, but repay it as quickly as possible, so that others, looking to him, may be the more ready to minister to myself.

Iatrocles, who at that time was, together with Myronides, dismissed as a freed-man by myself, sails now with the things sent by me; keep him in your pay, as being well disposed towards you, and make use of him in any way you please, [2]and know yourself either the letter itself, or if a memorandum of it is preserved.[2]

[1] I have translated, as if the Greek were, what the sense requires, *περὶ σὲ*, not, as at present, *παρὰ σὲ*—

[2]—[2] The words between the numerals I cannot understand. Stephens's version is "et epistolam aut ipsam, aut, si ipsius exemplar servatur, tute cognosce." But *ὑπόμνημα* is not the Greek for "exemplar," but for "commentarius." The Greek is *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἤ, εἰ ὑπόμνημα αὐτῆς σώζεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἴσθι.* One MS. however has *ἃ αὐτὴν*: two omit *εἰ*: one reads *αὐτοῖς* for *αὐτῆς*, and one *καὶ ὁ αὐτός*: all which are proofs of some deep-seated disorder here. The sense seems to have been originally something to this effect, "and acquaint yourself with the letter from itself, or, if it be not preserved, from the memorandum of the person who has heard it"—in Greek, *καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἢ αὐτὴν ἤ, εἰ μὴ σώζεται, διὰ τὸ ὑπόμνημα αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀκηκοότος ἴσθι.* So in Euripides, Iphigenia is represented as telling the contents of the letter she is putting into the hands of Pylades; for to use her own words in v. 744, *ἢν μὲν ἐκσώσῃς γραφήν, Αὐτὴ φράσει σιγῶσα τἀπεσταλμένα· Ἢν δ' ἐν θαλάσσῃ γράμματ' ἀφανισθῇ τάδε, Τὸ σῶμα σώσας, τοὺς λόγους σώσεις ἐμοί.* i. e.

> "If you preserve the writing, 'twill itself
> The matter of the missive silent tell;
> But if by the sea the writing disappears,
> Saving your body, you will save my words."

As the foregoing Epistle was considered by Serranus to be spurious, Stephens was led to defend it by observing that it was referred to by Plutarch in T. ii. p. 533, B., and Theodoret, p. 27, ed. Sylb. So too when Collins had in his "Discourse on Free Thinking" reiterated the opinion expressed by Cudworth in his Intellectual System, p. 403, ed. 1678, of the Epistle being spurious, Bentley in his Remarks, p. 411, ed. Dyce, observed that the internal character of the letter exhibits all the marks of genuineness; for it is not a mere mass of common-place, such as the letters forged by Sophists generally are, but one of business, and with the circumstantial account of persons and things, suited to the writer and the times in which he lived; as in the passage, where allusion is made

to an Apollo, sculptured by Leochares, who, as we learn from Pliny, H. N. xxxv. 2, and Pausanias, i. 1 and 3, v. 20, became a celebrated artist, subsequent to the period when he was spoken of by Plato as a young man; and that the letter is quoted by Eusebius in Præp. Evang. x. 13, p. 530. From these remarks of Bentley Fabricius was probably led to say that he could discover no proofs of spuriousness, when his opinion was asked by P. Wesseling; who, in his "Epistola ad Venemam," p. 36, has produced fresh testimony in its favour by appealing to Plutarch in Dion, T. i. p. 966, E., and ii. p. 474, D., where Plato is referred to. He conceives, however, that two Epistles have been moulded into one; and that the first ended just before the mention of Leptines, bringing with him the Apollo of Leochares; for Plutarch, in ii. p. 533, speaks of the words quoted from the Epistle, as being towards the close of it. And so far is Wesseling from believing the Epistle to be not genuine, that he calculates it was written about Ol. ciii. 4.

Despite, however, the proofs thus brought forward by Stephens, Bentley, and Wesseling, with whom Wyttenbach on Phædon, p. 108, agrees, Meiners has, in Commentat. Societat. Reg. Gottingen, A. D. 1783, endeavoured to show its spuriousness by arguments to which Tennemann has replied in his "Lehren und Meinungen der Sokratiker über Unsterblichkeit," Iena, 1791, as I learn from Harless on Fabricius Biblioth. Gr. T. iii. p. 106. On the other hand Taylor, in a note on the 12th Epistle, says that he has omitted the 13th as being not genuine, from the allusion there made to the difference between one and many gods—an argument to which I have replied by supposing the existence of a corruption, antecedent even to the time of Eusebius.

END OF VOL. IV.

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